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Abstract 
Fraud has become a worldwide problem that is not set to abate in the near future. It is 
eroding the profitability of organisations with devastating effects on firm solvency. This 
research aims to contribute to the knowledge and understanding of fraud in Kenya’s 
financial institutions and focuses on the Kenyan banking industry, which includes forty 
three commercial banks of local, national, regional and international standing. The 
research conducted uses a theoretical framework based on the Fraud Triangle to analyse 
the incidence of fraud and the motivations of fraudsters. The research uses a sample of 
audit, fraud, security and other managers involved in fraud fighting from thirty banks 
across the industry to conduct a mixed qualitative and quantitative study based on a 
survey of sixty respondents and seventeen semi-structured interviews. The research found 
that fraud is considered to be a major problem within the Kenyan banking industry, 
although the relative size of frauds conducted was relatively small and unsophisticated. 
Fraud detection and prevention methods used in the industry were standard and no 
different from global standards. The fraud triangle worked effectively to predict the 
patterns of fraud described by respondents. However from this study it is argued that the 
Fraud Triangle is not as effective in explaining the collusive and predatory nature of the 
Kenyan bank fraudster. Internal and external factors involved in fraud in Kenya are also 
identified, including weak industry co-operation, inadequately trained police and 
prosecutors, ineffective justice systems, weak government regulatory frameworks, low or 
non-existent fraud budgets for detecting and preventing fraud, among others. 
International banks were ahead of local, national and regional banks in efforts to establish 
industry co-operation; availability of capital, human, technological and other resources; 
dedicated fraud departments and budgets. Unlike previous research and theories that have 
mainly focused on either the individual or environmental factors, this research suggests 
an integrated theoretical and conceptual approach to fraud. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
The world banking industry is integrated in ways that would have been unimaginable 
three decades ago, due to the process of globalization. Globalization, or the process of 
expanding and integrating markets, regulatory frameworks, and international institutions 
from country to country in order to create a more integrated world governance and 
economic framework, has of course been a process that has reached back into antiquity 
(Busch, 2009). The rapidly expanding pace of globalization, driven by factors such as 
establishment of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and subsequent lowering of 
market and competition barriers, has led to increased capital mobility and increased 
ability of financial services agencies to meet the needs of individuals and companies 
around the world (Busch, 2009).  
 
However, the increasing rate of globalization, combined with the expansion of 
technology and other factors, has also increased the rate of fraud and new fraud activities 
(Zagaris, 2010). These new fraud opportunities can often be extremely difficult to detect 
due to their technological sophistication; thus, banks can spend considerable resources 
attempting to identify frauds and combat them (Kranacher, Riley & Wells, 2010). Banks 
face challenges in identifying fraud and preventing fraud and these difficulties can often 
be exacerbated by the political, regulatory, and institutional frameworks that are in place. 
However, even in the case of significant regulatory support, the regulatory framework of 
a given country cannot be expected to stop or even necessarily significantly reduce the 
incidence of fraud in the banking industry (Hoffman, 2002). This research focuses on the 
occurrence of fraud in the Kenyan banking industry.  
 
1.1  Background of the Problem  
The Kenyan banking industry is regulated by the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK), which 
manages bank supervision and monetary policy in line with key economic objectives 
within Kenya (Central Bank of Kenya, 2011). The Central Bank of Kenya was 
established following independence in 1966, and was re-established in 1997 with a higher 
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level of autonomy to set monetary and fiscal policy; however, the bank is not as yet fully 
independent. The bank’s core mandate for supervision includes review and revision of 
laws and policies related to banking as well as licensing and oversight of financial 
services and banking agencies operating within Kenya, including commercial and retail 
banks, microfinance agencies, mortgage agencies, insurance companies, and other 
companies (Bank Supervision Report, 2008). As of Dec 2010 the total number of banks 
registered in Kenya included 43 commercial banks, 126 foreign exchange bureaus, two 
representative offices of foreign banks, two microfinance institutions, and one mortgage 
finance company (Bank Supervision Report, 2010).  
 
In terms of performance, the Kenyan banking system is currently doing very well 
compared to other regional banking sector industries. The aggregate balance sheet for the 
banking sector increased by 23.4% over 2010 (Central Bank, 2010c), representing a total 
growth of 320.8 billion Kenyan shillings (KES). 19.9% of this growth represented loans 
and advances, and there was also an increase in the bank’s deposit base of 19.8% (a total 
growth of KES 210.6 billion) (Central Bank of Kenya, 2010c). Total capital available 
increased by 20.8% over the course of the year, while non-performing loans fell by 5.7% 
(or a total of KES 3.5 billion). The banking sector’s highest growth was reflected in 
profitability, with banks registering an increase of 48.3% in pre-tax profits during 2010 
(Central Bank of Kenya, 2010c). Overall, this represents a strong growth in the banking 
industry, largely driven by increasing lending and decreasing poorly performing loans as 
well as an increase in bank operational efficiency (Central Bank of Kenya, 2010c). 
 
Fraud in the banking industry is not formally tracked by the Central Bank, and thus there 
is no information regarding how this affects bank profitability and operational capacity. 
Although fraud is one of the focuses of the Kenya Bankers Association (KBA), 
information is still only thinly available.  This research seeks to fill that gap by examining 
fraud in the Kenyan banking industry and identifying ways in which the industry could 
improve its fraud handling.  
 
3 
 
1.2 Aim of the Research 
The aim of this study is to determine the nature and characteristics of fraud in the banking 
sector in Kenya and assess how the banking industry prevents and manages fraud, and to 
assess external conditions that affect the outcomes of the banking sectors’ efforts to 
combat fraud.  
 
 
1.3 Research Questions 
Specific research questions have also been established to accomplish the research 
objectives. The four research questions that are addressed include:  
1. What are the characteristics of fraud in the Kenyan banking industry? This 
research question is explored using quantitative research (Chapter 5).  
2. What are the perceived characteristics of those that perpetrate fraud in the Kenyan 
banking industry? This research question is also addressed by quantitative 
research (Chapter 5)  
3. How do banks approach fraud management? This question is answered through a 
combination of quantitative survey and qualitative interviews (Chapters 5 and 6)   
4. Are there differences between the approaches to fraud management adopted by 
Kenyan and international banks? This research question was addressed by 
comparing findings in the qualitative and quantitative research from Kenyan and 
international banks, in order to identify similarities and differences in response, 
as well as literature review-based analysis.  
 
1.4 Scope of the Research 
The scope of this research is limited by industry participation, time, and geography. This 
scope was defined in order to provide a discrete subject for comparison and to determine 
the boundaries of what would and would not be discussed.  
 
The financial services sector includes commercial and retail banks, insurance providers, 
investment management firms, and other firms that provide services dealing with the flow 
of money. The choice has been made in this research to limit participation to commercial 
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and retail banks only, because of the complexity of defining an amorphous financial 
services industry as compared to a discrete banking industry.  
 
The second limitation is geographical classification. For the purpose of this discussion, 
local banks are those banks who are headquartered in Kenya and whose main operations 
occur throughout Kenya. National banks are those that have operations in Kenya but in 
which the government has substantial participation in. Regional banks are banks that have 
operations in Kenya in addition to operations in another country in East and Central 
Africa (Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, Sudan etc.) and/or any other 
African country. International banks are banks that have worldwide operations across the 
continents. The choice has also been made to constrain the sample to include only banks 
that are licensed to operate inside Kenya. 
 
Finally, there is a temporal limitation of the scope of this research. The history of the 
Kenyan financial industry is rich, and there is considerable scope for historical discussion 
of its formation, regulation, changes, and status. However, the current context of fraud in 
the banking industry includes elements that have not been consistently present, including 
the use of information technology. There are also problems with collection of reliable 
historical data in areas such as fraud, where the majority of fraud goes undetected (Wells, 
2004). Given this, the temporal scope of this research is constrained to only include 
commercial and retail banks that are licensed in Kenya at the time of the research. This 
does introduce some degree of survivorship bias; however, given availability of 
information there was no way to avoid this bias. 
 
1.5 Rationale for the Research 
As stated by Bologna and Lindquist (1995), fraud is no simple vice. Over the past few 
years fraud has grown both in size and complexity. The costs of fraud are increasing 
worldwide. Studies in the UK and the USA indicate that the loss due to fraud continues to 
increase every year (KPMG, 2008; ACFE, 2004; ACFE, 2008). In Kenya details of fraud 
losses are not readily available. However, the KPMG (2005) report on the African Fraud 
and Misconduct survey indicates that fraud is a major concern among African companies 
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and employees are the main perpetrators. Six per cent of the African Fraud and 
Misconduct survey respondents said they had lost US$170,000 or more to fraud in the 
year 2001, and most respondents said poor internal controls, theft and corruption were the 
main causes of fraud (KPMG, 2005). 
The lack of knowledge regarding fraud is likely to become an issue for development in 
the near future. Sub-Saharan Africa is rapidly becoming a target for increasing foreign 
direct investment (FDI), particularly from countries such as China and India which have 
begun to operate significant international investments in Africa (Broadman & Isik, 2007). 
This expansion includes Kenya, which has been a target for FDI in areas such as energy 
generation as well as others (Broadman & Isik, 2007). Given this, the current research 
and its goal of providing information about the nature of fraud inherent in the Kenyan 
banking industry, as well as discussion of what the industry is doing to combat issues of 
fraud, will provide valuable information for international firms considering involvement 
in Kenya. This research can provide insights on how to improve Kenya’s access to 
international investment funds.  
1.6 Significance of the Research 
The present research has significance for theory as well as for empirical application in the 
areas of business and policymaking. Theoretically, the application of well known theories 
of fraud, such as the Fraud Triangle (Cressey, 1973; Wells, 2004) to the Kenyan context 
will provide more information regarding whether these theories can be considered to be 
universal or whether they are contingent on cultural constructions. The Fraud Triangle 
Theory hypothesizes that fraud is likely to occur when an individual is faced with 
pressure from a non-shareable problem, an opportunity to commit the crime and a 
rationalization to justify the fraudulent act. The research can also be expected to debunk 
some of the claims that are made in the academic literature regarding the experience of 
fraud in the African context and its meaning. Given the application of existing theories as 
well as the addition of more information from the research regarding the Kenyan banking 
industry, this can be considered to be important research from this viewpoint.  
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There are also significant practical applications of this research. The Kenyan banking 
industry can use the information gained from this research to modify its practices in order 
to better combat fraud, as well as to identify areas that are working well. Comparison to 
international firms can also provide information regarding practices that may be effective 
for the Kenyan banking industry. Investors are major users of this information in a 
pragmatic fashion. One of the major factors in foreign investment is financial risk, or the 
risk involved in dealing with the financial systems of a given country (Broadman & Isik, 
2007). However, some degree of financial risk is inherent in almost all financial systems. 
Understanding the degree of risk and the specific issues that will need to be overcome 
will be extremely important for investors to make an informed decision. Finally, there is 
expected to be significant information derived from this research that can be applied by 
Kenyan regulators and policymakers. Legal, regulatory and law enforcement institutions 
are a major source of support for fraud prevention initiatives, but they can also hamper 
fraud prevention initiatives if they are not formed or applied correctly. By highlighting 
the problems that banks experience within the Kenyan banking system, this research will 
provide information for regulators on how regulations and institutions can be improved in 
order to reduce the impact of fraud on the Kenyan economy. It will also inform the law 
enforcement and judicial systems about the nature and characteristics of fraud and how to 
best assist in fraud prevention, detection, investigation and deterrence. Given the paucity 
of academic research from local Kenyan writers this study will be useful to academics, 
professionals and students of business in Kenya.  
 
1.7 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis research was conducted in two parts, a quantitative survey completed by bank 
representatives who are knowledgeable about issues of fraud in their banks and in the 
industry. Qualitative interviews were conducted with bank managers who also work in 
areas or departments that handle fraud issues. The structure of the thesis is presented as 
follows. 
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Chapter One contains an introduction to this study. It lays out the background of the 
study and the aims, objectives and research questions of the research at hand. This 
chapter also introduces the scope, rationale and significance of this study.  
 
In Chapter Two the literature on fraud, fraud theories, the external and internal 
environments that affect fraud levels, the banking environment in Africa  and other 
related aspects of fraud such as responses to fraud and local and international banking 
issues are reviewed so as to provide an understanding of the nature of fraud and the 
context within which fraud occurs. This includes discussion of theories of fraud and its 
determinants, as well as empirical literature that provide evidence for potential outcomes 
of the research. This chapter also considers literature support for a few hypotheses the 
tests and results of which are discussed later in Chapter 5.  
 
Chapter Three, on Contextualizing Kenya’s Banking Industry, provides historical, 
regulatory, legal, political, and economic and market information about Kenya’s banking 
industry and its structure, expanding the information that is offered in the Background 
within this chapter (Section 1.2). This chapter also presents the conceptual framework for 
the study.  
 
In Chapter Four, the Research Methodology chapter describes the mixed methods 
approach that was considered appropriate in conducting the primary research of this 
study.  This chapter discusses the research philosophy as well as the practical 
considerations that were relevant to the research.  
Chapter Five, the Quantitative Study – Results and Analysis, presents the results of the 
quantitative survey that is conducted covering a total of 60 respondents from 35 banks. 
Discussion of the quantitative survey is primarily descriptive and exploratory in nature. 
However, a few hypotheses are formulated in order to shed further light on possible 
relationships existing in regard to prosecution outcomes, use of software protection, fraud 
detection approaches and size of the bank as determinants of the size of loss to fraud. 
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Chapter Six reports the Qualitative Results of the seventeen semi-structured interviews 
conducted. The purpose of this chapter is to determine the common themes emerging 
from the study. The main themes include issues relating to individual perpetrators like 
collusion and internal controls; themes relating to banks and the internal banking industry 
environment such as industry co-operation in information sharing, customer training and 
customer competition, internal controls, fraud budgets and deterrence; and external issues 
such as structural, institutional, ethical, legal and computer based challenges. This chapter 
highlights how the qualitative findings relate to the research questions and the conceptual 
framework. 
 
Chapter Seven mainly discusses the findings detailed in Chapter Six. An integration of 
the qualitative and quantitative findings are discussed in order to triangulate an answer to 
the research questions, and then analysed from the perspective of the literature. The 
themes that emerged from Chapter Six are discussed further in light of the conceptual 
framework capturing the individual perpetrator, internal banking industry environment 
and the broader external environment. 
 
In Chapter Eight, Conclusions and Recommendations, the main issues that emerge from 
the study are discussed. This chapter focuses on the theoretical and practical contributions 
made by this study. A summary of the main findings and arguments based on the research 
questions is given. Contributions made to knowledge, theory and literature as well as 
policy implications and recommendations are addressed in this chapter. Finally this last 
chapter discusses the limitations of the study in terms of its application to other areas of 
study.  
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Chapter 2  
Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
This literature review constructs a theoretical framework regarding banking fraud and 
provides a discussion focused on the research questions. The goal of the literature review 
is multi-fold. First, in Section 2.2 it presents the background information required to 
understand the problem of fraud in the banking industry in a real-world context. It defines 
fraud in the context of this study and outlines the different types of fraud that are the main 
focus of this study. This section also highlights the increasing trend of predicting 
perpetrators of fraud through the art of profiling. Section 2.3 presents the theoretical 
underpinnings of the discussion that will be used for analysis and examination. It 
discusses the main fraud theory used in this study as well as other theories of fraud. The 
discussion about the fraud theories leads into a discussion on the external and internal 
environmental factors that affect the levels of fraud. Various issues regarding local and 
international banking are considered in Section 2.5 while Section 2.6 examines various 
responses to fraud. An overview of the banking environment in Africa is captured in 
Section 2.7 and Section 2.8 presents hypotheses that will be tested later in Chapter 5 
 
2.2 Fraud 
This section considers the definition of fraud and explains the types of fraud in the 
context of this study. 
 
2.2.1 Defining Fraud 
The term “fraud” is difficult to define as its legal definition varies from country to 
country.  For example, in 1888 the U.S. Supreme Court deemed that fraud occurs when a 
defendant knowingly makes representation in regard to a material fact that is false and the 
complainant acts on this representation reasonably believing it to be true. In the UK, the 
Fraud Act (2006) defines fraud as being committed in three ways; by false representation, 
by failing to disclose information, and by abuse of position. Meanwhile as observed by 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the United States fraud is an illegal act 
10 
 
which is characterized by deceit, concealment, or violation of trust and which does not 
necessarily depend upon the application or threat of physical force or violence. The FBI 
definition of fraud can be narrowed down to lying, stealing and cheating (Silverstone et 
al., 2012) which resonate with today’s fraud schemes in banks that are technically 
sophisticated. These definitions show the varying views about what constitutes fraud. 
 
Individuals and organisations commit fraud acts to obtain money, property, or services; to 
avoid the payment or loss of money or services; or to secure personal or business 
advantage (Silverstone and Sheetz, 2004). Fraud therefore covers criminal offences that 
involve the use of deception for personal gain at the detriment or loss of another person.  
It includes activities such as deception, theft, bribery, corruption, forgery, embezzlement, 
misappropriation, conspiracy, collusion, money laundering, extortion and concealment of 
material facts (Chartered Institute of Management Accountants, 2008; Theft Act, 1978; 
Fraud Act, 2006).  
 
For this study, bank fraud therefore involves the fraudulent use of one’s position within 
or outside of the bank for personal enrichment by deliberately misusing or 
misappropriating the bank’s financial resources, assets or other properties held by the 
bank and obtaining funds from bank customers (depositors) through fraudulent 
representation.  
 
Fraud can be classified into three primary groups: fraud that has been exposed and is 
publicly known; fraud that has been discovered by organisations but not made public yet; 
and fraud that has not been detected (Silverstone and Davia, 2005). Only around 20% of 
fraud belongs in the group of exposed fraud. Reasons advanced for this are: most fraud is 
discovered accidentally; independent auditors do not proactively audit to detect fraud; 
entities without internal staff cannot audit to detect fraud proactively; most internal 
auditors do not have adequate training or experience to detect fraud proactively; and most 
internal controls are inadequate to prevent fraud (Silverstone and Davia, 2005; Wells, 
2004; Albrecht, 2004).  
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Figure 2.1 – Categorizing fraud 
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As shown in Figure 2.1 this study will mainly focus on detected fraud that has been 
publically exposed in the banking industry. However, due to the methods used in this 
research it is possible that there may be some evidence of fraud that has not yet been 
brought out in the public domain. Of the fraud that is publically exposed some is 
committed by insiders (i.e. managerial and non-managerial employees) while others are 
committed by outsiders such as customers, suppliers, agents, organised criminals, 
opportunists, and predators to mention a few.  
 
Elliot and Willingham (1980) categorised fraud into management fraud and employee 
fraud. Management fraud is committed by managerial employees and consists of, but is 
not limited to: Financial Statement fraud, misrepresentation of material facts, 
misappropriation of assets, concealment of material facts, illegal acts, bribery, corruption 
and conflict of interest. Silverstone and Sheetz (2004) add that management fraud 
involves the manipulation of earnings reported in the financial statements prepared for 
shareholders and creditors. This type of fraud affects stock prices, management bonuses, 
availability and terms of debt financing.  
 
On the other hand employee fraud, committed by non-managerial employees, consists of, 
but is not limited to: embezzlement, breach of fiduciary duties and theft of trade secrets 
of intellectual property (Elliot and Willingham, 1980). Additional items like pilferage, 
petty theft, false overtime claims, sick leave abuse, and use of company assets for their 
own benefit can also be viewed as fraud on the part of the employee, without forgetting 
bribery and corruption.  
 
Insider fraud can also take on the definition advanced by the Association of Certified 
Fraud Examiners (ACFE, 2008, p.5) for occupational fraud that considers fraud to be “the 
use of one’s occupation for personal enrichment through the deliberate misuse or 
misapplication of the employing organisation’s resources or assets.” The Association of 
Certified Fraud Examiners (2008) Report to the Nation (U.S.A) states that asset 
misappropriation, corruption and fraudulent financial statements form the three broad 
categories of occupational fraud. According to the ACFE (2006), asset misappropriation 
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in the U.S.A accounts for 80% of occupational fraud cases, corruption accounts for 13% 
while fraudulent financial statements account for 7% of the fraud cases. Though asset 
misappropriation was the most frequent occupational fraud committed, the losses on 
average were the lowest compared to the average losses due to corruption and fraudulent 
financial statements (ACFE, 2006). 
 
In addition to management and employee fraud, there is customer fraud, such as false 
claim applications and fraudulent claims and the submission of false financial 
information on bank loan applications. 
 
While the various actors (managerial, non-managerial employees, customers and other 
outsiders) are portrayed separately in Figure 2.1 they often work together in committing 
fraud through collusion as shown in Figure 2.2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 – Collusion among perpetrators 
Managerial 
Employees 
Others – suppliers, 
criminals etc. 
Customers Non-managerial 
employees 
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There are different combinations of possible collusion such as collusion within, between 
a manager and junior staff member; collusion externally, between customers and 
organized criminal groups or customers with agents or suppliers; and boundary spanning, 
collusion where an internal employee or manager works together with an external 
fraudster that may have particular skills to defraud the bank. 
 
 
2.2.2 Types of Fraud 
As explained in Section 2.2.1 above two distinct types of banking fraud can be identified. 
This section further discusses these two types of fraud in the bank. The first type of fraud 
is insider fraud, which is perpetrated by a member of the bank’s staff or, but not endemic 
to the bank’s control systems (Greenbaum & Thakor, 2007). This type of fraud may be 
typified at its extreme by the actions of Jerome Kerviel, the rogue trader that allegedly 
lost €4.9 billion in bad trading at the Société Générale investment bank in 2008 (Weiss, 
2008). This type of fraud may also involve interaction with outside individuals, such as 
customers or other firms, who offer an incentive to the employee (such as a bribe or 
kickback) to facilitate the fraud (Mishkin, 2006). Control fraud is a type of insider fraud, 
but is executed at the highest levels of the company, with the company itself designed to 
hide and facilitate the fraudulent activities. It involves subversion of the corporate culture 
and control systems of the bank in order to perpetrate systemic fraud (Black, 2005b). This 
is the type of fraud that was perpetrated in many cases in the United States Savings and 
Loans (S&L) scandals of the 1980s (Black, 2005b). Finally, customers, suppliers, 
organised criminals and even ex-employees may perpetrate external fraud on the bank. 
This type of fraud is outsider fraud and it can result either from theft of personal data of 
legitimate customers of the bank or falsification of personal data in order to increase the 
likelihood of loans being made to customers that would not otherwise qualify (Mishkin, 
2006).  
 
2.2.2.1 Insider Fraud  
The most important type of banking fraud is undoubtedly insider fraud, due to its 
prevalence and difficulty in detection and prevention. Research has indicated without 
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doubt that corruption of bank officials is a significant problem worldwide, according to 
analysis of the World Business Environment Survey (Beck et al., 2006). Insider fraud 
may be particularly expensive due to agency problems. Research indicates that the cost of 
exposed insider fraud is far more significant in terms of abnormal negative returns to 
shareholders than it is in terms of fines, fees and other losses assigned to the firm itself 
(Cloninger & Waller, 2000).  
 
Insider fraud in the organisation can include many forms, including “embezzlement, 
insider trading, self-dealing, lying about facts, failing to disclose facts, corruption… 
cover-ups… [and] intentional misrepresentations in financial statements” (Zahra et al., 
2007, p. 122). In banks it can also include the falsifying of loan documents, disclosure of 
bank or customer information which may result in fraudulent activity, theft of cash or 
cheques, misuse of bank assets and/or of one’s position, identity theft, and electronic theft 
among others. 
 
Insider fraud can also range from small acts (such as a small amount of embezzlement or 
falsification of a single document) to systemic internal fraud that affects all elements of 
the organisation. Although the most obvious reason to commit insider fraud is greed or 
demand for increased earnings, there are also a number of other reasons. Zahra et al. 
(2007) indicate that fraud committed within corporations is usually contrary to the usual 
assumption of societal pressures for consumption, as many if not most of the actors are 
paid well enough to meet their personal and societal-induced demands for consumption. 
Factors such as industry culture, investment horizons and payback periods, industry 
concentration, and environmental factors are likely to influence internal fraud. Top 
management overlooking or even encouraging fraudulent activities by others are often 
common (Razaee, 2005; Summers & Sweeney, 1998). Insider issues include board 
composition and responsibility for CEO accountability, management, attitudes and 
actions of the top management, and corporate culture traits such as emphasis on honesty 
(or in contrast creation of a culture of dishonesty) (Beasley, 1996; Crutchley et al., 2007; 
Dunn, 2004; Rezaee, 2005). One particular problem may be in cases where top 
management is very charismatic or connected, which can increase the tendency of the 
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organisation to follow the lead regarding corrupt practices (Zahra et al., 2007). Insider 
trading is commonly seen in cases where there is inappropriate screening or checking or 
family members or friends of those in the corporation (Brody, 2010).  Brody (2010) 
argues that background checks alone are just one aspect of the employee selection and 
recruitment process and organisations also need to consider measures such as honesty and 
integrity testing. Insider trading charges are more common in business than investment 
activities, as these individuals may have more access to information and may be more 
likely to share it (Szockyj & Geis, 2002).  
 
Although less common than ‘garden-variety’ insider fraud, control fraud is undoubtedly 
the most devastating type of insider fraud. Control frauds are crimes initiated by the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) or topmost managers of the organization. Control fraud, or 
modification of the internal systems that would otherwise detect fraud, was at the heart of 
the 1980s US Savings and Loan scandal (Black, 2005b). Control fraud is often driven by 
a motivation of “gambling for resurrection” (Pontell, 2005, p. 756), or attempting to 
mitigate or reverse the damage from previous losses before investors or regulators notice 
it. In this case accounting fraud is used, by the manipulation of financial statements, to 
deceive the creditors and shareholders of the company. Control fraud can also be driven 
by moral hazard, or the knowledge that if the fraud is discovered the cost will not be 
borne by the firm or perpetrators. Control frauds are some of the largest, most damaging 
and expensive types of fraud, because they have the potential to completely subvert a 
company, as well as the economy in general through introduction of a corrupt 
institutional system (Black, 2005a). One example of a control fraud is a Ponzi scheme, in 
which older investors are paid off with the money of newer investors in order to make it 
look like nothing is wrong (Black, 2005b).  
 
Another common insider fraud that is more complex than simply embezzling money is 
earnings management, or “the alteration of firm’s reported performance by insiders to 
either mislead some stakeholders or to influence contractual outcomes” (Shen & Chih, 
2005, p. 2676). However, this approach primarily applies to public firms and occurs at 
the top level.  
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Another area where insider fraud may arise at the individual bank level is in poor quality 
bank loans. These loans may be offered to those whom the loan officer has a direct 
personal or business interest with, which may precipitate a conflict of interest, this 
inducing some degree of fraud. These loans may be constructed through a collusion of 
recipient and banker (Breuer, 2006). In some cases, bank inefficiency and insider conflict 
of interest may not be introduced through greed, but through a conflict of interest that lies 
in empathy with the customer population (Dixon, Ritchie, & Siwale, 2007). This may be 
important for the African case because conflicts may not be immediately apparent; for 
example, one case in a Zambian microfinance operation showed that loan officers 
struggled between the financial accountability requirements promoted by their corporate 
structure and the needs of the borrowers that were not always able to make payments in 
time. This demonstrates one of the problems with the current construction of banking 
fraud; specifically, that approaches to consumer fraud that are constructed in Western 
industrialized economies, which do not make significant use of microfinance or offer 
significant lending facilities to the poor, may not be appropriate in African banks that do 
offer this type of loans (Dixon, Ritchie, & Siwale, 2007). This is not just a problem due 
to the loss of income for the bank, but because in developing countries especially it may 
stymie development through funding inappropriate projects while leaving useful 
development projects unfunded (Barth et al., 2008). 
 
2.2.2.2 External Fraud 
Banking fraud may also be perpetrated from outside the bank, or external fraud. One 
common type of fraud is new account fraud, “which involves the criminal using a false 
identity, made-up or stolen, to open a new account, typically to obtain a credit card or 
loan” (Hartmann-Wendels, Mählmann, & Versen, 2009, p. 347). Another type of fraud is 
existing account fraud, where the criminal gains access to an existing account or set of 
accounts and uses them for fraudulent purposes. This can be seen through cases of 
hacking, phishing and scams. Existing account fraud is commonly easier to detect than 
new account fraud, as it becomes apparent from algorithmic detection rather than taking 
some time to become apparent, particularly if the fraudster maintains the account 
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legitimately for some time (Hartmann-Wendels et al., 2009). Identifying fraud is often 
done informally, which reduces the potential for a cost-benefit analysis to determine 
appropriate systems for detection (Canhoto & Backhouse, 2007). 
 
In conclusion, this section has highlighted that fraud is a term that has varied legal 
definitions. This study focuses on fraud that has been detected and publically exposed. 
Two broad types of fraud have been identified: insider fraud and outsider fraud. Although 
fraud may be defined broadly as seen in the sections above, this study’s scope does not 
encompass all potential forms of fraud that may occur. In this research, the focus is on 
forms of fraud that occur within the banking organisations and that are committed by 
management, employees, customers, and other people linked to the banks. However, this 
does not include the category of control fraud or management fraud, including systematic 
fraud associated with subversion of accounting systems and external fraud such as 
earnings management. These types of fraud were excluded due to the difficulty in 
detection and the likelihood that they would not be reported objectively by the 
respondents who are effectively an integral part of the control mechanisms of the firm.  
 
2.3 Theories of Fraud 
Over the past half a century, a number of fraud theories have emerged to explain the 
nature of fraud. The primary theory of fraud that will be used in this research is the fraud 
triangle theory posed by Cressey (1973). However, there are a number of additional 
theories that can be used to understand various aspects of fraud as well as the antecedents 
of fraud occurrences. This section first discusses the fraud triangle theory, and then 
briefly describes a number of other theoretical perspectives that can be used in 
examination of the research area. 
 
2.3.1 Fraud Triangle theory 
The most widely accepted fraud theory is that offered by Donald Cressey (1973), the 
criminologist who carried out a research on 200 embezzlers (trust violators) who had 
been incarcerated and held in various prisons in the US Midwest. Cresseys’ final research 
statement was summed up as follows: 
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“Trusted persons become trust violators when they conceive of themselves as 
having a financial problem which is non-shareable, are aware that this problem 
can be secretly resolved by violation of the position of financial trust, and are able 
to apply to their own conduct in that situation verbalizations which enable them to 
adjust their conceptions of themselves as trusted persons with their conceptions of 
themselves as users of the entrusted funds or property.” (Cressey, 1973, p30) 
 
This hypothesis has popularly become known as the Fraud Triangle Theory. The legs’ of 
the triangle respectively represent the individuals’ pressure, opportunity and 
rationalization for committing fraud and is shown in Figure 2.3: 
 
 
Figure 2.3: The Fraud Triangle  
(Source: Adapted from Cressey, 1973)  
 
The first factor, pressure on the employee, occurs due to “non-shareable” financial 
problems. Cressey (1973) identified fraud as being the outcome of problems that the 
individual perceived as being in some way non-sharable. He identified six types of non-
sharable problems that were seen to lead to the potential for fraud within the individual. 
Figure 2.4 shows these types of problems. Cressey (1973) viewed the term “non-
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shareable” as being relative, varying from person to person. Thus, what is non-shareable 
to one person may not be non-shareable to another. However, he concluded that non-
shareable problems were concerned with status-seeking or status-maintaining activities. 
The six categories of non-shareable problems include violations of obligations, personal 
failures, business reversals, isolation from friends and associates, status gaining demands, 
and problems in the employer-employee relationship (Cressey, 1973).  
 
Figure 2.4: Six types of non-shareable problems   
 (Source: Adapted from Cressey, 1973) 
 
The second factor of the Fraud Triangle is Opportunity. By itself the non-shareable 
problem will not lead an employee to commit fraud (Wells, 2005). The employee must 
also perceive that he/she has the opportunity to commit the crime without being caught. 
While the position of trust may provide an opportunity for the solution of a non-shareable 
financial problem, Cressey (1973) found that many trusted people did not at first see in 
their positions of trust the opportunities which such positions offer, and thus did not 
engage in fraud by using entrusted funds to solve their non-shareable problems. Making 
the connection between the non-shareable problem and the illegal solution is a product of 
the interrelated intellectual processes of knowing and rationalizing that the problem can 
be solved by violation of their position of trust. Rarely would a person in a position of 
trust not know, in a general way, that the position of trust can be violated, and therefore, 
21 
 
that an objective opportunity for trust violation exists. With respect to general 
information, Wells (2004) states that the very essence of an individual’s fiduciary 
capacity implies that since the position is one of trust it is capable of being violated. 
Opportunities could present themselves in the form of poor internal controls, weak 
discipline policies or poor organisational ethics (Cressey, 1973; Wells, 2004). 
 
The third factor to be considered is rationalization. The act of rationalization is not an 
after-thought that justifies the fraud, but it is the real reason(s) which the person has for 
acting in a fraudulent manner. Rationalization is, therefore, part of the motivation to 
commit fraud and is often abandoned after the criminal act has taken place (Wells, 2005). 
Cressey (1973) observed that a trusted person does not invent a new rationalization for 
his violation of trust, but rather he applies to his own situation a verbalization which has 
been made available to him by virtue of his having come in contact with a culture in 
which such verbalizations are present. The fraudulent individual acquires such 
verbalizations from other persons who have had prior experience with situations 
involving positions of trust and trust violation. This resonates the Differential Association 
theory earlier discussed (Sutherland, 1949) that suggests that an individual learns crime 
from their association with persons already exposed to it. Examples of such ideologies 
that seek to justify the crime are: “some of our most respectable citizens got their start in 
life by using other people’s money temporarily”; “all people steal when they get in a tight 
spot”; “my intent is only to use money temporarily so I am ‘borrowing’, not ‘stealing’; “I 
have been trying to live an honest life, but I have had nothing but troubles so ‘to hell with 
it” (Cressey, 1973; pgs. 102-107, 110, 118, 124) 
 
These cultural ideologies are contradictory to the theme that honesty is expected in all 
situations of trust. The individual uses such ideologies to adjust contradictory personal 
values in regard to criminality on the one hand and integrity, honesty and morality on the 
other. These rationalizations form excuses for the trusted person to violate the trust but 
are not sufficient in escaping legal prosecution. Employees who take organisation funds 
for their own purposes over a prolonged period of time have been known to consider 
themselves as borrowers rather than criminals. It is only when the rationalizations are 
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abandoned that the trust offender sees himself for what he is, a criminal (Cressey, 1973; 
Wells, 2005). 
 
Cresset’s Fraud Triangle has been used to explain the nature of fraudsters for many years. 
However, in concluding his research Cressey (1973) points out that the fraud triangle 
theory is limited in its practical use for prevention and detection of trust violation like 
fraud or for treatment of apprehended offenders. Wells (2005) has also echoed the same 
sentiment that the fraud theory triangle has had little application when it comes to fraud 
prevention. This theory is therefore open to revision.  
   
One obvious critique of this model is that it describes antecedents that may be present in 
a large number of cases that do not result in fraud. Thus, the fraud triangle cannot be said 
to be predictive; rather it is a descriptive model that is best used in post hoc analysis 
(Day, 2010). Furthermore, the elements that are posed within this model cannot always 
be seen to be present; one example of this is many cases of executive fraud, in which 
there is no discernible non-shareable problem that must be solved by the fraud (Albrecht, 
Albrecht, & Albrecht, 2004). This means that even if the fraud triangle is used 
predictively, it cannot be used to fully model all cases, because some cases will fall 
outside this model. There is also a limitation in the existing research in that the majority 
of research is placed on issues of opportunity and putative motivation for the fraud. In 
contrast, elements of rationalization, cognitive capability to perform the fraud, and the 
incentive to commit fraud have been relatively poorly studied in the literature; thus, there 
are a number of assumptions that must be made about these areas (Holton, 2009). The 
reason for this lack of study may be due to a fundamental problem with the formulation 
of the rationalization construct; given that actually identifying the rationalization used by 
the individual at the time of the fraud is not possible and many individuals may engage in 
post hoc rationalization, there is no real way to identify the actual rationalization for the 
crime (Souse & Wright, 2008). This means that the majority of fraud research necessarily 
focuses on the development of opportunity and, sometimes, identification of fraud 
incentives, rather than rationalization.   
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2.3.2 Other Theories of Fraud 
In addition to the fraud triangle theory, there are a number of other theories of fraud that 
can be identified within the literature. These range from the earliest theories such as 
differential association and cultural transmission theory, to domain-specific theories such 
as accounting fraud models, to specific observations that may be generalized to an area of 
fraud causation. This section discusses a number of theories of fraud causation that have 
emerged, specifically identifying the main points of the theories and discussing the uses 
and critiques of the theory.  
 
2.3.2.1 Theory of Differential Association 
Among the earliest theories was the “Theory of Differential Association”, developed by 
Edwin Sutherland in the 1930’s. Sutherland can be said to be the “Father of white-collar 
crime”, being the pioneer researcher in the area of white-collar crime (Wells, 2005). He 
first researched on fraud committed by upper-class business executives either against 
shareholders or the public and he coined the term “white-collar crime” in 1939.  
 
According to the Theory of Differential Association Sutherland (1949) suggested that 
crime is learned, just like any other subject. He believed that criminal behaviour occurred 
with other persons in a process of communication and hence criminality could not occur 
without the help of other people. Gaylord and Gallaher (1988) observe that Sutherland in 
departure from economic explanations, biological and pathological perspectives attributes 
crime to the social context of the individual. Sutherland (1949) viewed criminal 
behaviour as arising when an individual is exposed more to definitions favourable to 
violation of law than to definitions unfavourable to violation of law; hence criminal 
behaviour is a consequence of conflicting values. He theorised that the learning process 
consisted of two areas: the techniques to commit the crime and the attitudes, drives, 
rationalizations and motives of the criminal mind. Thus he found that organisations that 
have dishonest employees will eventually ‘infect’ a portion of honest ones and generally 
that honest employees will eventually have an influence on some of those who are 
dishonest (Sutherland, 1949; Wells, 2005). Today the Theory of Differential Associations 
is one of the most widely accepted theories of white-collar crime. 
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However, it is not without its critics. Akers (1996) criticised Sutherland’s Differential 
Association theory based on the inaccurate assumption that Sutherland was suggesting 
that by simply interacting with criminals an individual would tend to criminal behaviour; 
but this was not what Sutherland proposed. Supporters of Sutherlands’ Differential 
Association theory like Donald R. Cressey (Sutherland and Cressey, 1978) argue that 
some of these criticisms are misinterpretations on the part of the critics (Akers, 1996). 
Other criticisms emanate from the apparent inability of the theory to explain acts of 
deviance that are not necessarily learnt. Other authors argue that the theory cannot be 
measured empirically (Matsueda, 1988; Akers, 1996) due to the inability or difficulty in 
measuring and defining Sutherland's concept of "definitions" favourable and 
unfavourable to criminal behaviour. Sutherland did not clearly define which crimes were 
white-collar crimes as not all individuals in a position of trust hold a white-collar job, e.g. 
a vehicle mechanic. 
 
Another criticism advanced is that Sutherland's theory represents a "cultural deviance" 
theory as it made incorrect presumptions about individual behaviour and the importance 
of culture in deviant behaviour (Matsueda, 1988). However Akers (1996) again argues 
that this criticism is yet another misinterpretation of Sutherland's theory. Laub (2006, p.1) 
argues that Sutherland’s concept “was flawed because he embraced a sociological model 
of crime and in doing so adopted a form of sociological positivism.” He further argues 
that Sutherland ignored key facts about crime that were contrary to his theoretical 
partialities.   
 
Sutherland (1974, pg.82) summarized his own list of some of the criticisms levelled 
against his differential association theory, such as the theory: is defective as it omits 
consideration of free will; ignores the role of the victim; fails to explain the origin of 
crime; does not define terms such as "systematic" and "excess" clearly; ignore biological 
factors; can apply to non-criminals, and assumes all persons are equally exposed to 
criminal and anti-criminal behaviour patterns. In spite of criticisms brought forward 
against it, the Differential Association theory’s contribution is strong and several 
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contemporary theorists in criminology and sociology have extended and expanded on 
Sutherlands’ theory to explain criminal behaviour (Akers, 2004; Burgess and Akers, 
1966; Bandura, 1997; Glaser, 1956)  
 
2.3.2.2 Job dissatisfaction theory  
Research by Hollinger and Clarke (1983) on 12,000 employees revealed that 
dissatisfaction motivated employees to commit fraud. When employees perceived that 
their jobs or working conditions were unfair, they were more likely to justify and commit 
fraud (Wells, 2005).  However, this theory is difficult to prove due to the relative lack of 
information regarding employee theft in general; while it can be studied in its particulars, 
it is difficult to identify in general due to lack of reliable and widespread information 
about employee theft (Mustaine & Tewksbury, 2002). Furthermore, this model suffers 
from the same issues regarding motivation and rationalization as the Fraud Triangle 
theory.   
 
2.3.2.3 The Fraud Scale 
Steven Albrecht (Albrecht et al., 1983) also developed a fraud theory known as the 
“Fraud Scale” in the 1980s’ that shared some of the fraud elements used by Cressey 
(1973) in explaining criminal behaviour. His theory suggests that three factors contribute 
to fraud: a situational pressure (like Cressey’s financial pressure); a perceived opportunity 
to conceal the fraud; and, the level of the employees’ personal integrity. The situational 
pressures are described as the immediate problems individuals experience within their 
environment. Opportunities to commit fraud may be created by individuals or by 
deficient or missing internal controls. Personal integrity refers to the personal code of 
ethical behaviour each person adopts.  
 
As illustrated in Figure 2.5 Albrecht concluded that when situational pressures and 
perceived opportunities are high and personal integrity is low, occupational fraud is much 
more likely to occur than when the opposite is true ( Albrecht, Howe and Romney, 1983). 
The main contribution made by the Fraud Scale model is the addition of the integrity 
dimension in explaining the occurrence of fraud. The integrity dimension was included as 
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a refinement to the rationalization concept suggested by Cressey (1973).  
 
 
Figure 2.5: The Fraud Scale  
 
 
2.3.2.4 The Fraud Diamond Theory 
Wolfe and Hermanson (2004), building on the fraud triangle theory, theorized that 
another fourth element – capability of the offender – should be added to the fraud triangle 
to create what they term as the “Fraud Diamond”. According to the fraud diamond 
theory, in order for fraud to be possible, other than having a motivation, opportunity and 
rationalization, the offender requires the capability of committing the crime, where 
capability may involve the technical knowledge, confidence etc. to execute and/or get 
away with the crime (Wolfe & Hermanson, 2004). The inclusion of cognitive capabilities 
and biases has helped to rectify some of the potential limitations of the fraud triangle; for 
example, one group of researchers uses cognitive heuristics to understand why in some 
cases managers may develop a rationalization to commit fraud, while others did not, 
based on individual cognitive biases and conditions  (Anadarajan & Kleinman, 2011). 
This model has been little applied in the literature, but the addition of the fourth leg leads 
to social manipulation (Omar & Mohamad Din, 2010).  Social manipulation, or the 
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involvement of others in the fraud through subterfuge or manipulation of emotions, social 
status, or other factors, is also often called social engineering. This form of manipulation 
allows the fraud perpetrator to involve others in the fraud, in order to use their access or 
skills to benefit the fraud perpetrator. Thus, this type of fraud may involve others as co-
conspirators who are not fully cognizant of the nature of the fraud (or who may not know 
about it at all), but who are rather acting out of desire to help a co-worker or other 
acquaintance (Omar & Mohamad Din, 2010). This complicates the picture of the fraud 
offender, as one or more conspirators may not actually have the motivations associated 
with the formation of a fraud intention as described within the fraud triangle.   
 
2.3.2.5 Eclectic theories 
In addition to the formalized models presented above, there are a number of so-called 
eclectic theories of fraud, which present a combination of factors as being implicated in 
the formation of intention to commit fraud. This section presents a range of eclectic 
theories discussed within the literature and examines how these theories are tied to earlier 
theories. 
 
2.3.2.5.1 Fraud in the Accounting Environment  
The development of theories of fraud is on-going. An attempt to link fraud to the 
accounting environment was made by Riahi-Belkaoui and Picur (2000). They suggest a 
framework for fraud that can be used for identifying those situations most conducive to 
fraud in the accounting environment. The framework, shown in Figure 2.6 borrows from 
models and theories in the field of criminology such as the conflict and consensus 
approaches, the ecological theory, cultural transmission theory and anomie theories.  
 
The conflict and consensus approaches hypothesize that laws develop from general public 
opinion reflecting the popular will of the society. The conflict approach suggests that 
laws are influenced and passed by interest groups to their benefit. This suggests that 
accounting interest groups give the impression that they are in control of problematic 
situations when they really are not. As a result the regulations that are enacted for 
checking fraudulent reporting and white-collar crime are weak. The conflict approach 
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also attributes fraud to a system of inequalities that condones certain types of aggressive 
behaviour that lead to crime and those engaging in fraud are reacting to life conditions of 
their own social class. Hence, the conflict model of crime proposes that the origins of 
fraudulent accounting practices may be connected to the political and economic 
development of a society (Carey, 1978, cited by Riahi-Belkaoui & Picur, 2000). In 
comparison, the consensus approach suggests that rather than emerging from and then 
exacerbating conflict between special interest groups, laws emerge from and then 
encourage cooperation between these groups, improving access to justice to all within the 
society (Riahi-Belkaoui & Picur, 2000). Under the consensus model, the origins of fraud 
are still connected to political and economic development, but rather than accounting 
interest groups being positioned as being weak, they are positioned as being actors in a 
consensus-building approach. 
 
The ecological theory suggests that certain types of criminals are attracted to the fields of 
business and accounting. This theory blames the occurrence of corporate fraud, white-
collar crimes and audit failures on the weak social organisation of accounting as a 
discipline and the failure of the general public to act effectively as an agent of social 
control by being indifferent to crime (Riahi-Belkaoui & Picur, 2000). Figure 2.6 shows 
the interactions between the accounting groups (who argue for private regulation), social 
institutions and inequality, social disorganization and elements of anomie, and the 
attraction of the criminal to the firm, which is perceived as a rich target, all of which 
together result in the various forms of white-collar crime. While this theory is highly 
complex and detailed, it has been little discussed within the literature and there has been 
little substantive involvement or application of the model. The application of this model 
may be limited in that it concerns itself with fraud mainly in the accounting environment 
rather than embracing a broader perspective of fraud. Thus, application of the model is 
complex and is likely to be difficult. 
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 Figure 2.6: A framework for fraud in accounting.  
(Source: Riahi-Belkaoui & Picur (2000), pg.41) 
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2.3.2.5.2 Cultural Transmission Theory 
The Cultural Transmission theory is similar to the Differential Association theory put 
forward by Sutherland (1949) in which he suggested that criminal behaviour is learned. 
However, it differs from the Differential Association theory in that it presupposes the 
existence of a specific criminal culture, which is associated with people living in a 
specific area or within a specific ethnic group (Costello, 1997). The Cultural 
Transmission Theory assumes that criminals have been transmitted into a culture of crime 
by being socialized to accept specific values that condone crime. Therefore implying that 
fraudulent behaviour in accounting is learned. These sociological theories of crime 
emerged in the early 20th Century in order to explain the emergence of criminal groups in 
specific regions of a city, ethnic group, or class (Costello, 1997). However, this theory is 
much criticized due to its assumptions. In particular, it fails to take into account that those 
that are exposed to a so-called culture of crime are also exposed to mainstream culture, 
which affords individuals a number of different options and views as well (Cloward & 
Ohlin, 1966). In more explicit terms, the cultural transmission theory relates to a 
normative, middle-class moral system and positions everything outside this system as 
wrong or ‘other’ (Costello, 1997). This makes these models, according to Costello, both 
illogical and discriminatory; thus, this is not a useful model for understanding fraud in a 
given context.  
 
2.3.2.5.3 Anomie Theories 
Lastly, the Anomie theories concentrate on the confusion that ensues to an individual 
when there is a misfit between values and norms e.g. the dilemma between goals and the 
means to achieve it. In a bid to align the goals with the means an individual may adopt 
five types of solutions, including conformity, innovation (using illegitimate means to 
achieve success, as in accounting fraud), ritualism, retreatism, and rebellion (Durkheim, 
1964; Merton, 1938; Merton, 1957). All these adaptations arise from the pressures of the 
society that accentuate economic success and the difficulty of achieving it. Thus the 
anomie theories involve the failure to match norms or values of ambition with the ability 
to realize the goals using illegitimate means (Durkheim, 1964; Merton, 1938; Merton, 
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1957). Anomie may seem to have a lack of application to the modern executive fraud 
case, but in fact evidence indicates that this is not so; instead, anomie may be perceived at 
the highest levels, and often poses a much more significant problem at these levels than at 
lower levels (Passas, 1990). However, one criticism of anomie theory is that the 
innovator and conformist categories are not mutually exclusive; in fact, many individuals 
that commit fraud may use both legitimate and illegitimate means to gain power (Murphy 
& Robinson, 2008). Thus, it is not as simple to just classify everyone into a single group 
based on their methods. There are also more fundamental theoretical critiques of the 
anomie model, especially that there are fundamental contradictions in the various 
specifications of the theory by Durkheim, Merton and others that have led to inconsistent 
and even opposing applications of the theory  (Passas, 1999). Although Passas (1999) 
argues that there is continuity within the model, it is difficult to deny that there have been 
a number of different applications of this model. 
 
2.3.2.6 Profiling of fraud offenders 
Potential perpetrators of the types of fraud can be identified through the skill of profiling. 
With the advent of fraudulent scandals and corporate collapses (Enron, Tyco, World Com 
etc.) at the turn of this century, research in the field of fraud by accountants and auditors, 
as opposed to mostly criminologists, has grown. The emphasis of research has also 
shifted from just understanding criminal behaviour to looking at aspects of deterrence and 
prevention of fraud (Krambia-Kapardis, 2001; Smith, 2003). Profiling fraud involves 
classifying offenders in such a way that facilitates understanding criminal behaviour 
(Krambia, 2001).  
 
Krambia (2001) carried out a study on 50 serious fraud cases in Australia. The study 
analysed the offences committed, the offender, the victim and the sentencing of the 
offenders by the courts of law. This research is a clear shift in the study of fraud as it 
introduces the aspect of prevention and deterrence. Weisburd (2001) also did a study 
based on 968 cases of offenders in the USA whose sample was based on an earlier study 
by Wheeler (1998). This research explored the criminal careers of white-collar offenders 
and identified three categories of offenders: those who commit crime as a result of a 
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crisis, those who commit crime due to greed and were exploiting an opportunity that had 
presented it-self and those who were pursuing a career in crime (chronic offenders). The 
profiling of offenders is useful in the prevention of fraud. Studies carried out by Krambia-
Kapardis (2004), on developing a taxonomy based on 12 types of offenders, demonstrates 
that profiling fraud offenders can enhance fraud prevention and detection. 
 
Later models such as the Eclectic Fraud Detection model suggested by Krambia-Kapardis 
(2002) still have at its centre the original contributions of the fraud triangle. One 
component part of this model is what is referred to as the ROP (rationalizations, 
opportunities and crime prone employee). This model has been tested using auditors and 
organisations in Australia and Cyprus. In Cyprus the model was used in a fraud 
victimization survey, where organisations were the victims of fraud, while in Australia 
auditors were involved in the study. In Australia and New Zealand a case study of 155 
files of serious fraud (Smith, 2003) provided an indication of how serious fraud was 
committed, the characteristics of the offender and victims, the loss suffered, the judicial 
process and sentencing of offenders, motivations, rationalizations, mitigating factors and 
key risk factors behind the commission of the crimes (Smith, 2003; Krambia-Kapardis, 
2001). This study on serious fraud once again highlights the importance of fraud 
prevention and deterrence. However, it is worthwhile to note that assessing the 
behavioural aspects of fraud in looking at the motivations, opportunities and 
rationalizations still remains an integral part of improving fraud prevention and detection.  
 
More recently in Australia, attempts have been made at profiling fraud offenders (Steane 
and Cockerell, 2005). With the assistance of case studies and the Analysis Led Fraud 
Assessment (ALFA) Technique, they suggest that there are three components that cause 
fraudulent behaviour, namely: motivation, opportunity and a suitable target, and that in 
combination with these three fraud indicators, fraud methods and fraud consequences 
play an important role. We can therefore conclude that recent studies are focusing more 
on fraud prevention and deterrence, but at the same time there is an attempt to combine 
this with the behavioural aspects of fraud offenders (Wolfe and Hermanson, 2004; Smith, 
2003; Krambia-Kapardis, 2004). This study intends to look at both behavioural as well as 
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environmental aspects that contribute to fraudulent behaviour. 
 
While fraud profiling offers a certain amount of promise for detecting fraud, there are a 
number of issues and problems that must be taken into account in this practice. First and 
most obvious is that simply fitting the proximal characteristics of the fraud triangle (or 
any other diagnostic device) does not imply that the individual will commit fraud, or even 
will consider it as a viable option for resolving their financial difficulties (Day, 2010). In 
other words simply having pressure created by a non-shareable problem, sufficient 
rationalization and the opportunity to commit a fraud does not mean that the individual 
will succumb to the pressure. There are also issues with interpretation of profiling, 
especially with inferences from the individual’s psychological state (if it can be 
determined in any great detail) to the actions taken (Canter, 2004).  Dorminey et al., 
(2010, p.18) supports this view stating that the fraud triangle “does not adequately 
explain the actions of pathological fraudsters: predators who are better organized, have 
better concealment schemes and are better at interacting with auditors and antifraud 
professionals.” The predator only seeks opportunity and does not require the other two 
elements of the fraud triangle, pressure and rationalization to enhance their chances of 
committing a crime. The typical fraudster has been profiled as a person that is middle 
aged, well-educated, a good citizen holding a position of responsibility, a trusted worker 
and a first-time offender (Dorminey et al., 2010). This individual does not set out 
primarily to commit fraud. They gradually succumb to pressure and are referred to as the 
“accidental fraudster” by Kranacher et al (2011). Predators on the other hand set out 
immediately to devise fraud schemes. Krancher et al (2011) further add that the fraud 
triangle was created with the “accidental fraudster” in mind rather than the predator. 
However, an individual can move from exhibiting the characteristics of an accidental 
fraudster to taking on the nature of a predator if they (accidental fraudster) are not caught 
in the initial stages of committing the fraud. 
 
 A further problem with the use of profiling is the issue of electronic evidence, which can 
often be more difficult to handle and interpret than physical evidence (Rogers, 2003). 
This may be particularly in the case of computer-based crimes, where the criminal may 
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have greater knowledge of the system than the investigator and thus be able to manipulate 
evidence. Furthermore, the majority of profiling (in general, as well as in fraud cases) is 
aimed not at identifying potential fraud perpetrators, but in identifying the characteristics 
of unknown perpetrators of crimes that have already been committed (Goodwill, Alison, 
& Beech, 2009). In effect this means that undetected perpetrators of fraud remain outside 
the scope of profiling. 
 
Section 2.3 has examined various theories of fraud found from literature. The theory most 
significant to this study is the Fraud Triangle theory that is central to explaining an 
individual’s fraudulent behaviour. Among the other theories, the Fraud diamond 
theoretically is similar to the Fraud Triangle Theory. The Eclectic theories emphasize the 
significance of environmental factors in affecting fraud levels. This section has also 
discussed the various theoretical models that consider the possibility of identifying 
potential fraud perpetrators through the art of profiling. More importantly the topics 
discussed above in Sections 2.2 and 2.3 (Fraud and the theories of Fraud) form the central 
part of the conceptual framework (Section 3.10, Figure 3.2). The next section examines 
more external and internal environmental factors that impact or contribute to increased 
levels of fraud. 
 
2.4 External and Internal Environments impacting fraud 
Even as environmental factors grow in importance, the general use of environmental 
information has not grown as much across the banking industry. This is mainly attributed 
to unavailability of accurate and comparable information that the banks can use on a 
shared basis (Murray, Kelly and Ganzi, 1997). Sharing information is important to an 
industry like banking as there is a tendency for banks to suffer the same type of frauds 
perpetrated by perhaps the same perpetrators. The size of the bank can influence formal 
information sharing (Berger et al., 2005). Historically in Kenya and Africa generally,  
bank instability and the absence or ineffectiveness of institutional boards at the period of 
early bank development has hindered the flow of information sharing (Neu et al., 2010) 
and encouraged fraud and corruption (Kane and Rice, 2001). Information sharing 
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therefore remains critical in bringing about co-operation and a concerted effort on the part 
of the banks in order to curb fraud and corruption. 
 
There exists both an external and internal environment within and around the banking 
industry that impacts the levels of fraud. The internal environment includes the strengths 
and weaknesses of individual banks. On the other hand the external environment provides 
opportunities to the banking industry while at the same time it also poses threats. By 
taking advantage of the opportunities, banks in the industry can increase their 
profitability, market share and customer base, but this may inadvertently increase the risk 
of fraud 
 
2.4.1 External Environment 
The external environment of a bank consists of six main components, namely: the 
economic environment, technological environment, competition, the legal and regulatory 
sector, socio-cultural environment and customer sector (Popoola, 2000). These 
environments are discussed below. 
 
2.4.1.1 Economic Environment 
The economic environment comprises of economic factors such as exchange rates, 
inflation rates, interest rates, unemployment, economic growth rates, and stock markets 
among others (Popoola, 2000). Also related to the economic environment are the 
economic foundations of fraud. Economic foundations of fraud are based on agency 
problems, moral hazard, and the existence of incentives to commit or prevent fraud 
(Black, 2005b; Button, Johnston, & Frimpong, 2008; Crocker, 1998; Demirguc-Kunt & 
Detragiarche, 2005; Feldman, 2001; Krugman & Wells, 2006; Mayes, 2005). Each of 
these three elements, shown in Figure 2.7, offers explanations for why fraud occurs and 
why it remains persistent within the banking structure.  
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Figure 2.7: Economic Foundations of Fraud 
 
An agency problem can be described simply as a situation in which an agent does not act 
in the interest of the principal or owner of the corporation, but instead in his or her own 
interest. The principal-agent relationship is a relationship in which there are two parties, 
the principal, normally the owners of the bank (who have ownership equity in a given 
asset and in whose interests the asset should be managed) and the agent (who acts to 
manage the asset for the principal). Because the agent has the main control of the asset 
and can control the information that is provided to the principal, it is possible that the 
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agent will be able to manipulate the management of the asset to his own advantage. In 
order to overcome this problem it is necessary to overcome the information asymmetry 
between agent and principal and to align the interests of the agent with the interests of the 
principal (Krugman & Wells, 2006; Stremitzer, 2005).  
 
In the case of insider fraud, the individual that perpetrates the fraud is working against the 
interests of the principal (owners and stakeholders) of the corporation. However, it is 
important to note that simply eliminating agency problems could also be problematic. In 
this instance, an agency problem may be beneficial, as it could result in a whistle-blower 
alerting regulators to fraud by the owner against the interests of the owner (Black, 
2005b).  
 
Moral hazard is introduced into the banking system when the bank is no longer liable to 
pay for the full cost of any losses. Freed from this responsibility, the bank may act in 
ways that lead to a higher potential loss, including higher levels of risk taking in 
legitimate business as well as less effort placed toward reducing or eliminating fraud. 
This most commonly may occur through deposit insurance or another method for the 
government or the industry as a whole (Mayes, 2005). However, in the case of many 
developing countries, these structures have not yet been put into place; thus, consumers 
and customers, investors, owners, and the government will bear the cost of bank 
insolvency or failure (Mayes, 2005). Moral hazard may be introduced into the banking 
system is through depository insurance, which protects bank customers from some degree 
of losses in case of bank failure. Empirical evidence shows that deposit insurance 
increases the degree of instability in the banking system, and that the more extensive this 
insurance is, the higher the adverse effect is. Yet, deposit insurance is also necessary to 
build trust in the banking system (Demirguc-Kunt & Detragiarche, 2002). Thus, this is an 
element of moral hazard that is difficult to remove from the banking system. However, 
the issue of market discipline may fulfil some of the requirements of reduction of moral 
hazard, particularly in deregulated markets (Nier & Baumann, 2006). Market discipline 
refers to the conditions under which investors are willing to invest; simply, if effective 
conditions are not in place for investment banks will be negatively treated. Moral hazard 
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is key to discussions of banking fraud, particularly banking fraud associated with 
managers or others with some degree of agency in managing the firm, because moral 
hazard may promote a culture in which losses are not strongly tracked or accounted for, 
and in which the existence of depository insurance or other forms of protection can 
provide a rationalization for the fraud perpetrator to commit fraud (Mayes, 2005). Thus, 
moral hazard may promote the development of increased fraud.  
 
Economic foundations of fraud are based primarily on incentives, including incentives to 
commit fraud and incentives to prevent or reduce fraud (Feldman, 2001). Feldman (2001) 
argues that fraud often remains undetected because of weak incentives for this detection. 
However, this is a significant issue, particularly in public policy, since this is a high 
economic cost that could be mitigated through the use of stronger incentives and 
organised programs for fraud prevention (Button et al., 2008). The use of incentives to 
prevent and detect fraud can be highly useful, for example in the use of optimal incentive 
policies, which identify the best incentive point to prevent fraud rather than create it 
(Crocker & Morgan, 1998). These economic issues are relevant to the specific creation of 
policies that will prevent fraud, as well as to the detection of fraud.  
 
2.4.1.2 Technology Environment  
The technological environment includes, most importantly, innovation of new products 
and services, research and development, new techniques and methods of service and 
increasingly significantly, information technologies which are relevant to the banking 
industry. Technological change has revolutionized the way financial data is stored, 
processed and analysed. At the same time it has improved the quality of banking services, 
risk management capabilities, led to reduction of banking costs and increased banks’ 
lending capacity (Wilson et al., 2010). Increased globalization has made it easier for 
international banks to share information and technology (Claessens and Horen, 2008). In 
this study emphasis will be placed on the use of information technologies in banks for the 
perpetration, prevention and detection of fraud. 
 
One of the major differences expected between local and international banks is the use of 
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information technology (IT). Research (Furst et al., 2002) shows that banks are likely to 
embrace new technologies like internet banking if they are part of a bank holding 
company (international banks and branches); are located in an urban area and mainly 
incur high fixed operating costs relative to their operating revenues. Therefore bank 
location, bank size and industry location have been found to be important factors in the 
adoption of internet banking technologies (Wilson et al., 2010). 
  
The use of IT in banking auditing is a relatively recent development, only dating to the 
early 1990s (Shao, 1999). Early fraud detection systems worked on rule induction based 
on historical data, which compared typical and atypical data in specific users. By 1999, 
several larger banks and many small banks in the UK had adopted expert systems for 
fraud detection (Shao, 1999). Further refinements included the introduction of the use of 
case-based reasoning for new customer fraud, which applied multiple algorithms in order 
to compare the new customer with historical data (Wheeler & Aitkin, 2000). Other 
multiple algorithmic approaches were designed to work with skewed data as well, 
providing a highly cost-effective approach by integrating minority class training 
examples (Phua et al., 2004). The successful use of these algorithms was found to reduce 
even further the need for further manual investigation. Banks also began to use direct 
technologies to reduce existing customer fraud. By 2004, the chip and pin system was 
being tested as a means of prevention of card theft in the United Kingdom (Arnfield, 
2004). The Meridien Card, first introduced by Meridien BIAO in Zambia in the early 
1990s, was also an early experiment in shifting the fraud detection process toward the 
customer (Sardanis, 2007). This card acted as a physical identification card with the 
customer picture on the card as well as using smart card technology to prevent 
unauthorized access to the card (Sardanis, 2007). 
 
Accounting and auditing systems are important for controlling and identifying 
inappropriate risk taking and potential fraud within the bank environment (Fernandez & 
Gonzales, 2005). Accounting and auditing information systems, if implemented properly, 
can maintain capital discipline and prevent circumvention of capital requirements. 
However, this effect is actually diminished by moral hazard resulting from deposit 
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insurance schedules as well as the size of the bank (Fernandez & Gonzales, 2005). This is 
relevant to Kenyan banking as the industry has had a history of bank failures arising from 
moral hazard, poor management, weak internal controls, undercapitalization and adverse 
selection (Brownridge, 1998; Brownridge, 1998b).  
 
Some of the most common information systems-based methods of fraud detection today 
are based in statistics and machine learning (Bolton & Hand, 2002). These approaches 
vary widely in sophistication and technology in use, and can range from a simple 
historical comparison to complex neural networks creating behavioural models (Bolton & 
Hand, 2002). Many such techniques fall into the class known as data mining, or a process 
in which existing bodies of data within the organisation (up to and including all 
information flowing into and out of the organisation) is manipulated using machine-based 
processes in order to provide insight into various aspects of the data (Homazi & Giles, 
2004). It does not necessarily provide certainties regarding fraud, but instead identifies 
potentially fraudulent occurrences from existing data (Phua et al., 2005). In Kenya the 
use of widespread information technology systems is not yet common in the banking 
industry. Kenyan banks are only now beginning to embrace fraud detection techniques 
such as data mining. Fraud investigation has remained largely manual and the use of 
smart cards and uniquely developed bank photo-cards have yet to be introduced (Gikandi 
and Bloor, 2010; Balancing Act, 2010). 
  
The increasing cost of financial fraud has begun to move banks away from historical data 
analysis and toward the use of real-time data mining in order to detect and prevent fraud 
as, or preferably before, it happens (Edge & Sampaio, 2009). One such method is the 
construction of account signatures, in which new transactions are compared to a 
construction based on the user’s previous activity (Edge & Sampaio, 2009). This 
statistical technique allows for detection and prevention of existing customer fraud in real 
time. The importance of techniques that utilise account signatures for fraud prevention 
purposes has been underplayed in Kenya over a number of years as it has been legally 
difficult to successfully prosecute fraud cases using electronic signatures as evidence in 
court cases. However, an amendment to the Kenya Communications Amendment Bill, 
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2008 (Government of Kenya, 2008) now gives Kenyan retail banks the same benefit 
enjoyed by their counterparts in the developed countries by making electronic records 
permissible in legal proceedings (Gikandi and Bloor, 2010). Thus there is expected to be 
growth in the use of such technology by Kenyan banks.  
 
There is a growing use of neural networks and complex statistical techniques to detect 
both insider and outsider fraud in the banking environment (Paliwal & Kumar, 2009). 
These techniques require more sophisticated computing power and specialized 
development, but can be much more powerful (though more costly) (Paliwal & Kumar, 
2009). The issue of the cost of technology is significant in the Kenyan banking industry. 
Due to lack of skilled manpower, most information technology systems currently in use 
in Kenya are externally procured. An international bank is believed to have procured a 
new information technology at the equivalent of USD50 million (Turana, 2011). Apart 
from the cost of the software banks have to contend with cost of procuring skilled 
expatriate manpower to implement and maintain the information technology systems 
(Turana, 2011). The cost and complexity of these systems, though potentially useful, 
places them out of the reach of many Kenyan banks, which continue to use older systems.  
Fraud prevention software is still not perfect. For example, the security API that 
accompanied the chip and pin cards deployed throughout the United Kingdom had 
significant flaws that prevented full security within this system, leaving customers open 
to some forms of fraud even though they are theoretically secure (Mannan & Van 
Oorschot, 2009). 
  
Information technology can be used in the auditing process as well as in automated fraud 
detection procedures (Debreceny et al., 2005). The general class of computerized tools 
for auditing is known as Computer Assisted Auditing Techniques (CAATs) (Debreceny 
et al., 2005). One example of this is the use of generalized audit software (GAS), a type 
of software that allows the auditor to query the bank or business’s databases and other 
programs in order to create specific views into the bank’s financial position as well as 
detection of fraud (Debreceny et al., 2005). However, this is not always used. One study 
of international commercial banks in Singapore showed that external auditors did not use 
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GAS in any case, while internal auditors used GAS only as an exception to their usual 
work patterns and not as a general tool for use (Debreceny et al., 2005). A 2006 study 
indicated that digital analysis software, discovery sampling, and data mining were not 
commonly used in the organisation despite firms agreeing that they may be useful 
(Bierstaker et al., 2006). Thus, how useful this tool is can be debated.    
 
Information technology is one of the most important tools in prevention and detection of 
fraud, and has grown substantially since its introduction in the 1990s. Early programs 
were based on historical analysis, but refinements including use of case-based reasoning 
for new customer fraud and other approaches including smart cards have dramatically 
improved the effectiveness of these systems. Accounting and auditing information 
systems allow for detection and prevention of fraud as well as implementation of capital 
discipline. Statistics and machine learning have further improved the effectiveness of 
systems, and real-time data mining is becoming increasingly important in banks 
attempting to lower the cost of fraud. Neural networks and complex statistical techniques 
require substantially more sophisticated computing software and hardware, and may be 
out of reach for local Kenyan banks. Although it is clear that the use of information 
technologies provides a significant competitive advantage for banks, the cost and 
technical complexity of these systems may place them out of reach for local banks. Thus, 
determining what type of information technology systems are in use and how effectively 
they are used will determine how Kenyan banks can compete in this regard with 
international banks.  
 
2.4.1.3 Competition 
Deregulation is one of the forces that has not only driven change in the banking industry, 
but has also served to remove barriers to competition. Studies by Zhao et al (2009; 2010) 
indicate that deregulatory measures geared at promoting competition resulted in increased 
risk taking in Indian banks. These studies also suggest that competition leads to increased 
risk taking in the banks. 
 
Competitive pressure has driven banks and other financial institutions to opt for 
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diversification strategies (Wilson et al., 2010). The advent of new technologies has 
increased competition from inside and outside the banking industry. The use of mobile 
phone technologies in Africa, and specifically Kenya has led to new inter-sectoral 
competition for services once dominated by the banking industry.  
 
2.4.1.4 Regulatory environment 
This environment consists of political developments, policies, government legislation and 
regulations affecting bank operation. It also includes government action such as 
deregulation and the actions of law enforcement institutions, like the police, the courts 
and legal systems. 
 
One of the driving forces of change in the banking industry is deregulation (Wilson et al., 
2010). Deregulation, a driving force in the economic reforms on-going over the past 
thirty years, is one of the major enablers of banking fraud (Black, 2005b). Deregulation is 
important in the Kenyan context because of the on-going process of liberalization, 
privatization and other deregulation initiatives that have affected how corporations have 
operated (Barako et al., 2006). The experience of deregulation, despite its ideological 
assumption that industries will be self-policing, is that it increases the potential for fraud 
(Black, 2005b). Similarly, regulation has been shown to have an effect on the type and 
degree of fraud experienced. Changes in regulation and reporting requirements have 
brought about changes in the type of fraud commonly perpetrated in the banking industry. 
Green and Reinstein (2004) indicate that while the scale of fraud has declined, there are 
still about as many individual fraudulent incidents in the banking system, at least in the 
United States.  
 
Law enforcement is a major structure of the institutional context that is needed for trade 
and effective market operations (Milgrom et al., 1990). However, law enforcement as an 
institution in Kenya is known to be weak and often ineffective in prosecution of criminals 
(Anderson, 2002). Thus, the state of law enforcement and the institutional capacity of the 
external environment will play a role in this study. 
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The provision of appropriate law enforcement protocols and specialists to combat fraud is 
a major social factor in preventing fraud (Button et al., 2007). In some countries, fraud 
and corruption specialists, or even complete specialist units, have emerged within the 
criminal justice system, as well as within specific regulatory organisations, in order to 
detect and prevent various types of fraud (Button et al., 2007). Many large banks 
maintain their own fraud investigation services. For example, a United Kingdom Serious 
Fraud Office (SFO) investigation found that the six largest banks in the United Kingdom 
had in-house investigation teams totalling approximately 2,500 investigators (Button et 
al., 2007). This is one way in which banks, as well as regulators, can reduce the potential 
for fraud. Identifying insider fraud can be much more difficult than external fraud, since 
insiders understand what systems are in place to detect them and have some degree of 
access and freedom in circumventing these systems (Porter, 2003). This difficulty is 
increased by the fact that many organisations take a reactive approach to identifying 
fraudulent activity, rather than a proactive approach to preventing it (Porter, 2003). In 
insider fraud cases, the use of law enforcement and forensic accounting may be far more 
useful than algorithmic or procedural methods (Porter, 2003). However, this does not 
mean that these methods should be ignored or discarded.  
 
Although law enforcement is commonly regarded as the main instrument of the 
institution in preventing fraud, in the Kenyan context it may not be as effective, as 
Kenyan law enforcement institutions are relatively weak and often regarded as 
ineffective. In-house investigation organizations may provide some stopgap measures for 
banks attempting to prevent fraud, but the lack of support from dedicated and trained law 
enforcement officials may prevent the banks from effective fraud prevention.   
Structural reasons for fraud in Kenya include slow judicial systems that do not allow for 
appropriate enforcement of legal rules; gaps in the legal framework intended to support 
the detection and prevention of fraud, and lack of independence in regulatory bodies 
(Omurgonulsen & Omurgonulsen, 2009). Additional factors include personal greed and 
social and ethical norms along with national culture (Black, 2005b). This also applies to 
issues like whistle-blowing (Black, 2005b).  
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2.4.1.5 The Customer 
The customer in the context of this study is defined as the individuals or businesses that 
purchase or consume the services provided by the bank. A customer is an individual that 
does business with a bank through activities such as maintaining bank accounts, 
withdrawing or depositing money, transacting with debit and credit cards etc. The bank, 
in return for providing services to individuals and businesses, is able to earn some return 
from those provided with services 
 
 
2.4.1.6 The Socio-cultural environment 
The socio-cultural environment is a diverse mixture manifesting a range of social values, 
ethics, crime rates, age, gender, education, unemployment etc. In this study the socio-
cultural environment will also include perceptions of the social problem of corruption, 
present in the business banking environment (Bakre, 2007; Transparency International, 
2009) and generally acceptable business practice (Zahra, Priem, & Rasheed, 2007). 
Considering the impact that banking systems have on the development of an economy it 
is imperative that they operate efficiently. However, the banking systems in developing 
and transition countries do not always operate efficiently due to corruption. This problem 
of corruption is aggravated by the lack of adequate laws, prudential regulations, a lack of 
effective and efficient court systems and other appropriate institutions. Nevertheless 
objective courts and better law enforcement tend to curtail corruption (Barth et al., 2009). 
Barth (2009) found that increased competition and information sharing within the 
banking sector helps to reduce corruption in bank lending. Lending corruption was also 
found to be less prevalent in firms that were government or foreign owned and where the 
bank form of ownership was private and foreign.  
 
2.4.1.7 The Political environment 
The political environment is closely linked to the regulatory environment. This is because 
laws that govern and regulate businesses are determined by political processes. Some 
changes in government lead to a change in policies which can affect the business 
positively or negatively.  The concept of political risk, that is the impact of political 
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change on businesses operations, includes wars and civil wars, riots, strikes, 
expropriation and other political risks (Buckley, 2004; Robbins & Coulter, 2012). In 
Kenya the banking industry has been affected by government interference through 
politicians’ involvement in banks. Such interference has led to insider dealings some of 
which have been fraudulent in nature. This is discussed further in Chapter 3. 
 
2.4.2 Internal Environment 
Organizations use their strengths to mitigate their weaknesses. Through a SWOT analysis 
an organization can determine the resource capabilities and competencies that it possesses 
and which can give them a competitive advantage over their competitors (Robbins & 
Coulter, 2012). Considering the strengths and weaknesses of the banks is important in 
fraud prevention. Banks need to have adequate funds to meet the relatively high costs of 
fraud prevention. Having skilled human resources is also important and should be one of 
the strengths of a business. Developing efficient internal systems to prevent and detect 
fraud can help to reduce fraud. This section looks at some selected internal banking 
industry factors such as Corporate Governance, organizational characteristics, bank 
governance and risk taking and aspects of fraud prevention and detection. 
 
 
2.4.2.1 Corporate Governance and Organisational Characteristics 
Corporate Governance and organisational characteristics can influence the nature of fraud 
in a firm. Singleton and Singleton (2010) have shown that accounting transactions are 
influenced by factors like the type of industry, organisational culture, organisational 
strategy, culture and size of the organisation. Firms that are large in size find it relatively 
more challenging to have effective fraud control as their size impacts important fraud 
measures such as the segregation of duties. The size of the organisation is also a factor 
that determines the type and amount of fraud (value) committed as well as the control 
method adopted by the organisation.  
 
Larger organisations are more difficult to control compared to smaller organisations due 
to various organisational complexities (Singleton & Singleton, 2010) and are therefore 
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susceptible to higher incidences of fraud. This is supported in a study conducted by 
Holmes et al (2000) where it was found that on average, perpetrators tended to victimise 
larger governmental entities (in terms of number of employees) as compared to relatively 
smaller private sector entities.   
 
As the size of an organisation increases and the degree of supervision decreases, theft and 
fraud increases (Murphy, 1993).  An empirical study by Barnes and Webb (2007) found 
that the larger the size of the organisation the more the susceptibility to theft and fraud. 
Sector or industry was not important, but corporate structure was, with more fraud 
occurring in Public Limited Companies (PLC’s) and private companies. This seems to 
contradict the findings of Holmes et al (2000). However, it can be argued that the study 
by Barnes and Webb (2007) referred to type of organisation and did not specify whether 
these were large or small PLC’s and Private Companies. In addition the study by Barnes 
and Webb (2007) found that monetary size of an individual fraud increased with 
organisational size. 
 
Corporate governance serves as a protective measure against fraud by introducing 
elements such as internal controls, corporate culture and ethics, and oversight norms as 
well as enforcing specific laws regarding reporting and controls, thus reducing the 
potential for and incidence of fraud (Baucus and Near, 1991; Drew, Kelley and Kendrick, 
2006; Macey & O'Hara, 2003; Rose-Ackerman, 2002; Sankar, 2003; Schein, 1996; 
Simons, 1995; Tadesse, 2006; Uzun, Szewczyk and Varma, 2004). 
 
Corporate governance, or the management of the bank in order to meet the needs of the 
appropriate group of individuals, is at the foundation of the need for fraud prevention 
(Macey & O'Hara, 2003). The appropriate orientation of corporate governance varies 
depending on the business model in use. The Anglo-American model, used by banks 
derived from the American and English modes of doing business, focuses on a 
shareholder perspective (focusing on the rights and needs of equity owners in the bank). 
In contrast, the Franco-German model of corporate governance emphasizes the 
stakeholder perspective (focusing on the needs and rights of all stakeholders in the 
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business, such as customers, workers, and others) (Smith, 2003). However, in both cases 
fiduciary duties, or duties pertaining to the appropriate management of the bank, are 
owed to the group that is the focus of the corporate governance process (Kaler, 2003). 
This includes control of finances (including protection from internal theft), return of 
profits to the appropriate group, and reporting and records keeping requirements intended 
to protect the firm from regulatory repercussions or legal action  (Winkler, 2004). One of 
the major problems of corporate governance is the separation of ownership and control, 
which introduces the possibility for an agency problem into the organisation (Macey & 
O'Hara, 2003).  
 
The CLASS model of corporate governance provides one framework to understand 
corporate governance and reduction of risk within the banking structure (Drew, Kelley, & 
Kendrick, 2006). This framework – which incorporates elements of Culture, Leadership, 
Alignment, Systems, and Structure – is intended to promote the corporate culture and 
structure required to improve corporate governance and reduce the culture of risk-taking 
and the potential for corruption. This framework is shown in Figure 2.8. Organisational 
culture is influenced by leadership practices and systems. Culture is a perception and it 
represents ways of behaving and ways of understanding shared by a group of people. 
Hofstede (1980) defines culture as the collective programming of the mind which helps to 
distinguish members of a group of people from another. Organizational culture is 
described by Robbins and Coulter (2012, p.80) as “the shared values, principles, 
traditions, and ways of doing things that influence the way organizational members act” – 
briefly explained as “how things are done around here.” Mullins (1999, p.53) further 
defined organizational culture as “the collection of traditions, values, beliefs, policies, 
and attitudes that constitute a pervasive context for everything we do and think in an 
organization.” Leadership on the other hand is the art and process of influencing a group 
to achieve certain goals. Leadership is what leaders do (Robbins & Coulter, 2012) 
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Figure 2.8: The CLASS model of corporate governance 
 (Source: Drew et al. 2006, p.129) 
 
The purpose of alignment is to ensure that each element of the CLASS model works in 
harmony with other elements so that organisational culture reinforces leadership and 
systems reinforce the culture. All elements work together and no one element stands 
alone. Other studies have evidenced that organisational culture; leadership, systems and 
structures (Schein, 1996; Baucus and Near, 1991; Simons, 1995) cannot be easily 
separated. A study by Sankar (2003) reinforces the link between organisation culture and 
leadership while ensuring the alignment of culture with leadership. 
 
Alignment is difficult to achieve as it involves a degree of conflict between the other four 
elements of the CLASS Model as alignment ensures each element is harmonized in 
relation to other elements. Labovitz (2005, as cited by Drew et al., 2006, Pg.133) defines 
alignment as “an optimal state in which people, key processes and strategies work in 
tandem.” He further noted that lack of alignment can lead to financial problems as well as 
problems in co-ordination and performance. Leadership styles need to be aligned with 
systems, culture and structure. A study by Uzun et al (2004) examined and found a 
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significant correlation between the composition and structure of the organisation boards 
and the incidence of corporate fraud. Corporate governance can also be effective in 
reducing losses from fraud. Disclosure, financial reporting, and financial disclosure 
regulations have been shown to reduce the level of financial crises in one study of 49 
countries (Tadesse, 2006).  
 
Although corporate governance is clearly highly relevant, implementing a Western model 
of corporate governance may prove to be problematic in Kenya, because of the 
differences between African and Western corporate governance models (McGee, 2008). 
The state of African corporate governance has traditionally been held to be inconsistent 
and prone to failure and fraud due to a kin-based, rather than a contractually based, 
system of obligations (McGee, 2008). However, evidence suggests that this may be 
changing rapidly due to both internal and external pressures, including a push for more 
external investment and external imposition of corporate governance rules from outside 
aid bodies (Rousseau, 2005). Thus, it is difficult to determine the precise nature of 
corporate governance that will be seen. This can best be considered under a plurality 
model rather than a dichotomous model, in which Kenya is considered to be a unique 
case rather than simply African or Western (Heugens & Otten, 2007).  
 
There have also been some specific observations of corporate governance made regarding 
Kenya in comparison to the west.  One short study found that Kenyan companies were 
approximately 29 days slower than American companies to report financial results 
(Muhoro & McGee, 2008). A second study found that voluntary disclosure norms in 
Kenyan companies, including positive effects from audit committees and negative effects 
from non-executive directors, were consistent with Western expectations regarding 
disclosure following privatization and reform of the Nairobi Stock Exchange (Barako et 
al., 2006).  
 
There are a variety of perspectives on the role of corporate governance in fraud 
commission and prevention. The CLASS model of corporate governance reflects a 
number of elements of corporate governance that may affect fraud: culture, leadership, 
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alignment, systems and structure. Additional factors include size, specific business 
alignment, and corporate structure. Industry and sector, on the other hand, are less 
relevant in this area. However, care must be taken when applying findings from European 
firms to Kenya, as there are substantial differences between Kenyan corporate 
governance and Western styles of corporate governance. As such, the issue of corporate 
governance should be considered potentially important, but the existing findings should 
not be taken as directly transferable.  
 
 
2.4.2.2 Bank Governance and Risk Taking 
Corporate governance, as discussed in the section above, based on Western models may 
be complex to apply in developing countries, as in the Kenyan context (Rousseau, 2005). 
Understanding the characteristics of governance that are likely to lead to risk taking is 
important. The level of fraud inherent in the banking system may be related to the degree 
of risk taking involved in its business practices. In many cases insider fraud results from 
attempts to cover up excessive risk taking (Weiss, 2008). Excessive risk taking is an 
example of bad judgement that can lead to investment failure, a source of non-shareable 
problems as captured in Figure 2.4. Excessive risk taking also leads to moral hazard as 
already explained under Section 2.4.1.1. Theoretical evidence suggests that bank 
governance is dependent on the ownership structure of the bank (Laeven & Levine, 
2009). Single ownership or highly consolidated ownership mitigates against aggressive 
risk-taking, while diversified ownership (such as public share-based equity ownership) 
creates pressure for aggressive risk-taking. This is due to the different level of potential 
loss for the owners in case of failed risk. Furthermore, owners and managers of banks 
may have a different view of risk taking, creating a conflict between these two areas; 
regulation also plays a role in reducing or mitigating the amount of risk taken by a given 
bank. As a result, empirical research has shown that the amount of risk taking in a bank is 
related to its ownership structure as well as to capital regulations, restrictions on non-
financial activities, and deposit insurance regulation (Laeven & Levine, 2009). This 
demonstrates why bank governance and risk taking may be different from bank to bank, 
introducing a different level of risk within the bank.  
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2.4.2.3 Fraud Detection and Prevention Strategy 
The use of effective fraud prevention techniques intended to prevent existing customer 
fraud particularly is important because without these techniques, it can be difficult to 
build trust between the bank and the customer, which can result in reduced ability to use 
Internet banking and increased customer churn (Suh & Han, 2002). 
 
Types of fraud encountered in the banking environment include internal fraud and 
external fraud (Black, 2005b; Greenbaum & Thakor, 2007; Mishkin, 2006; Weiss, 2009). 
Fraud detection and prevention is at the heart of every fraud management system. 
Detection of fraud is highly complex, and a large percentage of fraud cases are actually 
detected externally (such as by the media or external auditors) or by accident (Dyck, 
Morse, & Zingales, 2007). However, approaches such as lifecycle monitoring and 
verification can be used to reduce the incidence of fraud overall (Potter, 2002; Porter, 
2003; Wilhelm, 2004; Venkatraman & Delpachitra, 2008).  
 
According to Wilhelm (2004) the fraud management lifecycle can be used to encapsulate 
the process of fraud prevention. This cycle consists of eight stages, including deterrence, 
prevention, detection, mitigation, analysis, policy, investigation, and prosecution 
(Wilhelm, 2004). The deterrence stage involves activities that hinder or discourage fraud 
through fear of consequences (Wilhelm, 2004; Webster, 1997, 1976, 1941). On the other 
hand prevention activities hinder, check, keep away or stop the fraudster from 
committing fraudulent activities. The detection stage uncovers existing or attempted fraud 
while mitigation includes activities designed to stop the continuation of the fraud e.g. 
blocking access to the bank account. The analysis stage seeks to determine the root cause 
of the fraud and the factors that led to the occurrence of the fraudulent activity. The 
policy stage is characterised by the creation, evaluation and communication of policies 
aimed at reducing fraud e.g. fixing limits to the authority to incur expenditure such as any 
transaction over £10,000 should be reported. The seventh stage of investigation brings 
together any evidence and information to curb further fraudulent activity, recover assets 
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or secure restitution and gather evidence necessary for the successful prosecution of the 
fraudsters. Many known frauds are not prosecuted due to concerns about the damage such 
prosecution could cause to the image and reputation of the organisation. The combination 
of internal factors (information technology, risk tolerance, fraud management philosophy 
etc.) and external factors (regulatory requirements, competitors, fraud methods etc.) all 
play a part in influencing fraud management. The complexity of fraud management 
increases with a dynamic and ever growing environment (Wilhem, 2004; Webster, 1997, 
1976, 1941). 
 
Bank verification has traditionally depended on the customer signature for verification of 
identity (Potter, 2002). However, the meaning of the signature has become increasingly 
complex as technology has changed and it has become increasingly easy to forge 
signatures, as well as to detect forgeries (Potter, 2002). A recent introduction to 
customer-side fraud prevention by banks is the use of biometric security (Venkatraman & 
Delpachitra, 2008). The use of this technology in banking is still relatively rare, although 
it is being piloted in the New Zealand Bio-Sec project, and poses considerable ethical and 
operational concerns in addition to being expensive (Venkatraman & Delpachitra, 2008). 
However, it represents a strong improvement on current methods of customer-side 
authentication.  
 
Specific signs of potential fraud by insider employees that Porter (2003) identified 
included long hours, refusal to delegate, different behavioural patterns than expected, 
copying data, overriding controls, and relatively low levels of documentation. This 
suggests identifying these factors is crucially important for detecting fraud.  
 
The rest of this section discusses auditing as a measure of fraud management. Also 
discussed here are the implications of recent regulatory requirements on whistle blowing 
and World Bank fraud prevention and detection rules. The goal of the discussion is to 
demonstrate how banks can prevent fraud as well as how fraud can be detected.  
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2.4.2.3.1 Auditing 
Often a strong system of internal controls is the frontline defence that an organization can 
employ to prevent and detect fraud. The absence of internal controls does not always 
preclude the occurrence of fraud but it does leave potentially an open door for it to 
happen. Poor internal controls manifest themselves through: poor inventory control, lack 
of proper documentation and support for cash payments, lack of segregation of duties, 
ineffective or obsolete accounting software and the absence of independent verification 
(Doyle et al., 2007; Porter, 2003) 
 
To prevent these failures, companies should conduct periodic risk assessments, lead by 
either internal or external auditing staff. The assessments should focus on high-risk areas, 
such as physical controls relating to high-dollar fixed assets, cash, marketable securities, 
payroll and inventory. 
 
Specific questions should be raised during these assessments: Is there a policy of locking 
doors and filing cabinets after business hours? Does the company require the use of 
identification numbers and passwords, which are kept, secured and rotated on a regular 
basis? Does the company have a policy of mandatory vacations and job rotations? Does 
the company have at least one back-up copy of all data and software files stored at a 
secure off-site storage location? Does the company run background checks on new 
employees? 
 
Internal and external auditing, or oversight by independent accounting professionals of 
the company’s accounts and reports, is a major approach to fraud reduction (Wells, 
2007). Evidence regarding auditing indicates that many companies actually desire audits 
even in the absence of regulation requiring it (Wallace, 2004). For example, following the 
1996 relaxation of mandating auditing statements for private corporations in Canada, 
73% of the companies that had previously been required to audit continued to do so even 
though it was no longer required (Wallace, 2004). Of the remaining 27%, many firms 
continued to use a review engagement rather than a formal audit (Wallace, 2004). This is 
consistent with agency and information theory, which indicate that auditing is an 
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important element in reducing agency problems and providing full information to owners 
(and not only to regulators).  
 
The role of audit in fraud deterrence has become more pronounced in recent years.  A 
report by the ACFE (2002) showed evidence from the USA that the audit function had a 
substantial impact on the size of the typical fraud. This report revealed that audited 
companies suffered less severe fraud losses compared to unaudited companies. This study 
further established that there were two reasons why fraud losses were less severe in 
audited companies; first the audit process itself, through routine procedures of examining 
documents, trend analysis and asset verification, was able to detect fraud and prevent it 
from happening or act as a future deterrent; secondly, awareness of and knowledge that 
auditors were watching was enough to discourage employees from committing fraud and 
served as an effective deterrent (ACFE, 2002). The use of management oversight can be 
an effective deterrent. However, the idea that someone is watching you does not always 
prevents fraud from happening but it does deter fraud to some degree as it increases the 
perception of likely detection. Internal audits therefore mainly play a detection and 
deterrence role (AICPA, 2012).  
 
The role and impact of internal audit as a measure for detection and deterrence of fraud 
gained recognition with the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the USA. The 
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99 (SAS 99) on Consideration of Fraud in a 
Financial Statement Audit, was the first major audit standard to be effected after the 
enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (AICPA, 2002). The importance of internal 
controls as a main fraud deterrence measure in the audit process is implied in both the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act and the SAS 99 which require management to evaluate and test 
internal controls and other anti-fraud programs to ensure they are effective. The role of 
internal audit is therefore to be responsible for evaluating, testing and examining the 
adequacy and the effectiveness of actions taken by the management in fulfilling their 
obligations. A person intent on committing fraud will be deterred if they think that the 
internal controls are strong enough to block their attempt. However, simply enforcing 
internal controls does not always prevent or deter fraud from occurring. This is more so 
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when one considers that often the same people who have oversight over the internal 
controls (management and employees) could potentially be the same ones involved in 
fraudulent activities, either individually or in collusion.  
 
Historically companies have not considered fraud prevention as their main objective of 
internal control activities. Anti-fraud activities were mainly viewed as compliance 
activities rather than specific fraud concerns. However, today, internal control factors are 
quickly taking over compliance issues as the main drivers and initiators of antifraud 
activities (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2004). No longer is fraud viewed at as an anomaly, 
or an infrequent failure of internal controls but after all the corporate scandals of the early 
21st century (Enron, World Com etc.) it is seen as an important risk that can affect the 
entire life and reputation of the business. The role of audit in fraud deterrence is therefore 
shifting from being compliance driven to proactive detection and prevention of fraud 
embedded in audit function. 
 
Taking into account that internal controls can deteriorate over time, either due to 
technological advances or human intervention (management overrides or collusion), other 
anti-fraud controls should be used (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2004) to deter individuals 
from perpetrating fraud by sending out a message that the management are committed to 
fraud prevention and detection. 
 
There is still no firm universal agreement on the responsibility of auditors for bringing 
fraud forward and the role of auditors to do so has not been clearly defined. For example, 
the auditors and the professional bodies responsible for setting the standards for the 
profession have varying opinions about the role of the auditor. Meanwhile the users of 
financial statements (normally the investors) expect that auditors will detect fraud as they 
(the users) do not always trust the management to detect fraud given that management 
can also act fraudulently. The auditors on the other hand know that it is not possible for to 
identify all fraud as their work is based on samples, meaning that some fraud would go 
undetected as they will not have the opportunity to look at every single transaction 
(Alleyne & Howard, 2005). Porter (1997) in a review of the historical role of the 
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auditor’s duty to detect and report fraud noted a shift in auditing paradigm over the years. 
In the 1920’s the primary objective of audit was to uncover or detect fraud (Porter, 1997). 
However, as the size and volume of transactions increased in the 1930’s the auditors’ role 
began to shift to that of designing and implementing appropriate internal control systems 
as well as the responsibility, towards the management, for detecting and preventing fraud.  
Two fundamental aspects of successful auditing are to ensure auditor’s responsibility and 
auditor independence. In the 1960’s, despite criticisms by the public about the reluctance 
of auditors to take on their role of fraud detection, auditors continued to downplay or 
minimize their role in fraud detection (Porter, 1997). With the advent of technology and 
the computer age in the 1980’s, fraud incidences increased rapidly until the fall of large 
corporations like Enron caused the International Auditing Standards (IAS) to be 
revamped so as to re-emphasize the role of the auditor in fraud detection (IAS 135 and 
IAS 240). Nonetheless it is important to note that the IAS 200 still states that the primary 
objective of the audit is simply to form an opinion of the financial statements and not 
fraud prevention and detection activities of the organizations.  Authors (Boynton et al., 
2005; Oremade, 1988) are of the opinion that auditors should be more proactive in 
seeking to identify fraud in their regular audit activities.  
 
However, auditor’s responsibility brings with it the so-called expectations gap, in which 
there is a difference in views regarding whether or not the auditor is responsible for 
detecting and reporting fraud (Lin, 2004). The perception of auditor responsibility and 
independence varies depending on the cultural context as well. For example, Lin (2004) 
studied auditors in China, who indicated that self-regulation and less government 
involvement would be beneficial. However, other research has indicated that lack of 
government involvement can leave auditors vulnerable to undue influence by firm 
principals (Lee, Clarke, & Dean, 2008). Examination of the audit expectations gap in the 
Iranian context showed a gap that was largely consistent with, although not identical to, 
the situations in Saudi Arabia and China (Salehi & Azary, 2008). One study that took 
place in Barbados following the Enron scandal found that auditors view fraud detection 
as a management responsibility, while management viewed this as the responsibility of 
the auditor (Alleyne & Howard, 2005). This may vary depending on whether the 
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company has a sound internal auditing structure; in this case, there may be more 
interaction and cooperation between auditors and management, making fraud detection a 
group responsibility rather than an individual responsibility (Alleyne & Howard, 2005). 
The conflict between the view of management and the view of auditors regarding the 
responsibility of auditors in fraud detection also extended to Britain in the 1990s 
(Humphrey & Turley, 1993).  
 
In some cases, the management of a company in addition to auditors are held formally 
responsible for fraud detection and prevention (Thomas & Gibson, 2003). This is 
particularly the case under the AICPA standards board, although this may not be 
consistent across accounting boards (Thomas & Gibson, 2003). There are still cases 
where conflict in consistency regarding auditor and manager views exists and that may 
result in lack of detection of the fraud; such conflict has clear implications for fraud 
detection and prevention because of the lack of consistent understanding of whose 
responsibility for preventing and detecting fraud. 
  
One study found that despite pressure to enforce auditor responsibility for detecting 
fraud, the auditing profession resisted this change (Humphrey & Turley, 1993). Auditors 
often cannot correctly identify systematic or control fraud (Black, 2005b). However, 
since the Enron and WorldCom scandals of the early 2000s, auditors are expected to take 
a more active role in fraud detection in Britain and the United States (Evanoff & 
Kaufmann, 2005). The audit expectations gap continues to exist in many cultures 
(Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007). However, the specific contributory elements may vary from 
culture to culture. Porter (2007) suggests that education on the one hand can help in 
narrowing the auditor expectations gap while expanding the scope of audit to include 
additional auditor duties can mitigate the expectations gap. In so doing the public 
expectations and the auditors role can be more closely aligned, minimizing the gap. 
  
Auditor expectations will affect the outcomes of auditing in some cases. One assumption 
commonly made by accountants is that internal controls are sufficient to reduce the 
potential for fraud; however, evidence shows that this is not the case, as fraud happens 
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even in organisations with strong internal controls (Wells, 2004). The efficacy of internal 
auditing as a control measure was tested by James (2003). The researcher found that the 
perceived independence of internal auditors was a major factor in perception of ability to 
detect fraud. Internal auditors that reported to senior management were seen as less likely 
to detect fraud than those that reported to the audit committee (James, 2003). This finding 
underscores the role of corporate governance in preventing internal fraud. 
 
The ethical sensitivity of the auditor is also likely to play a role in whether the auditor 
will detect and bring to light potential fraud (Abdolmohammadi & Owhoso, 2000). In 
this research, it was shown that auditors that had knowledge of ethical actions by the 
corporation being audited were less likely to see fraud than those that did not have this 
information (Abdolmohammadi & Owhoso, 2000).  
 
Accountants and auditors may be either complicit in fraud or the main perpetrator. This is 
an agency problem due to independent auditors being selected, hired and paid by the 
managers they are being paid to audit. This problem is not adequately dealt with in most 
auditing regulations, leaving auditor independence frequently in doubt (Gavious, 2007). 
A study of accounting and external auditing in Nigeria demonstrate that collusion with 
corrupted management has led to substantial losses through fraud over the past few 
decades. This has included both collusion through misstatement of accounts and, after 
companies have been placed in receivership, collusion with corrupt receivers as well 
(Bakre, 2007). Although the use of expatriate managers was used to reduce this, it is still 
a serious issue for the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria (ICAN) (Bakre, 
2007). Another situation in which a small English accountancy firm was implicated in 
money laundering activities demonstrates this point (Mitchell & Sikka, 1996). In this 
case, Jackson & Co., a small accountancy firm, used a long series of Shell accounts in 
order to facilitate money laundering of funds embezzled by the chief accountant of AGIP 
(Africa) Ltd, an oil drilling company from Tunis. This fraud resulted in the loss of $10.5 
million over the period of two years (1985 to 1987) (Mitchell & Sikka, 1996).  
 
Fraud detection models are commonly used by auditors to detect fraud (Krambia-
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Kapardis, 2002). A red-flags approach to fraud detection uses specific red flags to 
indicate that fraud may be occurring; for example, one common red flag is an employee 
who does not take his or her holidays (which can indicate that he or she is guarding 
evidence of fraud) (Krambia-Kapardis, 2002). However, a more sophisticated model is 
likely to be more effective, if this model can be defined appropriately.  
 
One of the problems with external auditing as a means of protection from insider fraud 
and corruption is the relationship between the auditor and the senior manager (Lee, 
Clarke, & Dean, 2008). Analysis of previous insider fraud cases has shown that there is a 
pattern of auditors relying on senior managers for information and to be honest, but then 
rejecting their own responsibility to identify corruption within the reporting. Lee, Clarke 
and Dean (2008) explained this phenomenon as resulting from domination of the auditor 
by the senior management official; although the auditor identifies the fraud, he or she 
may be driven to not reveal it due to this personal interaction. In this case, the auditor 
may not deliberately hide the fraud, but may be taken in by lies or misdirection by the 
senior management of the firm. However, even if it is not intentional, this is one of the 
biggest problems with relying on auditing to detect fraud. 
 
The use of effective fraud prevention techniques intended to prevent existing customer 
fraud particularly is important because without these techniques, it can be difficult to 
build trust between the bank and the customer, which can result in reduced ability to use 
internet banking and increased customer churn (Suh & Han, 2002). 
 
Bank verification has traditionally depended on the customer signature for verification of 
identity (Potter, 2002). However, the meaning of the signature has become increasingly 
complex as technology has changed and it has become increasingly easy to forge 
signatures, as well as to detect forgeries (Potter, 2002). A recent introduction to 
customer-side fraud prevention by banks is the use of biometric security (Venkatraman & 
Delpachitra, 2008). The use of this technology in banking is still relatively rare, although 
it is being piloted in the New Zealand Bio-Sec project, and poses considerable ethical and 
operational concerns in addition to being expensive (Venkatraman & Delpachitra, 2008). 
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However, it represents a strong improvement on current methods of customer-side 
authentication.  
 
2.4.2.3.2 Whistle blowers and regulatory requirements 
Whistle blowing is traditionally a voluntary practice of individuals who observe 
something incorrect about a given auditing or accounting situation and bring it to the 
attention of auditors (Schmidt, 2005). However, there has also been a movement in recent 
years to introduce a regulatory requirement for whistle blowers, or to induce some 
regulatory compensation or incentive to blow the whistle (Schmidt, 2005). Schmidt 
(2005) found that a variety of measures in the US, UK and Germany have been identified 
and intended to enforce the obligation for whistle blowing. These include the US 
Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002, the British Public Interest Disclosure Act (PIDA) of 
1998, and a variety of special-purpose German regulations and case law (Schmidt, 2005). 
Although the specifics of each law vary, the ultimate intent is to influence the whistle 
blower to bring the irregularity to attention either through positive influence (monetary 
incentive) or negative influence (the potential to be prosecuted if it is found out) 
(Schmidt, 2005).  
 
Whistle-blowers may face significant social pressures in African societies, however, 
which may mean that regardless of incentives, there may be a strong incidence of 
retaliation that will act as a negative incentive to engage in the disclosure activity 
(Domfeh & Bawole, 2011). There are also structural impediments to whistle blowing, 
such as elements of the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating 
Corruption, which promotes a presumption of guilt that whistle-blowers must overcome 
(Schroth, 2005). A significant case of whistle-blowing relates to the infamous Kenyan 
Goldenberg Scandal (referred to in Chapter 3 Section 3.6). Another famous Kenyan 
whistle-blower, John Githingo, a journalist, also resigned his job and fled the country two 
years after unearthing evidence of corruption, fraud and graft at high levels of 
government in Kenya (Transparency International, 2007). These cases discourage the 
practice of whistle-blowing in Kenya. Even though some laws have been passed to 
protect the whistle-blower there is still lack of effective legal protection for whistle-
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blowers in Kenya (Transparency International, 2007). Thus, whistleblowing, though it is 
considered to be valuable in a Western context, may not be effective in the Kenyan 
banking environment.  
 
 
2.4.2.3.3 World Bank Fraud Detection and Prevention Rules 
A major factor in the modernization of the Kenyan banking system has been the 
imposition of World Bank rules for development lending (McGee, 2008; Muhoro & 
McGee, 2008). Thus, World Bank rules are likely to be highly relevant for the 
development of fraud detection systems in the Kenyan bank. The World Bank has its own 
series of rules for fraud and corruption prevention and detection in World Bank projects. 
They include specific anticorruption policies intended to address corruption in the 
bidding and loan processes in general bank operations and case studies that highlight 
where and when fraud may be found (Aguilar et al., 2000). The guidelines also include a 
specific ethical guidance for bank staff intended to address problems of ethical practice 
by bank employees.  
 
Section 2.4 has demonstrated the external environments (economic, technological, 
competition, regulatory, customer and socio-cultural) that exist outside the banking 
industry which influence fraud prevention and detection. This section has also reviewed 
aspects of the internal banking environment such as corporate governance and issues of 
fraud detection and prevention, and most importantly, the role of auditing. Banks, it 
emerges, must scan their external environment regularly to counter any threats and take 
advantage of opportunities while ensuring that they identify any internal strengths and 
weaknesses.  
 
2.5 Issues in local and international banking 
The section above has presented the immediate internal and external environmental 
elements that have an impact on fraud prevention and detection. This section focuses on 
selected issues in local and international banking. This includes discussion of 
international bank operations in Kenya, differences in corporate governance between 
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Kenyan and international firms, facilitators and consequences of bank fraud in Kenya.  
 
2.5.1 International Banks in Kenya 
International banks in Kenya have a long history and a relatively large market share of 
the retail banking population (Bank Supervision Report 2009). Previous findings in 
African banking indicate that international and regional banks have different approaches 
to fraud, one of the expected findings of this present research (Barako et al., 2006; 
McGee, 2008; Muhoro & McGee, 2008; Rousseau, 2005). Thus, asking the question of 
why international banks enter the market in the first place is relevant to understanding 
why differences between international and other banks is likely to emerge.  
 
There are a number of reasons for entering the international market in addition to reasons 
of growth and profit. Some international banks may construct internal capital markets, 
allowing free flow of capital between international branches in order to reduce costs, 
grow credit facilities and provide competitive advantage (De Haas & Van Lelyveld, 
2010). In some other cases, international banks may be drawn to developing countries 
with less regulatory pressures on banking as a means of effecting international market 
entry (Petrou, 2009). This is particularly the case in banks that have had difficulty with 
fraud in the past, as regulators in developed countries may discourage or even outright 
refuse their entry. However, regulators in developing countries may not be as rigorous 
and looser regulation in these countries may allow these banks to maintain fraudulent 
banking practices (Petrou, 2009) due to absence of stringent regulation. Ordinarily, 
conducting business in a consistent way would be a matter of business ethics (Weiss, 
2008). However, for a company that is already business ethics would not matter. Benefits 
of international banks entering the Kenyan market include technological spill over and 
capacity increasing, improving financial mediation efficiency, improving credit access, 
and increasing financial stability as well as providing support for development activities 
(Claessens and Jansen, 2000; Clarke et al., 2002; Clarke et al., 2003). 
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2.5.2 Differences in Corporate Governance  
A number of country characteristics play a role in determining what appropriate corporate 
governance is and how it is accomplished within individual country settings, particularly 
in regard to external environmental conditions (Doidge et al., 2007).  
 
Banking structures in developing countries are often driven by business orientations that 
are at odds with Western ideas of transparency and fair dealing. For example, the Chinese 
banking system, which is based on relationships, is often considered to be highly corrupt 
by Western analysts (Horrocks et al., 2008). Research based on the Standard & Poor’s 
transparency index and the corporate governance survey by the Institutional Shareholder 
Services (ISS) group found that country characteristics, including economic development, 
financial development, and legal and regulatory structures, are more important than firm-
level characteristics in corporate governance, and that companies attempting to develop 
foreign direct investment will promote corporate governance standards (Doidge et al., 
2007). Differences based on national culture priorities, including acceptance of litigation, 
legal formalism, and cultural value dimensions, in addition to legal structure, provides an 
improved model for corporate governance (Licht et al., 2005). There are some firm-level 
attributes that identify how a firm will implement corporate governance, including 
finance sources (government or private), board size, ownership concentration, and free 
cash flow (Chhaochharia & Laeven, 2009). 
 
This implies that banks in Kenya will not only be affected by individual bank attributes 
but also by country characteristics such as Kenya’s socio-economic, political, historic, 
legal and regulatory structures as well as corporate governance structures. These 
relationships are captured in the conceptual framework (Figure 3.2) and discussed largely 
in Chapter 3. 
 
2.5.3 Consequences of Bank Fraud 
Consequences of bank fraud can potentially involve bank failures and banking crises 
destabilizing the national economy. There has been little organised research into these 
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consequences in the Kenyan context. Thus, understanding what effects this has had in 
other contexts will help to demonstrate how the issues can be defined within this context 
and how they can be identified, as well as understanding the possible consequences for 
the Kenyan banking system and economy if fraud continues to go unchecked.  
 
Extreme cases of bank fraud have the potential to highly disturb the economic system of a 
country. For example, in 1983, the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE) closed for 18 days 
following earnings management frauds attempts by the six main banks during a period of 
unusually high sell-offs (Blass & Grossman, 1996). The Turkish banking crisis of 2000 
was also found to have likely been caused by systemic banking fraud, including the use 
of back to back loans intended to circumvent lending and capital requirements regulations 
(Soral et al., 2006).  
 
One study that examined the relative losses on assets attributable to a bank’s failure 
indicated that losses on assets could be as much as 30% of the failed bank’s assets, with a 
further direct cost of closure of as much as 10% of the bank’s assets (James, 1991). More 
recent analysis has shown that in addition to the direct cost of bank failure on the 
individual level, patterns of bank failure as have occurred in the United States, Spain, 
Japan, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland have cost taxpayers as much as three per cent of 
GDP in order to cover excess costs (Westernhagen, et al., 2004). Even if bank fraud is not 
levied directly against banks and customers within the host country, it can still prove to 
be detrimental to the country. Research has shown that the Nigerian Advance fee (419) 
banking frauds, although not generally levied against African banking customers, have 
had a negative effect on the perception of Nigeria and Africa as a whole (Vincent et al., 
2004).  
  
2.6 Responses to Fraud 
Social and internal responses to fraud are important because they help to define the 
relationship between the banks and the fraud perpetrators and the general treatment of 
fraud in society, which will help to determine the overall cultural acceptance of fraud. 
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They also potentially serve as deterrents to committing fraud, making them important for 
consideration of the various factors involved.  
 
2.6.1 Regulation and Harmonisation  
One common external response to banking that may take place on a national or 
international level is that of regulation and harmonisation of banking rules intended to 
address the problem of banking fraud. This section examines the regulation and 
harmonisation efforts currently in place and examines their effects briefly. 
 
There are three very common areas of banking regulatory requirements that may affect 
cost and profit efficiency as well as providing both areas for fraud and areas for fraud 
detection. These areas, derived from the Basel II accords, include capital adequacy 
(reserve) requirements, supervisory power, and market discipline mechanisms (Pasiouros 
et al., 2009). Research across 615 commercial banks in 74 countries across the 2000 to 
2004 period showed that supervisory power by a central authority as well as market 
discipline regulations (including public disclosure of financial information) increases cost 
and profit efficiency. However, restrictions on banking activities, such as not allowing 
participation in non-banking sectors, increased profit efficiency but reduced cost 
efficiency; conversely increased capital requirements increases cost efficiency but 
reduces profit efficiency (Pasiouros et al., 2009).  
 
Changes in regulation and reporting requirements have brought about changes in the type 
of fraud commonly perpetrated in the banking industry (Green & Reinstein, 2004). 
Changes in regulation resulting in reduction of fraud have been observed at least as early 
as the 1970s (Jaffe, 1974). Green and Reinstein (2004) indicate that while the degree of 
fraud has declined, there are still about as many individual fraudulent incidents in the 
banking system, at least in the United States. Under previous regulations that did not 
require high disclosure, fraud was commonly focused on the creation of fictitious 
information in order to support specific objectives; under the current high-transparency 
and public disclosure regime, fraud more commonly involves withholding information 
(Green & Reinstein, 2004). 
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One obvious example of changes in regulation that have brought about changes in 
potential fraud levels in Kenya is the liberalization of the Nairobi Stock Exchange in a 
drive to increase foreign direct investment in Kenya, which resulted in increased demands 
for transparency and imposed higher standards for corporate governance  (Barako, 
Hancock, & Izan, 2006). However, simple changes in law and regulation cannot be relied 
upon to completely reduce or eliminate fraud; instead, there needs to be changes in 
attitudes surrounding fraud and its incidence as well as the regulatory changes in order to 
be effective  (McBarnet, 2003). Until these attitudes change, McBarnet (2003) argues, the 
regulation is unlikely to be effective in challenging existing fraud rates.  
 
There is evidence that banking industry harmonisation has significant benefits not only 
for the industry, but also for the growth of the economy as a whole (Romero-Avila, 
2007). Romero-Avila (2007) found that increasing efficiency of financial intermediation 
drove economic growth in the European Union (EU) through the period of 1960 to 2001. 
This harmonisation, which included standardization of regulatory and process 
requirements for banks, increased the consistency of banking treatment (Romero-Avila, 
2007). Banking industry harmonisation is one way in which developing countries could 
expect to benefit from regulation, as well as reduction of fraud. One example of this type 
of harmonization is the Basel banking standards, which are meant to impose a consistent 
method of banking regulation for issues such as reserves and deposit handling across 
different nations and regions (Benston, 1994). Compliance with this regulation helps the 
banks in their fight against fraud as the regulations provide for best practice, which if 
adhered to gives guidance on moral, ethical and other anti-fraud related issues. At the 
same time compliance means that Kenyan banking agencies have a higher rate of access 
to external sources of funds and other areas, which is a significant economic benefit 
(Benston, 1994). In particular, harmonized and consistent banking regulations make it 
easier for firms to access capital, thus allowing for a higher rate of growth across national 
borders rather than constraining the firm’s market to a single country (Utrero-González, 
2007). This provides a significant benefit for the firms and the economy as a whole.  
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2.6.1.1 Supervision 
Bank fraud commonly emerges as a response to inadequate supervisory conditions 
(Evanoff & Kaufmann, 2005). Supervision at the government level is arranged in 
different ways depending on the jurisdiction. While the European Union has a central and 
single bank supervisory structure, the United States has shared bank supervision 
structures. This can lead to uncertainty regarding bank management, including the 
understanding of what would occur if the bank failed as well as who bears responsibility 
for losses from fraud. This can be particularly difficult in the case of international banks, 
where different levels of supervision and different supervisors may be present in the 
different countries. Thus, a bank that may be appropriately controlled in the home 
country may not be subject to appropriate oversight in other countries (Evanoff & 
Kaufmann, 2005).  
 
2.6.1.2 Restriction of Business 
Although banks may not detect initial fraud, they will have much stronger reactions 
following disclosed fraud by customers (Graham, Li, & Qiu, 2008). Specifically, 
companies that are forced to restate their earnings face higher spreads and interest rates 
and more demand for securing of loans than those that do not, as well as higher fees; 
those that have restated due to fraud are even further penalized. Thus, the bank can use 
contract terms to protect themselves from information asymmetries identified through 
these restatements (Graham, Li, & Qiu, 2008). However, it is uncertain how often this 
happens in Africa.  
 
2.6.2 Human Resources Strategies (Recruitment and Selection) 
One major individual response that banks may use in order to reduce fraud is to use 
recruitment and selection strategies to limit the exposure to those believed to be 
untrustworthy.  However, this has not been very effective in the African context for a 
variety of reasons. 
 
Human resources management practices, including recruitment and selection, are seen as 
a means of  controlling for risk management  (Meyer et al., 2011). However, some firms 
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in Africa (as in Meyer et al’s study in South Africa) often have poor recruitment 
practices, such as not checking CVs or references prior to the hiring of the employee. 
Recruitment and selection practices including not checking CVs or references can often 
be seen to be related to structural issues, such as not being able to rely on support from 
previous employers and sabotage by employees  (Meyer, Roodt, & Robbins, 2011). Thus, 
while firms should rely on recruitment and selection practices to lessen the potential for 
internal theft or other risks, in practice this may not always occur  (Meyer, Roodt, & 
Robbins, 2011). Another issue, observed in Tanzania, is that a bank may outsource or 
share its back office operations, and in the process lose full control of the recruitment 
processes used to select the employees working on its accounts  (Newenham-Kawindi, 
2011). Furthermore, as in the Tanzanian case, the issue of social relationships and its 
impact on the recruitment practices may also influence the effectiveness of recruitment 
for risk maangement  (Newenham-Kawindi, 2011). While it might be presumed that the 
risk of recruitment would be higher for positions such as clerks or cashiers, in fact this is 
not true; a study of Nigerian banks revealed that between 2000 and 2007, the most 
frequent perpetrators of fraud were supervisors, managers, or assistants in these roles  
(Owojori, Akintoye, & Adidu, 2011). As such, increased skills and responsibility cannot 
be substituted for effective recruitment practices.  
 
There are a number of strategies that can be identified that are already in use in African 
firms to improve their recruitment and selection approaches in order to improve both 
human capital development and decrease risk. One potential strategy is the use of 
technical assistance from abroad, usually procured in the form of technical specialists. 
Technical assistance involves recruitment of Western specialists in the required area in 
order to provide support, training, and development services for the firm (Oshikoya, 
2010). For example, banks could use technical assistance and Western recruitment in 
order to provide information technology skills to implement IT systems. Another 
approach that is increasingly used by African firms is internal development of human 
resources, including training of human resources specialists in order to better improve 
recruitment and selection practices. This system relies on improvement of the internal 
resources of the firm in order to improve the recuitment practices (Kamoche, 2011).   
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2.7 The Banking Environment in Africa 
The previous section has discussed fraud from a global perspective. This section 
examines the banking environment in Africa focusing especially on existing evidence of 
corporate governance, fraud, and practises that differ from those of banks in Western 
countries. It provides specific evidence regarding the external conditions, including 
cultural, regulatory, and enforcement conditions that will affect the outcomes of anti-
fraud measures in African banks. 
 
2.7.1 Fraud in African Banking 
Africa is commonly believed to have a higher rate of corruption than other regions of the 
world (Mbaku, 2007). The reasons given for this corruption are varied, ranging from 
institutional explanations such as relative weakness of postcolonial institutions or the lack 
of rule of law based on the failure of states to individual explanations such as strong 
collectivist or ‘tribal’ ties and the dominance of interpersonal relationships rather than 
contractual relationships  (Mbaku, 2007). A cultural anomie explanation can also be 
posed, wherein corruption is significant due to the perception of economic disparities and 
economic hardships (Smith, 2008). This is particularly problematic given the issues with 
development aid and the formation of specific norms surrounding its use that encourage 
or even require corruption (Moyo & Ferguson, 2010).  
 
Regardless of the reason for the high rate of corruption, it is clearly indicated on objective 
comparative measures that demonstrate that African countries are, in general, unusually 
prone to corruption. These metrics are tracked by Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception Index, which measures public sector corruption based on 13 
separate surveys (Transparency International, 2010). Table 2.1 highlights the top and 
bottom ten CPI scores for countries in Africa, derived from Transparency International’s 
Web site. Of these, Botswana was the highest ranking (least corrupt) of all 178 countries 
at 33, while Somalia was the last ranked country at 178 (Transparency International, 
2010). In the 2010 index, Kenya has dropped among the ten bottom African nations at 
number 154 with a ranking of just 2.1, showing the problems that Kenya is likely to face 
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in managing fraud and corruption.  Africa’s general position at the bottom of this ranking 
indicates that it has a worse performance, at least on Transparency International’s 
corruption model, than most other regions (See Appendix IIA and IIB) 
 
 Table 2.1 Top ten and bottom ten African countries as ranked by Transparency International CPI  
Top Ten Countries  Bottom Ten Countries 
Country Rank CPI 2009 
Score 
Country Rank CPI 2009 
Score 
Botswana 33 5.8 Congo Brazzaville 154 2.1 
Mauritius 39 5.4 Guinea Bissau 154 2.1 
Cape Verde 45 5.1 Kenya 154 2.1 
Seychelles 49 4.8 Guinea 164 2.0 
South Africa 54 4.5 Democratic Republic 
of Congo 
164 2.0 
Namibia 56 4.4 Angola 168 1.9 
Tunisia 59 4.3 Equatorial Guinea 168 1.8 
Ghana 62 4.1 Burundi 170 1.8 
Rwanda 66 4.0 Chad 171 1.7 
Lesotho 78 3.5 Sudan 172 1.6 
   Somalia 178 1.1 
(Source: Transparency International, 2010) 
 
General studies from African banking illustrate issues of concern to Kenya. A study of 
banking governance in Ghana found that there were considerable problems with 
corporate governance and fraud (Evans & Dadzie, 1998). This research, from the records 
of the Central Bank of Ghana during the 1990s showed that informed lenders charged 
higher fees for their loans (indicating potential bribes or other corrupt activity), and that 
prior relationships between lending officers and borrowers reduced enforcement of loan 
terms. This research does not provide a clear indication of corruption, although this was 
presented as one of the possibilities; it also suggested that lack of information or informal 
collection practices were evidence, as well as corruption in the general institutional 
structure.  
 
In terms of fraud detection and prevention in African banking, evidence is scarce. 
However, one study showed that Nigerian commercial banks used relatively few risk 
management practices when engaged in information systems outsourcing (a potential 
source of external fraud). This study indicated that strategic, management, and 
information systems approaches were used only lightly in these banks, indicating a 
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serious lack in comparison to international banks, along with little regulatory attention to 
information technology (Adeleye et al., 2004). This both decreases competitive ability 
and increases fraud. Fraud innovations such as the Nigerian or 419 fraud, which 
commonly involves fraudsters using email to contact strangers, claiming to be sons or 
daughters of African diplomats, businessmen or other notables and extracting money due 
to implausible claims of large amounts of money, has made it clear that many African 
countries do not have sufficient fraud controls in place (Ampratwum, 2009). 
 
2.7.2 Structural Adjustment  
In many cases, the use of increased regulation in order to prevent bank fraud is actually 
restricted or discouraged in developing countries by financial policies that make external 
aid contingent on deregulation and liberalization (Grundberg, 1998). These changes are 
commonly made through programs such as World Bank structural adjustment programs, 
which require specific changes to the banking and economic system in order to drive 
foreign investment (Neu et al., 2008).  These regulations are intended to benefit foreign 
direct investment (FDI) inflows by improving the economic environment and 
attractiveness of the host country; however, they also reduce the host country’s ability to 
effectively oversee business and prevent fraud (Grundberg, 1998). Thus, rather than 
decreasing corruption and fraud in incoming industries, the use of financial liberalization 
regimes may actually increase it. This is a problem that has not yet been overcome by 
banking regulators in many countries. Although this problem is not unique to Africa, as 
Asian and South American countries have also undergone structural adjustment, it does 
play a significant role in development of conditions within these countries (and so needs 
to be considered).  
 
 
Nigeria’s experience with structural adjustment demonstrates how well or how poorly 
these regulatory demands may work. The IMF structural adjustment program in Nigeria, 
which began in 1986 under considerable economic pressure, called for a number of 
changes to be made to the regulatory environment in addition to other changes intended 
to reduce Nigeria’s foreign debt load. These changes were intended to promote improved 
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investment climate, reduction of the deficit, and improvement of foreign exchange rates 
(Neu et al., 2008). This required reduction in regulation, public expenditures, and 
reorientation toward an export-led economy. It also came with considerable surveillance 
and oversight regulations by the IMF in order to ensure that the country was fulfilling its 
requirements (Neu et al., 2008). It was not only Nigeria that undertook this adjustment; 
instead, a large number of African countries, including Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, 
Tanzania, and Zimbabwe among others have undertaken a similar process of adjustment. 
The banking sector underwent liberalization and deregulation in keeping with these 
policies as well as the foundation of a deposit insurance program (Neu et al., 2008). 
Accounting technologies and other practices were also introduced. However, the 
reduction in regulation also left the banking industry without clear guidance in terms of 
accounting and reporting. This opened the door to considerable fraud and falsification of 
information throughout this period (Neu et al., 2008). Thus, the regulations intended to 
improve the efficiency of the banking system may have actually reduced its efficiency by 
increasing the opportunity for fraud.  
 
Beginning in the mid-1990s, African governments began to reverse the structural changes 
required by the IMF as it became clear they were no longer effective (Kane & Rice, 
2001). For example, in 1999 the Bank of Uganda increased its capital reserve 
requirements, and through the mid-1990s several African governments began to increase 
the amount of regulation banks were subject to. However, this was still insufficient to 
mitigate the damage to governments and depositors done by the lax regulation that 
allowed fraud to flourish. It also was insufficient to overcome a general atmosphere of 
corruption in some cases (Kane & Rice, 2001).  
 
2.7.3 Bank Privatization and Regulation  
One issue in African banking is the on-going or relatively recent privatization of banks. A 
study of banks in Nigeria from 1990 to 2001 demonstrated that a large number of banks 
had undergone privatization during this time (Beck et al., 2005). Furthermore, during this 
period there was also a development of significant difference in performance between 
privatized banks and those that remained under state control. Beck et al (2005) found that 
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privatized banks became more efficient and less fraud-driven than those that remained 
under state control. However, this research did not examine changes in regulation during 
this time that may have affected the outcomes of the research. The research also showed 
that banks that did not focus on lending, but instead on investment and bond 
management, have better performance than lending-based banks (Beck et al., 2005). It is 
possible that the issue of loan officer reluctance and conflicts of interest may have played 
into this, but that is uncertain.  
 
2.7.4 Islamic Finance and Microfinance – Special Structures 
Two areas where African banking systems differ from Western systems is in the use of 
Islamic finance and microfinance. These structures are not directly dealt with in this 
research, which focuses on the traditional Western-style commercial banking system. 
However, a brief word regarding them is appropriate in this case.  
 
Islamic finance, intended to meet the needs of customers observing Islamic law 
particularly in regard to the payment or charging of interest, is becoming increasingly 
common throughout the Middle East and Africa, and is beginning to play a wider role in 
provision of financial services for Islamic observant individuals in these regions (Pryor, 
2007). The first fully licensed Shariah compliant Kenyan banks are the Gulf African 
Bank (2007) and the First Community Bank (2008) (Wanyoike, 2011).  However, there is 
little evidence regarding fraud in this case, and due to the relatively short establishment of 
these banks they were not included in this study. 
 
Microfinance is an area of banking that does not commonly exist in the Western banking 
practice, but is very common throughout the developing world, especially in Africa. 
Microfinance is the practice of making very small loans (in many cases under $100 USD) 
intended to develop entrepreneurial activity in a given area (Krugman & Wells, 2006). 
Microfinance lenders, isolated from the formal banking sector and with limited access to 
fraud detection and prevention abilities and lower regulation rates, may suffer a higher 
rate of fraud, but actually use stronger social norms to prevent fraud (Arun, 2005).  
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2.8 Hypotheses 
A number of hypotheses can be formulated following analysis of the literature. These 
hypotheses were posed in relation to three of the four following research questions:  
1. What are the characteristics of fraud in the Kenyan banking industry?  
2. What are the perceived characteristics of those that perpetrate fraud in the Kenyan 
banking industry?  
3. How do banks approach fraud management?  
4. Are there differences between the approaches to fraud management adopted by 
Kenyan and international banks?  
 
2.8.1 Hypothesis 1  
The first hypothesis is based on the size and geographic scope of the bank as compared to 
the size of the loss experienced within the bank. This hypothesis is related to the research 
question on the characteristics of fraud in the Kenyan banking industry. Murphy (1993) 
found that there was a linear relationship between the size of an organisation and the 
amount of fraud and theft, but a negative relationship between size and degree of 
supervision. Decreased supervision can lead to increase in fraud (Murphy, 1993).  
 
The literature review identified that accounting transactions are affected by 
organizational characteristics such as the type of industry, organisational size, strategy 
and culture (Singleton and Singleton, 2010). This would suggest that fraudulent 
accounting transactions are influenced by the same factors. Research also shows that 
large organisations are more susceptible to higher incidences of fraud than smaller 
organisations as larger organisations tend to have more complex organisational structures 
(Singleton and Singleton, 2010; Holmes et al., 2000). This indicates that larger banks 
including those in Kenya could experience higher rates of fraud as well as offer greater 
opportunities and gains for fraudsters.  
 
Holmes et al (2000) also found that not only the size of the organisation mattered in 
determining the amount of fraud but also the type of organisation, as larger government 
firms were more likely to become victims of fraud than smaller private firms. Barnes and 
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Webb (2007) found that larger organisations were found to be more susceptible to fraud 
than smaller organisations while public limited and private companies were found to be 
more susceptible to fraud and theft than public sector organisations, but that industry or 
sector did not affect fraud. This may suggest that the size of an individual bank in Kenya 
could determine its’ susceptibility to fraud. 
 
The discussion above leads to three initial hypotheses that will be used to examine the 
relationship between the size of bank and the amount (size) of the loss suffered by the 
organisation due to fraud. These hypotheses are similar in terms of their independent 
variable (size of the bank), but vary in terms of their dependent variable (including total 
loss to fraud, loss to fraud as a percentage of annual earnings, and loss to fraud based on a 
single event).  
 
Hypothesis 1a: The total size of the loss to fraud will vary directly in proportion to the 
type or scope of the bank (where type or scope relates to whether the bank is 
international, national, regional or local) 
Hypothesis 1b: The loss to fraud as a percentage of annual earnings will vary depending 
on the size of the bank.  
 
2.8.2 Hypothesis 2  
This second hypothesis is related to the research question on whether there are 
differences between the approaches to fraud management adopted by Kenyan and 
International banks.  
 
Certain views have been expressed about the likelihood of prosecution. Abiola (2009) 
while researching into the relationship between poor salaries and fraud, and the 
relationship between fraud detection systems and fraud, in Nigeria hinted on the 
likelihood of prosecution, suggesting that Nigerian banks are likely to avoid prosecution 
if possible in order to avoid embarrassment or the market perception that they have been 
cheated or are vulnerable to being cheated. However, the disclosure and prosecution of 
fraudsters in international banks may be more likely, due to the practice of international 
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banks using bounties or bonuses for discovery and prosecution of fraud (Fisher et al., 
2001). This could also be the case in Kenya.  
 
There is also research supporting individual assumptions regarding the differences 
between international and regional or local banks. In a study of international firms in the 
Netherlands, it was found that international firms were high targets of crime and fraud, 
and that this led to a higher rate of prosecution among firms (Van Dijk & Terlouw, 1996). 
International firms are also likely to be interested in observing the laws and institutional 
rules of the country they are operating in, while domestic firms may have more social 
capital, reducing this need (Barker & Cobb, 1999). In many cases, international 
companies may be eager to prosecute fraud in order to avoid the appearance of 
corruption, which could provoke legal difficulties in their home countries or in other 
countries they operate in, such as in the United States under the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act  (Lee & Hong, 2010). Findings of research conducted in the Middle East comprising 
respondents from different cultures indicated that what is considered to be fraud or 
corruption in one culture may not be transgressing cultural norms in another. This lack of 
common understanding of what constitutes fraud and corruption makes it difficult to fight 
and prosecute fraud locally and internationally (Watson, 2003).  
 
Based on the above discussion, hypothesis 2 is proposed as follows: 
Hypothesis 2a: Banks that are international banks or international subsidiary banks will 
be more likely to use criminal prosecution or civil action against fraudsters than national, 
regional, or local banks. 
Hypothesis 2b: Banks will be more likely to use criminal prosecution or civil action 
against external parties than against internal parties.  
 
2.8.3 Hypothesis 3  
Hypothesis 3 draws from the research question on how banks approach fraud 
management. There is considerable practical evidence for the use of internal security and 
auditing protocols, training, and other mechanisms for control of internal fraud, and their 
effectiveness within the organisation in terms of controlling fraud at the corporate culture 
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level (May, 2003; Singleton, Singleton, & Bologna, 2006). However, this research is not 
uniform. Research by Barnes and Webb (2007) indicates that there is no relationship 
between the size of fraud loss and the nature of management controls employed by the 
organisation. There may also be a cultural element to the effectiveness of management 
controls, as traditional management controls have proved to be more effective in a 
Sinhalese organisation than were imported, stricter control practices from privatised 
international owners (Wickramasinghe & Hopper, 2005). Furthermore, management 
controls have proved to be ineffective in cases such as Enron, where strong management 
controls were undermined by the development of a culture where management fraud was 
prevalent (Free & Macintosh, 2007). However, some types of controls, such as strong 
records management, are significantly associated with a reduction in fraud (Palmer, 
2000). Given this conflicting information, it is likely that the use of procedural and 
management controls for fraud will reduce fraud, but possibly only in certain ways.  
 
Size of the organisation is also a determining factor in how the firms will choose 
organisational security protocols.  In a study of major Australian firms, larger firms were 
found to have more effective data management protocols (Nord, Nord, & Zu, 2005). 
Larger organisations have also been found to use internal auditing approaches more 
commonly than smaller organisations (Coram, Ferguson, & Moroney, 2008). 
Furthermore, smaller organisations are associated with more reluctance to identify fraud 
even in cases where it is clear given the existing security protocols (Keenan, 2000).  
 
 
Given this evidence, Hypothesis 3 is posed: 
Hypothesis 3a: The use of procedural and auditing approaches to fraud detection and 
monitoring will result in lower occurrence of fraud.  
Hypothesis 3b: Large organisations will be more likely to adopt organisational security 
protocols than small organisations.  
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2.9 Summary 
This chapter has presented the most relevant secondary information identified by the 
researcher in the literature for the area of research. The fraud theories provide an 
understanding about the nature, characteristics and behaviour of fraud and those who 
perpetrate fraud. A theoretical and contextual framework has been laid by identifying the 
economic foundations of fraud, corporate governance practices, types of banking fraud 
and aspects of fraud detection and prevention. The body of empirical evidence for fraud 
in the banking industry has been examined, presenting specific information and evidence 
regarding areas such as the use of software and auditing practices for the areas of 
concern. The chapter further explored why international banks set up a presence in 
developing countries. The importance and challenges of bank governance, regulation and 
harmonization, deregulation, supervision and law enforcement have been considered. 
This chapter also provided contextual evidence for banking in Africa, including special 
concerns of African banking as well as evidence regarding the management of bank fraud 
in Africa. From the literature presented above it is clear that most of the research and 
studies on fraud and fraud prevention have been carried out in very few countries, 
notably, the United States of America, Great Britain and Australia. This justifies and 
presents a strong case for more fraud research in Africa.  
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Chapter 3  
Contextualising Kenya’s Banking Industry 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces Kenya’s banking system highlighting the historical, economic 
and social-political issues that have affected the banking industry. The chapter sets the 
background and context in which the banking industry operates and serves to enhance the 
understanding of the development of this industry. Discussion in this chapter includes the 
structure of the banking industry (Section 3.1) and historical, political, economic, legal, 
technological, regulatory and other factors that influence the banking industry (Section 
3.2 – Section 3.9). Section 3.10 presents the construction of a conceptual framework 
intended to support the findings. This information discusses primarily the external factors 
involved in the development of fraud within the banking industry.  
 
3.2 Structure of the Banking industry 
The Kenyan banking system falls under the auspices of the Central Bank of Kenya 
(CBK). The CBK is an independent Central Bank that engages with fiscal and monetary 
policies for the Kenyan government as well as oversight of the Kenyan banking industry 
(Central Bank of Kenya, 2007; Central Bank of Kenya, 2008c). Other than formulating or 
implementing monetary policies the CBK fosters the liquidity, solvency and proper 
functioning of the banking and financial systems in Kenya (Central Bank of Kenya, 
2007). As at the end of December 2010 the banking sector comprised of 43 commercial 
banks, 1 mortgage finance company, 5 deposit taking microfinance institutions (DTM), 2 
representative offices of foreign banks and 126 foreign exchange bureaus which are all 
private and mostly locally owned (Bank Supervision Report, 2010). This included 33 
locally owned institutions and 12 foreign owned institutions (Bank Supervision Report, 
2008). The local banks included three state-owned or primarily state-owned institutions, 
28 privately owned institutions and 2 mortgage finance institutions. The foreign owned 
banks consisted of 8 locally incorporated foreign banks and 4 branches of foreign 
incorporated banks. Figure 3.1 demonstrates this arrangement and structure of the 
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Kenyan banking industry. Additional components of the financial sector in Kenya that 
will not be studied include micro finance institutions, insurance companies and the 
Nairobi stock exchange. Further information regarding the banking sector in Kenya is 
found in Appendices IIC and Appendix IID  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Ownership structures of commercial banks and mortgage finance institutions in Kenya 
 (Source: Bank Supervision Report, 2008; Central Bank of Kenya, 2008b) 
 
Table 3.1 summarizes the number of banks, mortgage finance companies (MFC), micro 
finance institutes (MFI), representative (REP) offices, deposit taking micro finance 
45 
BANKING 
INSTITUTIONS 
33 
LOCAL 
12** 
FOREIGN 
3* 
GOVERNMENT 
8 
LOCALLY 
INCORPORATED 
4  
FOREIGN 
BRANCHES 
2 
MORTGAGE 
FINANCE 
28 
PRIVATE 
KENYA 
BANKING INSTITUTIONS 
COMMERCIAL BANKS 
43 
MORTGAGE FINANCE COMPANIES 
2 
82 
 
institute (DTM), building (BLDG) societies and foreign exchange (forex) bureaus 
between 2006 and 2010. 
 
Table 3.1 various types of banks in Kenya  
Year No. of 
Banks 
Commercial 
Banks 
Mortgage 
Finance 
Companies 
Micro 
Finance 
Agencies 
Rep 
Office 
Building 
Societies 
Forex 
Bureaus 
2010 44 43 1 - 2 5 126 
2009 46 44 2 - - - 130 
2008 45 43 2 - - - 120 
2007 45 42 2 1 - - 97 
2006 45 41 2 1 - 1 95 
(Source: Bank Supervision Reports, 2006-2010) 
 
Large banks (comprising 14 banks) dominate the market and hold over 80% of the total 
net assets, net advances, customer deposits and capital reserves. The remaining 20% of 
the net assets are shared among medium size banks (13%), small banks (4%) and other 
financial institutions. The big banks tend to enjoy high profitability, 90% of the total 
profits in the banking sector, while several other banks are affected by non-performing 
loans (Bank Supervision Report, 2008).  
 
 
3.3 History and growth of the banking industry in Kenya 
This section outlines the dynamic nature of Kenya’s banking industry and lays out 
various factors that have contributed to strengths and weaknesses in the industry. Some of 
these factors have encouraged mismanagement and fraudulent practices within the 
industry.  
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3.3.1 History of the Banking industry 
Kenya has a long history of commercial banking that goes back to 1896 when the 
National Bank of India opened a branch in Mombasa, Kenya. Kenya’s financial system 
grew faster post-independence than most other sub-Saharan African countries 
(Brownridge, 1998). By the time of independence in 1963, Kenya had 10 commercial 
banks. 80% of the market share for bank deposits was held between three big banks - 
National and Grindlays Bank, Barclays Bank, and Standard Bank (Kenya Commercial 
Bank, 2011). On achieving independence there was a need to develop a more locally 
oriented banking system. Thus, upon independence the Government of Kenya (GOK) 
substantially nationalized the National and Grindlays Bank by acquiring 60% of its 
shareholding. The GOK was later to acquire 100% of the National and Grindlays shares 
in 1970, taking full control of Kenya’s largest commercial bank and subsequently 
renaming it the Kenya Commercial Bank (KCB). Today KCB boasts the largest branch 
network in Kenya (Kenya Commercial Bank, 2011). Other than the KCB two more banks 
were established in 1970: the Cooperative Bank of Kenya and the National Bank of 
Kenya (NBK). By the early 1970s the Kenya Commercial Bank and the National Bank of 
Kenya held between them 35% of the paid up capital while the Barc1ays Bank and the 
Standard Bank accounted for about 22% each. In view of the move towards divesture, the 
two governments owned commercial banks (KCB and NBK) sold 40% of their shares to 
the public between 1988 and 1996 (Ngugi & Kabubo, 1998) 
 
The global economic recession of the mid-2000’s had little direct effect on the Kenyan 
economy. The Kenyan Banking Sector remained strong in the wake of the global 
financial crisis due to low levels of their participation in or weak financial linkages to 
global financial markets (Bank Supervision Report, Annual report 2008). 
 
Commendable progress has been made in improving access to financial services in Kenya 
over the past few years. This increase in accessing financial services is attributed to the 
increased use of non-bank financial institutions, especially companies that are providing 
mobile phone money transfer services such as Safaricom (MPESA) and Zain 
(SOKOTELE) that more than doubled demand for financial services from 7.5% in 2006 
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to 17.9% in 2009. By the end of December 2009, MPESA had attracted over 9 million 
registered customers and 16,000 agents country-wide (Bank Supervision Report, 2009). 
 
3.3.2 Changes in the banking industry 
Despite the rapid development witnessed in the financial system, Kenya's capital market 
still remains relatively young. With a banking industry that stands at just over 40 
commercial banks and several foreign exchange bureaus, Kenya’s banking industry is 
relatively large. In the past 2 decades the banking industry has undergone changes due to 
mergers, acquisitions and conversions.  
 
As a result of changes in the operating environment a number of commercial banks and 
other licensed institutions have opted for mergers and acquisitions. Between 1994 and 
June 2010 there have been 32 successful mergers. The details of specific banks that 
merged are shown in Appendix IIE. Only three acquisitions have taken place to date (as 
shown in Appendix IIE). Over the years several non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) 
have transformed or converted themselves into commercial banks by meeting the 
minimum prudential requirements for commercial banks as far as capital adequacy, 
liquidity and assets requirements are concerned. Details of the specific bank conversions 
as well as a comparative graph showing mergers, acquisitions and conversions are 
contained in Appendix IIF. 
 
In the face of the second wave of banking failures in 1993-1994, the Central Bank of 
Kenya tightened the Banking laws in 1995 requiring all Non-Bank Financial Institutions 
(NBFI) to convert to Commercial banks or face closure.  
 
 
3.4 Legal, Regulatory and Policy Frameworks of Banking 
The Companies Act (Chapter 486, Laws of Kenya) the Banking Act (Chapter 488, Laws 
of Kenya, 2009) and the Central Bank of Kenya Act (Chapter 491, Laws of Kenya) 
provide the main legal framework for banking in Kenya, in addition to best practices. The 
Central Bank is legally empowered through the Central Bank Act and Chapter 492 of the 
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laws of Kenya to oversee the performance of the financial and banking systems in terms 
of solvency, liquidity and stability of the financial systems. The Central Bank also 
regulates and supervises the money market while enforcing the Banking Act and 
prudential guidelines for best practices in the industry. The Bank also works closely with 
the Institute of Certified Public Accountants of Kenya (ICPAK) to ensure that the 
banking sector leads the other sectors in the implementation of International Accounting 
Standards (Centre for Corporate Governance, 2004). Other regulating and legal bodies 
include the Kenya Bankers Association (KBA) and the Capital Markets Authority 
(CMA). 
 
The capital market is part of the financial system that provides funds for long-term 
development and brings together lenders (investors) of capital and borrowers (companies 
that sell securities to the public) of capital (Capital Markets Authority, 2011). The CMA’s 
main goal is to provide long-term credit, reducing pressure on the government and 
expanding capital market ownership.  
 
The Kenya Bankers Association is a self-regulating body dealing with bank operational 
rules and procedures. On the 16th July 1962 the Kenya Bankers (Employers) Association 
was registered as a Trade Union to cater for the employment rights of bank workers. In 
April 1968 a separate sister body called the Kenya Bankers Association was registered 
under the Societies Act to take care of other social and business interests of bank 
workers. However, in the year 2000, the two Associations merged together to create the 
Kenya Bankers Association, embracing the functions of the two bodies. The 
Association’s membership consists of the 43 Commercial Banks (African Banking & 
Finance Conference, 2010).   
 
Policy reforms have seen a shift in the banking sector from total control by foreign 
investors at the time of independence to one that now has significant local ownership 
(Ikiara, Nyandemo and Ikiara, 2003). Government divesture has also played a role. Over 
the past two decades (since around 1990) the government has sold most of its shares in 
banks like Kenya Commercial Bank, National Bank of Kenya and Housing Finance 
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Company to the public and private sector. Policy in the banking sector has remained 
relatively liberal since the 1980’s with restrictions on paid up capital for foreign banks 
and foreign shareholding of listed banks being relaxed. After the implementation of the 
World Bank sponsored Structural Adjustment programmes (SAPs) a number of reforms 
were initiated in the financial sector with an aim of tightening the regulatory 
environment, fostering competition and enhancing efficiency (Ikiara, Nyandemo and 
Ikiara, 2003).  
 
The legislative framework for the banking industry was provided by the Banking Act of 
1968, which replaced the banking ordinance enacted under the colonial era. This legal 
framework and CBK’s supervisory responsibilities evolved to regulate a banking system 
confined to subsidiaries of multinational or international banks that had strong internal 
controls and qualified staff. Conversely, with the advent of local financial institutions in 
the 1970’s the demands placed on the bank supervisors changed. Financial institutions 
begun to mushroom but they were often fraudulently and incompetently managed and 
lacked the required capitalization (Brownridge, 1998). This can be blamed on the relaxed 
regulatory and supervisory systems prevalent and operating in the banking and financial 
systems at this time, which cultivated a culture of poor governance and weak 
management in the industry. Clear laws, rules and regulations need to be set up to 
legislate and regulate the banking industry to enable effective legal enforcement (Gikandi 
and Bloor, 2010). 
 
3.5 Kenya’s Banking Crises: 1980-1990 
Kenya has experienced two major waves of banking crises that have affected the industry 
and encouraged fraudulent practices within the industry. These crises provide an 
understanding of history that has influenced management in the banking industry. 
  
Immediately after independence in 1963 the Kenyan banking and financial system can be 
described as one that was highly controlled by the government. In 1982 the government 
relaxed some of the strict rules that had been placed on the issuance of licenses. This 
encouraged a number of non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) to join the banking 
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industry. The government also introduced a low capital requirement of KES 5 million 
that could easily be raised (Centre for Corporate Governance, 2004). By the onset of 
financial reforms in the mid-1980s, the number of licensed commercial banks had 
doubled to 24, comprising of 15 foreign-owned, 3 state banks and 6 locally-owned 
private banks (Mwega, n.d.). The mushrooming of financial institutions in the 1970’s 
coupled with lax banking laws, inadequate CBK supervisory capacity and the use of 
political connections by some banks to override the banking laws resulted in deficiencies 
of the banking system that ushered in several bank failures (37 bank failures as at 1998) 
in the 1980s and 1990s.  
 
A total of 10 NBFIs and 2 banks were closed or taken over in the period 1984-1989 and a 
further 10 NBFIs and 5 banks in 1993-1994 (Brownridge, 1998b). In spite of the efforts 
of the Central Bank and the Treasury to bail out the ailing institutions, the Rural Urban 
Credit Finance collapsed in December 1984, under a cloud regarding fraudulent political 
involvement that resulted in a high non-performing debt load (Brownridge, 1998).  
 
An amendment to the Banking Act in 1985 expanded the safety net by putting restrictions 
on insider or connected lending, raising the level of minimum capital requirements (to 
KES 15 million for a bank and KES7.5 million for a NBFI) and tightening the licensing 
procedure. At this point in time several financial institutions had secured funds from 
parastatal organisations and suffered liquidity crises when the same parastatals suddenly 
withdrew their deposits supposedly for political motives. Some financial institutions 
flaunted lending procedures or attempted to squeeze interest rate margins. Poorly 
qualified managers were also often appointed from among less able employees 
(Brownridge, 1998; Central Bank of Kenya, 2008). Other than poor management 
practices, bad governance and weak internal controls were prevalent during this period. 
The Continental Bank of Kenya Limited and Continental Credit Finance Limited 
collapsed in 1986 and Capital Finance Limited followed in 1987. Seven collapsed banks 
were merged to create Consolidated Bank of Kenya Limited in 1989. 
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In response to the first wave of crisis (1984-6) the Deposit Protection Fund Board 
(DPFB) was established in 1986 as a deposit insurance scheme to provide cover for 
depositors and act as bank liquidator. The same amendments gave Central Bank of Kenya 
the responsibility of risk minimization through enhanced prudential regulation, 
supervision and surveillance. The function of curator and revival of ailing institutions was 
also entrusted to the Central Bank (Central Bank of Kenya, 2008). 
 
Eleven institutions were placed under liquidation in 1993. Ten of these were under the 
DPFB while one went into voluntary liquidation. Further failures were seen, however, 
including two in 1994, three in 1996, one in 1997, five in 1998, one in 1999, one in 2001, 
two in 2003, and two in 2005 (Central Bank of Kenya, 2008).  
 
Shared characteristics in bank failures in the 1980s and 1990s include strict ownership 
control (individual or family), concentrated lending decisions and policies, and 
mismanagement of loans including disbursement of loans without collateral, 
documentation, or credit-worthiness of borrowers (Brownridge, 1998). The majority of 
banks thus collapsed due to fraudulent or imprudent lending, which was often politically 
linked (Brownridge, 1998). This could have been avoided by independent management 
(Brownridge, 1998b). A further factor was a rush to privatization from government 
control, which compounded the problem by introducing a weak institutional environment 
and ineffective legal and regulatory controls as well as sale to connected individuals, 
reducing the overall benefit of privatization (Beck & Fuchs, 2004). Other causes of 
failure included inadequate capitalization, excessive insider lending resulting in non-
performing loans and adverse selection of borrowers (Brownridge, 1998). In particular, 
insider loans to politicians and others for speculative ventures such as real estate resulted 
in a mismatching of bank asset and liability maturities (Waweru and Kalani, 2009). This 
is consistent with evidence from other banking environments showing that fraudulent or 
unsound banking practices by managers are implicated in failure of banks (Rezaee, 
2001). 
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3.6 The Goldenberg Scandal 
One of the largest scandals so far in Kenya’s history is what has become popularly known 
as the Goldenberg Scandal. This scandal involved two companies, Goldenberg 
International Limited and the Exchange Bank Limited. These two companies were related 
as they shared common shareholders, promoters and directors1 (Republic of Kenya, 
2005). Goldenberg International was registered in 1990 as stated in its Articles of 
Association (Article 3(a) and (b)) to: 
 
“3 (a) To carry on the business of import and export in any or all types of minerals, gold, 
silver, diamonds, precious and semiprecious stones … in Kenya to all PTA countries, 
Europe, India and other parts of the world. 
 
(b) To prospect, explore, open and work claims or mines and raise dig and quarry for 
gold, silver, mineral ores … diamonds, precious and semi-precious stones … in Kenya 
and in other parts of East Africa.”(Republic of Kenya, 2005, p.36) 
 
There is no evidence that Goldenberg International ever engaged in the activity for which 
it was registered, and Kenya has few sources of gold or diamonds. It is therefore largely 
believed that Goldenberg International brought in gold and diamonds from the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and exported the same while maintaining that they 
processed the minerals from Kenya. There was also no evidence of the company having 
other shares allotted and paid for from anyone else except the two directors. The 
Exchange Bank was officially registered and licensed to operate by the Ministry of 
Finance in 1991 with a proposed capital of 40 million Kenya Shillings (KES). Like 
Goldenberg International Limited, there was no evidence that other persons had been 
invited to take up shares in Exchange Bank Limited. No register of members existed, no 
copies of share certificate were available and at no time had the Central Bank of Kenya 
confirmed that the Exchange Bank had the proposed nominal capital (Republic of Kenya, 
2005). Although there are clear signs that this was a fraudulent company, economic and 
political upheaval in the Kenyan government allowed the firm to be established.  
 
                                                 
1 Kamlesh Pattni, the 25 year old son of a gold jeweller dealer in Mombasa and Mr. Kanyuto, the then 
Director of Intelligence with the Kenya Police. He was also a Director in the First American Bank and 
Firestone East Africa 
90 
 
To sum it up the Goldenberg Affair was nothing “but a series of business deals or alleged 
business deals revolving round various economic schemes” that related to “Export 
Compensation, Pre-shipment Finance, Retention Accounts, Convertible Foreign 
Exchange bearer certificates (Forex C), Spot and Forward Contracts, cheque kiting and 
outright theft” (Republic of Kenya, 2005, p.35). The government had set up an export 
compensation scheme and through it paid out incentives to Goldenberg International for 
the supposed export of gold estimated at USD80 Million (BBC News, 2006). 
 
Even though it is largely acknowledged to be fraud, this case has been difficult to 
prosecute as the scandal is largely believed to have involved prominent people and top 
government officials2. Economically, the Goldenberg Affair has cost the tax payer over 
USD600 million with another estimated USD1 Billion believed to have been siphoned 
out through the Goldenberg connections. At the time this scandal erupted in 1993 the 
losses from this fraud were estimated at an amount equal to 10% of Kenya’s Gross 
Domestic Product (Republic of Kenya, 2005; Family News Forum, 2010; BBC News, 
2006). 
 
In 1993 when the scandal broke the Exchange Bank was closed down due to failure to 
honour foreign exchange contracts. Other banks that had dealings with Goldenberg 
International Limited went into liquidation at around the same time, including the Trade 
Bank, Post Bank Credit Ltd., Delphis Bank Ltd., Trust Bank Ltd. and Pan African Bank. 
This heralded the second wave of the banking crisis in Kenya.  
 
There were a number of effects from the Goldenberg Scandal. The Parliamentary process 
of scrutinizing financial and legal documents had to be addressed and the Central bank 
had to review legal and regulatory mechanisms. The office of the Auditor General was 
also held to account for the removal of qualified staff and their replacement with less 
                                                 
2 Those allegedly charged include former intelligence chief James Kanyotu, former treasury permanent 
secretary Wilfred Karuga Koinange, former Central Bank governor Eric Kotut and his deputy Eliphaz 
Riungu. Among those mentioned adversely in this case were, the former President’s (Moi) two sons – 
Gideon and Philip, two former Vice Presidents, prominent business men and senior civil servants. The 
Goldenberg Commission report states that the former President, Moi, and the then Finance Minister, 
George Saitoti, have a case to answer as they must have been aware of the scam. The top executives of the 
Department of Mines and Geology are also included here. 
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qualified staff that were not competent enough to produce audited accounts for the 
Parliamentary Accounts Committee. The police did not move swift enough to arrest the 
perpetrators, nor did the Attorney General rise to the occasion by bringing a case against 
the perpetrators. Instead the Goldenberg scandal was first brought to court by the Law 
Society of Kenya, while the judiciary system actually impeded progress (Republic of 
Kenya, 2005). The Goldenberg Scandal continues to be implicated in Kenyan 
socioeconomic and monetary losses as well as affecting the financial services industry.  
 
3.7 Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in Kenyan Banks 
Moral hazard arises when individuals, or a group of individuals, prioritizes their interest 
or/and possible financial gain without giving a thought to the moral implications of their 
decision. It involves a trade off between risk and return and is mainly characterized by 
asymmetric information (Brownridge, 1998b).  Kenya’s banking crisis of the early 1980’s 
and 1990’s was precipitated by the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection. Some 
banks were lending without regard to the stipulated minimum capital requirements set by 
the CBK. As argued by Brownridge (1998a), moral hazard is inversely related to bank 
capital. Poorly capitalized banks have not invested much of their own money and rely 
mainly on capital provided by other people. Such banks therefore do not stand to lose 
much by investing in risky ventures.  
 
Brownridge (1998b) further argues that moral hazard becomes more severe when banks 
engage in insider lending. Insider lending is profitable when profits arise from the project 
as these profits will all be internal profits. However, when the projects return losses the 
bank will have to bear the full brunt of the loss, having no external party to share the loss 
with. As proved in the case of Kenya’s banking crisis, insider lending is a leading cause 
of bank failures worldwide (Caprio, 1997, Pg.6-7, cited by Brownridge, 1998b). 
 
Factors involved in moral hazard include information asymmetry (when one party is 
more informed than another and thus has a greater advantage in terms of negotiation 
power) (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) and adverse selection, or the process of sorting 
potential borrowers and “is a consequence of different borrowers having different 
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probabilities of repaying their loan” (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981, Pg.393). An adverse 
selection problem arises when a borrower who borrows at a high interest rate is unable to 
repay the loan leading to reduced profits to the lender. Several “political banks” were 
affected by the effects of adverse selection during the era of the banking crisis, after loans 
to politicians at a high interest rate resulted in default and eventually liquidation of the 
banks. Non-performing loans still remain a problem in Kenya today. This is shown by 
on-going high interest rate spreads (high lending rates) and low deposit rates. With 
increasing competition for customers in the banking industry, adverse selection of 
borrowers and moral hazard will only get worse, leaving local banks more exposed to 
these hazards due to less credit-worthy borrowers (Brownridge, 1998b).  
 
3.8 Developments in the Legal and Supervisory Framework 
The CBK in collaboration with the Ministry of Finance champions legislative reforms for 
enhancing stability, safety, efficiency, accessibility and integrity within the banking 
system. In 2008 the Microfinance Act was made operational, the publication of the Credit 
Reference Bureau regulations took place, the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money 
Laundering Bill, 2008 was tabled in Parliament and Presidential Assent was given to the 
Finance Act, 2008. 
 
3.8.1 Credit Reference Bureaus (CRB’s) 
Publication of the Banking (Credit Reference Bureau) Regulations, 2008 on 11th July 
2008 and the operationalization of the same on 2nd February 2009 marked a milestone in 
Kenyan banking. These regulations empower the CBK to license and oversee Credit 
Reference Bureaus that will collate credit information from banking institutions on non-
performing loans, dishonoured cheques (other than on technical reasons), proven cases of 
fraud, forgeries and cheque kiting, false statements and declarations, tendering false 
securities and misapplication of borrowed funds. The Central Bank of Kenya received 
three applications for CRB licenses before end of 2009 from the Credit Reference Bureau 
Africa Limited (CRB Africa), Metropol Credit Reference Bureau Limited (Metropol) and 
Compuscan (K) Limited (Compuscan). However, only CRB Africa has been approved as 
of August 2009 (Bank Supervision Report, 2008; Bank Supervision Report, 2009). As at 
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30th September 2010, banks had accessed 103,332 credit reports. The uptake of credit 
reports by banks’ is expected to increase as use of credit referencing is entrenched in 
banks’ credit appraisal processes (Bank Supervision Report, 2010).  
 
3.8.2 Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act 
The AML Bill became an Act of Parliament in December 2009. The Act is significant as 
it represents the first step Kenya is taking in criminalizing the offence of money 
laundering. This Act establishes the Financial Reporting Centre, the Assets Recovery 
Agency and the Anti-Money Laundering Advisory Board. It allows for the confiscation 
of wealth and assets arising from money laundering by instituting procedures for both 
civil and criminal forfeiture. The AML Act establishes procedures for international 
assistance in investigations and proceedings enabling banks to work with other banks 
world-wide to fight the money laundering crime as well as reinforcing financial integrity 
(Bank Supervision Report, 2009; Bank Supervision Report, 2010). 
 
3.8.3 The Finance Act 
Every year the Finance Act is amended for changes and developments in the legal and 
supervisory arena. Importantly, the Finance Act of 2009 gave the Central Bank of Kenya 
permission to share bank information with fiscal or tax agencies and fraud investigation 
agencies. 
 
3.8.4 IT Usage  
There has been a marked increase in ICT investment by banks in the industry. ICT 
investment has been driven by customer awareness of and demand for ATMs and related 
services such as mobile phone and Internet banking, as well as improved efficiency 
(Bank Supervision Report, 2009; Bank Supervision Report 2010).There has been a 
noticeable improvement in staff – customer ratio from 1:60 in 1996 to  1:252 in 2008 
(Bank Supervision Report, 2008).  
 
As at December 2010, 33 out of the 44 bank institutions were providing electronic 
banking, while 19 banks offer overseas electronic money transfer services in 
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collaboration with various international money transfer agents. Other e-banking services 
introduced by financial institutions included the electronic viewing and retrieval of bank 
accounts and statements via email, balance enquiries, cheque book requests and enquiries 
on status of cheques, notification on purchases and withdrawals made by the customer, 
transfer of funds between designated accounts and utility payment services and mobile 
phone top ups.  
 
The security of electronic banking in Kenya is questionable. Recent reports indicate that 
electronic funds transfer systems, created loopholes for fraud (Irungu, 2011) representing 
69% of the total fraud reported in the second quarter for 2010 (Irungu, 2011). This 
suggests that e-banking is exposing banks and rendering them more vulnerable to fraud. 
 
Developments in information technology have also stimulated competition from the 
mobile phone industry. Since the advent of the mobile phone money transfer services in 
March 2007 with Safaricom’s M-Pesa service, other mobile operators have registered 
over 15 million customers (Bank Supervision Report, 2010). The M-Pesa service had 
facilitated the transfer of more than KESS23.77 billion by October 2008($339.5 million) 
(Anon, 2008). It is estimated that 13 million Kenyans own mobile phones, and that 73% 
use mobile banking services (Government of Kenya, 2008). M-Pesa remains the fore-
runner in the mobile phone money transfer industry, shifting 305.7 million transactions 
valued at approximately US$8 billion (KShs727.8 billion). This has prompted banks to 
respond to customer needs by entering into partnership with mobile phone transfer 
service companies to provide mobile banking services to banking customers. Banking 
services offered by commercial banks include ZAP (Standard Chartered Bank in 
collaboration with mobile phone provider Zain) and EAZZY 24-7 (a partnership between 
Safaricom and Equity Bank), among others (Bank Supervision Report, 2010). There are 
already indications that cases of fraud are surfacing in the mobile phone transfer services. 
In 2010 fraudsters reportedly stole US$233,333 (KShs21 million) through Safaricom’s 
M-Pesa money transfer system (Irungu, 2011).  
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3.8.5 Agent Banking 
The agent banking model allows financial institutions to provide banking services in 
areas where there is no direct need for a physical branch, but there is a need for banking 
services, reducing the cost of service provision and expanding services for the unbanked. 
This new model eliminates the need for a physical bank building and reduces costs while 
providing convenient banking services for the public (Risk Management Survey, 2010). 
This model is being used in other developing countries like India and several South 
American countries such as Brazil, Peru, Colombia, Chile and Mexico. Brazil currently 
operates the largest agent banking system in the world. 
 
Since the coming into operations of the Guidelines on Agent Banking in May 2010, six 
banks have applied to the CBK for Agent Network approval. Of these, two applications 
had been granted approval by end of September 2010, while the other four are at various 
stages of review. As at 30th September 2010, CBK had approved 5,892 agents of which 
4,392 of these agents are linked to the telecommunication business with 1,500 comprising 
other types of enterprises. Two thirds of agents are in rural areas. The principal-agent 
problem poses a fraud risk and banks must carefully investigate agents before appointing 
them (Wafula, 2010). There are also issues in regulation and legal frameworks for this 
type of banking (Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, 2011). 
 
3.9 Regional growth and networking 
Kenyan banks have continued to spread into the East African regions. The East African 
Central Banks of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi finalised a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in late 2008 that is aimed at facilitating 
information sharing and supervisory co-operation especially for banking groups that are 
regional. With the banks leading the way, by the end of 2009, similar arrangements were 
achieved between the Insurance Regulatory Authority (IRA), Capital Markets Authority 
(CMA) and the Retirement Benefits Authority (RBA). These initiatives highlight the 
growing need for co-ordination first amongst the domestic regulators and then amongst 
foreign and domestic regulators. It is anticipated that banks will continue to explore new 
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regional opportunities and consolidate their market niches (Bank Supervision report, 
2008; Bank Supervision report, 2009) 
 
Through various initiatives led by World Bank, International Monetary Fund and the 
Financial Stability Institute (FSI) strategies are being laid to enhance the harmonization 
of supervisory practices. Meanwhile the CBK is currently involved in efforts to establish 
monetary unions by the East African Community (EAC), the Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the African Union (AU). The EAC and 
COMESA are building blocks for the African Monetary Union. The plan is that through 
the Monetary Affairs Committee (MAC), an EAC Committee tasked with the mandate of 
laying the foundation for a common monetary union, one currency and one Central Bank 
will be established in East Africa. Such growth emphasizes the need for harmonisation of 
supervisory policies, practices and procedures.  
 
Even though regionally Kenya’s banking and financial systems are relatively well 
developed it has not achieved its full potential due to structural barriers and weaknesses 
(Beck and Fuchs, 2004). Expanding operations into new regions will further complicate 
these structural barriers due to the imminent challenge of cross-border fraud and risk 
management. 
 
3.10 The Conceptual Framework 
Following examination of the literature, theoretical and empirical research that has been 
conducted, a conceptual framework has been designed that takes into account a number 
of the requirements of the study and identifies potential areas of influence on the practice 
of fraud. The conceptual framework is shown in Figure 3.2. The conceptual diagram 
separates the internal and external industry factors. The internal factors represent bank 
specific and inter-bank factors while the external factors represent factors from without 
the banking industry that impact on fraud management.  
 
The conceptual framework begins with the core of the fraud – the perpetrator, or 
individual committing the fraud, and his or her motivation. Thus, the first component of 
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the conceptual framework is represented by Cressey’s fraud triangle formed by the three 
elements of pressure, opportunity, and rationalization (Cressey, 1973; Wells, 2005).  
 
The second component is the internal industry factors, including factors that both 
encourage and discourage fraud, such as information sharing, inter-bank competition, 
organisational characteristics, insider involvement, internal controls, and information 
technology (Barth et al, 2008; Breuer, 2006; Canhoto & Backhouse, 2007; Cressey, 1973; 
Holtfreter, 2005; Macey & O’Hara, 2003; Smigel, 1956; Wells, 2004; Zahra, Priem & 
Rasheed, 2007).  
 
The third component is the external industry factors. These include legal factors like 
regulation and law and enforcement as well as general governance environment (Aguilar, 
Gill & Pino, 2000; Barth et al., 2008; Doidge, Karolyi, & Stulz, 2007; Licht, 
Goldschmidt, & Schwartz, 2005; Macey & O’Hara, 2003; Wilhelm, 2004). Ethical 
factors also play a role (Aguilar, Gill & Pino, 2000; Cressey, 1973; Schmidt, 2005; 
Wells, 2005). Sociocultural factors such as corruption and acceptable business practices 
must also be considered (Bakre, 2007; Transparency International, 2009; Zahra, Priem & 
Rasheed, 2007). The use of information technology in society generally is also 
considered at this level (Fernandez & Gonzales, 2005). Further factors considered include 
political, economic, and customer factors. 
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Figure 3.2: Conceptual Framework for fraud in Kenya’s banking industry 
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3.10.1 The Fraud Triangle   
The centre of the fraud is the fraud triangle representing the individual, which has been 
discussed earlier in Chapter 2, Section 2.3.1, as this model best describes the reasoning 
behind individual fraud and fraudsters.  
The use of the fraud triangle as the foundational model can be justified by the fact that it 
has gained professional acceptance and this framework has been formally adopted into 
the Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 99 as an official model in detection of 
financial statement fraud (Ramos, 2003; AICPA, 2002). Table 3.2 operationally defines 
each of the three main elements. 
 
Table 3.2 Definitions of individual factors in fraud (Fraud Triangle) 
Factor Definition  
Pressure 
(Section 2.3.1) 
Pressure will be defined as motivation for commission of fraud, which is defined as 
the non-sharable problem at the source of the fraud (Cressey, 1973; Wells, 2005). Six 
non-shareable problems (sub-types) leading to pressure to commit fraud will be 
included in this model. However, these sub-types should not be considered to be 
mutually exclusive, as they often interact (Cressey, 1973). 
• Violation of obligations will refer to pressure created from failure to meet 
obligations caused by gambling, drinking, drugs, or excessive personal debt 
(Wells, 2005).  
• Personal failures will refer to failure of investments, losses caused by bad 
judgment, divorce or other relationship failure (Wells, 2005) 
• Business reversal will refer to failures of business that cause pressure for 
fraud, including increase in business rates, losses due to recession, or other 
financial factors (Wells, 2005) 
• Isolation will refer to feelings that there is no one to share the problems with, 
including isolation at work as well as at home and in social life (Wells, 2005) 
• Status gaining will refer to behaviours that are focused on increasing the 
lifestyle status of the individual and allowing them to live beyond their 
means, such as purchase of luxury goods, houses, vehicles, or other high-
status products (Wells, 2005) 
• Employer-employee relations will refer to behaviours promoted by a 
perceived breakdown of the relationship between the employer and the 
employee and feelings of betrayal or lack of trust resulting from this 
relationship breakdown (Wells, 2005).  
Opportunity 
(Section 2.3.1) 
Opportunity refers to the access and technical skills required in order to allow the 
individual to conceive of and successfully complete the conceived fraud (Cressey, 
1973; Wells, 2005).  
Rationalization 
(Section 2.3.1)  
Rationalization refers to the a priori reasoning that the person committing fraud uses in 
order to allow them to commit the fraud and still maintain a personal image of himself 
or herself as an honourable person (Wells, 2005).  
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3.10.2 Industry Factors  
Although the individual commits the fraud under the individual fraud triangle model 
described above, the fraud is not committed in a vacuum. Instead, there are significant 
elements of the banking industry that will influence whether fraud is committed and, if 
so, how it is committed. Thus, the second aspect of the conceptual analysis that will be 
examined is the internal industry (banking) factors that define the internal environment 
that enables fraud to flourish in the banking industry.  
Internal industry factors include the following: 
• Information sharing 
• Competition 
• Organisational characteristics 
• Internal controls 
• Insider involvement 
• Information technology 
Each of these factors is related to the ability of the banks to detect and prevent fraud 
within the environment of their own bank, including both positive and negative factors. 
Table 3.3 provides a definition of each of these variables, along with relevant sections of 
the literature review for further reference. 
 
Table 3.3 Industry-level factors in fraud 
Factor Definition  
Information 
Sharing 
(Section 2.4.1) 
Information sharing will be defined as provision of information regarding customers, 
employees, and fraud mechanisms that is relevant to fraud prevention (Barth et al., 
2008). Sharing information between banks in regard to customers, employees, and 
fraud mechanisms provides a protective mechanism within the banking industry as a 
whole as well as to individual banks that engage in the practice, as it allows for early 
identification of potential corruption (Barth et al., 2008). 
Competition 
(Section 2.4.1.3)  
Competition will be defined as the practice of seeking to attract customers from other 
banks and increase the bank’s share of churn from individuals switching account. 
Increasing competition between banks can increase transparency (Barth et al., 2008). 
Organisational 
characteristics 
(Sections 2.4.2.1)  
Organisational characteristics include public, private, government, not for profit 
structures; size of the organisation is based on number of employees; revenue – for 
publicly trading organisations; internal controls – background checks, internal and 
external audits, anonymous reporting (Holtfreter, 2005; Smigel, 1956).  
Corporate governance, or the management of the bank in order to meet the needs of 
the appropriate group of individuals, is at the foundation of the need for fraud 
prevention (Macey & O'Hara, 2003). Issues in corporate governance include 
separation of ownership and control (Macey & O’Hara, 2003). However, research on 
corporate governance in the banking industry in Africa and other developing regions 
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is rare (Arun & Turner, 20020 Lin, 2005; Prowse, 1997; Oman, 2001). Thus, this 
will not be considered strongly in this research.  
Insider 
involvement  
(Sections 2.2.2.1, 
2.4.2.3.1) 
Insider involvement will be defined as a conspiracy between two or more parties in 
order to commit fraud, primarily through collusion by members of the organisation 
Breuer, 2006; Canhoto & Backhouse, 2007). Insider involvement can include self-
dealing, embezzlement, insider trading, corruption and other forms, and is commonly 
discussed in the literature (Arun, 2008; Barth et al., 2008; Beasley, 1996; Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt, & Levine, 2006; Black, 2005a; Black, 2005b; Cloninger & Waller, 
2000;  Crutchley, Jensen, & Marshall, 2007; Dixon, Ritchie, & Siwale, 2007; Dunn, 
2004; Lee, Clarke & Dean, 2008; Pontell, 2005; Rezaee, 2005; Shen & Chih, 2005; 
Summers & Sweeney, 1998; Szockyj & Geis, 2002; Zahra, Priem, & Rasheed, 
2007). 
Internal Controls  
(Section 2.4.2.3.1, 
2.4.2.3.2)  
Internal Controls will be defined as procedures and checks and balances used within 
the bank to detect and prevent fraud (Wells, 2005). Internal controls are intended to 
be effective, but will not be effective in preventing control fraud or other endemic 
frauds within the organisation (Cressey, 1973; Wells, 2004).  
Information 
Technology (IT) 
(Section 2.4.1.2)  
As can be seen from the conceptual framework (Figure 3.2) information technology 
is both an internal and external banking factor  Arnfield, 2004; Bierstaker, Brody, & 
Pacini, 2006; Bolton & Hand, 2002; Debreceny et al., 2005; Durtschi, Hillison, & 
Pacini, 2004; Edge & Sampaio, 2009; Fernandez & Gonzales, 2005; Homazi & 
Giles, 2004; Mannan & Van Oorschot, 2009; Paliwal & Kumar; Phua, Alahakoon & 
Lee, 2004; Phua, Lee, Smith  Gayler, 2005; Sardanis, 2007; Shao, 1999).  
 
These factors cannot be neatly divided into factors specific to individual banks or the 
general industry for obvious reasons; for example, most banks will have a limited range 
of internal controls that they can use, due to the regulation of the banking industry (Riahi-
Belkaoui & Picur, 2000). However, banking regulations can often be too weak to create 
any significant change in the development of internal controls (Riahi-Belkaoui & Picur, 
2000). Internal controls, organisational characteristics and insider involvement have been 
considered to be bank specific factors, while competition for customers and information 
sharing as industry-wide factors. Figure 3.3 shows the balance of these factors within this 
model.  
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Figure 3.3 Industry and banking factors in the conceptual model of fraud 
 
3.10.3 The External Industry Environment  
The external environment around the banking industry is the third aspect of the 
conceptual framework. The individual sub-dimensions of the external environment 
include legal, ethical, socio-cultural, economic, political, information technology and the 
customer dimensions.  
 
The external environment model can be visualized as shown in Figure 3.4. Table 3.4 
provides a comprehensive definition for each of these factors in the external environment, 
which are not strictly ordered and which may influence each other. 
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Figure 3.4 the external environmental level of the conceptual framework 
 
Table 3.4 Definition of external environmental factors for the conceptual framework 
Factor Definition 
Legal  
(Sections 
2.4.1.4; 3.7; 
3.8) 
Legal can refer to laws, regulations, rules, and enforcement of these legal structures by 
government officials in the country of practice (Aguilar, Gill & Pino, 2000).  
The legal external environment will include factors such as regulation and regulatory 
bodies, corporate governance rules, law enforcement and prosecution of alleged 
perpetrators of fraud at the local, national, and international level (Macey & O'Hara, 
2003). Some of the areas of the legal environment that may affect the outcomes of fraud 
management include the legal environment for lending (Barth et al., 2008), development 
law and corruption (Doidge, Karolyi, & Stulz, 2007), regulation of the corporate 
governance environment (Licht, Goldschmidt, & Schwartz, 2005), and availability, 
commonality and competence of police investigation and criminal prosecution (Wilhelm, 
2004). 
Ethical 
(Sections 
2.4.1.6) 
Ethical factors in the external environment can be defined as individual and cultural social 
norms and values that are internalized by the individual and provide guidance regarding 
the acceptance of fraud (Aguilar, Gill, & Pino, 2000). However, ethical values can at times 
be twisted in order to provide a rationalization for the use of fraud (Cressey, 1973; Wells, 
2005). Ethical factors can be inculcated in the employee workforce of the bank through the 
use of ethical training (Aguilar, Gill, & Pino, 2000), as well as the use of whistle-blower 
programs in order to encourage the report of ethical issues within the organisation 
(Schmidt, 2005). 
Socio-cultural 
(Section 
2.4.1.6) 
Socio-cultural factors will be defined as those factors that exist primarily in the social and 
cultural environment. Some examples will include the overall level of perception of 
corruption in the business environment (Bakre, 2007; Transparency International, 2009) 
and what is considered to be acceptable business practice (Zahra, Priem, & Rasheed, 
2007).   
Information 
Technology 
Information Technology will be defined as the use of computer data storage and analysis 
technologies for internal control and the prevention and detection of fraud (Fernandez & 
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(Sections 
2.4.1.2) 
 
Gonzales, 2005). Information technology systems are commonly used in the accounting 
and auditing functions of banks, as well as in customer account management, connections 
with external agencies, other banks, and centralized banking systems, and other 
connections and analysis tasks (Fernandez & Gonzales, 2005). Information Technology 
can be a positive factor in detection and prevention of fraud (Fernandez & Gonzales, 
2005). However, it is also highly vulnerable to inefficiency and ineffectiveness if the 
information technology is not implemented properly (Fernandez & Gonzales, 2005).  
Political 
(Sections 
2.4.1.7; 3.4) 
The political environment will be defined by the history and role of the government 
intervention in the affairs of banks through politicians as it relates to the laws, agencies 
and other factors that are applied by the government.  
Economic 
(Sections 
2.4.1.1, 3.5; 
3.6;3.7) 
The economic environment will be defined by macro-economic factors that influence the 
banking industry in Kenya such as the banking crisis, moral hazard, adverse selection and 
corruption  
Customer 
(Section 
2.4.1.5; 2.2.1) 
This will be defined as an individual or organisation that avails of the products and 
services offered by a bank and who maintain an account in the said bank. 
 
 
3.10.4 Use of the Conceptual Model 
This conceptual model will be used as a means of discussing fraud and formulating an 
understanding of what can often be a complex issue. The conceptual framework has been 
used in creation of the survey and interviews conducted in the study, and will also be 
used in discussion of the results of the survey and the interviews. This model will also 
provide a means of analysing the outcomes in terms of the existing literature and 
comparison of the findings to what have been identified as the most important factors in 
conduct of fraud. The conceptual framework, however, is descriptive of the expected 
findings of the research, rather than prescriptive; it is possible that other elements of fraud 
will be identified that are not included in this model, in which case they will be analysed 
in order to determine why they were not found in the existing literature.  
 
3.11 Summary 
This chapter has outlined a basic background of the banking industry in Kenya 
contextualizing it in relation to its historic, political, economic, legal and regulatory 
environments. These environments form an important part of the conceptual framework. 
The interaction of these environments helps to partly explain the nature and enhance the 
understanding of fraud in the banking industry. Kenya’s banking industry has undergone 
several changes over the past two to three decades that have resulted in mergers, 
conversions and lately acquisitions. As a consequence the banking structure has 
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constantly changed. The first wave of the banking crisis in the 1980’s was occasioned by 
poor management, weak internal controls, bad governance, insider lending especially to 
political banks resulting in non-performing loans and all catalysed by a weak legal, 
regulatory, supervisory and policy banking framework. The second wave of the banking 
crisis in the 1990’s was precipitated by difficult economic and political reforms and the 
revelation of the Goldenberg scandal. Recent developments in information technology, 
new banking models, laws and regulations and information sharing have improved 
conditions in Kenyan banking. What remains clear is that historical events (both pre and 
post-independence) have contributed to fraudulent practices in the banking industry. 
Government interference and political influences have negatively affected the fight 
against fraud and corruption in the banking industry. The dynamic changes in the 
structure of the banking industry, regional expansion, new developments in ICT and new 
modes of financial service delivery to the customer all provide more challenges to fraud 
and risk management. However, the banking industry, through measures like credit 
referencing and devising new legislature, endeavours to provide sharing of credit 
information and to improve laws and regulation that can have a positive impact on the 
management and reduction of fraud. 
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Chapter 4  
Research Methodology 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the ontological and epistemological positions, methodology and 
methods used in the research design of this study. Ontology addresses the nature of being 
and reality, defining what is real in the world. The ontological position of constructionism 
was adopted for this study. This research further used a theoretical perspective that 
combined a positivist and interpretivist research philosophy in order to come to 
conclusions about the research topic. Subsequently, a triangulated research design that 
combined qualitative and quantitative methods of a questionnaire and interviews in order 
to examine the research questions is adopted. This chapter attempts to justify the methods 
applied in the research. The research methodology is focused on addressing the following 
research questions: 
 
1. What are the characteristics of fraud in the Kenyan banking industry?  
2. What are the perceived characteristics of those that perpetrate fraud in the Kenyan 
banking industry?  
3. How do banks approach fraud management?  
4. Are there differences between the approaches to fraud management adopted by 
Kenyan and international banks?  
 
It also discusses various aspects of the research methodology including research approach 
(Section 4.2); research design and sample selection (Section 4.3); quantitative and 
qualitative research procedures (Sections 4.4 and 4.5); data integration and presentation 
(Sections 4.6 and 4.7); and various research issues including reliability, validity, 
generalisation, and ethics (Section 4.8). Section 4.9 concludes with general field 
reflections of this study. 
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4.2 Research Approach 
Justification of the choice and use of specific methodology and methods is not only based 
on the research questions of the study but on the assumptions that we make about reality, 
our theoretical perspectives. Theoretical perspectives lie behind the choice of 
methodology and reflect the philosophical stance that informs this choice. Our theoretical 
assumptions reflect what we understand about human knowledge and what it entails. 
Theoretical perspectives on the other hand are informed by epistemology and ontology 
(Crotty, 1998). Therefore as shown by Figure 4.1 the methods proposed to be used in this 
study are governed by the methodology which in turn is influenced by the theoretical 
perspectives which are subsequently informed by the epistemology or ontology. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Four Elements of the Research Process 
 
4.2.1 Epistemological and Ontological Position 
According to Crotty (1998, p.10) “each theoretical perspective embodies a certain way of 
understanding what is (ontology) as well as a certain way of understanding what it means 
to know (epistemology).” Ontology is concerned with the nature of existence, the 
structure of reality. Epistemology deals with the nature, possibility, scope and general 
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basis of knowledge (Hamlyn, 1995) and “is concerned with providing a philosophical 
grounding  for deciding what kinds of knowledge are possible and how we can ensure 
that they are both adequate and legitimate” (Maynard, 1994, p.10). Even though a fine 
line is drawn between epistemology and ontology the two concepts tend to be spoken of 
inter-changeably by several authors. This is because epistemological and ontological 
issues tend to emerge simultaneously. In order to construct meaningful reality there must 
be meaning and there must be meaningful reality to create meaning. Due to this 
confluence, writers have a problem in separating these two concepts (Guba and Lincoln, 
1994; Crotty, 1998). Therefore in the research approach adopted for this study the terms 
epistemology and ontology will be used inter-changeably. 
 
There are several possible epistemological/ontological stances that can be used in 
research. However, the three main epistemological positions are: objectivism, 
constructivism and subjectivism. Objectivist epistemology sustains that things exist as 
meaningful entities independently of consciousness and experiences. In other words, truth 
and meaning reside within and are found in the objects. Thus, “meaningful reality exists 
as such apart from any consciousness” (Crotty, 1998, p.8) and as illustrated by Crotty 
(1998) a tree in the forest is a tree irrespective of whether any one knows about its 
existence. When people recognize the tree they merely discover a meaning that was 
waiting to be discovered all along. Just like the source of the River Nile is Lake Victoria, 
even upon its discovery, Lake Victoria (object) had been lying there all the time waiting 
to be ‘discovered’. Therefore under this ontological position, the objective truth can be 
uncovered because understandings and values are objectified in the people being studied.  
 
The second epistemological/ontological position, constructionism, rejects the objectivists’ 
view of human knowledge positing that there is no objective truth out there waiting for us 
to discover it. Therefore meaning is not discovered, but constructed (Crotty, 1998). As 
meaning is constructed and not discovered then different people construct meaning in 
different ways in relation to the same phenomena. This can be seen as you move from 
one generation to another, one culture to another, one time period to another. Thus, the 
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constructionist view is that the subject and object emerge together in the generation of 
meaning, which is a consequence of the mind and cannot exist without it.  
 
The third epistemological/ontological stance is subjectivism, a variant of constructionism 
which is the view that meaning is created out of nothing, which is difficult considering 
that few human beings are creative enough, though it can be argued that we can learn 
from others’ created meaning. Even in subjectivism, meaning must come from 
something, a dream, a religious belief or a voice in the subconscious. The point here 
being that meaning is imported from somewhere else and literally imposed onto the 
object by the subject rather than coming from an interaction between subject and object 
as in constructivism.  In other words the object does not contribute at all in creating 
meaning (Crotty, 1998).   
 
This study seeks to understand the nature and characteristics of fraud and how banks 
individually and collectively (based on type of bank – local, national, regional or 
international) approach fraud management. Different respondents will hold different 
perceptions of fraud and will construct different meanings of the same phenomenon that 
is, fraud, based on their fraud experiences with perpetrators and specific external and 
internal bank environments. Their perceptions of fraud may be dependent on but distinct 
from these factors. Therefore the ontological position chosen for this research is that of 
constructionism. As such, and as discussed above, this research cannot expose an 
objective truth independent to any consciousness, as would strictly happen under 
positivism, but it will explore a way of seeing things through the human eye of 
understanding as would occur under interpretivism (Crotty, 1998).   
 
However, if the researcher were to treat epistemology and ontology on a separate footing 
then the epistemology of the study would be constructionism while realism would be 
adopted as the ontological position. Realism is an ontological notion asserting that reality 
exists outside the mind implying that the world and things in it exist independently of our 
consciousness of them. In this study it means that fraud exists whether we are conscious 
of it or not.   
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It is important to point out that some authors (Guba and Lincoln, 1994; Macquarrie, 
1973) link realism as an ontological approach with objectivism in epistemology, an 
incompatible link. Crotty (1998, p.11) challenges this traditional link and observes that 
“realism in ontology and constructionism in epistemology turn out to be quite 
compatible”. While agreeing that there is a world independent of the consciousness 
Crotty (1998) contends that the world without a mind in inconceivable and meaning 
without a mind is not meaning. This research can therefore comfortably adopt realism in 
ontology and constructionism in epistemology and remain compatible.  
 
4.2.2 Theoretical Perspectives 
As discussed at the beginning of Section 4.2 the theoretical perspective is the 
philosophical stance that informs the methodology chosen for a piece of research. The 
theoretical perspective provides grounding of the logic and criteria behind the 
methodology. Therefore, the theoretical perspective or research philosophy adopted will 
give rise to a number of assumptions that will subsequently influence the methodology 
(Crotty, 1998).   
 
The research philosophy is important because it provides a foundation for the selection of 
research approach and design as well as a means to interpret or view the findings in 
regard to their context in the world. 
 
There is a long- standing ontological and epistemological discussion on the best approach 
to adopt when conducting research.  At the centre of this discussion are two different 
research inquiry approaches, namely the positivist inquiry, which typically employs 
experimental and quantitative approaches and the interpretive inquiry, which usually 
makes use of naturalistic and qualitative approaches to inductively and holistically 
understand human experience in context-specific settings (Patton, 1990).  Even though a 
number of authors have engaged in the discussion and review of this debate (Cook and 
Reichardt, 1979; Patton, 1986; Fetterman, 1988; Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2003) there still remains a significant blur between the two research styles.  
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Rather than choosing one style of inquiry over the other Patton (1990) is in favour of a 
paradigm of choices. A paradigm is a worldview or “a cluster of beliefs and dictates 
which for scientists in a particular discipline influence what should be studied, how 
research should be done, how results should be interpreted, and so on” (Bryman, 1988, 
p.4). Patton (1990) argues that a paradigm of choices rejects methodological orthodoxy in 
favour of methodological appropriateness as the primary criterion for judging 
methodological quality.  The issue therefore is not whether one has uniformly adhered to 
logical-positivist or interpretative canons but whether one has made a sensible 
methodological decision given the purpose of the inquiry and the research questions 
being investigated.  
 
Bryman (1989, p.248) says that the “distinction between quantitative and qualitative 
research is not simply a matter of different approaches to the research process, each with 
its own cluster of research methods….but it concerns antagonistic views about more 
fundamental issues to do with the nature of one’s subject matter.” Therefore instead of 
viewing the interpretivist inquiry and positivist inquiry as competing approaches one 
should draw from both of them depending on the nature of the study. This research was 
conducted from a dual research philosophy of positivism and interpretivism, with each 
philosophy playing an important role in the outcomes of the research as well as its design. 
The next four sections discuss the theoretical perspectives and the mixed approach 
adopted in this study.   
 
 
4.2.2.1 Positivist research inquiry 
The first research approach that has been selected is positivism, most specifically the 
post-positivist approach of critical realism. Positivism is the foundational theory of the 
scientific method. It holds that the physical world and world of perception can be 
objectively measured and cause and effect can be described and identified with certainty 
(Schutt, 2003). This philosophy is foundational in quantitative research particularly, 
which focuses on the use of statistical connections between phenomena as measured and 
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observed. The positivist philosophy requires careful and consistent research design based 
on logical assumptions and the use of valid statistical measurement and comparison in 
order to lead to thoughtful and careful conclusions (Trochim & O'Donnelly, 2006). 
Positivists seek to explain the world by developing general laws that arise from what can 
be observed as facts (Henn, Weinstein and Foard, 2009). Thus, the positivist philosophy 
is highly suitable for statistical research work, as well as for the determination of cause 
and effect relationships.  
Under the positivist inquiry the phenomena being studied is first observed, then theories 
are developed based on these observations. Through a continuous process of verification 
and observations of similar phenomena, positivists will develop a theory that later 
becomes a law which can be generalized to similar phenomena. Ironically the continuous 
verification-observation process that defines the positivist inquiry is also its drawback as 
it limits the progress of knowledge and there could be limitations based on observation.  
Thus Popper (1959, as cited by Henn, Weinstein and Foard, 2009, p.13) states the 
solution to these two problems lies “not in attempting to verify what we already know, 
but in trying to falsify it.” In so doing theories can be tested against new data and should 
the data refute the established theory its general application can be challenged. 
Nonetheless, in this research what can be tested could be limited considering that fraud is 
a complex problem and it is elusive by nature. It can be difficult to accurately test aspects 
of fraud.  
However, the positivist approach eschews any possibility that the researcher or 
respondents may introduce bias into the research (Schutt, 2003). This assumption is 
highly unlikely, in the view of this researcher, especially in regard to the controversial 
issue of banking fraud. Thus, a post-positivist approach was selected in order to allow for 
the possibility of researcher and response bias (Trochim & O'Donnelly, 2006). In this 
perspective, it is acknowledged that there are objective, external facts that can be 
observed and measured, and that these objective, external facts lend themselves to the 
methods of scientific inquiry (Grix, 2004). However, there is also an acknowledgement 
that in any form of social inquiry, the existence of objective facts does not preclude the 
potential that human interactions and interpretations play a significant role in constructing 
 113 
subjective truth (Grix, 2004). Thus, in this theoretical perspective, there is no conflict 
between acknowledging the existence of objective facts and considering the potential for 
social construction of knowledge and reality.  
The specific approach that was selected was critical realism, which philosophizes that it 
is not possible for human research to be completely free of bias; instead, the potential 
sources of bias must be carefully examined and isolated, as well as controlled in as much 
detail as possible (Fleetwood, 1999). The role of critical realism is to state that all theory 
can be revised, based on new research or new findings, and that the researcher will be 
inherently biased based on their interest in the subject (Trochim & O'Donnelly, 2006). 
Thus, the critical realism philosophy allows for the use of positivist rigor in the research 
while still allowing for the potential of human bias and the potential that previous 
research is flawed (Trochim & O'Donnelly, 2006). This demands re-examination of the 
research material based on new findings and outcomes. This approach is widely used in 
the field of economics, in which purely financial or statistical information must be 
combined with information regarding the motivations of the researcher and the 
participants (Fleetwood, 1999).  
Unlike the qualitative approach that works best with small samples, is relatively 
unstructured and based upon descriptions, the quantitative approach is suited for a study 
that has a relatively large sample, is highly structured and based on statistics. Qualitative 
researchers believe that rich descriptions of the social world are valuable whereas 
quantitative researchers’ believe that such detail interrupts the process of developing 
generalizations (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003, p.16). For the positivist precision, objectivity 
and rigor replace hunches, experience and intuition as the means of investigating research 
problems, and consequently social science is based on the approach used in the natural 
sciences. (Colins and Hussey, 2003, p.52) Even though the use of quantitative tools, like 
the questionnaire, under the positivist approach restricts participants to only what has 
been asked, greatly limiting their views and opinions, it still has its benefits. One benefit 
of using quantitative data is that it can measure the reaction of many people to a restricted 
set of questions facilitating comparisons and allowing for findings to be generalized 
(Patton, 1990) 
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4.2.2.2 Interpretive research inquiry 
The goal of the researcher was not merely to explain the specific relationships between 
variables studied, but to consider what these relationships meant in the context of the 
Kenyan banking industry on the whole. However, positivist philosophy does not allow 
for the kind of interpretation required to support the research demands. Thus, the 
researcher used a dual research philosophy, including interpretivism in the research 
philosophy in order to provide a more balanced design. Interpretivism is a wide-ranging 
group of research philosophies, which is often viewed as the opposite or antithesis of the 
positivist approach. Interpretivist approaches are useful in the social world, and are based 
in the assumption that humans, and research derived from them, is inherently subjective 
(Grix, 2004).  
 
Qualitative data provide an avenue to establish well grounded, rich descriptions and 
fruitful explanations of processes in identifiable local contexts. Such data can also give 
rise to unexpected findings and new relationships useful in confirming or revising 
conceptual frameworks (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Interpretive research inquiry 
emphasises an attempt to understand social phenomena by constructing meaning from 
actual lived experiences of participants in the research. Hence an individual’s experience 
is best explained and understood from their own perspective or world view. Interpretivists 
seek to understand how people attribute meaning to their circumstances. In the words of 
Denzin and Lincoln (2003, p.13) qualitative researchers’ stress the socially constructed 
nature of reality, the intimate relationship between the researcher and what is studied – 
they seek answers to questions that stress how social experience is created and given 
meaning.  In this research using qualitative inquiry allows the interview participants to 
present their opinions and views on fraud in the banking industry, allowing their views to 
take precedence over those of the researcher. By listening to their fraud experiences the 
researcher is able to pick out the key words in the comments and responses made by the 
participants. Words, as described by Miles and Huberman (1994), “especially organized 
into incidents or stories, have a concrete, vivid, meaningful flavour that often proves far 
more convincing to a reader – another researcher, a policymaker, a practitioner – than 
pages of summarized numbers.” In the interpretative inquiry participants are allowed to 
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explain their world in their own words and as Henn, Weinstein and Foard (2009, p.16) 
suggest “Language is considered a tool with which we make meanings.” 
 
Thus in an interpretive research approach the participants are active, portraying inner 
capabilities which allow for individual perceptions and judgements, and are not merely 
passive vehicles in the matter under research. They can influence, change and contribute 
to meanings. Blumer (1969) suggests that a distinct feature of human reaction is that it is 
not based on people reacting to each other rather it is based on people interpreting each 
other’s actions. Therefore interpretive research involves researching ‘with’ and not ‘on’ 
people. Henn, Weinsten and Foard (2009, p.15) state that “human action can only be 
understood by relating it to the conscious intentions, motives, and purposes and 
ultimately the values of the agent that performs it.”  
 
Thus interpretivists argue that social realities lie in what people do, say and think, rather 
than the kind of abstract system that is somewhat greater than the sum of its parts as 
advocated under the positivist inquiry (Garrick, 1999). How a researcher carries out their 
research is influenced by the general interpretivist assumptions and the philosophical 
issues underpinning the study and by weaving together an understanding we are finally 
able to build rather than test a theory (Henn, Weinstein and Foard, 2009).  
 
According to those who support the interpretivist inquiry there are no absolute answers 
(Candy, 1991; Mezirow, 1996) as there are alternative ways of understanding social 
phenomena. Thus they also argue that due to the diversity of social reality, how it is 
known, experienced and constructed, social theories cannot be generalized universally as 
they are specific to given cultural and historic set ups (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). Given 
that interpretivists regard the research process as an interaction between two or more 
people the researcher and the participant become players. According to Patton (1990, 
p.14) “in qualitative inquiry, the researcher is the instrument.” This is supported by 
Brannen (1994), who says that researchers must use themselves as the instrument. 
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This makes the interpretivist inquiry appropriate for some of the issues being studied in 
this research. An interpretive approach considers and acknowledges the processes by 
which the individual makes sense of their world. It also allows for the researcher’s role in 
knowledge construction to become more explicit. Given the sensitive, broad and complex 
nature of fraud issues interpretive research inquiry is relevant and suitable for this study. 
Fraud has also not been widely studied academically in Kenya’s banking industry making 
it an under-developed research topic. The interpretivist inquiry can be best applied to 
explore or build up an understanding of something, which in our case is fraud, of which 
there exists little knowledge (Henn, Weinstein and Foard, 2009). It is also an area where 
existing theory suggests the use of or making up of narratives may be anticipated; for 
example, the fraud triangle on one part consists of rationalization.  
 
4.2.2.3 The mixed approach 
Interpretivism is based on a number of specific differences from positivism, including a 
belief in the social construction of views by people, and the role of the social world in 
influencing human action. In direct contrast to the positivist approach, the interpretivist 
approach does not assume the existence of a social world independent of the observation 
of its participants (Grix, 2004). The ultimate conclusion of this position is that value-free 
or objective research is simply not possible in the social world, and as such is 
inappropriate for social research in general and perhaps no less in fraud studies. 
While the interpretivist inquiry is an analytic-inductive approach and the positivist 
inquiry is largely a hypothetical-deductive approach, an evaluation can include elements 
of both inquiries (Patton, 1990, p.46). Table 4.1 summarises the distinction between 
quantitative and qualitative paradigms.  
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 Table 4.1 Distinction between interpretivist and positivist paradigms  
                                                           
 
 
Basic beliefs 
 
Interpretivist 
    
Positivist 
 
• The world is socially constructed 
and subjective 
• The observer is part of what is 
observed 
• Science is driven by human 
interest 
 
 
• The world is external and 
objective 
• The observer is independent 
 
• Science is value- free 
Researchers 
should 
• Focus on meaning 
• Try to understand what is 
happening 
• Look at the totality of each 
situation 
 
• Focus on facts 
• Look for causality and 
fundamental laws 
• Reduce phenomenon to the 
simplest elements  
• Formulate and test hypotheses 
Preferred 
methods 
 
• Develop ideas through induction 
from evidence 
• Small samples investigation in 
depth or over time. 
 
• Operationalize concepts so they 
can be measured 
• Large samples  
 
 
(Source: Remenyi et al, 1998, p. 104) 
 
 
4.2.2.4 Triangulation and Integration of Research  
Epistemological and theoretical positions have influenced the character of both 
quantitative and qualitative research. Quantitative research has been influenced by the 
natural science model of research and its positivist form while qualitative research has 
been influenced by an epistemological position that rejects the appropriateness of a 
natural science approach to the study of humans (Bryman, 1994; Brannen, 1994).  
Research can be most fruitful when both the quantitative and qualitative research 
approaches are used (Bird, 1994) and the triangulation research design allows for 
consideration of research in two ways. The triangulation approach examines the research 
question from a qualitative and quantitative perspective separately (Creswell, 2009). The 
use of quantitative research allows for consideration of the research questions using a 
strictly positivist approach, identifying cause and effect through the use of statistical 
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analysis (Creswell, 2009). The use of a qualitative approach allows for the use of the 
interpretivist philosophy, in which the construction of the social world is considered to be 
a key influence on the research findings. Both approaches have their own strengths and 
weaknesses and this provides a good reason to combine them.  
According to Bryman (1994, p.63), triangulation is drawn from the idea of “multiple 
operationism” which suggests that the validity of findings and the degree of confidence in 
them will be enhanced by the deployment of more than one approach to data collection. 
Moreover, Denzin and Lincoln (2003) suggest that triangulation reflects an attempt to 
secure an in-depth understanding of the phenomena in question. Citing Flick (1998), 
Denzin and Lincoln (2003) add that triangulation is not a tool or a strategy of validation, 
but an alternative to validation. They further state that the combination of methodological 
practices, empirical materials, perspectives and observers into one study is a strategy that 
adds rigor, breadth, complexity, richness and depth to any inquiry. 
4.3 Research Design 
The research design can be summarized as a mixed methods approach. The mixed 
methods approach to research examines a research problem from both a qualitative and a 
quantitative perspective, integrating findings from both approaches in order to arrive at a 
highly robust approach (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007).  
The mixed methods approach is intended to provide a robust research process that 
mitigates the weaknesses of qualitative and quantitative research individually. Qualitative 
research is often thought to be prone to bias, difficulty in interpretation, and difficulty in 
limitation of the findings (Creswell, 2009). On the other hand, quantitative research can 
be unnecessarily limited and may miss important issues in the research due to the 
perceptions of the researcher, as it does not allow for any additional input to be found. 
Thus, the combination of qualitative and quantitative research can provide substantially 
improved research due to the integration of both perspectives, allowing for the researcher 
to consider additional information while at the same time maintaining the statistical rigor 
of the quantitative approach (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007). This allows for a more 
comprehensive research process.  
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Mixed methods research is not without its own weaknesses, although it does provide 
some balance for the weaknesses of each of the two combined methods. One weakness is 
the difficulty involved in integrating the research findings of both the qualitative and 
quantitative study. Another issue is how to identify the findings that are relevant to the 
specific research questions (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007). Qualitative and quantitative 
research can both be used to generate substantial findings that are not strictly defined 
within the auspices of the research findings. However, by maintaining careful control of 
the research design, the researcher can reduce the potential that irrelevant findings will be 
included in the research. Finally, the mixed methods approach can at times be complex 
and require more resources and time to complete the research effectively.   
 
The mixed methods approach was chosen as a means to provide both the statistical 
balance of the quantitative approach and the breadth and increased understanding of the 
research subject. It was also selected in order to overcome the difficulties involved in 
both the qualitative and quantitative research approaches. Neither of the two approaches 
was considered to be adequate for full consideration of the research questions, and thus 
the research would be most appropriately conducted under the mixed methods approach. 
The triangulation analysis approach was used in order to overcome the difficulty in 
integrating the results of the research.  
 
The decision to combine approaches for a study should be guided by the research 
problem at hand. Needless to say that a research that combines the two approaches is not 
necessarily always superior. For this reason, the research methods adopted for this study 
will be triangulated. Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) state that employing a pragmatic 
and balanced or pluralist position helps to improve communication among researchers 
from different paradigms as they attempt to advance knowledge (Maxcy, 2003; Watson, 
1990) and to shed light on how research approaches can be mixed fruitfully (Hoshmand, 
2003).  
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4.3.1 Sampling strategy  
There are two types of sampling techniques, namely probability sampling and non-
probability sampling. There is no hard and fast rule regarding when probability sampling 
can be employed. However, if it is important for the researcher to be able to generalize to 
a wider population then probability sampling would be the most appropriate sampling 
approach. Non-probability sampling would be suitable for a study whose research 
questions do not specify the unit of analysis, such as a particular category of people, that 
should be sampled (Bryman, 2004). Thus in probability sampling the people or units 
chosen as the sample will be representative of the whole population under study allowing 
generalizations to be made while in non-probability sampling the chosen sample may or 
may not be well representative of the wider population. Due care should therefore be 
made when selecting a sample for use with a non-probability sampling method to 
enhance the chances that the selected sample will be representative of the other units in 
the study. There is a greater preference by researchers to use probability sampling as it is 
deemed to yield verifiable accurate results compared to non-probability sampling. 
Probability sampling is also often more favoured under positivism. However, there are 
areas of study where it may not be practical or possible to use probability sampling. 
Lincoln and Guba (1985) describe non-probability sampling as being emergent and 
sequential. This arises from the nature of the research process, which depicts a journey of 
discovery as opposed to hypothesis testing.  
 
In this study non-probability sampling, specifically purposive sampling was used to 
identify the initial respondents. Most qualitative samples tend to be purposive, rather than 
random (Miles and Hubermann, 1994). As the title implies purposive sampling is 
sampling with a purpose in mind. In this case specific pre-defined groups are usually 
identified at the beginning of the study as part of the sample. Non-probability sampling 
enables the researcher to select research participants that have the experiences necessary 
to understand the phenomena in question, which in the case of this study is fraud. By so 
doing it is possible to get the views and opinions of the target group, which are valuable.  
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Whenever fraud occurs there are a perpetrator and a victim. It would have been ideal to 
collect the views and opinions from perpetrators to get a good picture about their 
motivations and rationalizations. However, finding fraud perpetrators to interview would 
have been an uphill task. Moreover, the perpetrators were probably less likely to give 
truthful information about their actions and motivations. Thus a decision was made from 
the onset to purposely select respondents, first through established contacts and then 
subsequently through the snowballing technique, from among those who were 
knowledgeable about fraud and were involved in actively preventing and detecting fraud 
in the banking industry. This group represented key organisational staff such as internal 
auditors/managers, fraud investigators/managers, operational risk managers, information 
systems managers, security personnel, financial crime team members and forensic 
auditors among others. As stated by Krambia-Kapardis (2004) when surveying corporate 
victims of fraud it is essential to decide the appropriate person in the organisation to 
respond as failure to do so may lead to a low response rate. The choice of whom to talk 
with, where, when, about what, and why, places limits on the conclusions we finally draw 
and how confident others feel about them (Miles and Hubermann, 1994). By sampling 
people we can get at the characteristics of settings, events and processes. However, 
determining the appropriate person(s) as respondents can be hampered by practicalities, 
such as, being able to gain access to them. 
 
Miles and Hubermann (1994) on the other hand point out that samples in qualitative 
studies are usually not wholly pre-specified, but can evolve once the fieldwork begins 
with the initial choice of informants leading the researcher to similar and different ones. 
For this study, after the initial group of respondents was purposely selected the researcher 
was able to identify more respondents recommended or introduced by those purposely 
selected. This introduced the use of snowball sampling. According to Patton (1990) 
snowball sampling identifies cases of interest from people who know people who know 
which cases are information-rich.  Both a formal and informal network was exploited to 
find suitable respondents.  
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4.3.2 Population  
Although individuals were used for sampling, the level of analysis for this research was 
the bank. The population of this study consisted of all the banks in Kenya. As discussed 
in the previous chapter (Section 3.1) the number of banks in the industry has changed 
with the Central Bank reporting a total of 45 banks in the years 2006, 2007 and 2008, a 
total of 46 banks in 2009 and 43 banks as at the end of 2010. At the time of data 
collection there were 45 banks and this was adopted as the population of the study. 
 
4.3.3 Sample 
The research was conducted at both an individual as well as organisational level with 
individuals representing their views as well as the views of the organisation. The sample 
consisted of 40 out of a total of 45 banking institutions. Five banks were excluded due to 
age (under five years) and organisational stability reasons.  
 
Given the relatively small size of the industry and the potential size of the participant 
pool, it was necessary that the sampling strategy cover the entire industry. Encouragingly 
Emory and Copper (1991 p.248) states that “it is not true that the research is considered 
representative if it has a large sample area.” However, given the sensitive nature of the 
research, the researcher did not set a specific number of participants in recognition of the 
fact that it may not be possible to meet a given number of participants. Nonetheless as a 
guide the researcher set out to reach two people (knowledgeable about fraud in the 
organization, such as auditors, fraud investigators, security managers etc.) in each one of 
the 40 sampled banks for the quantitative study (80 respondents) and one person in every 
two banks (20 respondents) for the interviewing process. Thus, the sampling strategy was 
to poll every potential participant in the study and seek permission for the study’s 
engagement. This approach resulted in 60 out of the intended 80 respondents contacted 
for the quantitative study. The 60 respondents were senior and upper middle level 
managers as already defined in Section 4.3.1. All respondents were from head offices 
located in Nairobi. Views represented at least 70% of the market share controlled by the 
largest nine banks. For the qualitative part of the survey 17 senior managers agreed to 
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participate in semi-structured interviews. The research respondents were contacted in 
person, by telephone and via email. 
 
The response rate was expected to be between 40% and 50%, which would translate into 
an adequate representation (Blumberg, Cooper and Schindler, 2005). The quantitative 
survey achieved a 75% response rate while the qualitative study reflected an 85% 
response rate. The high response rate was achieved through maintaining a simple 
questionnaire that was easy to follow, keeping the length of interviews short, notifying 
the respondents in advance of sending out the questionnaire or conducting the interviews, 
constant follow up of respondents and participants’ interest in the research. 
 
4.4 Quantitative Research Process  
Primary data was collected by the use of a questionnaire and interviews. The reason for 
using these different tools lies in the fact that they are able to capture and verify sensitive 
issues (Mintzberg, 1983; Patton, 1990). This following section discusses the data 
collection and analysis in two parts to capture both the quantitative and qualitative 
approaches used. 
 
The quantitative research process was based on a questionnaire distributed to the 
participants in the survey. The questionnaire contained structured questions with options 
for “other” to capture any new or unique information. It was administered to auditors, 
accountants and/or other managers that were knowledgeable about fraud in these 
organisations, such as electronic fraud managers and Information Systems Audit 
managers. 
 
4.4.1 Instrument Design and Testing 
The survey used a questionnaire consisting of 29 questions focusing on four different 
areas of concern, namely; the general view of the respondent toward banking fraud and 
its growth in the industry, details regarding a recent typical fraud uncovered by the bank, 
organisational responses to this fraud, and specific details regarding the respondent. This 
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instrument design was intended to support the research questions and hypotheses, and 
provide specific information into these processes.  
 
The instrument was tested in two stages. A pre-testing stage involved independent review 
by three individuals that were familiar with the subject matter and with survey design and 
adjustment of the survey in order to account for the feedback provided by these details. 
The resulting instrument was then pilot tested using a total of fifteen volunteer 
respondents. These participants completed the survey, pointing out areas of difficulty 
with the survey. These included difficulty in understanding some questions, as well as 
areas where respondents could not provide information due to non-disclosure agreements 
or other industry issues. Almost all the participants felt that the questionnaire took a 
longer time to fill than they anticipated. However, they were of the opinion that the 
questionnaire was an appropriate tool to collect information about fraud in Kenya. They 
did confess that despite the length of the questionnaire, all questions were relevant and 
none of them should be deleted. Some of the participants in the pilot study were of the 
opinion that some of the question-answer categories should be condensed.  The survey 
was then adjusted in order to account for the feedback of the pilot study group. The final 
version of the questionnaire is attached in Appendix IIIA  
 
4.4.2 Data Collection 
Before any data was collected ethical approval and clearance to proceed with the research 
was sought from the Ethical Approval Committee of the Graduate School in keeping with 
the code of research at the Nottingham Trent University.  
 
The data collection process was conducted as follows. First, participants were given an 
overview of the research, informed consent forms, and institutional release forms in order 
to ensure that all data collected could be used in accordance with the requirements of 
human subjects’ research. Participants were then sent the survey using email, postal mail, 
or by hand. Each participant was assigned a participant number in order to remove 
institutional names from any respondents. The researcher logged the responses from each 
respondent as they were returned, with the researcher logging each response and entering 
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it into the data set. The researcher followed up with non-responding participants at two 
weeks intervals. The researcher clarified missing or unclear responses by following up 
with respective participants by telephone and/or email.  Barring a few participants most 
of them were easily accessible and willingly gave follow up contacts to the researcher. In 
total number of respondents were 60. As indicated earlier in Section 4.3.3 the estimated 
sample size for the quantitative survey was 80 respondents. The response rate for the 
survey was therefore 75% of 80 respondents. 
 
4.4.3 Data Preparation 
The data preparation process involved the creation of an SPSS data set from the 
responses of the survey. A data set was created from the final tested instrument in 
preparation for the research. As each response was collected, the researcher entered the 
responses to each item into the data set, including participant number in order to be able 
to double-check the responses. The researcher then had a second individual double-check 
the accuracy of the responses entered into the data set, in order to ensure accuracy. Any 
errors that were found were rectified and then double-checked. This preparation structure 
was intended so that the analysis could begin immediately on completion of the data 
collection process.  
 
4.4.4 Data Analysis 
The data analysis process was performed in SPSS. The data analysis included descriptive 
statistics created in SPSS for each variable. This was performed for two reasons. First, a 
respondent profile was created in order to describe the conditions under which the survey 
was constructed. Second, a complete descriptive statistical run was performed in order to 
understand the relative commonality of the responses. The analysis then used an 
inductive statistical technique, the Chi Square, in order to test whether a relationship 
exists between the variables indicated in the hypotheses. The specific statistical technique 
used in establishing relationships in each hypothesis is discussed in the next chapter. The 
confidence level used for analysis was 95% (p < .05). This allowed for 5% or less chance 
of Type I error.  
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4.4.5 Choice of Statistical Tests 
The first set of statistical tests that were selected was descriptive statistics. Descriptive 
statistics are a way of presenting the characteristics of a given sample in terms of the 
frequency of occurrence of specific polled traits. Descriptive statistics, including counts 
and frequencies, measures of central tendency (such as mean, median, and mode), and 
measures of dispersion (such as standard deviation and range) that allow for the 
description of the distribution of the sample (Johnson & Bhattacharya, 2009). Another 
descriptive statistic, the odds ratio, was also used to describe the degree of independence 
and the chance of a given occurrence in a series of events (Moore & Notz, 2006).  
 
There are some weaknesses with the descriptive approach, which led to the use of 
additional tests in order to fill in these gaps. Under ordinary conditions, descriptive 
statistics cannot be used to make generalizations to the full sample (Brase & Brase, 
2007). However, in this particular instance that may not be the case, given that the sample 
was close to a census (or a survey of the entire population). However, this does not mean 
that descriptive statistics are entirely sufficient to the task of answering all the research 
questions involved (Trochim & Donnelly, 2006). 
 
For testing the hypotheses the chi square test for differences in distribution was used. The 
chi square test for difference in distribution uses the chi square coefficient (χ2) to 
determine whether there is a difference from the actual and expected distribution. This 
can be performed using either a specified distribution or can assume equal distributions 
(Moore & Notz, 2006). The chi square test was used to compare distributions of 
categorical and nominal data characteristics and determine whether they were different 
from the expected distribution. As one of the few tests that can be used to compare the 
distributions of nominal and categorical data (Johnson & Bhattacharya, 2009), this was 
considered to be the appropriate choice. 
 
Pearson's Chi-Square test was used to test the null hypothesis that the frequencies in the 
columns of a cross-tabulation were not significantly associated with the frequencies in the 
rows. The Pearson’s Chi-Squared statistic (χ2) was computed by SPSS using the 
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"Analyze - Descriptive Statistics - Crosstabs" menu option (Field, 2009). The χ2 test 
statistic was interpreted to infer whether or not the probability (p-value) of an association 
between the frequencies in the rows and the columns of the cross-classification was due 
to random chance.  The p-value could range from a minimum of just above 0 (a very 
slight chance that the data were caused by random chance) to a maximum of just less than 
1 (a very high chance that the data were caused by random chance). The problem is how 
small does the p-value have to be before the H0 can be rejected?  The decision rule used 
in this study was to reject the null hypothesis if the p-value of the χ2 test statistic was less 
than the conventional significance level of α = .05.  The value of α reflected the 
probability of the test producing a Type I error (i.e., the false rejection of the null 
hypothesis when, in fact, it should not be rejected).  This limit was set to a small value, 
typically α = .05, so that the probability of a Type I error was reduced.  The use of  α = 
.05 implied a 1 in 20 chance of making a Type I error, which is conventionally agreed to 
be an acceptable level (Field, 2009). The limitation of all null hypothesis statistical tests, 
including the Chi-Square test, is that the test statistics and p-values are extremely 
sensitive to sample size. If the sample size is too small then there is an elevated 
probability of a Type II error (i.e., not rejecting the null hypothesis when, in fact, it 
should be rejected). If more than 50% of the cells in a cross-tabulation contain 
frequencies less than five, then the results of a Chi-Square test are invalid (Agresti, 2007).  
In order to ensure that the cells of each cross-tabulation in this study contained sufficient 
cases, the original categories used for the questionnaire items had to be judiciously 
collapsed (i.e., two or more existing categories containing less than five cases had to be 
combined together  in order to create a new category containing  more cases).  Despite 
collapsing the categories, not all the cells in the cross-tabulations contained at least five 
cases.   
 
Before conducting null hypothesis statistical tests it was essential to specify the 
measurement levels of each variable collected using the questionnaire, because different 
types of null hypothesis statistical tests in SPSS operate on different types of variable 
(Field, 2009). Interval/scale level variables are continuous measurements with an equal 
interval between each successive measurement. Ordinal level variables are grouped into 
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numerical categories, such that each category is ranked into logical order, from low to 
high, but the distance between each category is not equal. Nominal variables are grouped 
into qualitative categories which cannot be ranked into a numerical order. All the 
variables analysed in this study were measured at the ordinal or nominal level. SPSS 
required each ordinal or nominal level category to be coded with an integer, known as a 
value label. As all the variables were categorical, it was not possible to use parametric 
statistics (e.g., means and standard deviations) which assume normally distributed 
scale/interval level variables (i.e., their frequency distribution is a bell-shaped curve). 
Only non-parametric statistics appropriate for ordinal and nominal variables were 
justified. 
 
4.5 Qualitative Research Process 
The qualitative research process started after the first batch of 40 questionnaires were 
received and tentatively analysed. The preliminary analysis was useful in highlighting 
some emergent issues that could be followed up in the interviews. A total of 17 out of 20 
participants agreed to participate in further research. The qualitative research process was 
interview-based, with a semi-guided interview process allowing for the researcher to 
gather specific information, while allowing participants to include further information.  
 
4.5.1 Instrument Design 
The instrument used in the interview process was a semi-guided interview guide, which 
included 30 qualitative questions based on the findings of the quantitative research as 
well as information from the literature review. These questions were put through the 
same pre-testing process as the quantitative research, with the interview questions being 
looked over by three subject matter experts who were familiar with the research structure. 
However, this instrument, in keeping with the qualitative structure, was not put through 
pilot testing. A copy of the interview schedule can be found in Appendix IIIB. 
 
4.5.2 Data Collection 
The data collection process involved personal visits to the participants. Interviews were 
all conducted in the capital city, Nairobi where all banks have their headquarters. The 
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researcher began with a discussion of the interview process, making sure that the 
participants understood the aims and objectives of the research. The participants were 
also informed about their right to withdraw from the research and encouraged to provide 
any additional information that they thought was of relevance during the course of the 
interview. Participants were also explained to about the importance of informed consent, 
anonymity and confidentiality. Each participant signed a consent form before the start of 
the interview.  The researcher recorded the interviews in order to ensure that the full input 
from the participants could be available. Prior to beginning the interviews the researcher 
sought consent from the participants to have their interviews recorded. All participants 
agreed to be recorded and were willing to affirm it by signing the consent form. 
Interviews lasted typically between thirty to just over sixty minutes (excluding, 
introductions, exchange of pleasantries and final appreciations). 
 
4.5.3 Data Preparation 
Following each interview, the researcher transcribed the interviews as conducted, 
including research questions and the responses to these questions. A paper copy of each 
transcript was prepared in order to allow note taking and manual coding. A database was 
then prepared in order to allow for the paper coding to be more easily analysed, with 
sheets for each interview question.  
 
4.5.4 Data Analysis 
The data analysis process used an open coding process first, in order to create all possible 
codes for analysis. Saldana (2009, p.3) explains a code as “a word or short phrase that 
symbolically assigns a summative, salient, essence-capturing and/or evocative attribute 
for a portion of language-based or visual data.” 
Coding was based on content analysis, with the meanings of comments and answers 
rather than the specific words being used as the basis for the coding process in most 
cases. Focusing on each question, the researcher then identified the most common codes 
from each of the participants. These common codes were examined in light of the 
research questions, and were then constructed into a narrative framework that examined 
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these questions in detail. Coding was performed manually, due to familiarity with data 
and the relatively small size of the sample.  
 
In discussing qualitative analysis, Miles and Huberman (1994) explained that in 
analysing data three stages are important; namely, data reduction, data display and 
conclusion drawing and verifying. Data reduction gives rise to three levels or 
categories of information: text driven categories, coherence-driven categories and 
theory driven categories. The interview data was transcribed and significant segments 
of texts and themes that relate to the conceptual framework were drawn out from the 
transcribed interviews. Text-driven categories were then formed with themes being 
extracted. An effort was then made to conceptualize logical links and relationships 
between the themes, giving rise to coherence-driven categories. Finally, a link was 
established between the coherence-driven categories and literature gathered to 
develop theory-driven constructs. 
 
Data display involved taking the reduced data and displaying it in an organised, 
compressed way so that conclusions can be more easily drawn. Miles and Huberman 
(1994) state that conclusion drawing and verification is the final analytical activity 
for the qualitative researcher, through noticing  patterns of differences and 
similarities, regularities and irregularities, explanations, casual flows and 
propositions. 
 
Following the analysis, the researcher contacted the participants and offered them the 
opportunity to review the interpretation of the findings. (This was in order to enact the 
interpretivist philosophy, as well as the critical realist philosophy, in order to provide 
multiple points of view of the research and help to reduce the potential for researcher 
bias). There was no additional feedback to the original information provided. However, 
their affirmation of the analysis was a positive confirmation on the accuracy of the 
information.  
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4.6 Data Integration  
A triangulation approach was used for integration. In this approach, the researcher used 
qualitative and quantitative findings to discuss and answer each of the research questions 
(Creswell, 2009). Each of the findings for the qualitative and quantitative research is 
presented separately. However, the hypothesis-proving efforts are only approached using 
quantitative research, because of the goal of hypothesis proving.  The qualitative research 
is also used to expand the findings and discuss the views of the research participants that 
were not detected in the research.  
 
4.7 Data Presentation 
The data presentation is in three sections. First, a respondent profile was constructed that 
identifies the overall characteristics of the participants. Then, a section on the quantitative 
findings discussed the descriptive findings as well as the inductive analysis that was 
conducted. These sections are included in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 encompasses the findings 
of the qualitative research, while Chapter 7 discusses these findings in terms of their 
position within the existing literature, including how it meets the expectations set by the 
existing research as well as how it differs from these expectations.  A variety of tables, 
graphs, and other representations are used in order to describe the findings.  
 
4.8 Research Issues 
The research issues that were encountered during this research process were important in 
determining the outcomes of the research. The main issues include reliability, validity, 
generalization of findings, and the ethics of the research process. Each of these issues is 
discussed in detail below. It should be noted that these issues do have some difference in 
meanings based on the qualitative and quantitative research, and each of these is 
discussed separately below.  
 
4.8.1 Reliability 
 Scale reliability in quantitative-based studies is defined as the degree to which scale 
items are free from random error (McDaniel and Gates, 2007). It expresses the “ratio of 
the variance of the true score to the variance of the observed score” (Netemeyer et al, 
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2003, p. 42). Kerlinger (1973) argues that concepts that may be synonymous to reliability 
often demonstrate characteristics of “dependability, stability, consistency, predictability, 
and accuracy” (p. 442). Thus, reliable scales are those that can be depended on and that 
show consistency over time. 
 
The particular concern for reliability in this instrument is internal consistency reliability, 
or the ability to ensure that items within the test are reflecting the same constructs 
(Trochim, 2006).  There are different methods for assessing the reliability of a construct. 
However, a common research practice is to report coefficient alpha of all multi-item 
scales, whether these scales are borrowed from existing batteries or are newly developed 
or both.  
 
Reliability in qualitative research is not based on the ability to re-measure results. Instead, 
this concept in critical research is based on issues like ontological appropriateness, 
multiple perceptions of participants and other researchers, and methodological 
trustworthiness (Healy & Perry, 2000). Although some researchers argue that reliability is 
a purely quantitative concept and there are no applications to qualitative research, this is 
not a general position, and most researchers feel that the issue of reliability is based in 
trustworthiness of the design process (Golafshani, 2003). For example trustworthiness of 
information can be achieved by collecting data through multiple key informants 
(Bonoma, 1985). In order to ensure that this research was conducted in a reliable manner, 
multiple informants were identified from the different banks and information collected 
from them. This reduces the risk of unbiased views being collected. Interviewees were 
also selected from different levels of responsibility (audit, forensic departments, risk 
management, fraud investigators) and seniority (managers, assistant managers, Heads of 
Departments) so as to collect and integrate a range of perceptions (Friedberg, 1993).  
 
4.8.2 Validity 
Validity in quantitative research is related to the concept of reliability. A construct that 
meets validity requirements must by default be reliable, but not vice versa. This means 
that a construct may be reliable but not valid (Netemeyer et al., 2003). The main issues in 
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quantitative validity in this research include construct validity and measurement validity. 
Construct validity refers to the ability of the identified items in the instrument to reflect 
the underlying constructs (Trochim & O'Donnelly, 2006). Construct validity was ensured 
in the pilot testing process, which included an analysis in order to examine whether the 
constructs being discussed in the research were those that were being perceived by the 
participants. This was also ensured in the qualitative research, by comparing the findings 
of the research to participant feedback in this area.  
 
As with reliability, validity in qualitative research is a divergent concept from that of 
validity in quantitative research. Validity in qualitative research can encompass issues of 
construct validity, contingent validity, and analytical generalization, as well as rigor in 
the analysis process (Golafshani, 2003; Healy & Perry, 2000). These issues have been 
protected using careful analysis of the findings in order to ensure construct validity, 
including analysis by others (participants and other readers) as well as the researcher. The 
issue of contingent validity has been examined in the same way. However, the issue of 
analytical generalization has not been addressed, as this would not be easily determined 
from the structure of the survey.  
 
4.8.3 Generalization of Findings  
One of the weaknesses of the qualitative approach which was intended to be compensated 
for by the mixed methods research approach is the inability to generalize findings of the 
research (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007). However, the quantitative research process has 
direct implications for generalization of findings. In this case, almost the entirety of the 
Kenyan banking industry was encompassed by the research, and so the application of 
these findings to the Kenyan context is appropriate. The quantitative results can be 
generalized with caution to banks in other countries in Africa with similar banking 
structures. The results may also be generalized with caution to international banks in 
Kenya as they were well represented in the survey.  
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4.8.4 Ethical considerations of the research 
Ethical considerations were important in this study. Research ethics in this study has 
been guided by the Nottingham Trent University Graduate School code on research 
ethics. Throughout the duration of the research due care and attention was paid to 
protect all persons involved in giving information. The background and aims of the 
study were explained to the participants in a participants’ information sheet attached 
to the questionnaire to ensure they understood the research. Issues of confidentiality, 
privacy, anonymity and informed consent were also outlined in the information sheet. 
Ensuring informed consent and giving a clear explanation about the nature of the 
research is useful in creating solid communication grounds from the start, can reduce 
attrition rates and increase the quality of data gathered. An assurance that the data 
collected would remain anonymous and all data will be based on aggregates was 
given to the research participants. The questionnaire did not ask for personal data 
such as name of the respondent or of the organisation, thus encouraging anonymity. 
Those being interviewed were also informed about the nature of the research in 
advance and they asked to sign a consent form before the start of each interview. 
Respondents being interviewed were given code numbers so that their identity was 
concealed to avoid traceability in the research report. All participants were informed 
that they had the right to opt out of the research at any time before the final 
publication of the thesis or to decline from divulging information they were not 
comfortable about. None of the participants have so far sought to withdraw their 
participation. However, during the interviews two interviewees declined to answer a 
question each stating that they were under a code of secrecy and could therefore not 
divulge certain information.  
 
To enhance confidentiality and security interviews were recorded using a digital 
recorder and the data was later transferred to a secure laptop that only the researcher 
had access to. Any information that could be traced to or identified with a particular 
participant was removed from the transcripts and any subsequent write ups. 
Participant names and financial institution names were removed from the analysis 
process. Code numbers and pseudo-names were assigned to participants and banks so 
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that their identity was concealed to avoid traceability in the research report. Pseudo 
names were selected from Biblical characters. All data has been held securely in a 
locked cabinet and confidentiality of information divulged will be upheld. All audio 
files will be deleted or destroyed once they have been archived by the University in 
keeping with University rules. 
 
4.9 Field Reflections 
The research was carried out in the main capital city, Nairobi, where all banks have their 
headquarters. At first it was not easy to win the confidence of respondents as traditionally 
there has been a conservative culture where people are still very cautious about disclosing 
personal and organisational information to researchers. However, as the fieldwork 
progressed and the researcher got personally introduced, respondents gained more 
confidence and spoke freely. Younger managers were more open as most of them had 
experienced challenges of collecting information as postgraduate students and were 
therefore more sympathetic to the researchers’ cause. Participants in the interviews all 
had a very positive attitude towards the research and expressed their desire to have a copy 
of the findings. Interestingly they did not mind being recorded and spoke freely in 
response to the interview questions. This shows a change in traditional culture where 
people that were once apprehensive about speaking out, even in terms not favourable 
towards their own organisation, have now embraced a new culture of openness and 
engagement with research. All the interviews were carried out at the convenience of the 
respondents in their offices or in a quiet room within the organisational building. The 
interviews lasted between 30 and 60 minutes. Due to the unavailability of time on the part 
of some participants at least three interviews were postponed and eventually cancelled.  
However, it is worth pointing out that the response rate for the quantitative research was 
75% (Sixty out of eighty possible respondents) and 85% for the qualitative study 
(Seventeen out of twenty possible respondents). This response rate makes this study as 
comparable as other research as it has adequately covered the banking industry; 
significantly it has captured the views of the leading banks that represent 70% of Kenya’s 
banking market share. 
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4.10 Summary 
This chapter has summarized the research process that was used in the study, in order to 
allow for critical examination of the findings, as well as replication of the research in 
other areas if possible. This has included discussion of the materials in terms of the 
qualitative and quantitative process, as well as the integration of the various findings. The 
research design and methods were then examined in light of the ways in which the 
research could be considered for generalization and replication. Not the entire results of 
the study would however be replicable due to the qualitative portion of the study, whose 
findings would be difficult to duplicate. This chapter has also discussed the various issues 
within the study, including reliability, validity, and ethics, and how these issues have 
affected the research. This chapter provides evidence that the research design was 
carefully constructed in accordance with the research philosophies in use, and that the 
findings of the research are founded in statistical and interpretive approaches. The study 
adopted a constructionism epistemology/ontology. Theoretical perspectives included both 
qualitative and quantitative approaches while research methods included a survey and 
semi-structured interviews. The next three chapters present the findings and outcomes of 
the study.  
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Chapter 5  
Quantitative Study Results and Analysis 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the results and analysis of the survey that was conducted. The 
main purpose of the survey was to collect information that would give a broad idea of the 
nature and characteristics of fraud in the Kenyan banking industry. The survey consisted 
of 29 quantitative questions, using a variety of question types including rankings, 
descriptive and interval-ratio questions. The questions were focused in four areas, 
including identification of the nature, trends, and characteristics of fraud, the experience 
of fraud in the organisation, fraud prevention techniques in use within the organisation, 
and information regarding the organisation and the role of the respondent in the 
organisation. This survey questionnaire is attached in Appendix 6. This survey was 
distributed to a sample of 60 individual respondents from organisations that met with the 
requirements of the study, the criteria of which are mentioned in the previous chapter. 
Following identification of hypotheses regarding the relationship between fraud and 
organisational characteristics (presented in Chapter 2), statistical analysis was performed 
using the statistical package SPSS. This analysis included descriptive statistics and 
inferential univariate and multivariate inferential statistical analysis, designed to both 
provide a hypothesis-testing approach and to identify any other relationships or patterns 
that could be seen within the data. An exploratory approach was used in order to identify 
any other potential relationships. Section 5.2 gives a review of the research questions the 
research is based on. Sections 5.3 and 5.4 present the analysis and discussion of the 
survey. Section 5.5 identifies the outcomes of the hypotheses testing procedure while 
Section 5.6 provides the findings in light of the research questions and the conceptual 
framework. Finally Section 5.7 summarizes the outcomes of the findings and analysis. 
 
5.2 Review of the Research Questions 
The following research questions were used in guiding the findings of the research. Of 
these research questions, Questions 1 and 2 are explored fully within this chapter, while 
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Question 3 is explored using both quantitative and qualitative findings (that is, split 
between Chapters 5 and 6). Research question 4 is discussed through some of the 
hypothesis outcomes and it is again discussed within Chapter 7. 
 
1. What are the characteristics of fraud in the Kenyan banking industry?  
2. What are the perceived characteristics of those that perpetrate fraud in the Kenyan 
banking industry?  
3. How do banks approach fraud management?  
4. Are there differences between the approaches to fraud management adopted by 
Kenyan and international banks?  
 
5.3 Results and Analysis 
The results of this study focused in three areas. First, in order to understand where the 
responses to the study have been derived from and the overall sample used for this study, 
a respondent study was built using the demographic and organisational information that 
was collected within the study. Second, descriptive statistics were provided that identified 
specific issues involved in the data set and described the distribution of variables. Third, 
statistical processes were used in order to identify relationships that were used to either 
prove or disprove the hypotheses that were stated above. The results of this research were 
then analysed in terms of the existing literature on fraud in the banking industry in order 
to determine where there were differences and similarities, as well as new insights that 
have emerged from the process of this research study. 
 
5.3.1 Respondent Profile 
This study was built on a sample of 60 respondents from 30 banking institutions selected 
from the population as described in the methodology chapter. A profile of the 
respondents has been built in order to determine the institutional and organisational 
context in which this research has taken place. The respondent profile included 
organisation-specific characteristics (including the description of the banking operation, 
the type of business organisation, the number of employees, and the turnover lost to fraud 
over the past year) as well as respondent-specific characteristics (including the position in 
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the organisation, the number of years in this organisation, and the number of years 
involved in the banking industry on the whole).  
 
5.3.2 Organisational Characteristics 
Table 5.1 provides a summary of categorical institutional characteristics, including the 
institution’s general coverage, the corporate entity type based on respondents, and the 
number of employees within the organisation in Kenya.  
 
Table 5.1 Descriptive characteristics of organisations 
Description of the Institution (based on respondents) 
Institutional Description Number of respondents Per cent 
Local Bank 19 31.7% 
National Bank 8 13.3% 
International Bank 21 35% 
Regional Bank 12 20% 
Total 60 100% 
Corporate Structure Type of the Institution (based on respondents) 
Corporate Structure Type Number of respondents Per cent 
Public Limited Company 32 53.3% 
Private Limited Company 22 36.7% 
Public Sector (Government) 6 10% 
Total 60 100% 
Number of Employees In the Institution (in Kenya) 
Number of Employees Number of Respondents Per cent 
1 to 100 4 6.7% 
101 to 500 23 38.3% 
501 to 1,000 9 15% 
1,001 to 10,000 24 40% 
Total 60 100% 
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In terms of categorization, local banks are those whose operations were confined to 
Kenya; national banks are those in which the Government of Kenya has a substantial 
interest in by way of shareholding; regional banks are those that have operations in 
Kenya as well as in other African nations; and international banks are those whose 
operations cut across nations and continents of the world. 
 
The most common types of banks based on respondents included local banks and 
international banks, with regional banks being a third common type. The most common 
corporate structure reflected was the Public Limited Company. Importantly, Table 5.2 
(Cross-tabulation of organisation type and scope) shows that at least 75-76% of 
international and regional bank respondents surveyed were from Public limited 
institutions while most Local bank respondents (74%) were from Private limited 
companies; indicating that there was more public participation in international banks. 
 
Table 5.2 Cross tabulation of Institutional description and corporate structure 
Institutional 
Description 
n Public Ltd (%) Private Ltd (%) Public Sector (%) 
Local Bank 19 26.3 73.7 0.0 
National Bank 8 25.0 0.0 75.0 
International Bank 21 76.2 23.8 0.0 
Regional Bank 12 75.0 25.0 0.0 
Total 60 53.3 36.7 10.0 
 
The main non-categorical descriptive statistic used to build a profile for the banks was the 
amount of turnover lost to fraud each year, where turnover represents the annual revenue 
net of any sales returns. This was based on a percentage scale, with the minimum 
response indicating a loss of 0.01% and the maximum response indicating a loss of 5%. 
The mean for the full sample was 1.1757%, with a standard deviation of 0.84552. 
However, these figures varied somewhat from the mean when considering sub-samples 
based on the type of institution. The results of this analysis seem to indicate that fraud as 
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a percentage of annual turnover drops as the geographical spread of the banking 
institution gets wider. This was also analysed using the number of employees as the 
determining factor, in order to identify whether this was an issue unique to geographic 
coverage or if it was reflecting the size of the organisation. Table 5.3 identifies the means 
and standard deviations for each of the organisation type groups and employee size 
categories. These figures suggest a negative relationship between organisation size and 
percentage lost to fraud. 
 
Table 5.3 Mean and standard deviation of fraud lost as a per cent of turnover annually, between 
organisational type categories and employee size categories 
Organisation Type of the 
Institution 
Mean (%) Standard Deviation 
Local Bank 1.4947 .29444 
Regional Bank 1.0850 .20176 
National Bank 1.0025 .18710 
International Bank 1.0053 .07274 
International Subsidiary 1.000 .50000 
All Categories 1.1757 0.84552 
Number of Employees Mean Standard Deviation 
0 to 100 0.7750 .30380 
101 to 500 1.0357 .13091 
501 to 1,000 2.0667 .53774 
1,001 to 10,000 1.0425 .07269 
 
 
5.3.3 Respondent Characteristics 
In addition to the institutional data observed above, there was also analysis of the data 
provided by the respondents to the study themselves. The responses for this study came 
from a wide variety of individuals within the banking institution, with varying degrees of 
responsibility within the organisation itself as well as a variety of levels of experience, 
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both within the organisation and outside it. Table 5.4 shows the job titles of respondents 
(which have been standardized but not collapsed).  
 
Table 5.4 Role of the respondent in the organisation 
Job Title Frequency Percept 
Audit and Investigations/Internal Auditor 18 30.0% 
Audit manager/Chief Internal Auditor 5 8.333% 
Risk Manager 5 8.333% 
Accountant 3 5.0% 
Auditor (Internal) 3 5.0% 
Fraud Investigation 3 5.0% 
Fraud Prevention and Investigation/Operations 3 5.0% 
Head of Security 2 3.3333% 
Internal Investigations 2 3.3333% 
Manager (Not further Specified) 2 3.3333% 
Operations Manager 2 3.3333% 
Security/Investigations Manager 2 3.3333% 
Assurance Manager 1 1.6667% 
Internal Control Monitor 1 1.6667% 
Floor Services Manager 1 1.6667% 
Forensic Manager/Forensic Auditor 1 1.6667% 
Head of Accounting 1 1.6667% 
Head of Finance 1 1.6667% 
Heads Internal Control & Compliance Dept 1 1.6667% 
Information System Auditor 1 1.6667% 
Systems and Process Analyst 1 1.6667% 
Validation Specialist 1 1.6667% 
Total 60 100% 
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Respondent-specific questions included the number of years worked in the current 
institution, the number of years overall experience in the accounting or auditing field, and 
the role of the respondent in the organisation.  
 
Table 5.4 shows a wide variety of respondents, and the majority of who fall into fraud 
prevention and detection, security and auditing job functions. The average overall 
accounting experience was 10.71 years while the average number of years the 
respondents had worked in the current institution was 6.9 years.  
 
5.4 Descriptive Statistics  
In order to understand the outcomes, it is important to understand the role that fraud has 
played within the organisations that have been examined. The descriptive statistics that 
have been conducted are based on four areas of discussion, including the overall view of 
fraud on the part of the respondent; experience of fraud (the types of fraud experienced, 
reasons for conducting such fraud, and who conducted the fraud, as well as the losses 
experienced and outcomes); the organisational climate responses to fraud; and the 
software integration responses to fraud.   
 
Section 5.4.1 addressed Research Question 1 about the characteristics of fraud in the 
banking industry and the respondents view on this. Section 5.4.2 addressed the fraud 
experience of the respondent and captures Research Question 2 on the perceived 
characteristics of perpetrators as this section highlights who the perpetrator is, their 
motivation and rationalization. Section 5.4.3 considers the nature, kind and size of fraud 
addressing Research Question 1. Section 5.4.4 reviews Research Question 3 on how 
banks do fraud management.   
 
5.4.1 Respondent’s View of Fraud 
This section deals with Research Question 1 which sought to understand the respondents’ 
views on the characteristics of fraud in Kenya’s banking industry. The first question was 
about how the respondents classify the fraud problem. Fifty four respondents (90%) 
indicated that it was a major problem as shown in Figure 5.1. This high percentage could 
 144 
perhaps have been influenced by the nature of the respondents’ job, which involves 
detecting and preventing fraud. These results are consistent with the general industry 
findings of the African Fraud and Misconduct survey (KPMG, 2005) that reported 72% 
of respondents indicated that fraud was a major problem.  
 
 
Figure 5.1 Classification of the fraud problem by respondents 
 
The second question sought to find out how likely it was that fraud would be encountered 
in the financial sector. One respondent indicated that it was quite unlikely, while six 
(10%) respondents indicated that it was likely. Twelve respondents (20%) indicated that 
it was quite likely, while 41 respondents (68.3% of the sample) indicated that it was very 
likely. In total at least 98.3% respondents said that fraud is likely to occur over the next 5 
years in the financial sector. 
 
The third question focused on the direction of the trend in fraud. Three respondents 
indicated that it was decreasing, while seven indicated that it was remaining constant. 
Thirty-eight respondents indicated that it was increasing, while 12 respondents indicated 
that it was increasing rapidly (See Figure 5.2). 
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Figure 5.2 Trends in fraud 
 
Table 5.5 cross-tabulates responses based on bank scope.  
 
Table 5.5 Cross-tabulation: Fraud trends by bank scope 
Bank Type n Increasing (%) Constant (%) Decreasing (%) 
Local Banks 19 84.2 10.5 5.3 
National Banks 8 75.0 25.0 0.0 
International Banks 21 85.7 9.5 4.8 
Regional 12 83.3 8.3 8.3 
 
Again this finding is in tandem with findings of the African Fraud Survey (KPMG, 
2005), which returned a similar opinion with 79% of the respondents expressing their 
opinion that the trend of fraud was on the increase.   
 
Respondents were also asked to choose up to three reasons for the changes in the trend in 
banking fraud that they saw. These responses were not inherently ranked for importance.  
Table 5.6 demonstrates the reasons that were shown for the total fraud. This shows that 
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the most common reasons for changes in the trend of banking fraud include economic 
pressures, advanced computer technologies, and more sophisticated criminals.  
 
Table 5.6 Reasons given for changes in bank trends 
Reason  Frequency  
(n=60x3=180) 
Percept of total 
responses (173) 
Percept of respondents 
indicating (60) 
Economic pressure 43 24.86 71.70 
Advanced computer 
technologies 
28 16.18 46.70 
More sophisticated 
criminals 
23 13.29 38.30 
Ineffectiveness of justice 
systems 
19 10.98 31.70 
Changing society values 18 10.40 30.00 
Inadequate fraud training  16 9.25 26.70 
Poor management practices 11 6.36 18.30 
Social-cultural factors 6 3.47 10.00 
Poor ethical practices 6 3.47 10.00 
Political factors 3 1.73 5.00 
 
These figures did not show significant differences based on the size and scope of the 
banking operation. Although there were some percentage differences, this was due to 
dramatic difference in the size of the categories, as well as one local bank respondent 
with an outlying view of the severity of the fraud problem. Full cross-tabulation tables for 
this investigation are available in the Appendix IA.  
 
5.4.2 The Experience of Fraud 
The second group of questions focused on the experience of fraud over the past year, 
identifying perpetrator characteristics, losses, and reasons given for the fraud. This is 
intended to characterize the scope and scale of fraud as experienced by respondents in 
their organisations, and this is also analysed depending on the organisation type in order 
to determine if there are any significant differences between institutions based on scope 
of the institution.  This Section addresses Research Question 2. 
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5.4.2.1 Who Perpetrates Fraud? 
Research question 2 read, “What are the perceived characteristics of those that perpetrate 
fraud?” The quantitative insight into this question is demonstrated within this section. 
One group of questions asked in this survey focuses on the perpetrator characteristics, 
including the position or role of each perpetrator, their age, gender, and other 
characteristics. This information was compiled from the views expressed by those 
employed to counteract fraud in the organisation and not from the fraudsters involved in 
the committing the fraud. Information regarding educational level, though important in 
other studies (Sutherland, 1949; Krambia, 2004; Wheeler, Weisburd and Bode, 1988) was 
not routinely available and so was excluded; The minimum educational level of internal 
perpetrators can be inferred as Kenyan banks require a secondary school education for 
positions such as cashiers, tellers etc.  
 
The most common organisation was collusion between internal and external perpetrators 
(N = 42), and the second most common was collusion between internal perpetrators (N = 
8).  
 
Figure 5.3 Fraud perpetrators by type of conspiracy 
 
These findings agree with the KMPG (2005) report that revealed that over 75% of frauds 
are perpetrated by employees in Kenyan organisations and that collusion is the number 
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one form of fraud in the organisations surveyed. If collusion between external 
perpetrators is included then the overall rate of collusion moves up to 88%, leaving single 
perpetrators in only 12% of cases. This raises an important question as to whether earlier 
criminology theories that emphasized the individual characteristics and circumstances of 
fraudsters may have over-simplified real situations.  
 
The second issue that emerged was the relative positions of internal and external first and 
second parties. Table 5.7 demonstrates the positions or roles of the parties that engaged in 
the fraud. This shows that a total of 87 internal perpetrators and 78 external perpetrators 
were involved in the overall level of fraud.  
 
Table 5.7 Role and position of perpetrators 
Role and Position of Perpetrators 
Internal Roles First Party Second Party Total 
An Executive (Director/Officer) 2 1 3 
A junior manager 5 9 14 
A middle manager 9 3 12 
A senior manager 6 2 8 
A junior non-managerial employee 18 6 24 
A middle non-managerial employee 8 4 12 
A supervisor 6 7 13 
An Owner 1 0 1 
Total 55 32 87 
External Roles    
A Customer 20 7 27 
A competitor 1 1 2 
A supplier 3 4 7 
A Contractor 2 0 2 
A former Employee 6 10 16 
An organised Criminal 13 2 15 
A company agent 3 2 5 
A Friend 2 0 2 
Other 0 2 2 
Total  50 28 78 
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Collusion between internal perpetrators mainly involved junior non-managerial 
employees as the internal first party (main perpetrator) and either a Supervisor or a junior 
manager as the internal second party (the accomplice). Early studies in white-collar crime 
showed that the position held by the perpetrator in the victim organisation played a role in 
the kind of fraud committed (Cressey, 1973). This is because the perpetrator will possess 
technical knowledge by virtue of the fiduciary duties and position of trust that they 
occupy that enables them to perpetrator the fraud. This finding therefore supports the 
work of Cressey (1973). Friedrichs (2004) and Vaughan (2001) have argued that 
employees in junior positions can only commit certain types of fraud as their 
opportunities would be limited by their position while those in higher managerial or 
executive positions may have access to more opportunities based on the greater degree of 
trust vested in their position.  
 
The main external parties involved in the fraud were bank customers and organised 
criminals as the external first parties and former employees as the external second parties. 
The African Fraud Survey (KPMG, 2005) supports this outcome as it also indicated that 
customers were the next highest group of perpetrators after employees making them the 
top external party to fraudulent activities. 
 
The survey also collected information on reported age and gender of the fraudsters. Table 
5.8 shows the age and gender of primary and secondary internal perpetrators in order to 
allow for comparison. (This information was not reported for all parties). The majority of 
both internal and external perpetrators are between 31 and 40 and male. This is 
approximately consistent with findings previous research, including Benson and Moore 
(1992); Holtfreter (2005); Krambia (2004); Wheeler et al. (1988). This did not quite agree 
with previous studies carried out by Wheeler et al (1988) who found that the typical 
offender was white male aged forty on average. However, the study by Wheeler et al 
(1988) was carried out in America. Kenya is a relatively ‘younger’ society than America 
and has a different cultural setting. One could therefore argue that the context of Wheeler 
et al (1988) study varies from that of this research. 
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Table 5.8: Age and Gender of Parties Involved in Fraud 
Age of Parties Involved in Fraud 
Internal 1st Party 2nd Party Total 
Below 30yrs 19 9 28 
31-40yrs 28 21 49 
41-50yrs 6 2 8 
Over 50yrs 1 1 2 
External 1st Party 2nd Party Total 
Below 30yrs 7 2 9 
31-40yrs 30 22 52 
41-50yrs 9 1 10 
Over 50yrs 1 1 2 
Gender of Parties Involve in Fraud 
Internal 1st Party 2nd Party Total 
Male 43 23 66 
Female 12 11 23 
External    
Male 44 22 66 
Female 5 5 10 
 
There are relatively few studies on gender and fraud either in Kenya or generally (Daly, 
1989; Heimer, 2000, as cited in Holtfreter, 2005; Steffensmeier, 1993). Press reports also 
indicate that there is little known about the gender breakdown of fraud in Kenya 
(Okwembah, 2010). This research shows that women are a minority participant in fraud, 
which is inconsistent with the findings on fraud in previous research (Holtfreter, 2005). 
This could be due to relatively low status of women in Kenyan banks, whose roles as 
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receptionists or tellers do not offer sufficient basis for collusion (Daly, 1989; Friedrichs, 
2004; Vaughan, 2001). There were no significant differences found in distribution 
between the various types of banks surveyed in the position, gender, or age of internal or 
external fraud perpetrators. Full cross-tabulations are available in the Appendix 
(Statistical Outcomes/Cross Tabulations).  
 
5.4.2.2 Motivations and Rationalizations for Fraud 
In addition to the types of fraud and the frequency of various types of fraud, this research 
also examined the identified motivations (pressures) and rationalizations (justifications) 
for the fraudulent activities involved. It should be noted that as this information came 
from the bank employees rather than the fraud perpetrators, this is a third-party 
assessment for the reasons involved in the fraudulent activity. Table 5.9 shows the 
relative frequency of various motivations for the fraud. These figures demonstrate that 
opportunity, lifestyle habits, personal financial pressure and greed were the most frequent 
motivating factors in the responses. These findings generally support findings of a 
KPMG (2007) study. 
 
Table 5.9: Motivating factors for fraud 
Motivating Factor Frequency (n=60) Percept (%) 
Opportunity 38 63.3 
Lifestyle habits 28 46.7 
Personal financial pressure 24 40.0 
Greed 21 35.0 
Others 5 8.3 
Substance Abuse 3 5.0 
Gambling 2 3.3 
Corporate financial pressure 2 3.3 
 
Results indicated that most perpetrators commit fraud from opportunity rather than need 
supports the predator concept (Kranacher et al., 2011). Under this model, the fraudster 
seeks out opportunities to commit fraud immediately, and do not require rationalization 
or pressure, but only opportunity (Dorminey et al., 2010). This is inconsistent with the 
fraud triangle theory, in which an individual gradually gives in (Kranacher et al., 2011). 
However, this is only indicative and since responses were not reported by fraudsters, this 
could be skewed. The research findings also confirmed that non-shareable problems, 
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including financial pressures, living beyond one’s means, social pressures, and greed as 
advanced by Cressey (1973) were motivators of fraud. 
 
Respondents were also asked about reasons given by perpetrators, in order to determine 
rationalizations used by fraudsters during the fraud process (Cressey, 1973). Table 5.10 
reflects the most common reasons reported which included getting rich quick, family 
pressure and the fact that others get away with it. As with the motivation of fraud 
discussed above the same status gaining and societal justifications have been advanced. 
However employer-employee relations (such as being under-paid and seeking revenge on 
the organization) did not seem to feature highly as justifications for fraud which could be 
an indicator that internal perpetrators were generally satisfied with their job or as 
predators would see the job as an opportunity to commit fraud. It is significant to note 
that about 20% of respondents were not sure as to why fraud was committed.   
 
Table 5.10: Justification of fraud given by perpetrators 
Reasons Frequency (n=60) Percept (%) 
To get rich quick 23 38.3 
Others are getting away with fraud 14 23.3 
Had family pressure 14 23.3 
Don't know 13 21.7 
Influenced/forced by others 9 15.0 
Was just borrowing hoping to repay 9 15.0 
Underpaid 8 13.3 
Others 6 10.0 
Was seeking revenge on the organisation 3 5.0 
Everyone else around them were fraudulent 2 3.3 
The amount of money taken was not too large a sum 2 3.3 
 
 153 
5.4.2.3 Reasons why fraud occurred (Opportunities) 
One of the questions focused on the respondent identifying the organizational reasons as 
to why the fraud occurred. This question essentially sought to know the reasons why the 
fraud was successful and what opportunities in the organization had led to the fraud 
occurring. Each respondent was to identify up to a maximum of 3 reasons. It should be 
noted that not all respondents identified 3 reasons as it was possible to have only one 
reason or opportunity. Table 5.11 indicates the reasons why fraud occurred. 
 
Table 5.11 Institutional or organizational reasons why fraud occurred 
 Frequency  
Reason 
Primary 
Reason  
Secondary 
Reason  
Tertiary 
Reason  
Total  
(n=60) Percentage 
Poor internal controls 27 9 2 38 
 
63.33 
Overrides of internal 
controls by management 7 11 4 22 36.67 
Poor screening 
procedures on hiring 18 - - 18 30 
Poor organizational 
culture 2 8 4 14 23.33 
Use of new technology 
and systems - 2 10 12 20 
Poor record keeping, 
lack of documentation 2 4 4 10 16.67 
Lack of fraud training 1 4 3 8 
 
13.33 
Other 1 4 2 7 
 
11.67 
Poor inventory control 1 2 2 5 
 
8.33 
Failure to punish 
offenders - 1 3 4 6.67 
Lack of ethical culture 2 - - 2 
 
3.33 
 
Poor internal controls and overrides of internal controls by management were cited as the 
main reasons why fraud occurred. Internal controls importantly play a vital role in the 
prevention, detection and deterrence of fraud (Porter, 2003). Strong internal controls can 
discourage attempts to defraud an organization while poor internal controls invite fraud 
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into the firm. However internal controls can become ineffective in the face of collusion 
especially where management or employees are involved. Overrides by the management 
weaken internal controls rendering them ineffective and opening a door to fraud. The 
results of this study support earlier studies carried out by the Association of Certified 
Fraud Examiners (ACFE, 2008) which found that the lack of internal controls was the 
most commonly cited weakness with overrides by management being ranked the number 
three weakness 
 
Poor screening procedures on recruitment also provided a significant opportunity in the 
commission of fraud. The recruitment and selection process is an important aspect of 
human resource strategies that can help to reduce the risk of fraud occurrence. The 
finding on poor screening procedures in Kenyan banks is consistent with findings of the 
study carried out by Meyer et al (2011) which indicated that firms in South Africa often 
have poor recruitment practices mainly arising from structural problems that create an 
inability to depend on previous employers for references before recruiting an employee. 
As observed from banks in Tanzania (Newenham-Kawindi, 2011), banks in Kenya need 
to monitor and remain in control of the recruitment process even when activities are 
outsourced. Recruiting the right people who possess the right skills while developing and 
training bank staff to increase human resource capacity is a strategy that can be adopted 
by the banks in Kenya (Kamoche, 2011; Oshikoya, 2010) 
 
 
 
5.4.3 Profile of the Fraud 
In addition to the perpetrators, the research collected data on the type of fraud. This 
included the type of the fraud, the nature of the fraud, any ancillary fraud conducted 
during the commission of the main fraud, the motivation for the fraud, the reasons given 
by the perpetrators where known, the overall level of loss due to the fraud, actions taken 
by the bank, outcomes of these actions, and any financial recovery the bank received. 
This discussion reflects on Research Question 1, “What are the characteristics of fraud in 
the Kenyan banking industry?”  
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5.4.3.1 Types of Fraud 
The first question was what type of fraud was observed. Figure 5.4 shows the relative 
popularity of various types of negotiable instruments and assets that were the target of 
frauds.  
 
 
Figure 5.4 Types of fraud  
 
This shows that the most popular types fraud based on frequency numbers were cheques 
(n=60; 66.66% of respondents), cash theft (58.33% of respondents), and credit cards 
(23.33% of respondents) with identity theft and bribery or kickbacks being secondary. 
This finding is consistent with reports appearing both in a national newspaper (Okwemba, 
2010) and on the local television news (KTN, 2010) revealing that cheque fraud was the 
most common type of fraud suffered by the banking industry in the first quarter of 2010.  
 
Table 5.12 demonstrates the frequency of the various types of fraud that were involved. 
The main types of fraud were theft and diversion (theft refers to the taking of money 
while diversion and misappropriation refer to assignment of funds to other areas). 
Conversion frauds are those that are used to conduct other frauds. Abuse and misuse 
frauds refer to frauds associated with violation of bank policies for personal gain, while 
infringement was primarily inappropriate seizure of private customer information.  
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Table 5.12 Nature of the fraud 
Nature of fraud Frequency (n=60) Percept (%) 
Theft 44 73.3 
Diversion/Misappropriation 31 51.7 
Conversion 16 26.7 
Abuse/Misuse 10 16.7 
Infringement 4 6.7 
Others 4 6.7 
 
Figure 5.5 compares nature of theft by type of institution, showing that theft was highest 
ranked in all cases. 
 
Figure 5.5 Top three fraud types by bank scope 
 
A number of the frauds involved secondary or ancillary frauds that were used in order to 
support or hide the main fraud approach. Table 5.13 shows the most common ancillary 
frauds that were reported. Once again, the vast majority of ancillary fraudulent activity 
was concentrated in three areas, transfer of funds, computer fraud and identity theft or 
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fraud. These findings are consistent with the Central Bank of Kenya’s first and second 
quarter 2010 reports.  
 
Table 5.13:  Frequencies of various ancillary frauds 
Type of fraud Frequency (n=60) Percept (%) 
Transfer of funds 39 66.1 
Identity fraud 32 54.2 
The use of computers (computer fraud) 22 37.3 
Falsified accounts and financial statements 14 23.7 
False invoicing 5 8.5 
Fraudulent expense claim 3 5.1 
 
5.4.3.2 Monetary Losses 
Overall loss from fraud was estimated as both a percentage of the organisation’s revenues 
(revenue) and as a fixed figure (presented in Kenyan shillings). Figure 5.6 demonstrates 
the overall monetary loss for a typical year demonstrated categorically as a percentage of 
the organisation’s revenues. A majority of the organizations reported a monetary loss of 
less than one per cent of the revenue, although a small number of organisations had a loss 
of up to 5%.  
 
Some of the respondents provided more exact estimates of the overall loss to the 
organisation. The mean loss to the organisation for those that provided this information in 
Kenyan Shillings (KES) (N = 25) was KES 21,641,000 (approximately USD $277,000 or 
€224,000 as of May 14, 2010), with a median loss of KES 5,000,000 and a standard 
deviation of 55,740,700 KES (€577,000 or US$ 713,000). This dramatic right-skewed 
distribution can be attributed to a single outlying instance of very high value fraud, where 
a total of 271,000,000 KES (US$ 3,466,000 or €2,804,000) was lost. The minimum fraud 
that was disclosed was KES 118,000 (approximately €1,221 or US$ 1,509). This 
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demonstrates a wide variance in the loss of funds as an overall total from the banks. This 
data is however restricted to known or detected fraud that has been reported. 
 
A number of banks also provided information regarding the loss to the organisation in 
terms of the loss of a single fraud as a percentage of annual revenue. The mean overall 
loss reported as a percentage of revenues (N = 27) was 1.57%, with a median 1% and a 
standard deviation of 2.93%. The minimum was 0.10%, with the maximum being 16%.  
 
Figure 5.6 Estimated overall loss as a per cent of projected annual revenues 
 
These estimated losses are only indicative of the potential problem fraud is within the 
banking industry. The only similar studies relate to the ACFE (2008) report where it was 
reported that the average loss for organisations in the USA is 7%. However, this 
considers more industries than just the banking industry considered under the current 
study. Closer to home the African fraud survey (KPMG, 2005) categorised 17% of the 
loss as ranging over USD$170,000 for all the industries surveyed in that study. A direct 
comparison cannot be made but it shows that fraud losses continue to be incurred and are 
likely to increase further given the general opinion about fraud. 
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5.4.4 Organisational Responses to Fraud 
Research question 3 asks how banks approach fraud management. This question is 
addressed in two ways, including discussion of the detection and investigation of specific 
frauds as well as organizational and technological approaches to prevention and 
detection.  
 
5.4.4.1 Detection and Investigation of Fraud 
Fraud was detected in a variety of ways, with some organisations using more than one 
method of detection. Figure 5.7 identifies the main type and frequency of the different 
ways in which fraud could be detected.  
 
Figure 5.7 Ways in which fraud was detected 
The data shows that one- third of the incidents were discovered by accident. The use of 
external auditing was one of the least useful methods of detection of fraud, with the same 
number of frauds being detected by anonymous letters or calls regarding the occurrence. 
In contrast, whistle-blowers (23.3%), and accountholder and customer complaints (12%) 
were popularly resorted to as methods of discovering fraud. As the use of other methods 
of fraud detection like whistle-blowing and internals controls increases then the 
likelihood of fraud being detected by accident should be reduced (ACFE, 2008). This is 
inconsistent with previous studies showing that rated internal controls as being the most 
commonly used detection method followed by whistle-blowing and then by accidental 
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discovery (KPMG, 2005). The difference in results from all these studies implies that 
there is no one universal or static method for fraud detection, making fraud detection and 
fraud detection methods fluid subjects. 
 
Organisations varied widely in who investigated the fraud, and some organisations used 
multiple investigators in order to investigate the crime. The most common bodies 
involved in the investigation (See Table 5.14) included internal investigation by a 
security department, investigation by a law enforcement body, and review of a case by 
internal audit committee.  
 
Table 5.14:  Investigating parties in reported frauds 
Investigator Type Frequency (n=60) Percept (%) 
Internal Investigation by Security Department 39 65.0 
Law enforcement body 28 46.7 
Case reviewed by internal audit committee 17 28.3 
Risk managers 8 13.3 
Forensic Accountants 6 10.0 
Private Investigators 5 8.3 
Internal Investigation by Finance Department 4 6.7 
Government regulatory body 2 3.3 
External auditors 1 1.7 
Fraud specialists 1 1.7 
Operations team 1 1.7 
 
There appears to be a preference by banks in Kenya to attempt investigating fraud cases 
internally by mainly resolving them through the Security Departments or the Audit 
Committees. This could be an image saving approach as the banks do not have to expose 
their fraud problems to external parties and risk damaging their reputation. However, 
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there are also a considerable percentage of respondents that indicated that a law 
enforcement body was involved in fraud investigation. This could be an indicator that 
almost half the fraud cases are reported to a law enforcing body. 
 
5.4.4.2 Actions and Outcomes   
Following the discovery of the theft, there were a number of actions the organisations 
could take, including civil or criminal prosecution, negotiated settlement, dismissal, 
disciplinary hearings, or others. Table 5.15 identifies the main responses that were 
observed in the data set regarding first and second internal and external parties to the 
fraud and it shows that the most frequent action in the case of internal parties was 
immediate dismissal, followed by criminal prosecution. 
 
Table 5.15 Actions taken against the parties involved in the fraud on discovery 
Internal Parties 1st Party (%) 2nd Party (%) 
Immediate dismissal 78.2% 68.8% 
Disciplinary action other than dismissal 7.3% 12.5% 
Allowed employees to resign 10.9% 15.6% 
Criminal prosecution 30.9% 28.1% 
Civil prosecution for recovery 10.9% 6.3% 
Negotiated settlement 1.8%  
Other action 1.8%  
External Parties   
Civil prosecution for recovery 23.3% 28.6% 
Criminal prosecution 80.0% 61.9% 
Negotiated settlement 3.3% 4.8% 
Took no action 50.0% 33.3% 
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The most common response for external parties was criminal prosecution, followed by 
civil prosecution. This does indicate that in the case of external parties almost all of the 
external parties faced criminal or civil prosecution. Where action was taken 80% (i.e. 
80% of the fraud cases on external 1st parties were referred for criminal prosecution and 
about 62% of fraud cases on external 2nd parties were referred to the courts for civil 
prosecution. However, rates of legal redress were somewhat lower for primary and 
secondary internal parties compared to external parties. The rates of negotiated or 
arbitrated cases were very low. 
 
The discussion under hypothesis 2b (Section 5.5.2) analyses if this difference is 
statistically significant. There were a high percentage of cases where no action was taken 
on external parties with 50% of external primary parties and almost 77% of external 
secondary parties walking away scot free with fraudulent acts. As discussed further in 
Chapters 6 (Section 6.4) legal issues surrounding the drawn out period of time it takes to 
secure a conviction, high acquittal rates, problems of police slackness and frequent 
transfers, unskilled fraud prosecutors, inadequate legislature to prosecute criminals, weak 
legal enforcement and poor industry co-operation among the banks are among some of 
the reasons why banks opt not to follow up on fraud cases. Sometimes the cost involved 
in pursuing a fraud case in terms of the legal fees and time spent far outweighs the benefit 
that the organisation will receive from the case. 
 
Respondents were also asked what the outcome of their actions against fraud perpetrators 
was (in the case of civil or criminal prosecution). Table 5.16 summarizes the outcome of 
actions against internal and external parties. (Percentages have been calculated on total 
number of cases reported, in order to ease difficulties with the number of parties 
involved). 
 
Table 5.16 shows that the chance of securing a conviction is more likely when an external 
party is concerned. However, it is also true to observe that a high percentage of cases 
were on-going and still before the courts.  
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Table 5.16 Outcome or status of criminal and civil courses 
 Internal 1st party 
(N = 29) 
Internal 2nd Party 
(N = 15) 
External 1st Party 
(N = 32) 
External 2nd Party 
(N = 19) 
Acquittal 20.7% 6.7% 12.5% 10.5% 
Conviction 34.5% 20.0% 43.8% 36.8% 
Negotiated Settlement 10.3% 20.0% 12.5% 10.5% 
On-going case 34.5% 33.3% 31.3% 42.1% 
 
 
The final outcome-based variable was the extent of financial recovery the organisations 
had realized. Figures in Table 5.17 show that, regardless of the category of perpetrator in 
the fraud, realization of financial recovery is very rare, but there are somewhat higher 
recoveries from internal fraud perpetrators than from external fraud perpetrators.  
 
Table 5.17 Extent of financial recovery from fraud perpetrators 
Extent of 
Recovery 
Internal 1st Party 
(n=52) (%) 
Internal 2nd Party 
(n=30) (%) 
External 1st Party 
(n=41) (%) 
External 
2nd Party 
(n=26) 
(%) 
None (0%) 71.2 66.7 82.9 84.6 
Partial 15.4 23.3 9.8 11.5 
Full (100%) 13.5 10.0 7.3 3.8 
 
5.4.4.3 Fraud Prevention measures 
The importance and use of fraud prevention measures were examined using ranked items 
that asked how useful each of the potential organisational responses was, with 1 
indicating most important and 5 indicating least important for a maximum of five 
responses. Table 5.18 describes the mean, median, and standard deviation of each of 
these measures, as well as the number of responses ranked against each measure. 
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Table 5.18 Ranked importance of organisational measures 
Organisational Approach Mean        Median Std. Dev. n 
Improvement or review of internal controls 1.53 1 0.979 55 
Training employees on fraud prevention 2.75 3 1.184 44 
Establishing fraud prevention policies 2.78 3 1.205 37 
Ethical code of conduct 3.32 4 1.282 25 
Implementing a fraud hotline 3.61 4 0.891 23 
Screening/reference checks 3.19 3 1.327 21 
Staff rotation policy 4.19 4 0.834 16 
Security department 3.55 4 1.440 11 
Automated fraud prevention 4 5 1.265 11 
Close supervision 4.1 4.5 1.101 10 
Spot checking 4.1 4 0.994 10 
Limiting opportunities 3.29 3 1.704 7 
Ethics training 3.83 4 0.983 6 
Fraud auditing 4.33 4.5 0.816 6 
High deterrence measures 3.2 3 1.483 5 
Use of forensic accountants 2.25 2 0.500 4 
Establishing a fraud budget 2.75 2.5 2.062 4 
Others 4 5 1.732 3 
Surveillance of electronic correspondence 2 2 0.000 1 
Inventory observation 5 5 0.000 1 
 
Table 5.18 demonstrates that there are some inconsistencies between the relative 
importance of measures and the number of banks using these measures. The five most 
commonly used measures included improvement or review of internal controls (N = 55), 
the use of fraud prevention training (N = 44), the use of fraud prevention policies (N = 
37), the use of an ethical conduct code (N = 25) and the use of a fraud hotline (N = 23). 
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However, independent t-testing for differences in means indicates that the mean 
importance ranking for ethical code of conduct and fraud prevention are not consistent 
with the frequency of the fraud prevention measures. This data is available in the 
Appendix (T-Tests).  
 
The responses that were ranked highly, but only by a small group, may be interpreted as 
being highly effective or important responses in organizational contexts that require 
them, but that are not routinely used. One such example is forensic accountants, which 
are ranked number 3 in mean importance among users despite the relative rarity of their 
use. This indicates that banks that do use forensic accountants consider them to be very 
important, but that their actual use is rare.  
 
The research has upheld the general perceived effectiveness of the internal control and 
audit and its widespread use within the organisation, as identified by a number of other 
researchers as being an important element in the prevention and detection of fraud 
(Bostan, 2010; Greenlee et al., 2007; Hillison et al., 1999; Moeller, 2004; Adams, 1994). 
The use of internal auditors has been shown to be consistent with findings by other 
researchers. This indicates that, despite any potential difference between the African and 
Anglo-American business models, internal controls still have the potential to be effective 
in cases where they have been implemented appropriately, as consistent with previous 
research in this area (Black & Geletkanycz, 2006; Palmer et al. 2008).  
 
5.4.4.4 Software Usage 
In addition to organisational responses, the respondents were asked what kind of software 
they used in their respective banks and how effective it was. The types of software 
security protocols that were examined included password protections, antivirus software, 
continuous auditing software, firewalls, discovery sampling, ratio analysis, digital 
analysis, data mining, and filtering software. All of the organisations reported some use 
of software security protocols, with the minimum number of protocols in use being 2 and 
the maximum being 9. Overall, the sample showed a mean of 5 types of software-based 
security protocols, with a standard deviation of 1.896.   
 166 
 
Table 5.19 shows the use and efficacy of each type of product. Antivirus software and 
password protection were used almost ubiquitously within the organisations. The use of 
anti-virus software is important in providing protection to the business websites against 
attacks from computer spyware and malware that can mimic the genuine business website 
leading to customers being defrauded through their account details being captured by 
counterfeit websites. Continuous auditing is being used by more than three quarters of the 
sample. 
 
The most effective software that was identified was digital analysis (100% rankings in 
highly effective and effective) along with data mining. However, though effective, few 
banks were making use of them. Of those using discovery sampling a number of them 
were not sure about its effectiveness. 
 
Table 5.19 Software use and perceptions of effectiveness 
Software Type Use Effectiveness 
 Yes No Highly Effective Effective Ineffective Unknown 
Antivirus Software 59 1 20 (34.5%) 34 (57.6%) 4 (6.8% 1 (1.7%) 
Password Protection 58 2 23 (39.7%) 31 (53.4%) 4 (6.9%)  
Continuous Auditing 46 4 12 (26.1%) 31 (67.4%) 3 (6.5%)  
Filtering 38 22 14 (36.8%) 15 (39.5%) 7 (18.4% 2 (5.3%) 
Firewalls 25 35 11 (44%) 12 (48%) 1 (4%) 1 (4%) 
Discovery Sampling 24 36 6 (25%) 13 (54.2%) 1 (4.2%) 4 (16.7%) 
Data Mining 22 38 16 (72.7%) 4 (18.2%) 2 (9.1%)  
Ratio Analysis 18 42 5 (27.8%)  10 (55.6%) 3 (16.7%)  
Digital Analysis 10 50 8 (80%) 2 (20%)   
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Digital analysis, discovery sampling and data mining are of particular importance given 
that these are the most technologically advanced methods and the ones with the most 
importance in terms of hidden fraud discovery. These findings concerning software 
effectiveness are consistent with results of Bierstaker et al. (2006) who found that even 
though data mining, digital analysis and discovery sampling were not used by majority of 
organisations they were ranked by participants of the study as being the most effective 
methods. Just like Bierstaker et al. (2006) this study has found that the more popular 
software approaches used for fraud prevention (i.e. firewalls, virus protection, password 
protection) are not as effective.  
 
The role of information security has been promoted as one of the determining factors in 
the effective prevention of internal and external fraud (Baloyi, 2005; Bielski, 2004; 
Bierstaker et al., 2006; Bolton & Hand, 2002; Haugen & Selin, 1999; Tipton & Krause, 
2006). The overall effectiveness as perceived by the respondents of software approaches 
to fraud detection and prevention was positive, with most methods being considered to be 
very effective or effective. However, this did not appear to translate into a direct 
reduction in the degree of fraud experienced by the banks. Some of the possibilities for 
this seeming disconnect in the relationship between bank losses and software 
effectiveness are either that the assessment of software effectiveness is overstated, or that 
there is a threshold of fraud below which the use of software cannot be overly effective. 
This is likely to occur when insiders have a heavy involvement in the practice of fraud, as 
insiders will understand the software detection systems in place and will understand what 
types of fraud are most likely to go unnoticed. Given this, it is likely that, given the 
relative uniformity in application of software across banks, the role of software in 
reducing frauds is consistent across banks and other variances are due to issues like 
insider access. However it is also possible that fraudsters behave like a ‘moving target’ in 
that as information technology (IT) based measures respond to their innovations 
fraudsters may shift their attention to other system weaknesses. 
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5.4.4.5 Organisational Response Discussion 
 The role of organisational culture in fraud reduction is supported by a large number of 
previous studies (Mawhinney, 2009; May, 2003; Moorthy et al., 2009; Porter, 2003; 
Stringer & Carey, 2006; Tipton & Krause, 2006; Wells, 2004). The majority of studies 
that have been performed on fraud in the banking system, as well as organisational fraud 
generally have been conducted in an Anglo-American business environment (in the 
United States or Great Britain, or in Commonwealth countries). However, there are 
significant differences in the emergent African business model (Sardanis, 2007). Some 
changes, such as ethics training or anonymous hotline establishment, have been slow in 
gaining acceptance in the business environment where this research was conducted.  The 
use of organisational change management practices can promote positive change within 
the organisation, and may be useful in some of the banks in order to improve 
organisational practice toward fraud prevention (Palmer et al., 2008). 
 
5.4.5  Descriptive Summary 
The results of the descriptive testing can be summarized as follows. Most respondents felt 
that fraud was a large and growing problem. Most frauds were collusion between internal 
and external perpetrators, including junior managers and non-managerial employees, 
customers, and former employees, male and aged 31-40. Motivations included 
opportunity and lifestyle issues; rationalizations included getting rich, family pressure, 
and others engaging in fraud while organizational fraud opportunities mainly presented 
themselves through poor internal controls, over-rides of internal controls and poor 
screening procedures on recruitment. Most fraud targeted cheques, cash, and credit cards, 
with fraud involving theft and diversion. Tools were mostly computer-based; identify 
fraud and theft, and falsification of accounts.  
 
Most frauds were detected through accident, internal controls, and external whistle-
blowers. Investigation was commonly performed by internal security departments and 
law enforcement bodies. Most institutions lost below 1% of annual turnovers, with more 
precise figures indicating loss of KES21.6 million or 1.57% of revenues. Responses 
involved dismissal and prosecution as well as civil prosecution. Conviction rates ranged 
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from 10.5% to 43.8%. Financial recovery was rare. Organisational responses included 
review of internal controls and training employees. Software used included antivirus 
software, password protection, and continuous auditing. However, the least used 
approaches, data mining and digital analysis, were also deemed to be the most effective. 
The low uptake of these highly effective methods could be due to the cost involved in 
implementing them. 
 
5.5 Hypothesis Outcomes 
Following the descriptive testing above, there are a number of hypotheses that were 
tested in order to determine the overall relationships between the data and the findings. 
The hypotheses were posed based on elements of Research Question 4 (“What are the 
differences in fraud management between Kenyan and international banks?”) although 
they refer to specific elements of the corporate governance and other elements of the 
bank. For more information regarding the theoretical foundations of the hypotheses, 
please refer to Section 2.8, Chapter 2. These elements are primarily based on internal 
elements and characteristics of the bank, particularly size and organization, as is 
consistent with the conceptual framework (Chapter 3, Section 3.10).   
 
The hypotheses that underpinned this study are listed in Table 5.20. It is theoretically 
impossible to prove that a research hypothesis is true by statistical analysis, however, it is 
possible to disprove a null hypothesis (i.e., infer that it is not true) at a prescribed level of 
probability (Field, 2009). Consequently, the research hypotheses were converted into null 
hypotheses for purposes of statistical analysis. Each null hypothesis (H0) proposed that 
the results were not statistically significant (i.e., the data were inconsequential, because 
they were caused by random chance).  The variables extracted from the questionnaire 
item scores which were used to test the null hypotheses are defined in Appendix IC 
 
If a null hypothesis was rejected, then the corresponding research hypothesis could be 
accepted, because it was unlikely that the data were caused by random chance. If the null 
hypothesis was not rejected, then the research hypothesis was redundant, and nothing 
meaningful could be concluded.  
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Table 5.20 – Research and Null hypothesis 
Research Hypothesis Null Hypothesis 
1a. The total size of the loss to fraud will 
vary directly in proportion to the type or 
scope of the bank. 
H01a: The value loss to fraud  is not 
significantly associated with the type of 
bank 
1b. The loss to fraud as a percentage of 
annual earnings will vary depending on the 
size of the bank. 
H01b: The percentage loss to fraud is not 
significantly associated with the size of 
bank 
2a. Banks that are international banks or 
international subsidiary banks will be more 
likely to use criminal prosecution or civil 
action against fraudsters than national, 
regional, or local banks. 
H02a. The type of action used against 
fraudsters is not significantly associated 
with the type of bank 
2b. Banks will be more likely to use 
criminal and civil action against external 
parties than against internal parties. 
H02b.  The type of action used against 
fraudsters is not significantly associated 
with the type of party 
3a. The use of procedural and auditing 
approaches to fraud detection and 
monitoring will result in lower occurrence 
of fraud. 
H03a. The type of security protocol is not 
significantly associated with the detected 
fraud (%)   
3b. Larger organisations will be more likely 
to adopt organisational security protocols 
than smaller organisations. 
H03b. The type of security protocol is not 
significantly associated with the size of 
the bank  
 
 
5.5.1 Hypothesis 1 
Research Hypothesis 1a and 1b were tested using the bank coverage (local to 
international) as the scope variable (the independent variable). The dependent variables 
were the total loss due to fraud and loss to fraud as a percentage of annual earnings. 
These variables were tested individually. This was tested at a confidence level of p = 0.05 
using the χ2 test statistic. 
 
Research Hypothesis 1a 
Hypothesis 1a: The total size of the loss to fraud will vary directly in proportion to the 
type or scope of the bank. 
H01a: The value loss to fraud is not significantly associated with the type of bank 
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25 respondents reported the value of their loss to fraud. As the typical loss reported was 
about KES 5,000,000 the value loss to fraud was collapsed into <KES 5,000,000 and > 
KES 5,000,000. In so doing not more than 50% of the cells in the cross-tabulation were 
less than 5. The null hypothesis was not rejected, indicated by p > .05 for the χ2 test 
statistic (Table 5.21) implying that Research Hypothesis 1a was rejected. There was no 
significant association between value loss to fraud and the type of bank. 
 
Table 5.21Cross-tabulation of value loss to fraud x type of bank 
 TYPE OF BANK 
Total 
χ2 test 
statistic 
p-value 
VALUE LOSS TO 
FRAUD (KES) 
National/Local/ 
Other Bank 
International 
Bank/Subsidiary 
< 5,000,000 11 3 14 .682 .409  
>5,000,000 7 4 11   
Total 18 7 25   
  
Research Hypothesis 1b 
Hypothesis 1b: The loss to fraud as a percentage of annual earnings will vary depending 
on the type or size of the bank.  
H01b: The percentage loss to fraud is not significantly associated with the size of bank  
 
The same process used under Hypothesis 1a was repeated using the size of the bank 
(number of employees) as the independent variable. 56 respondents reported their 
percentage loss to fraud. The percentage loss to fraud was collapsed into < 1% and > 1% 
so that not more than 50% of the cells in the cross-tabulation were less than 5. The null 
hypothesis was not rejected, indicated by p > .05 for the χ2 test statistic (Table 5.22) 
implying that the Research Hypothesis 1b was rejected and that there was no significant 
association between percentage loss to fraud and the size of the bank. 
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Table 5.22 Cross-tabulation of percentage loss to fraud x size of bank 
 SIZE OF BANK 
Total 
χ2 test 
statistic 
p-value 
PERCENTAGE 
LOSS TO FRAUD  <500 employees > 500 employees 
< 1% 21 27 48 .108 .742  
>1% 4 4 8   
Total 25 31 56   
  
While the χ2 test statistic did not yield a significant result, the earlier analysis based on 
bank size determined that there was a significant difference in the overall turnover lost to 
fraud in the past year (Table 5.3, Section 5.3.2). Examination of medians by size of the 
bank reveals that banks with under 100 employees (N = 4) experienced a mean loss of 
0.775% (standard deviation 0.608); banks with 101 to 500 employees (N = 9) 
experienced a loss of 1.036% (standard deviation 0.628); banks with 501-1000 employees 
experienced a loss of 2.0667% (standard deviation 1.613); and banks with 1,001 to 
10,000 employees (N = 24) experienced a mean loss of 1.0425% (standard deviation 
0.35613). Thus, banks with between 500 and 1,000 employees are significantly more 
likely to experience relatively higher losses than other groups.  
 
Given these findings, Hypothesis 1b is rejected but could be viewed as a moderate 
relationship, as banks with over 500 employees did experience a higher loss than other 
banks. There was no significant relationship between fraud and turnover/value loss. Thus 
Hypothesis 1a is rejected.  
 
These findings are somewhat inconsistent with previous findings (Murphy, 1993; Barnes 
and Webb, 2007). Reasons for inconsistency could involve the relatively smaller sample 
size used for this research compared to previous researches that have used large samples; 
limitation to a single industry – other researches have involved several industries while 
this study has only considered one industry; differences in category definition of 
employee size and general differences in the Kenyan business structure.  
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5.5.2 Hypothesis 2  
Hypothesis 2a: Banks that are international banks or international subsidiary banks will 
be more likely to use criminal prosecution or civil action against fraudsters than national, 
regional, or local banks. 
H02a: The type of action used against fraudsters is not significantly associated with the 
type of bank 
 
The total number of actions taken by the banks against fraudsters was 80, of which 60 
were criminal and 20 were civil prosecutions. The null hypothesis was not rejected, 
indicated by p > .05 for the χ2 test statistic (Table 5.23) meaning that international banks 
or subsidiaries will not be more likely to use criminal prosecution or civil action against 
fraudsters than other types of banks. There was no significant association between the 
type of action used against fraudsters and the type of bank. 
 
Table 5.23 Cross-tabulation of action used against fraudsters x type of bank 
 TYPE OF BANK 
Total 
χ2 test 
statistic 
p-value 
ACTION National/Local/Other 
Bank (Internal and 
External 1st and 2nd  
Parties)  
International 
/Subsidiary (Internal 
and External 1st and 
2nd Parties) 
Criminal 46 15 61 .023 .879* 
Civil 14 5 19   
Total 60 20 80   
  
Hypothesis 2b: Banks will be more likely to use criminal prosecution or civil action 
against external parties than against internal parties.  
H02b: The type of action used against fraudsters is not significantly associated with the 
type of party  
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Criminal or civil action was taken against 80 fraudsters, of whom 42 were external 1st or 
2nd parties and 38 were internal 1st or 2nd parties. The null hypothesis was not rejected, 
indicated by p > .05 for the χ2 test statistic (Table 5.24). Therefore Research Hypothesis 
2b is rejected as there was no significant association between the type of action used 
against fraudsters and the type of party. 
 
Table 5.24 Cross-tabulation of type of party and type of bank 
 BANK 
Total 
χ2 test 
statistic 
p-value 
PARTY National/Local 
/Other Bank  
 
International 
/Subsidiary  
 
Internal (1st & 2nd) 30 12 42 .051 .821 
External 1st and 2nd) 28 10 38   
Total 58 22 80 
 
 
Hypothesis 2a compared total prosecution against internal and external perpetrators 
(dependent variable) based on the categorical variable of scope of the organisation. The 
χ2 test does indicate that the probability of prosecution is not higher in international banks 
compared to other banks, failing to support the views of Fisher et al (2001) on the 
possible positive effect of incentives and rewards on disclosure and subsequent 
prosecution of fraud. This result also fails to support the views expressed by Abiola 
(2009) on the likelihood of Nigerian banks to avoid using prosecution.  
 
Hypothesis 2b addressed the likelihood of prosecution against internal and external 
actors. The results of the chi-square showed that distribution of internal prosecution was 
not significantly different from expected. Likewise, there was no significant difference in 
expected distribution among the external prosecution test. Given this evidence, 
hypothesis 2b is rejected, and banks are equally likely to prosecute internal as well as 
external perpetrators.  
 
Due to the small sample size only two categories were used for this hypothesis 
(International banks and other banks). The results may perhaps have been different if the 
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sample was large enough to allow more categories - local, regional, national and 
international banks. 
 
5.5.3 Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 3a: The use of procedural and auditing approaches to fraud detection and 
monitoring will result in lower occurrence of fraud.  
H03a. The type of security protocol is not significantly associated with the detected fraud 
percentage.   
 
The null hypothesis was not rejected with respect to seventeen of the protocols, indicated 
by p > .05 for the χ2 test statistics (See Appendix ID). There was no significant 
association between these types of security protocols and the percentage of detected 
fraud. The null hypothesis was, however, rejected with respect to two protocols, 
specifically (a) Training employees on fraud prevention (χ2 = 4.873, p = .027) and (b) 
Establishing a fraud budget (χ2 = 11.370, p = .001). Statistical evidence is provided to 
indicate that these two security protocols were significantly associated with the 
percentage of detected fraud. This signifies that there is weak acceptance for the outcome 
and largely there is no significant association between the use of certain preventive 
measures and the level of fraud. Results are included in Appendix ID 
 
This finding is important as it supports research by Barnes and Webb (2007) who found 
that the nature of management controls were not significant in determining either the size 
of fraud loss or the susceptibility of the organisation to fraud or theft.  
 
 
Hypothesis 3b: Larger organisations will be more likely to adopt organisational security 
protocols than smaller organisations.  
H03b: The type of security protocol is not significantly associated with the size of the 
bank 
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Hypothesis 3b proposed that relatively larger organisations were more likely to use 
organisational protocols than relatively smaller organisations. Relatively smaller 
organisations are defined as those with fewer than 500 employees 
 
The null hypothesis was not rejected with respect sixteen of the protocols, indicated by p 
> .05 for the χ2 test statistic (See Appendix ID). There was no significant association 
between these types of security protocols and the size of the bank.  
 
The null hypothesis was, however, rejected with respect to three protocols, specifically 
(a) Establishing an ethical code of conduct (χ2 = 4.873, p = .027); (b) Ethics training (χ2 = 
3.958, p = .047); and (c) Close supervision (χ2 = 5.939, p = .015). Statistical evidence is 
provided to indicate that these three security protocols were significantly associated with 
the size of the bank (Appendix ID).    
 
This again indicates that, although this hypothesis cannot be rejected entirely, there is 
only weak support for its outcomes agreeing with research by Barnes & Webb (2007). 
  
 
5.6 Reflection on the Research Questions and Conceptual Framework 
Research Question 1 asks “What are the characteristics of fraud in the Kenyan banking 
industry?” The findings reveal that a majority of the respondents’ view that fraud is a 
major problem in Kenya’s banking industry. There is a likelihood that fraud will continue 
to increase in the financial sector with the banking industry likely to witness an 
significant increase in the short and long term mainly due to economic pressures within 
the country, advanced computer technologies (like internet banking), more sophisticated 
criminals (like hackers), ineffective justice systems, changing societal values among 
others. Fraud largely comprised of theft of cash, diversion and misappropriation of 
cheques and card fraud by manipulating computer systems and through identity fraud. 
Fraud losses are estimated mostly at less than 1% of the turnover of the respective banks 
with a few banks reporting losses of between 1-5%. Using Chi square tests the study 
established that there was no significant relationship between the type of security 
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protocol and the amount of fraud loss. Statistical tests also showed that there was a weak 
association between the types of security protocols and the size of the bank (Hypothesis 
4).  
 
Research Question 2 considered “What are the perceived characteristics of those that 
perpetrate fraud in the Kenyan banking industry?” The research findings show that 
perpetrators of fraud were not limited to one category or group of people. Majority of 
fraud is committed through collusion of internal (employees and managers) and external 
(customers, criminals, organized criminals, former employees etc.) parties. Perpetrators 
were relatively young (31-40 years) and mainly male. He or she is most likely involved 
with the bank in a managerial or cash-handling non-supervisory role, and if there are 
external colluders they are likely to be customers of the bank. Most frauds are collusions 
rather than individual acts, indicating that fraud perpetrators are likely to work in groups. 
The main factors that motivated perpetrators to commit fraud as perceived by the 
respondents stemmed from the existence of an opportunity to commit fraud, lifestyle 
habits, personal financial pressure and simple greed. Fraud opportunities come in the 
form of poor internal controls, overrides of internal controls by management and poor 
screening procedures in the recruitment and selection process. The perpetrators advanced 
justifications or rationalizations ranging from “it was a way to get rich quick”, “others 
were getting away with it”, and “there was a need due to family pressure”, among others, 
as a way of mitigating their fraudulent actions.  
 
Research Question 3 sought to find out “How do banks approach fraud management?” 
This question has been answered through various views that considered fraud prevention, 
detection and investigation methods, actions resorted to by banks on discovering fraud, 
software usage and organizational responses to fraud. One third of fraud is detected by 
accident implying that fraud management partly relies on chance discoveries of fraud. 
The respondents also identified internal controls as a way through which fraud is 
detected. Investigation of fraud is primarily carried out internally by the security 
departments but there is also the involvement of law enforcing bodies in fraud 
investigation. This may imply that banks do report fraud cases to law enforcement bodies. 
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In attempting to manage fraud banks responded by taking action against both internal and 
external parties, immediately dismissing internal parties and following this up with 
criminal and civil prosecution, while the main response for external parties was criminal 
prosecution, followed by civil prosecution. It is rare that banks recover any funds or 
assets traceable to fraudulent activities.  
 
Ranking by respondents showed that organizational measures often adopted to enhance 
the prevention of fraud were:  the improvement or review of internal controls, the use of 
fraud prevention training, the use of fraud prevention policies, the use of an ethical 
conduct code and the use of a fraud hotline. Organizations used at a minimum two types 
of software security protocols. The least used security protocols, digital analysis, 
discovery sampling and data mining were found to be the most effective fraud prevention 
and detection security measures. However, further analysis using chi square cross 
tabulation (Hypothesis 4) revealed that there was no association between the fraud levels 
and the number of software solutions used. 
 
The last research question poses “Are there differences between the approaches to fraud 
management used by Kenyan and international banks?” This question has been partially 
answered in this chapter through the various hypotheses outcomes. Statistical testing on 
Hypothesis 1 has shown that there is no significant relationship between the type of bank 
and the amount of fraud loss. There was also no significant relationship between the size 
of the bank (as measured by number of employees) and the extent of fraud loss. Using 
Chi-square tests Hypothesis 2 established that international banks or international 
subsidiary banks were not more likely to use criminal prosecution or civil action against 
fraudsters than national, regional, or local banks. There was also no significant 
association found between the type of action used against fraudsters (criminal and civil 
prosecution) and the type of party (internal and external parties). However, the 
descriptive statistics does show that international banks have a higher count in terms of 
pursuing prosecution compared to the other types of banks. This perhaps shows a greater 
willingness of international banks to prosecute fraud. 
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Sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.3 can be considered in relation to the focal part of the conceptual 
framework labelled “Fraud” (Chapter 3, Section 3.10, and Figure 3.2). This aspect of the 
conceptual framework is captured through the discussions in Sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.3 on 
the nature and characteristics of fraud. The findings in this chapter also have implications 
that relate to the central part of the conceptual framework. The individual perpetrator is at 
the centre of the fraud, symbolized by the fraud triangle. The fraud triangle in the 
conceptual framework has been illustrated through the findings and discussion in Section 
5.4.2 which has highlighted who perpetrates fraud, what are the perceived motivations 
(pressure) for committing fraud, what are the organizational loopholes (reasons) that 
present an opportunity for fraud to occur and what are the justifications or rationalizations 
used by the fraudsters to mitigate their fraudulent acts.  
 
Section 5.4.4 on organizational responses to fraud directly relate to the internal industry 
environment depicted on the conceptual framework. This section has focused on the 
prevention, detection and investigation of fraud which are areas of internal control 
systems. Hypothesis 1 has also addressed the relationship between the size and the type 
of the bank and the amount of loss. This can be linked to internal industry factors on the 
conceptual framework as it deals with the organizational characteristics (size and 
structure). Hypothesis 3a examines the relationship between the fraud prevention 
methods used and the amount of fraud which has to do with an aspect of internal industry, 
that of internal control and systems measures. Hypothesis 3b also touches on the internal 
industry factors as it concerns the relationship between organizational security protocols 
and the size of the bank. 
 
Hypothesis 2a and 2b fit in the external industry factors as it focuses on prosecution 
which is a legal issue. Actions and outcomes pursued under Section 5.4.4.3 is also linked 
to aspects of law enforcement which again is part of legal and regulatory matters external 
to the industry. 
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5.7 Summary of Findings  
Overall trends indicate that banks about 0.01% of their turnover to fraud in the past year 
with a mean of about 1.18%, or about 21,641,000 KES (approximately US$ $277,000 or 
€224,000 as of May 14, 2010). As banks grew larger, losses as a percentage of annual 
revenue grew smaller. This did not show a normal distribution; however, precise figures 
were not provided by all banks, and there was one extreme outlier that affected the 
analysis. Most respondents felt that bank fraud was a major issue that was increasing in 
importance. 
 
Collusion between internal and external perpetrators was the most common type of fraud. 
The most common targets were cheques and cash, which were most commonly stolen or 
misappropriated. Detection was uncertain, with 33% of frauds being discovered by 
accident and 18% being caught by internal controls. Dismissal and criminal prosecution 
were the most common actions taken against fraudsters. Internal control reviews and 
training employees in fraud prevention were the most common responses to discovery of 
fraud within the organisation. The most commonly used technological prevention and 
detection techniques included anti-virus software, password protection, continuous 
auditing, and filtering.  
 
The outcomes of the hypothesis testing are summarised as follows. Only five statistically 
significant associations were identified at the .05 level of significance, emphasizing the 
importance of certain security protocols with respect to preventing bank fraud. There was 
a significant association between the percentage of detected fraud and two protocols, 
specifically the training of employees on fraud prevention and the establishment of a 
fraud budget. There was a significant association between the size of the bank and three 
protocols, specifically establishing a code of conduct, ethics training, and close 
supervision.  
 
No other statistically significant associations were found between the variables measured 
using the questionnaire. This may have been due to the relatively small sample size of 60 
respondents, which compromised the statistical inferences. According to Cohen (1992) 
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the minimum sample size for a Chi-Square test using a 2 x 2 cross-tabulation at α = .05 is 
87 cases to detect a medium effect, increasing to 785 cases to detect a small effect. The 
sample size used in this study was therefore lower than the minimum necessary to obtain 
precise statistical inferences using a Chi-Square test to detect small to medium sized 
statistical associations at the 0. 05 level.  Consequently, if this research is repeated in the 
future, a larger sample size, collecting data from more banks and respondents, is 
recommended.  
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Chapter 6  
Qualitative Study Findings 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents selected extracts from raw data gathered through field interviews 
which has been analysed and structured to provide some meaningful information. These 
extracts form the basis of themes that are to be discussed later in the Chapter 7. Seventeen 
interviewees were selected using snowball sampling.  Each interviewee represented a 
different bank and was chosen from a cross section of large, small, public, local, national, 
regional and international banks operating in the capital city of Kenya, Nairobi within 
constraints of availability and access to interviewees. Methods of interviewing are 
discussed in Chapter 4 (Research Methodology).  
This chapter discusses findings structuring them in terms of the conceptual framework. 
The findings of this qualitative study are arranged in the three main tiers of the 
conceptual framework: the perpetrator, the internal and the external environmental 
factors. The findings relate to the central part of the conceptual framework (Figure 3.2, 
Section 3.10) on the perpetrator – collusion and the Fraud Triangle (Section 6.2); the 
second aspect of the conceptual framework which includes internal bank factors with 
emerging themes on internal controls, fraud prevention and detection (fraud budgets, 
fraud detection and customers in fraud detection and adequate deterrence), internal 
industry-wide factors – information sharing, inter-bank competition and information 
technology (Section 6.3); the third aspect of the conceptual framework, the external 
factors findings are presented in Section 6.4 with themes on ethical issues, structural and 
institutional issues as well as cultural, socio-economic and information technology issues. 
Section 6.5 presents other issues arising from the interviews. Implications of these 
findings for the research questions and the conceptual framework are discussed in Section 
6.6. A summary (Section 6.7) concludes this chapter. A sample transcribed interview can 
be found in Appendix IV and a list of interviewees in Appendix V. The qualitative study 
mainly addressed Research Questions 2 (“What are the perceived characteristics of those 
that perpetrate fraud in the Kenyan banking industry?”) and Question 3 (“How do banks 
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approach fraud management?”) These questions are also addressed in the quantitative 
findings (Chapter 5) and will be discussed for integration further in Chapter 7.  
 
6.2 The Perpetrator 
The interviewees were asked to recall a recent fraud incidence that was typical and speak 
about it. Some of the characteristics and nature of fraud came through the interviews as a 
result of this. First, the types of fraud committed varied widely with the most common 
fraud being direct theft of cash from customers’ accounts, followed by cheque frauds. 
Identity fraud was used in a majority of the fraud cases reported by the interviewees. All 
except two of the cases were reported to the police. One of the cases that were not 
reported to the police was contracted out to external private investigators. The average 
fraud loss was KES 5,000,000 (approximately £41,667 or USD 64,000). From the 
interviews it was evident that recovery of fraud funds was rare with only one interviewee 
reporting full recovery of stolen funds. Direct costs of investigation involved costs 
towards accommodation, fuel and time taken during the investigation. These findings 
concerning the characteristics of fraud support the findings from the quantitative study. 
 
Like the quantitative study the average age of the perpetrator lies in the 31-45 years age 
bracket and perpetrators were mainly male. However, it is worth pointing out that there 
were a significant number of female perpetrators. Where the fraud involved an insider, 
the perpetrator typically held the position of a cashier, a teller or clerical staff in the bank. 
In at least four of the fraud cases the fraudsters had only worked in the bank and been in 
their current position for a period of less than two years which is a relatively short period 
of time.  
 
The interviews followed up on possible fraud motivations as well as factors giving rise to 
fraud opportunities. The interviewees spoke of financial pressure as being the main fraud 
motivator followed by opportunity, peer pressure and greed. Again this closely agrees 
with the findings of the survey (Chapter 5). Apart from these known motivations one or 
two fraud cases recounted by the interviewees had motivations that were rare such as the 
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perpetrator being blackmailed and therefore stealing funds in order to make the payments. 
The factors that contributed to fraud and therefore presented fraud opportunities included 
weak internal controls, lack of segregation of duties and lax supervision. Internal controls 
were not only weak but they were ignored and not properly managed by the bank 
employees and management. 
 
Based on the interviewees’ fraud experiences the perpetrators behind a majority of the 
fraudulent acts were either insiders (employees or managers) or insiders in collusion with 
outsiders (mainly customers). Of the seventeen interviewees there were only three 
incidences of external fraud that involved only outsiders. Even then in one of the three 
cases involving outsiders one of the external fraudsters was an ex-employee who had 
insider information.  
 
From the interviews the significant themes that can be identified with the perpetrator are 
the issue of collusion and the fraud triangle. The interviews confirmed that the elements 
of the fraud triangle were significant and this reflected through the findings on 
opportunity, motivations and rationalizations.  In terms of the research questions 
collusion and the fraud triangle are part of the question on the characteristics of the 
perpetrator. Conceptually in the framework the fraud triangle represents the perpetrator 
and is positioned at the center of the conceptual framework. The findings on the two 
themes of collusion and the fraud triangle are discussed further in the sections below. 
 
 
6.2.1 Collusion  
The study revealed that one of the issues facing the industry was the problem of collusion 
between two or more individuals. Question 3 in the interview schedule sought to clarify 
who the perpetrator was and further in Question 4 whether the perpetrator acted alone, 
with internal and/or external collusion. A majority of fraud cases recalled by the 
interviewees involved fraudulent withdrawals made from customers’ accounts either by 
or with the help of internal staff. The major themes that emerged from this included the 
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prevalence of internal control fraud and the problem of collusion and conflict between 
depositors and employees.  
 
As one interviewee conceded “it is difficult for an external party to defraud a bank 
without the help from an internal person” (Joseph – Local bank), emphasizing the view 
that external parties rarely get involved in fraud on their own without support or help 
from an insider. This was further evidenced by a fraud incidence narrated by another 
interviewee, Ruth, an employee of a regional bank. Ruth described the role of the 
employee in finding external information, instructing the external perpetrator on how to 
overcome controls, and the importance of the position of the employee colluding within 
the bank. She noted that:  
“The person who was responsible for making such changes failed to call the customer on 
the old telephone number and went ahead to change to the fraudsters telephone number. 
So that is where the catch was. After that was done everything else passed because any 
check you are calling to confirm you are confirming with the same 
fraudster.”(International bank) 
 
This case shows illustrates how employees who are entrusted with information and 
responsibility act in breach of the trust endowed on them when they divulge the same to 
other parties with the intention of defrauding another individual. They are aware of the 
systems and controls and instead of safeguarding these some of the internal people use 
their knowledge to perpetrate fraud against the organisation. The second thing that we 
can pick from this incidence is that fraud is encouraged by negligence on the part of the 
employees. The fact that a member of staff failed to make a critical telephone call is 
evidence that failing to implement internal measures can result in fraud losses. However, 
from the case above it is unclear whether the employee charged with the responsibility to 
confirm changes to telephone numbers was an integral part of the collusion. 
 
Collusion is not easy to detect or to prove. Elijah (International bank) recalled a case 
where the main perpetrator was external; however: “it could be possible there was 
internal collusion but that has not been proven.” 
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It is especially difficult to detect fraud when it is committed by a team or group of 
persons working together both on the inside and from the outside of the organisation. The 
creation of syndicates and cartels between the employees and external parties was a 
concern to Moses (International bank), who recalled a case where five members of staff, 
including cashiers, were involved in a single fraud. 
 
Given that collusion is a main ingredient in the commission of fraud taking steps to detect 
or deter it is central to the fight against fraud. Establishing internal control systems that 
are effective is one of the ways to do this. Internal control systems are discussed in the 
Section 6.3.1. 
 
6.2.2 Fraud Triangle  
Following up on the quantitative study the interviewees were asked about two aspects of 
the fraud triangle, the motivations (pressures) of the fraudsters and the opportunities that 
facilitated the occurrence of fraud. Jacob (Local Bank) commented that the perpetrator 
had a “…financial pressure. She thought she could multiply the money through some 
pyramid scheme that was promising a 50% return per month!” This not only shows that 
the perpetrator was motivated by some kind of financial pressure but that she also 
rationalized that she could “get rich quickly” by investing the stolen funds in a pyramid 
scheme. Participants Moses, Joseph, Simon all explained the fraud motivation as being 
financial pressure. The interviewees also pointed out that sheer opportunity and greed 
were motivators. Participants Joel, Thomas, Simon spoke about opportunity being the 
motivator; while Ruth and Paul made reference to greed, lack of ethics and an 
extravagant lifestyle as motivators. An example of this is shown in the statement below: 
 
“Though she had only worked for a short time with us this person had worked for two 
years in other institutions. With this kind of experience and the fact that she had forged 
documents it was not surprising that she could commit fraud – so she just took advantage 
of an opportunity” (Thomas, Regional Bank) 
 
 187 
A motivator like peer pressure was also advanced in the fraud cases explained by Adam 
and Paul. The findings on motivators indicate that though fraud is motivated by various 
reasons, opportunity, financial pressure and greed seem to be the main motivators. 
 
Considering fraud opportunities the interviewees were asked to explain the factors that 
contributed to or facilitated the occurrence of the fraud episode. The main three factors 
that were mentioned were poor or weak internal controls, the problem of separation of 
duties and poor supervision.  
 
By way of examples, Moses (International bank) and Joseph (Local bank) both explained  
that the failure to separate the making of the application and checking of the application 
resulted in the fraud occurring while Gabriel (Regional bank) put the fraud down to 
ignoring internal controls as well as the lack of a separation of duties. Like Gabriel, Joel 
(Regional bank) said that poor internal controls were in place allowing the fraud to occur. 
David (Local bank) and Thomas (Regional bank) indicated that a lapse in supervision 
presented a fraud opportunity: 
 
 “The supervisor did not play her role in inducting the employee on payment procedures 
when she joined and also the supervisor did not play her role in authorizing the payments 
that were above the teller limit. So I would say procedures were not followed and 
supervision was lax.” (Thomas, Regional Bank) 
 
The findings in this section show that the Fraud Triangle elements have been identified 
through this study and these will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. The 
fraud opportunities create a challenge mainly to the internal control systems of 
organizations. More findings on internal controls continue in the next section. 
 
6.3 Internal bank and Industry Factors  
The second aspect of analysis within the conceptual framework is that of internal factors. 
As discussed in the literature review (Chapter 3, Section 3.10.2, and Figure 3.3) the 
internal factors have been separated into two: internal bank specific factors (Internal 
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Controls & Systems, organizational characteristics and insider involvement) and internal 
industry-wide factors (inter-bank competition for customers and information sharing). 
The internal bank specific factors are discussed under Sections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2 while 
internal industry wide factors are discussed in Sections 6.3.3. Notably sub-section 6.3.3.3 
on Information Technology is part of both the internal and external industry factors. For 
this research it will be discussed under the internal industry-wide factors. 
 
Respondents were asked some questions that related to fraud management and these 
responses were later categorized under various dominant themes which are discussed 
below. Section 6.3 therefore mainly addresses Research Question 3 (“How do banks 
approach fraud management”) 
 
6.3.1 Internal Control Systems 
After talking about their fraud cases, the interviewees were asked the questions “What 
did you learn from this incident?” (Question 5 on interview schedule) and “What could 
be done to prevent the fraud from occurring again” (Question 6 on interview schedule).    
 
Narrating his experiences and lessons learnt from fraudulent activities Jacob stated that: 
 “We learnt that we have to strengthen our internal controls, so that no one single person 
can post and withdraw money without consent from a second party.” (Local bank) 
 
The separation or segregation of roles and duties was cited as being a useful tool of 
internal control. One recent innovation used by banks to attract customers is unsecured 
loans of up to KES1 million (USD12,900). Moses (International bank) explained how 
they suffered a loan application fraud because of a lack of clear separation between the 
“maker” of a document and the “checker” of the same; that is, the same person made out 
the application and performed the background and credit checks, offering the opportunity 
for fraud. After the fraud occurred, internal controls were improved to prevent this from 
happening again.  
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By segregating duties the management uses one individual to act independently as a 
check or balance against another. Using staff rotation is another approach identified by 
the banks for this purpose. Rotation ensures that employees take up different roles, duties 
and responsibilities and perhaps in the process re-shape relationships, effectively 
breaking up collusion. One regional bank manager, Gabriel, states the importance of this 
for senior officers. He stated that managers held positions for no more than two years, 
and then were rotated, as were their immediate superiors and subordinates. Short-term 
reassignments to different regions were also used. However, this was not universally 
successful, with some fraudsters using job rotation to confuse new staff members.  
 
The findings of this study revealed that collusion poses a daunting challenge to the 
internal controls put in place by individual banks.  The insider is aware of what and 
where the controls are and how to circumvent them. Therefore, having controls in place is 
not enough to fight fraud, the controls also need to be followed and enforced by those in 
position to do so. As Ruth (Regional bank) commented, fraudsters often beat the system 
and it is important “… not to over trust staff.” 
 
The controls must also be working at all times. As Joseph, an employee of a local bank 
observed any lapse in controls increases exposure to fraud. In his estimation, strong 
controls sometimes lead to relaxation of observance, which can open the bank to more 
fraud.  Simon said his bank had learnt that it is possible to manipulate controls and as 
such the internal controls should be reviewed constantly: 
“Controls can be manipulated. We must at all times review our controls. We also learnt 
that there must be checks and balances… every member of staff does have a price and 
critically it is the controls that are really important.” (International bank) 
 
Caleb reinforced this view: 
“Fraud and fraud prevention….all these things begin with individuals, boils down to an 
individual.”(Local bank)  
Overcoming low integrity thresholds among the staff remains a challenge in tackling 
collusion and in bolstering internal controls. 
 190 
 
While strengthening internal controls reduces exposure to fraud, it can also cause 
problems.  Excessive controls can dampen customer service as further requirements are 
placed on customer transactions. This requires a balance between strong internal controls 
and customer service, and banks cannot eliminate all risk. Thomas states: 
“We usually learn from experience….where a fraud penetrates the measure we have put 
up. So we will beef up the measure or control and review it. If it is inadequate we add 
more controls. But we also don’t want to put up stringent controls that will hamper 
service. So we have to bear with some risk.” 
 
It is not only poor internal controls and overrides of internal controls that should be 
considered. The interviewees identified the importance of tightening screening 
procedures during the recruitment of new employees. Speaking with interviewees 
highlighted the fact that one of the causes leading to fraud was complacency during the 
phase of recruiting new employees - due processes were not being followed before the 
recruitment of new staff. Therefore they had learned through their fraud experiences the 
importance of carrying out effective background checks on employees.  
 
Ruth (Regional bank) expressed that while firms must carefully select and screen 
employees, this did not always happen. In one case of fraud at her bank, Ruth revealed 
that the perpetrator had personal debt and financial management problems known to her 
former employer. Ruth’s bank hired her without sufficient background checks or 
references. 
 
In about half the cases that involved internal perpetrator(s), the perpetrator was known or 
later discovered to have had a fraud history. This raises an important issue about the 
quality of background checks carried out, if any, by the banks and how effective these 
checks are in minimizing fraud. However, these were not entirely attributable to banks.  
 
Thomas (Regional bank) indicated that delayed responses caused problems. In one case 
described by Thomas, an internal perpetrator forged university credentials. The employee 
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was hired before references were returned, and employers did not give poor feedback “as 
they fear being sued for libel in event of any wrong information being given.” The 
employee worked for the bank for two months, perpetrating fraud, before the university 
indicated that they did not have a student by that name. 
 
Adverse reports concerning the behaviour of staff members should not be taken lightly 
while doing background checks. Gabriel (Regional bank) recounted a case where there 
were rumours regarding a fraud perpetrator that were not followed up, reducing the 
ability to avert fraud. Later, they learned that one of the perpetrators of fraud in their bank 
did have previous history of fraud. Joel (Regional bank) and Thomas (Regional bank) 
agreed with Gabriel that background checks were vital and should not be ignored, and 
that these should be done prior to employment. 
 
Therefore, arising from the interviews is a concern about the efficacy of recruitment 
policies in fraud prevention. Why some banks are hiring employees without carrying out 
appropriate background checks given the fraud risk involved is a thought provoking 
issue. 
 
This Section, 6.3.1, has raised some important findings that relate to internal controls and 
screening procedures and their importance in fraud prevention. These are lessons that 
have been learnt through the experiences of the interviewees. When asked whether the 
fraud incidences had helped the organization to improve its fraud prevention and 
detection methods (Question 6 of interview schedule) all interviewees affirmed that the 
fraud incidents had helped the organization to improve their internal controls either 
through job rotation, segregation of duties, or carrying out appropriate background 
checks.  
 
6.3.2 Fraud prevention and detection  
To answer Research Question 3 “How do banks approach fraud management?” the 
respondents were asked whether their organization has a budget for fraud, the size of the 
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fraud budget as a percentage of the total organizational budget and whether this budget 
had increased over the past five years (Questions 13-15 of interview schedule).  
 
Another theme that has emerged is the process of detecting and preventing fraud and the 
challenges that are faced by banks in this area. Respondents generally report a shortage of 
resources and uncertainty regarding resource assignment for fraud prevention and 
detection. Of particular concern are findings that the majority of frauds are detected 
through customer action (such as examination of bank statements) rather than through 
bank internal or external controls.   
 
6.3.2.1 Fraud budgets 
Fighting fraud is a costly affair. Organisations need to weigh the cost of fighting fraud 
with the benefits they will receive from reduced fraud. The cost of fraud prevention to the 
organisation will be determined by the trade-off between cost and benefit.  
 
The size of the fraud budget can be an indicator of a firm’s commitment to fight fraud. Of 
the banks surveyed in this study very few had actual information on the organisations 
fraud budget and could clearly state the same. Moses (International bank) and Joshua 
were in a position to confidently say that they had a fraud budget that could be used for 
staff training and materials, litigation, and information sharing. Joshua indicated this 
budget could be expanded on request: “… every time there is an issue relating to budget 
the business has always given the money. So funding to fight fraud is there.” (Joshua – 
International bank) 
 
Solomon (Local bank) gave a thorough run down of their fraud budget, indicating that 
key areas included prevention, information and investigation, intelligence (including 
money for tip-offs), prosecution and travel, bank security forums, and specialized officer 
training. This budget covered all branches of the bank.  
 
One justification for lack of a fraud budget was that fraud was a sporadic event rather 
than a regular occurrence. Being a sporadic event there is less reason to make a specific 
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provision by establishing a distinct budget for it. As Caleb reasoned “it is hard to plan 
for fraud as it is not anticipated. There are times you can go without fraud for even a 
year and there are times you encounter fraud several times within a given year. So due to 
the sporadic nature of fraud we do not specifically allocate any money for it.”(Local 
bank) 
 
Another reason for not maintaining a specific budget was that in their opinion, the 
amount of money involved in most of the frauds was inconsequential. Adam stated: “We 
have not really had significant levels of fraud to warrant a separate, distinct budget. The 
case I talked to you about was the one major case we have ever had. Most of the cases 
that occur occasionally involve small sums of money.” 
This reflected an attitude that seemed to suggest that fraud is only significant if the 
amount involved is large and contradicts the general opinion that fraud is significant and 
increasing. 
  
Even in the absence of a specific budget for fraud the bankers said they had the money to 
fight fraud. Caleb states, “There are funds that are available to address fraud cases 
whenever they arise. The management is supportive and we have an open budget. I have 
never requested for money and been turned down. The money to fight fraud is there and it 
is enough” (Local bank)  
 
This gives the impression that some banks have endless resources to fight fraud. Whether 
this is sustainable at all times is debatable. It is clear that most banks may not spell out 
the actual amounts set aside specifically for handling fraud issues. In some cases fraud is 
masked under other budgets; Joseph (Local bank) indicated fraud was covered under the 
internal controls budget, while Thomas (Regional bank) stated his bank covered fraud 
under the operations budget. Both respondents justified this based on the unpredictability 
of fraud. Gabriel (Regional bank) indicated fraud was covered under the Information 
Technology (IT), due to the degree of fraud related to IT network vulnerability. David 
(Regional bank) explained that the fraud budget was met out of the audit department 
budget as the fraud department was in an early stage of development.  These arguments 
 194 
against budgets appear to imply that banks are simply responding to fraud or fraud 
attempts, using a reactive rather than proactive approach. In one exceptional case at a 
national bank, the fraud budget was withdrawn due to abuse by a bank officer; as a result 
the bank, according to Titus, “only has a small allowance for investigators. It is very 
important and we have asked the management to restore it.”(A National bank) 
 
Another question was what size the budget was as a percentage of total budget. There 
were few responses to this question, due to integration of the fraud budget or lack of 
budget. Moses (International bank) remarked that the fraud budget was not a significant 
amount in light of the total budget. According to him good control systems within the 
bank has frustrated a large amount of fraud resulting in a loss of only 1.7% when 
compared with the fraud exposure. Thus, “when the budget is drawn based on previous 
year’s budget the figure does not tend to be large…zero point something!” Joshua 
(International bank) would not disclose an exact amount due to confidentiality, while 
Solomon (Local bank) indicated a ceiling of 0.2% of depositor liability for fraud 
prevention. Most respondents agreed that this amount had increased over the past five 
years, but did not give a specific figure; instead, they indicated that increased staffing in 
IT and internal auditing departments showed growth in spending. The increase was also 
attributed to “one-off” fraud sums that arise every year from unexpected fraud that 
“really mess up the budget”(Moses – International bank). This statement belies the 
supposed unpredictability of fraud expenditures. Nonetheless there was also the 
perception that the introduction of new technologies has led to a decrease in the fraud 
budget or shifted it to the IT budget. However, Joseph (Local bank) indicated that his 
bank’s cost controls resulted in a lack of increase, even though they could use it. 
 
We can therefore note that there is an issue as to why a specific identifiable fraud budget 
should be planned for or if it should just be an ad hoc provision based on the reasoning 
that the occurrence of fraud is an unplanned event. It is also worthwhile considering why 
international banks appear to have embraced maintenance of specific fraud budgets 
before other banks. 
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6.3.2.2 Fraud detection and customers in fraud detection 
As part of interview, question 3, respondents were asked to explain how the fraud was 
detected. The interviewees raised interesting points about how each fraud was detected. 
Some interviewees identified that whistle blowing had been useful in detection of the 
frauds as recounted below.  
 
Ruth (Regional bank) recalled a case where an external whistle-blower alerted the bank to 
an imminent fraudulent withdrawal on a given account. Moses (International bank) 
recalled a case where an external whistle-blower using a fraud hotline alerted the bank to 
specific fraud on-going in 40 accounts; on investigation, this yielded over 300 fraudulent 
accounts. Joseph (Local bank) recalled a case where a relative of a bank employee 
provided information regarding the fraud. 
 
There are also other sources of fraud detection. Staff rotation and the recruitment of new 
staff have also brought fraud to the front. Gabriel (Regional bank) noted a case where a 
new employee, after seeing a discrepancy between their own lifestyle and older 
employees, uncovered fraud. David (Regional bank) discussed a case where books did 
not balance after rotation of a staff member. However, internal controls were not 
effective. Most notably only one interviewee said that internal controls had helped to 
detect fraud, through end of day reconciliation. Adam (A National bank) indicated that 
one fraud, involving a stolen chequebook, was uncovered by the German police 
investigating the theft. Another indicated that a report in a local newspaper involving 
business corruption resulted in the bank investigating accounts and uncovering a fraud of 
millions of Kenya Shillings.  
 
A majority of the fraud cases narrated related to fraudulent withdrawals from a 
customer’s account or cheque frauds. The interviewees revealed that the customer was 
the first person to alert the bank to the incidences. Elijah, Abraham, Joel, Thomas, 
Joshua, Simon, and Caleb all reported similar instances where customers reported 
suspicious activity in their statements following cheque fraud or fraudulent withdrawals. 
In one other case, explained by Titus (A National bank), a customer complained after 
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asking for a balance in the bank, and being given a balance of approximately USD 10 
rather than the expected USD 12,500. A cashier was found to have authorized 
withdrawals from this account as well as three other accounts. Without customer 
intervention these frauds may never have been noticed.  
 
An important question was to consider what steps banks were taking to prevent and 
detect fraud. Top responses included training for employees and tightening of internal 
controls. Only one interviewee in the course of the interview mentioned that customer 
training was important in fraud detection: 
“…the best effective tool is fraud training for all stakeholders - not only staff but also our 
customers. We also conduct fraud training for our customers as we did last month. We 
share with them what we think they did wrong or what they need to do or the frauds we 
think emanated from their end and what we want them to do.”(Moses – International 
Bank) 
 
If the customer in most cases is the person who detects the fraud then it makes sense that 
some time should be spent by the banks on increasing the customers’ awareness and 
training. But this has not been the case in most of the banks. This issue will be discussed 
further in the next chapter. 
 
6.3.2.3 Adequate deterrence 
Interviewees were asked what kind of action the organisation took on the offenders. In 
majority of the cases the perpetrators were dismissed or had their services terminated and 
the organisation also went ahead to institute criminal charges by prosecuting them before 
a court of law. In some cases even though the perpetrators have been dismissed or 
arrested, the cases are still on going and unresolved. These actions are seen as deterrents 
to other fraudsters. However, there have been several cases where a person commits fraud 
in one organisation, is dismissed and later they re-join another organisation where they go 
ahead and still commit fraud.  
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This raises the question of whether dismissal as deterrent is effective. However, most 
respondents did believe that it was effective. Simon (International bank) recounted a case 
that was discovered through internal investigation, but where the courts required 
substantial IT documentation. This prosecution would have taken a long time, and the 
perpetrator was willing to recompense the bank. Simon believed that dismissal served as 
an example to others, and that they would not be re-employed. (Of course, given previous 
evidence this is likely not true.)  Abraham, also from an international bank, felt dismissal 
was enough of a deterrent, showing other employees that they could lose their jobs.  
 
However, some banks do use prosecution. Justifying the action of suspending, arresting 
and finally prosecuting the perpetrator, Thomas (Regional bank) said that his bank’s zero-
tolerance policy required prosecution as a deterrent to further crimes. Moses 
(International bank) indicated that his bank used dismissal, criminal prosecution, and a 
civil suit to recover funds lost as a deterrent. Jacob, Titus, and Gabriel (representatives 
from local, national, and regional banks) also agreed that dismissal and prosecution was 
appropriate deterrent. 
 
Some interviewees had doubts about effectiveness of dismissal or prosecution. David did 
not think that dismissal and prosecution were an adequate deterrent as it did not deter 
perpetrators from re-offending and also due to corruption in the judicial system, citing 
that lengthy resolution of cases, technical complexity, corruption, and frequent acquittals 
made prosecution an inefficient deterrent. In David’s words: “As you know our judicial 
system takes long to resolve cases and there are cases being lost on technicalities…so we 
have seen many cases where people have been acquitted when they should not have been. 
We have taken many people to court but they continue committing the crimes. I would say 
that prosecution is just one of the ways to deter but certainly not an efficient one. Many 
people have several cases in court but they know they can buy their way out of court and 
they know the cases can be lost on technicalities; so they continue to commit fraud.” 
(Regional bank) 
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Solomon (Local bank) explained how they opted for a negotiated settlement one year into 
the arrest of the external perpetrators rather than pursue a conviction. This settlement 
resulted in the bank recouping some money and cutting short a lengthy criminal 
proceeding. 
 
Some of the interviewees had mixed answers to the question on adequate deterrent. Adam 
(A National bank), recalling a fraud incidence that involved an off-shore cheque, said that 
while local perpetrators would be deterred, it was unlikely to work with international 
perpetrators. Joseph (Local bank) also felt that dismissal and prosecution were currently 
the best option. However, he did not think that it was an adequate deterrent as there is 
always the fear of the perpetrator re-offending.  Like Adam and Joseph above, Ruth took 
a view that dismissal was necessary but perhaps not sufficient. Talking about a fraud case 
where the internal perpetrator was only dismissed, Ruth felt that upon dismissal a 
perpetrator should also be prosecuted. 
 
Overall, dismissals and prosecution were not likely to prevent perpetrators from 
reoffending, though they may deter other employees. In particular, these strategies are not 
preventative. Exploring other approaches to preventing re-offense is discussed in Chapter 
7.  
 
 
6.3.3 Internal industry-wide factors 
As mentioned earlier in Section 6.3, two key internal industry-wide factors, discussed 
below, is information sharing within the industry and inter-bank competition for 
customers. In the banking industry in Kenya, major issues that emerge are information 
sharing and competition for customers. In other words, the industry environment is based 
on a cooperation-competition model which potentially creates tensions and problems. In 
addition to these two factors, internal information technology factors will also be 
included for discussion. 
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6.3.3.1 Information sharing within the industry 
Respondents were asked whether banks share about their fraud experiences at industry 
level (Question 8 on interview schedule) and what measures banks are putting in place 
jointly to reduce the incidence of fraud (Question 9 on interview schedule). 
 
From the interview findings it emerged that there was a reluctance to share fraud 
information within the industry. Even where attempts are made to share information 
issues including public image and perception, historical precedent and at times 
management directives reduced the level of sharing. As one interviewee observed; 
“…banks don’t want to wash their dirty linen in public; they don’t want to tell you how 
they have been hit by fraudsters. They want to keep it to themselves.”(Gabriel – Regional 
bank) 
 
However, there is a growing trend towards information sharing due to increasing levels of 
fraud. The banks have learnt some lessons that have taught them that it does help to make 
a concerted effort at industry level to combat fraud. Adam mused: 
 “… now it is an industry norm that if this person hits one bank today, tomorrow it will be 
another bank. Apparently the perpetrator we are talking about had committed a similar 
crime in (Bank X) and another one in the (Bank Y). So we realized had we shared the 
information this person would not have succeeded in opening an account.”(Adam – A 
National bank) 
 
In a similar vein, Paul suggested: 
“….if I circulated it to other banks, they would be able to take measures towards 
protecting themselves against an occurrence of a similar incidence within the industry… 
It would be my call that collaboration between industry players be encouraged; sharing 
of information on fraud should not be shunned; in fact should any institution fall a victim 
of fraud they shouldn’t feel shy to share the same, because fraud is a common enemy to 
all banks and to all players” (Paul – Local bank) 
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Under the Kenya Bankers Association (KBA) a Securities and Fraud Committee was 
formed to handle issues related to fraud and banking security. This forum meets every 
month and ad hoc meetings are arranged when there are urgent issues to be discussed 
among the member banks. The research revealed that most respondents from 
international banks and national banks seemed to have a good knowledge of what goes on 
at the KBA. These respondents who were active participants of the Securities and Fraud 
Committee were conversant with how often the Committee met and what was shared. 
There were mixed responses from regional and local banks about the KBA. Some knew 
about the working of the KBA and there were a few who were aware about the KBA but 
had very little or no knowledge about it. Ruth had this to say: 
“I am aware that there are industry meetings held by various representatives of banks 
and they share their fraud experiences but I have not been involved in one so I would not 
be able to tell you much” (Regional bank) 
It is unclear whether Ruth was implying that her bank doesn’t participate in the KBA 
meetings or if she meant that she personally was not involved. However, Ruth is a senior 
member of the audit department in her bank and the researcher would have expected her 
to be aware of the KBA even though she is not directly involved in the meetings.  
 
However, Joshua suggested that the size of the firm could be a contributing factor to the 
level of active participation of banks. He explained, “Most of the big banks have 
dedicated fraud investigators who come. But the smaller banks have managers who are 
appointed to look at fraud issues. When there are big issues we ask them to attend so they 
can know what is happening.” (International bank) 
 
This inadvertently suggests that there is selectivity of membership participation and could 
explain why some banks are not as knowledgeable as others concerning the role of the 
KBA. To illustrate this further Abraham from a relatively smaller international bank had 
this to say in response to working with the KBA: “Yes, but only if there is a big case. But 
we do share under the KBA. We get to know about the cases of fraud and they send out 
precautions and fraud alerts.”(Abraham – International bank) 
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The KBA is helpful in providing a forum where the bankers can share their experiences 
about present and emerging fraud trends so that the banks can learn from one another. 
Through the Association the bankers share issues of common concern to map out how 
best they can all move forward. One of the Regional bank interviewees talked of being 
able to network with fraud investigators from other banks through the KBA forum. 
Thomas, a regional bank employee, indicated that meetings were used for personal 
experience sharing and networking, and then forwarded the information on to other bank 
employees. Employees Paul (local bank) and Joshua (international bank) also supported 
the role of the KBA meetings for information sharing and networking.  
 
Even though the Bankers Association is regarded as being helpful there is a feeling that 
the sharing mechanism is not well established or formalized. Bankers tend to share 
information in an informal way. Joseph thought that the Bankers Association was useful 
but he had this to add: 
“…Unfortunately the forum (KBA) is not very well established for us as peers in the 
industry to exchange notes and find out who is doing what, how and where, or how they 
have been affected by a category of fraud. It is still currently at a personal 
basis…”(Local bank)  
 
Caleb emphasizes that there is no established way of sharing information ‘but as security 
managers we know one another and share informally…. even now if I have a fraud here 
at this time I will have to inform my other colleagues that there is this new trend in fraud 
that is happening. We are in communication but it is not formal, it is something between 
us as security managers of banks” (Local bank) 
 
From what Joseph and Caleb have said above, it appears that there is a great deal of 
camaraderie in the industry that allows free sharing of information in an informal way 
among the bankers. Given the history of reluctance in sharing information, an informal 
system is as far as some banks are willing to go. 
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The KBA could be instrumental in creating a strong alliance in the banking industry. By 
providing a common source of information the KBA can empower banks bringing change 
in the industry and strengthening fraud prevention and detection. In so doing the KBA 
can assert their role and position as an umbrella body so that every single banker, 
irrespective of their position in the bank, will be aware of the Association.   
 
Sharing information remains the strongest joint measure being exercised by the banks. 
However, looking at one such joint measure banks have in place one comes across 
contrasting positions. Caleb seems to indicate that there is no common database or source 
of information on fraudsters. 
“…we don’t have maybe a database where we retrieve information…... we don’t have 
something like that….But I remember one time when we met we did agree that we need to 
create a database where we can have all the fraud posted there…”(Local bank)  
 
Still Paul implies that there is some kind of progress being made in setting up a database 
with images of fraudsters, but he actually does not say if this database has been 
implemented. 
“ … We are also in the process of coming up with a mechanism of sharing images or 
pictures of fraudsters, especially the most common ones because we have noticed that 
through the sharing of that information at that forum.” (Local bank) 
 
On the other hand Adam states that there is already a database in place: 
“…we [i.e. banks] have set up a database that acts like a reference bureau where banks 
can make reference to individuals who are blacklisted. We share information now 
openly” (A National bank) 
 
Caleb says, “through the Kenya Bankers Association we are trying to come up with a 
data base of offenders/fraudsters and the new types and trends of fraud” (Local bank).  
 
Although these comments are confusing, it seems that there is not yet a central database.  
Some interviewees expressed hope that the KBA is in the process of developing a 
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database of fraud offenders. David (Regional bank) indicated this database was in 
progress, but not yet developed.  
 
Sharing information has enabled the banks come up with common strategies that can 
deter habitual offenders. Thomas (Regional bank) indicated there were monthly forums 
were fraud was discussed, including credit card fraud. The industry has been able to 
compile some vital statistics on credit and debit card fraudsters, especially in regard to 
repeat offenders; according to Solomon “….card fraud offenders are just the same 
people. We get to know the repeat offenders and we work towards prevention and when 
we get to know the repeat offender we can issue an alert and thus keep them out of the 
industry…” (Local bank) 
 
Interviewees also mentioned other useful measures KBA has taken within the industry 
such as organising trainings and workshops for the players in the banking industry. By 
bringing in experts the KBA releases new ideas and awareness of fraud for the banks. 
Adhering to the prudential guidelines and basic minimum standards set by the Central 
Bank of Kenya as measures of regulation can also go a long way in promoting a 
concerted effort on the part of all banks. Elijah (International bank), however, was of the 
opinion that the industry wide measures should be more preventive rather than curative, 
and that not much proactive activity occurred.  
 
Respondents also indicated other joint measures, including a CBK Anti-Fraud unit 
operated by the police, but did not indicate these were a significant source of cooperation. 
Some reasons banks do not operate more formally or cooperatively could include costs, 
availability of time, different bank priorities and unwillingness to share or other reasons. 
Also of interest are the reasons as to why some banks are less aware and less active in the 
KBA. There is also a question about clarity among bankers on measures within the 
industry as illustrated by the difference responses on the availability of a fraudsters’ 
database. In conclusion, KBA is going in the right direction but it is difficult to identify if 
KBA exercises selectivity that may be keeping smaller banks on the peripherals of 
information sharing or if it is a choice of the smaller banks. 
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6.3.3.2 Competition for customers 
Another theme that emerged is the competition existing between banks for customers. 
This theme has come about as a part of the response to interview question 9 on the 
measures banks are putting in place to reduce the incidence of fraud. With just over 40 
commercial banks available, bank customers in Kenya are spoilt for choice. This implies 
that banks have to compete fiercely to win and retain customers.  To keep ahead of the 
competition every bank has to come up with new innovative services and bank products 
that will attract and retain customers. 
 
Within the banking industry there is a popular policy referred to as “Know Your 
Customer” (KYC). As part of prudence the bank staff is expected to closely scrutinize 
any new customers applying to join the bank or any existing customer desiring to sign up 
for any of the bank services and products e.g. unsecured loans. 
 
In spite of the apparent competition among the banks for new customers Adam (A 
National bank) explained that knowing your customer was important in reducing fraud, 
but said that “you will find because we all want money, we are rushing to win any type of 
account…we don’t even care about the document, because at the end of the day we are 
looking at the bottom line – what are your profits at the end of the year, hoping all is 
going to be well.” This comment shows that in a bid to increase the customer base and 
profits, procedures in account opening and customer transactions are at times not 
scrutinized properly. Furthermore, customers are often verified through relationships to 
other customers, according to Adam, which reduces the amount of information known. In 
Adams words “… you see we eventually opened an account for him (fraudster) through 
our customer… but we didn’t know much about this customer (fraudster).”(A National 
bank) 
 
Solomon agrees with the fact that you must not only know your customer, but controls 
and procedures must be complied with regardless of whom the customer is.  
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“Customers are not statistics, are we able to know them if we met in the streets? Cheque 
clearance standards have to be maintained, irrespective of who you are dealing with, 
whether it is a previous acquaintance or someone you are meeting for the first time…. If 
there is any discretion they must be in the interest of the bank and must be properly 
secured.”(Local bank) 
 
Seeking to know your customer will require due diligence to be taken before an account 
is opened. Caleb (Local bank), emphasizing this point, said that “it is important to pay 
attention to due diligence when an account is being opened.” According to policy, 
customers need to give proof of where they live or operate from. Unannounced visits are 
made to the address given by the customer. Caleb added that staff also needs to be trained 
so that they are keener when opening new accounts and those who give recommendations 
should be scrutinized to ensure that they are legitimate.  
 
This scrutiny of customers can be viewed as unnecessary by the customer and in effect 
act as a disincentive, pushing the customer away. Banks struggle between the pressures of 
customer demands and the KYC program requirements. As Joshua said: 
“We should not allow competition between banks for customers to hamper fraud 
prevention.” (International bank)  
 
The banks need to find a solution that will strike an equitable balance between increasing 
the number of customers and amount of profits without exposing the banks to potential 
fraud risks arising from limited knowledge of the customers. This may require some kind 
of background checks on the customer such as credit rating, accounts held in any other 
banks, etc. Whether the banking industry is in a position to do this is a matter that needs 
to be discussed further in later chapters.  
 
 
6.3.3.3 Information Technology - Use of fraud software and technology 
Interview question 12 asked “How has the bank protected itself by the use of fraud 
software and technology?” 
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One of the ways that banks can secure their systems against external and internal attack 
from fraudsters is to employ protective software and computer technologies. Other than a 
few cases, most of the banks have taken specific measures to protect their networks. The 
most common tool used is firewalls, which block access to vulnerable systems and 
control access based on specific profiles. Banks have also used customer education; for 
example, they have warned customers about phishing attempts, in which fraudsters lure 
customers to fake bank Web sites to provide personal information. Joshua indicates that 
his international bank has an anti-phishing unit at the group level.  
 
For internal protection banks are using passwords with restricted access rights. This way 
only a few people in the organisation have access to critical information, and the bank 
knows who can access the system. David indicates that usernames and passwords are 
associated with all actions within the system. However, officers are responsible for 
password security, and if this is breached it opens the bank up to risk.  
 
People are an important element in the effective operation of fraud software and 
technology. Employing key resource persons and vetting to determine the right personnel 
is crucial. With the right personnel then you can set up policy statements and then set up 
the structures. Elijah commented that policies such as getting customer images and soft 
copies of the customer’s signature are not IT-dependent, but are people-dependent; 
making sure these procedures work is crucial for security. Customer photos and 
signatures are also used by Thomas’s regional bank as a fraud prevention measure. 
However, this means that banks need effective training for faked documents, signatures, 
and photos. Some banks also use software packages to protect against credit and debit 
card frauds. Simon indicated that his international bank uses the commercial Fraud Guard 
software package.  
 
Issues of concern are whether banks are really setting up structures before using fraud 
technologies and how secure the systems are. International banks appear to be ahead of 
the other banks in technology. Some of the potential reasons for this could be due to cost 
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of required technology or expertise, economies of scale, increased exposure to fraud, or 
earlier entry into Internet banking than local, national, or regional banks.  
 
 
6.4 External Industry Factors 
The third aspect of the conceptual framework includes external factors that impact the 
levels of fraud and the fraud prevention and detection process. External factors include 
ethical, structural and institutional (legal and regulatory), socio-economic, cultural, 
technology and other external factors. All banks within this environment will be affected 
by the same factors. These external factors are discussed below. 
6.4.1 Banking Ethics 
Interviewees were asked various questions regarding banking ethics, including questions 
about codes of ethics and ethical culture. The responses were relevant to the socio-
cultural aspects of the occurrence of fraud.  
 
6.4.1.1 Code of ethics 
Respondents were asked “Does your bank have a code of ethics and are all the employees 
aware of it?” and “Who is responsible for developing an ethical culture in the 
organisation?” (Questions 20 and 22 on interview schedule) 
 
An emerging view from this research is that somebody should be charged with the 
responsibility of ensuring that there is an ethical culture within the organisation. An 
organisational ethical culture, if nurtured well, can have an impact on individual 
behaviour.  
 
Most respondents said that Human Resources was responsible for development of ethical 
culture, while in some international banks this responsibility was shared between Ethics 
and Risk Management departments as well. The HR department is guided by the Director 
and other top managers.  
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Most of the interviewees responded affirmatively that their banks have a written code of 
ethics with at least half of them adding that the staff are required to sign the code of 
ethics as confirmation that they have read the code and are aware of its contents. In some 
cases the employees are expected to re-read the code and sign afresh every six months. 
However, there was no indication of follow-up to ensure respondents had integrated this 
code. Joseph and Titus (local and national bank respondents) indicated that their banks 
did not have codes of ethics or fraud policies. Both acknowledged that this was a 
problem.  
 
 6.4.1.2 Unethical Behaviour 
Questions 21 and 23 on the interview schedule read “Has the organisation experienced 
any unethical behaviour in the past 5 years?” and “What type of unethical behaviour has 
the organisation experienced on a regular basis in the past 5 years?”  
 
A majority of the interviewees admitted that the organisation had faced some cases of 
unethical behaviour. Such behaviour included staff dishonesty, accessing customers’ 
accounts, divulging customer information, stealing cash, borrowing money without 
authorization, misusing sums of money intended to serve as “floats”, and sexual 
harassment. However, most respondents indicated this was not usual.  
 
Several examples were given. Adam indicated two cases where staff members had been 
found to be taking money from customer accounts, which resulted in a change of practice 
to frequent re-signing of the ethics policy (as well as dismissal of the staff members). Joel 
cited cases of cash theft and creation of fictitious transactions, while Joshua noted some 
cases of staff dishonesty.  
 
Ethics policies were a major factor in preventing unethical behaviour. Simon 
(International bank) opined that constant review of fraud policies served as a fraud 
prevention technique or deterrent, resulting in few cases of unethical behaviour. Some 
banks have clear policies about how to handle grievances caused by unethical behaviour. 
Moses (International bank) notes that the bank has a clear procedure for handling 
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ethically uncomfortable situations for employees. Those that did not report recent 
unethical behaviour attributed this to the fact that people follow structures and 
procedures. Elijah (International bank) reported that his bank used these procedures to 
ensure discovery of unethical action, echoing Simon’s view of ethics policies as a hard-
line deterrent rather than a fuzzier cultural view. Paul (Local bank) also indicated that his 
bank took a zero-tolerance approach to unethical behaviour, suggesting that these banks 
have a much stronger view of the importance of ethics than some other organisations. 
 
An important finding was that the relatively smaller banks did not report any marked 
incidences of unethical behaviour. This could be attributed to the fact that smaller banks 
may share common organisational culture and are more closely knit making it much more 
difficult for staff to carry out fraud undetected.  
 
 6.4.1.3 Reward Culture 
This study looked into how banks seek to enforce deterrence in a positive way (Question 
28 on interview schedule). Deterrence is often looked at as negative concept. However, 
there are ways that an organisation can positively deter its employees. Interviewees were 
asked how they enforced deterrence in a positive way. 
 
A number of interviewees revealed that they provide rewards and incentives to staff as a 
means of positively deterring the occurrence of fraud. Caleb reported that there were 
varying incentives to prevent fraud and encourage its detection. Jacob indicated that 
whistle-blowers were rewarded, as were those that were not engaged in fraud. Other 
banks, mainly the international banks talked about various schemes and policies that are 
in place to encourage staff members to actively participate in fraud prevention. Moses’ 
bank uses official recognition of those that assist in fraud prevention, while Joshua’s bank 
uses a fraud hotline and spot awards as well as percentage-based awards for reporting 
fraud. A frequent theme was “speaking up”, and this was frequently rewarded monetarily 
or with other recognition. Ruth indicated that her bank spelled out bonuses and salary 
increases available to those that comply with the code of conduct in the employment 
contract.   
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Monetary incentives were not the only approach taken. For example, Abraham indicated 
that his bank offered employees opportunities for education and training to increase 
commitment and reduce fraud.  However, Gabriel indicated that recruitment and 
induction and training were basic elements in aligning people to the available incentives, 
and that incentives could not work on their own. Adam stated that a first line of defence 
was good pay, and that whistle-blowing and monetary awards were secondary. Solomon, 
conversely, indicated that good staff relationships were instrumental in encouraging staff 
to come forward and report fraud. Even in giving rewards Solomon mentioned that 
keeping good staff relations encouraged people to come forward and report fraud. Other 
than giving rewards, Thomas explained that his bank also encouraged staff members 
involved in fraud to speak up and in exchange receive a reduced punishment. Titus 
indicated that the identity of whistle-blowers was not disclosed and that they would be 
transferred for protection if necessary. Joseph’s bank did not use monetary rewards at all, 
instead emphasizing organisational commitment and job security as incentives.  
 
6.4.2 Structural and Institutional Issues 
The study sought to identify structural and institutional issues that banks faced in the 
course of fighting fraud. Respondents were asked the following question (Question 29 on 
interview schedule): “In the process of fraud there are four main elements, namely: 
Prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution. Could you briefly discuss some of 
the challenges the organisation faces in these areas?” 
 
6.4.2.1 Challenges in preventing fraud 
Out of the 17 interviewees only 4 of them said that they hardly faced any challenges in 
preventing fraud. Others reported varied problems in attempting to prevent fraud. Ruth 
(Regional bank) said that preventing fraud was difficult where external actors were 
concerned as “the persons sent to carry out fraudulent transactions may just be a third 
party. So the person you catch might not give you much information.” However, as 
revealed by Abraham (International bank) it is not only external factors that make fraud 
prevention a challenge but also cases that involve more than one bank raise inter-bank co-
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operation issues. Often banks do not co-operate when it comes to sharing information. 
This makes it difficult prevent fraud spreading and affecting other banks. Adam 
(International bank) adds that there are co-operation problems when seeking vital inter-
bank information on fraudsters. Nonetheless Moses (International bank) and Thomas 
(Regional bank) are of the opinion that success in prevention has to do with the people 
whose job it is to ensure fraud is minimized. Thomas states “Procedures and controls are 
as good as the people who follow them. If people don’t follow them and you have good 
measures then it is like you are doing nothing.” In other words fraud prevention is not 
only about having controls and systems in place, but it is also about the kind of personnel 
you are having who will enforce the rules and procedures. Moses went further: 
 
 “Prevention has to do with the controls we have put in place in our processes. These are 
as good as the people, the integrity of the people, who are manning them. In terms of 
enforcing prevention there are lapses because of a lack of enforcement of the controls on 
the part of the staff.”(Moses - International Bank)  
 
Paul (Local bank) commented that the changing or evolving nature of fraud presents a 
challenge and the staff must remain on guard, aware, alert and educated consistently in 
order to identify the new forms frauds take on. On challenges posed by prevention, 
Joseph (local) and David (Regional) held the view that some prevention challenges are 
due to management taking too long to make decisions on audit and other queries; 
meanwhile the fraud will continue. 
 
6.4.2.2 Challenges in detecting fraud 
Challenges in detecting fraud related to delays in obtaining and accessing necessary 
documentation (Adam and Solomon). Detecting of fraud is also slowed down by data 
going “missing”, being destroyed or deleted (Moses and Thomas). Data was also not 
received in a timely fashion to facilitate detection of some fraud (Joshua and David). It is 
hard to follow up and detect fraud in the absence of crucial information that may be held 
by customers (Caleb, Jacob and Ruth) 
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6.4.2.3 Challenges in investigating fraud 
Challenges in investigating fraud yielded varied responses from the interviewees. One of 
the challenges faced by the banks was the fact that employees were reluctant to implicate 
their colleagues who are involved in fraud and this frustrated the investigations. There 
was also lack of co-operation from the police, management and other banks. The police 
and prosecutors lacked skills in carrying out investigations and cases took a long time 
with the police. In some cases the costs of investigating the fraud were prohibitive. 
During the process of investigating cases the banks face resistance by staff through the 
union that can shield the perpetrator. Other challenges included receiving threats from the 
fraudsters and fraudsters holding back information. 
 
6.4.2.4 Challenges in prosecuting fraud 
The aspect of challenges that evoked most response from the interviewees was that of 
prosecution. Banks indicated that there were only weak provisions for fraud detection and 
prosecution available, that the legal basis for fraud prosecution was inadequate, that 
prosecutorial, legal and law enforcement knowledge of fraud was lacking, and that the 
legal process was difficult and extended. These factors often moderated against the use of 
the court system in dealing with fraud. The study raised some legal issues in respect to 
prosecution and legal enforcement that are discussed below. Themes cover legal 
problems regarding the length of time it takes to prosecute fraud, the high acquittal rate, 
issues surrounding the police force and the justice system. More about issues arising from 
prosecution are covered in Section 6.4.2.4.1 – Section 6.4.2.4.5 
 
6.4.2.4.1 Prosecution 
Prosecution was one of the major challenges that respondents indicated they faced in 
fraud prevention. Some major issues included prosecution length and a high rate of 
acquittals.  
 
Some interviewees talked about the long period of time they had to wait for a case that 
was before the court to be concluded. Hence many cases remain unresolved for many 
years. In the process of the delays some witnesses relocate, material evidence is lost, 
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fraudsters bribe their way out and people lose interest in the case. Ruth (Regional bank), 
Adam (A National bank), and Joshua (International bank) mentioned the length of 
prosecution, indicating a minimum time of three months and as many as ten court visits 
for a prosecution.  
 
Problems with prosecution ran deeper than just length. Caleb (Local bank) indicated 
some cases had been on-going for more than seven years, stating that courts do not 
schedule cases in advance, but instead summon all witnesses at once for as many as 100 
cases, causing witnesses to miss court appearances. Solomon (Local bank) suggested 
cases could take eight years, and that further problems included prosecutorial and judicial 
independence, lawyers seeking adjournments and delays, and police transfers standing in 
the way of case completion. David (Regional bank) indicated that the judiciary was 
backlogged; both Solomon and David suggested that witnesses frequently disappeared or 
were compromised during this time. The length of time taken for prosecutions is both 
costly and reduces the deterrent power of criminal prosecution, ultimately harming banks. 
 
A judicial issue raised through the interviews was the high rate of case acquittals. Some 
interviewees explained how they have flagged up this issue within the industry. This high 
rate of acquittals frustrates the efforts made by banks in arresting and prosecuting 
fraudsters. At the same time fraudsters remain undeterred as they know they can buy their 
way out of the legal system. Moses (International bank) asserts a 95% acquittal rate, 
mostly due to police and prosecutor failure to understand evidence.  
 
Corruption in the judicial system was also cited as a challenge which eventually leads to 
fraudsters being acquitted. Titus (A National bank) indicates that “fraudsters have 
connections in the judicial system and end up getting an acquittal.” David (Regional 
bank) suggests most acquittals are due to technicalities. He states that this has been raised 
at the industry and police commissioner level, but that corruption is still rampant. It is 
clear that the judicial system needs to be strengthened to reduce the effects of corruption. 
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6.4.2.4.2 The legal system 
The legal system in general, including police, prosecutors, and judges, causes issues in 
effective prosecution. Abraham indicates that a lot of time is wasted trying to deal with 
the system. Joseph states that managers must rely on legal advisors, and that prosecution 
is inconvenient and postponements are common.  Joshua, Titus and Moses indicated that 
prosecutors and investigators lacked skills and knowledge to effectively prosecute crimes. 
Titus and Simon suggested that judges and magistrates often misunderstood crimes as 
well. Moses suggested that along with a lack of skill, prosecutors had no desire to 
understand the problems encountered. An apparent lack of equipment, facilities and 
expertise is a further challenge. Solomon indicated there were no forensic laboratories, 
document examiners, or other facilities for effective investigation in most cases, as well 
as a lack of IT knowledge and expertise. 
 
6.4.2.4.3 Cost Versus Benefit 
Other than the challenges raised by the legal system the legal fees at times do not 
compensate for time and money lost. Joseph indicated that for small amounts, too much 
time and costs were incurred for prosecution to be worthwhile. Caleb agreed with this, 
especially since monetary recovery was rare. The banks do not find it beneficial to take 
legal action where the cost of prosecution is greater than the amount recoverable from the 
fraud. As prosecution is a measure of deterrence, we can infer that striking a trade-off 
between deterring fraud and the costs associated with deterring fraud is an issue in fraud 
risk management.  
 
6.4.2.4.4 Frequent transfer and slackness of the police force 
The regular transfer of police staff who are investigating and prosecuting cases within the 
central bank fraud unit has greatly reduced the speed at which some of the cases are 
concluded. This further exacerbates the situation seen in Section 6.4.2.4.1, where length 
of prosecution makes police transfers more likely. Solomon (Local bank) indicated one 
case where they had a police officer working on a case where they were able to provide 
direct information about the identity of the perpetrator; however, his replacement was not 
as passionate and the case was dropped. Jacob cited a lack of cooperation from the police, 
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especially a failure to take a statement needed to proceed with a case. Elijah 
(International bank) cited multiple cases being dismissed for unprofessional 
investigations, and noted that this served as a significant reason for developing internal 
procedures. An overall sense of apathy and unprofessionalism on the part of police 
prevents completion of investigations.  
 
Moses indicated that passing a case to external investigators often resulted in a less 
effective investigation, since house investigators are generally well-trained compared to 
police. He stated: 
“Most of the police are in a hurry and not ready to sit down with the internal 
investigators to understand a case and the process. They don’t see the need why they 
should understand the whole process first before they look at what offence has been 
committed. This leads to the case evidence not being properly compiled.”(International 
bank) 
 
One of the biggest concerns to the banking industry is the high turnover of police 
personnel at the Banking Fraud Unit (which falls under the Central Bank, Police Unit) 
charged with the responsibility of investigating banking fraud cases. Moses notes that the 
unit has a high turnover rate. The department has frequent overhauls (three to six 
months), and experienced staff is routinely swapped for inexperienced staff. The 
investigative staffs also fail to listen to input from internal investigators. David confirms 
this situation, and also states that the department is understaffed. The researcher 
confirmed the problem of frequent transfers and inexperience. On visiting the Banking 
Fraud Unit, all the personnel were recently transferred after just 3 months in office. 
Moses suggests that there is some form of nepotism where police officers are appointed 
through connections (family or otherwise) implying that there are problems within the 
system. 
 
6.4.2.4.5 Weak legal enforcement and poor industry co-operation 
Investigating fraud at times requires the assistance of a third party, which in the case of 
this study is either another bank or a law enforcement institution. This study revealed that 
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there is little co-ordination between banks. And at the same time the police are not quick 
with assisting in bringing culprits to book. Adam observed that often frauds were cross-
bank, but investigation began in another bank, and that investigation was difficult without 
involving other banks, the court and police, and the central bank. However, this is 
hampered by a weak cooperation in the industry. This is particularly true because of the 
high cheque fraud load. Caleb cites difficulty getting information from other banks, like 
CCTV tapes. This offers an opportunity for improvement in the industry.  
 
In concluding the findings in this section certain issues stand out: Court cases are taking 
too long to resolve; the rate of acquittals is high; the legal and law enforcement system, 
including police investigators, prosecutors, and courts, are not very effective; and 
industry co-operation is weak. Arising from this are questions regarding how banks can 
deal with fraud given the deficiencies in the legal institution. How can problems 
encountered with the legal and law enforcement systems be tackled? Why is the banking 
industry not working co-operatively to fight fraud formally? These issues will be 
discussed further in the next chapter. 
 
6.4.3 Cultural Issues  
Respondents were asked “What cultural and social factors contribute to unethical 
behaviour in your organisation?” (Question 24 on interview schedule) 
 
The main cultural issue that emerged was the divide on the issue of tribal influences as a 
contributing element in fraud. Among those who believe that fraud has nothing to do with 
tribal/community affiliations was Joseph, who said: 
“There is a belief that certain communities are born thieves. I do not think it is true. It is 
just a culture that we propagate and try to justify that it is a part of culture.”(Local bank) 
Instead, he believed that this perception was a form of stereotyping, and that tribal 
affiliations were used as an excuse or scapegoat; instead, fraud happens all over, 
wherever people see motive and opportunity (indirectly referencing the Fraud Triangle).  
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Joshua opined that fraud occurred in both high-status and low-status people of different 
tribes or cultures, and was not confined to a certain culture. Simon shared similar 
sentiments as Joseph in saying that a thief is a thief and it has nothing to do with culture. 
However, some respondents felt differently. Titus remarked, “There could be some tribal 
and cultural elements though it is not a big issue. But there are tribes that need to be 
guarded carefully as they are very aggressive people.”(A National bank) 
This seems to imply that there are some tribal overtones involved in the perception of 
fraud within the banking industry. Gabriel remarked that “there are particular tribes that 
you never miss in a fraud trail,” (Regional bank) while Moses stated, “most of the 
perpetrators or fraudsters come from specific regions of the country.”(International 
bank) 
 
A number of social factors other than tribal affiliation were also discussed. Adam did 
indicate there was a certain age group (20s-30s) that were particularly involved in fraud. 
(This contradicts the findings of the quantitative study, which found that 31-40 was the 
most common age group, consistent with previous studies.)  Caleb (Local bank) indicated 
that substance abuse and gambling were often involved, while Ruth (Regional bank) cited 
pressure to live beyond one’s means as a major factor. Other respondents agreed with 
Ruth’s observation. 
 
Solomon explained his theory of “differential association” as an explanation of social 
factors contributing to fraud. Giving an example he said: 
“…someone was working here and leaves on account of fraud and he still retains his 
friends… Probably he is now a full time fraudster. There are some people who have had 
a low integrity threshold and they have been recruited. There is also peer pressure, 
drinking, economic survival, poor role models – no one is condemning them about the 
way they have achieved their riches; or where people see fraud as a very intelligent 
exploit!”(Local bank) 
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It is worth noting that most participants seemed very guarded when answering this 
question. However, it seems it would be unwise to ignore socio-economic, and in 
particular, tribal considerations, when seeking to understand attitudes to fraud in Kenya. 
 
6.4.4 Socioeconomic Issues  
The socio-economic issues were identified from the same question as that asked in 
Section 6.6 above i.e. “What cultural and social factors contribute to unethical behaviour 
in your organisation?” (Question 24 on interview schedule) 
 
In the course of the interviews interviewees explained some socio-economic issues that 
have led to the occurrence of fraud. One of these issues is unemployment and another 
economic constraint.  
 
Adam implied that there was a direct link between unemployment, crime and fraud, and 
that much bank fraud was the follow-up to violent crime such as muggings.  Others 
supporting a similar kind of view were Solomon, Thomas and David. Solomon (Local 
bank) cited a population explosion and lack of jobs as a factor in fraud, noting that it was 
difficult to control for this reason. Thomas cited unemployment and inflation as economic 
factors. However, according to David (Regional bank), some people have taken up fraud 
as a profession rather than as a desperation measure. However, from some of the fraud 
cases discussed with the interviewees some of the perpetrators were people in 
employment. Thus, these views must be considered critically, and are a cause for 
discussion later in Chapter 7. 
 
Another socio-economic issue that surfaced from the interviewees was one that arises 
from the use of fairly recent banking technologies such as online and telephone banking. 
The socio-dynamics present an even greater risk to the customer – that of actual physical 
risk. Criminals in Kenya have been known to escort their victims to ATM machines to 
withdraw funds from their accounts; even holding their victim hostage for a number of 
days so that they can make daily withdrawals until the account is fully depleted of its 
funds. Telephone banking can therefore make the customer vulnerable to physical attack. 
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Solomon, talking about the risks that the customer faces with increased automation, 
voiced this concern but usually the risks lie with the account owner who e.g. fails to erase 
certain information about their transactions. This has been one factor in banks rejecting 
technologies that allow for this type of access. Respondents also expressed fear for their 
own safety as those that prosecute fraud. Adam indicated there was a potential threat to 
physical security.  
 
 
6.4.5 Information Technology: Computer-based Crimes and New Challenges 
Kenyan banks are yet to make significant forays into computer-based personal banking, 
according to respondents, maintaining these services primarily for elite customers. 
However, this has not prevented computer-based fraud become increasingly prevalent. 
Banks have also faced issues such as identity theft, which have challenged existing 
models of fraud detection and prevention. Respondents were asked two questions that 
related to the banks’ susceptibility and vulnerability to fraud. Question 10 and 11 
respectively asked: “Has the organisation had any fraud incident involving the misuse of 
computers/computer networks/online banking or organised criminal groups?” and “Has 
internet banking increased your banks vulnerability to fraud?” The responses are given in 
Sections 6.4.5.1 and 6.4.5.2  
 
 
6.4.5.1 Susceptibility to computer related fraud and organised crime 
The researcher asked whether the organisation had suffered any fraud incident involving 
the misuse of computers/computer networks/online banking or organised criminal groups.  
 
The research revealed that a majority of the banks have not yet suffered Internet related 
frauds, even those occasioned by hackers. One of the main reasons that could explain this 
is that most banks have not yet moved into Internet banking. Those banks that have 
begun Internet banking have only rolled out the concept to a small group of bank 
customers, and this being still a privileged service; it is not open to all account holders. 
Currently the frauds suffered which relate to online or Internet banking is as a result of 
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customer negligence in securing their passwords and hence affording fraudsters the 
opportunity to exploit the lapse in security. The onus of keeping the account information 
safe and secure remains with the customer. Solomon and Moses both stated that 
customers had so far been the main weakness point for Internet-based fraud.  
 
Banks are beginning to face the reality that they will need to offer Internet and phone 
banking. Adam stated that his bank recently launched an online service, which already 
was subject to hacking attacks. Joseph reported that so far there had been few problems 
with the bank’s limited roll-out of Internet banking, but that they saw problems with 
identity theft as likely following a more comprehensive implementation. 
 
Identity fraud is a growing problem in Kenya’s banking industry. In the course of this 
research, it has become evident that fraudsters have access to facilities that enables them 
to produce fake passports, identification cards and even cloning credit and debit cards. 
With such falsified identity documents the fraudsters can gain access to customer 
accounts unlawfully withdrawing their money or they use the documents to open new 
accounts under false names. Paul suggests that proper scrutiny can prevent the use of 
these fraudulent documents.  However, Solomon and Moses indicate that card skimming 
is increasingly common and facilitated by internal sources with inside information. 
Moses saw a conflict, in that the bank offers IT innovations to improve customer service, 
but these functions also increase the ability to defraud the bank. Solomon admitted that 
these IT-enabled frauds, frequently performed with insider help, were difficult to keep up 
with. 
 
As mentioned in Section 6.2.1, collusion facilitates the leakage of customers’ vital 
banking information enabling the fraudsters to clone debit and credit cards. Even as the 
banks strive to keep up with technology they face a challenge not only from external 
forces but from their own staff working with external collusion. Titus indicated that 
insiders, rather than external hackers, were responsible for manipulation of computer 
systems. David indicated that ex-staff were frequently involved in these frauds, having 
inside information and contacts that allow them access.  
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Other than incidents involving card fraud syndicates, where there could be a possible 
external organised link, the banks did not report any major problems of organised 
criminal activity. Joshua summarized this well when he stated that: 
“We have not had an organised gang or hackers attack our system. Just amateurs using 
skimmed cards or employees trying to manipulate passwords to use the system to transfer 
funds or using wrong information.”(International bank) 
 
There was apparently difficulty identifying differences between ordinary fraud and 
organised crime. As Elijah said “we had a series of fraud that were similar and I cannot 
rule out that those people were an organised group.”(International bank) 
This uncertainty can be attributed to the complexity of organised crime and the difficulty 
involved in pinpointing it.  
 
There are other issues that affect the fight against computer fraud in the banks. One such 
issue is system problems. The computer systems do not have built-in anti-fraud tool, 
leaving banks dependent on manual systems. In some international banks, even they use 
very fast transaction-monitoring systems. International banks also have access to systems 
developed outside Kenya. Modernizing systems will help banks curb frauds like card 
frauds. At the time of research, Kenyan debit cards used magnetic stripes rather than chip 
and pin, increasing the ease of card fraud and use of skimmed cards from other countries. 
How much is being done by the banks to make customers aware of information 
technology-related fraud and identity theft is an issue arising from this section.  
 
6.4.5.2 Banks’ increased vulnerability to fraud due to Internet banking 
The interviewees were also asked whether Internet banking had increased their bank’s 
vulnerability to fraud. As banks attempt to take on new computer technology they may 
invariably find themselves exposed to fraud due to increased vulnerability. Adam (A 
National bank) indicated that an increasing public profile due to online banking had 
increased fraud such as cheque fraud and fraudulent account opening. Paul (Local bank) 
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indicated that jurisdictional issues also were introduced with online banking, requiring 
increased cooperation between banks and institutions. (See Section 6.3.3.1)  
 
Perceptions of exposure and vulnerability to fraud because of online banking vary 
depending on how much experience the bank has had. International and regional banks 
have had more experience, while local and national banks have had less exposure (with 
mainly corporate customers). However, the banks are well aware of the risks associated 
with online banking based on the experiences of other countries and the global trends. 
Titus (A National bank) and Gabriel (Regional bank) indicated that they are aware of 
risks from publications and other transmissions of experience. The general opinion is that 
online banking will soon become a serious risk. 
 
At present most of the risk and vulnerability of online banking lies with the customer. 
However, increasing bank profiles will mean that banks will need to improve their 
security systems.  Caleb (Local bank) stated that he was investigating what problems and 
risks his bank could expect from the introduction of online banking. However, banks are 
not put off by this, instead considering it as part of a cost-benefit analysis of increased 
business and commensurate increased risk. Responses indicate that banks are aware of 
the risks, are willing to face them and are preparing themselves to take these risks. 
 
On the contrary as some banks reported that advancement in computer technology has in 
effect minimized fraud occurrences and limited it to internal problems. David (Regional 
bank) stated that online fraud was relatively simple to spot as compared to the complex 
collusions and accidental negligence associated with other frauds. However, other 
respondents did admit that card skimming by staff had occurred. However, banks do face 
higher losses from these frauds than traditional frauds, according to Solomon. 
Additionally, the lack of paper trail in computerized fraud systems makes problems for 
investigation.  
 
We can therefore conclude that in spite of the risks attached to online banking, banks are 
beginning to provide these services to remain globally competitive. Perhaps the main 
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issue that arises here is how much of a risk banks are willing to take by embracing online 
banking as fraud management is also really about risk management. 
 
6.5 Other Issues  
There were a few issues from the research that are significant to discuss. One such issue 
is emerging fraud and international transactions. These are discussed below. 
 
6.5.1 Emergent fraud and lack of proper legislation 
The interviewees were asked if they were aware of certain frauds existing in other 
countries that could likely find their way into the Kenyan financial sector (Question 25 on 
interview schedule) and what measures were being put in place to combat such emerging 
fraud before they hit the industry (Question 26 on interview schedule).  
 
There was a general feeling that Kenya has already been exposed to most of the frauds 
happening in the rest of the world; putting it in the words of Gabriel “a majority of the 
frauds are here with us.” This view was supported by Simon, who stated that fraud was a 
globalized problem:  
Any fraud which is committed in London or Johannesburg tomorrow morning it is in 
Nairobi. Because of the technological advancements we find that fraud now is almost the 
same anywhere. So there is no strange fraud that is prevalent in London and not in 
Nairobi…it’s exactly the same.” 
 
Joseph argued that the prevalence of banking technology meant that Kenya’s banking 
industry was interconnected to the global world of fraud as well. He noted that IT usage 
was a major point of fraud exposure. Adam and David confirmed that credit card and 
identity fraud were becoming increasingly prevalent. However, there was a feeling 
among respondents that Kenya had not yet seen the full force of technology-enabled 
fraud. Joel believed that Internet-based fraud was still emerging in the market, while 
other respondents, including Ruth and Titus, saw credit card fraud and card skimming as 
fraud that would become more prevalent in future. Elijah sees Africa as the obvious next 
point for targeting of credit card fraud. Caleb saw an opportunity for improvement in 
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adoption of the chip and pin system, indicating that banks needed to adopt the system by 
2010 or they would be liable for fraudulent actions, indicating a regulatory change. 
 
The responses above indicate that banks are now increasingly encountering credit and 
debit card fraud. However, in Kenya the legal environment that banks operate in has 
made it difficult for banks to prosecute card frauds. The bankers noted that prosecution of 
card skimmers is difficult as there is no credit card legislation in Kenya. Moses explained 
the present situation this way: 
“The Attorney General is in the process of drafting Credit Card Legislation. They have 
borrowed heavily from the South African and UK legislation. They are putting it 
together. The legislation has still not yet reached the Parliament but it is at an advanced 
stage because I know we are actively involved including other stakeholders. But that has 
been our major challenge…..we still recover this crime but we can’t successfully 
prosecute because of lack of legislation.”(International bank) 
 
Without legislation the banks have no teeth to fight this type of fraud. Approving 
Government legislature often takes multiple levels and in the process valuable time is 
consumed. This is a great setback for the banking industry as it continues to suffer this 
fraud relentlessly. The fraudsters are aware that they can get away with it and will 
therefore keep exploiting the loophole created by lack of legislature.   
 
In light of the awareness that card fraud is a present and still emerging fraud, what are 
banks doing to prepare themselves? What progress has there been in getting the Credit 
Card Legislature passed and in advancing to “Pin and Chip” system? The next chapter 
will explore these issues as well as the possible advantages the legislature and “Pin and 
Chip” system will bring to the banking industry in terms of fighting fraud. 
 
6.5.2 Domestic and international transactions 
Over the past few decades globalization has changed the face of many industries, 
especially the banking industry. With globalization new opportunities and benefits have 
been brought to the banking industry. However, it has also brought some challenges.  
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One of the issues resulting from globalization is that of jurisdiction in investigating fraud. 
This issue arises as an offshoot from Question 3 (Who are the perpetrators and how was 
the fraud detected) where some cases involved fraud committed across the borders and 
their impact. One of the interviewees, Adam (A National bank) recounted a fraud 
incidence where a series of cheques had been stolen from a foreign embassy in a 
neighbouring country. In the process of this case being investigated it was discovered that 
one of the cheques (the fraudulent cheque passed on by the perpetrator to our customer) 
had gone through. The case of the stolen cheques had already been reported to the 
German police, but the paying bank was not aware. It is only in the process of the 
investigation that they realized one of the cheques had come through. This created a great 
deal of confusion regarding jurisdiction. At the time of reporting, the case had gone on 
for three years, with Adam’s bank being forced to take the financial hit for the fraud. 
However, there was no way for them to detect or monitor this type of fraud. 
 
Different rules operate in different areas of jurisdiction. This raises the issue about how to 
effectively carry out fraud management in cases that transcend borders. Adam reports that 
even simple issues like whether a cheque can be paid is confusing. Paul (Local bank) 
discussed a case involving a fake international cheque, indicating that local fraudsters 
capitalised on confusion regarding international cheques to create fake documents.  Paul 
reflected: 
 “I would imagine a situation whereby some instructions purportedly come from Europe 
and here I am in Africa, in the middle of Africa and I do not know whether these 
instructions are genuine. So it comes with its new challenges and we need to work harder 
to counter them.”  
 
With increased globalization competition is bound to reach dizzy heights. Increase in 
competition brings with it a degree of fraud risk. Can the banks effectively tackle 
international fraud and is international fraud a big threat to fraud security in the industry? 
This issue is addressed in Chapter 7.  
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6.5.3 Reducing Fraud 
A general question was asked (Question 29) concerning what the respondents thought 
could be done to reduce fraud in the banking industry. A summary of the responses 
includes: the banking industry in Kenya needs to learn/adopt from the experiences of 
developed countries; fraud training needs to be extended to the customers as they are the 
main detectors of fraud; internal control systems need to be enhanced to deter fraud; the 
banks also need to keep abreast of the fraudster – be one step ahead; 
 
 
6.6 Reflections on research questions and conceptual framework 
This chapter has discussed a number of themes that relate to the first three of the 
following four research questions: 
1. What are the characteristics of fraud in the Kenyan banking industry?  
2. What are the perceived characteristics of those that perpetrate fraud in the Kenyan 
banking industry?  
3. How do banks approach fraud management?  
4. Are there differences between the approaches to fraud management adopted by 
Kenyan and international banks?  
 
Considering Research Question 1 a few characteristics of fraud have come out of this 
qualitative study. The theft of cash, passing of fraudulent cheques and identity fraud are 
among the main types of fraud reported, agreeing with the findings of the quantitative 
study. Most of the frauds are reported to the police but recovery of fraudulent funds is 
low. A typical fraud would be in the order of about is KES 5,000,000. 
 
The findings of the qualitative study reveal some characteristics of those who perpetrate 
fraud in the banking industry as pursued in Research Question 2. Based on interviewees’ 
fraud experiences, fraud is mainly perpetrated through collusion of internal and/or 
external perpetrators. Like the quantitative study this study has also identified that the 
average age of the perpetrators lies in the age bracket of 31-45 years age and perpetrators 
are mostly male but with a significant number of female participation reported. Internal 
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perpetrators predominantly held positions of cashiers, tellers and clerks and had on 
average served for a short period of time. Motivations again point to financial pressure, 
opportunity and peer pressure while fraud opportunities are provided through poor 
internal controls, lack of segregation of duties and lax supervisory control.  
 
Research Question 3 on how banks manage fraud was the main focus of this study. The 
study shows that there is room for improving fraud management. Internal control systems 
require tightening, strengthening and enforcement. The recruitment for screening 
procedures needs to be managed better to reduce the instance of possibly hiring people 
with questionable backgrounds. Fraud prevention and detection should be improved by 
training customers as a majority of fraud is detected by them. Fraud budgets should be 
clearly defined and planned for. Efforts towards creating industry co-operation should be 
considered so that banks can share information and work together to fight and reduce 
fraud incidences. Competition for customers and profit margins needs to be considered in 
context of the fraud risk that this competition generates. There are ethical issues that have 
implications for the industry and the banks should strive to establish best practices. 
Structural and institutional issues pose a great challenge in the management of fraud with 
the main challenges being in the prevention and prosecution of fraud. Changes and 
improvements in the legal and justice systems and institutions appear to be the way 
forward to better and more effective fraud management. Cultural and socio-economic 
environments are broader issues that have an important bearing on fraud management. 
Understanding these issues can help organizations tackle fraud better. Finally as banks 
begin to increasingly embrace information technology (IT) precautions should be taken to 
bolster internal IT defenses including using appropriate software and technology. Proper 
fraud risk management should be contemplated so as to determine bank susceptibility and 
vulnerability to fraud.  
 
The qualitative study has provided some further and more in-depth answers to the 
research questions as discussed above. The identification of emerging frauds serves as a 
window to establishing future control measures. 
 
 228 
This chapter has been structured in such a way that the conceptual framework can be 
identified. Section 6.2 captures the perpetrator and Fraud Triangle, which is the central 
part of the conceptual framework. Internal factors of the conceptual framework are 
discussed in Section 6.3 while Sections 6.4 and 6.5 relate to the external factors of the 
conceptual framework, completing it. 
 
 
6.7 Summary 
This chapter has highlighted the main findings that have emerged from the field 
interviews with respondents from the banks. Main themes were based on the perpetrator – 
collusion and the fraud triangle. Other themes were based on the internal factors of the 
conceptual framework and included internal control systems, fraud prevention and 
detection and deterrence. Respondents report that customers, rather than internal controls, 
uncover most fraud.  
 
One major theme is relationships between banks and customers, which may be 
cooperative or competitive. KBA involvement indicates cooperation, but banks continue 
to compete for customers, which has impeded joint fraud detection and prevention 
efforts.  However, perhaps the biggest barrier to effective fraud prevention are the 
external factors that are presented in the form of bank ethics, cultural, socio-economic, 
information technology,  legal, structural and institutional framework that banks must 
work with. Legal systems are especially inadequate to deal with fraud and are inefficient 
in their dealings, leading to a situation in which the institutions actually impede, rather 
than promote, effective fraud prevention. Furthermore, banks now find themselves 
dealing with challenges such as computer-based fraud and identity theft, which their 
existing fraud mechanisms are not designed to handle. These themes will be developed 
further in Chapter 7, which also integrates the findings of the qualitative and quantitative 
research with the existing literature. 
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Chapter 7  
Discussion 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to integrate the qualitative and quantitative findings of this 
research with the existing literature in order to understand fraud in the Kenyan banking 
industry. Previously, the nature and characteristics of fraud in the Kenyan banking 
industry and its ability to prevent and detect fraud has been discussed, in line with the 
research questions associated with this research:  
 
1. What are the characteristics of fraud in the Kenyan banking industry?  
2. What are the perceived characteristics of those that perpetrate fraud in the Kenyan 
banking industry?  
3. How do banks approach fraud management?  
4. Are there differences between the approaches to fraud management adopted by 
Kenyan and international banks?  
 
The qualitative and quantitative findings of this research have identified a number of 
different trends and factors that can be compared to existing research and analysed 
together in order to draw conclusions about how the banks are handling the issue of 
fraud. The findings conflict in some areas, although not in others, and in some cases do 
not support the existing state of the literature. This chapter summarises findings from the 
qualitative findings (Section 7.2), discusses major themes and issues and relates them to 
literature (Section 7.3), and integrates qualitative and quantitative findings (Section 7.4). 
Further points of discussion include differences between international and other banks 
(Section 7.5); relation of findings to theories of fraud (Sections 7.6 and 7.7) and discusses 
the implications of these findings (Sections 7.8 and 7.9). 
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7.2 Overview of Qualitative Findings  
A brief summary of qualitative findings is provided below. These findings are detailed in 
Chapter 6 (Qualitative Findings). Key themes that were identified in the qualitative 
interviews included: collusion and internal controls; cooperation and competition 
between banks; customers; legal, structural, socio-economic, cultural, technology and 
other external factors. These findings primarily referred to Research Question 3 (“How 
do banks approach fraud management”) although they also touch on Question 1 (“What 
are the characteristics of fraud in the Kenyan banking industry) and Research Question 2 
(“What are the perceived characteristics of those that perpetrate fraud?”)    
 
Collusion between perpetrators was both pervasive and difficult to detect. Internal 
controls were seen as the main way to fight fraud, but were not necessarily successful. 
Banks do share information about fraud, which is an improvement on previous practices. 
However, participation in the KBA is uneven, which could limit its potential usefulness. 
Customers are a source of major competition between banks, and although there are 
safeguards against known fraudulent customers in place they are often circumvented. 
However, customers are also important in fraud detection as they are a main contributor 
in uncovering fraudulent activities happening in their bank accounts. Socioeconomic 
conditions including high unemployment rates and organised crime are seen as major 
factors in bank fraud. International transactions are also a major source of fraud. 
 
Banks reported complacency and failure to follow protocols when hiring new employees, 
which increased the chance of fraud. Banks also reported differences in the amount of 
money available to fight fraud; banks had different attitudes toward fraud budgets 
depending on their overall views of fraud. One area Kenyan banks did not face a 
significant challenge as yet is the case of internet banking fraud, which is due to selective 
practices adopted by the banks as to the clientele that can access online banking. 
However, identity theft and debit and credit card skimming were common. Banks are 
currently in the process of modernizing their computerized fraud detection systems, and 
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some of these systems remain manual. Some banks do use a code of ethics, but this is not 
consistent and the view on whether or not this is effective varies.  
 
One of the most significant issues that have emerged from the research is the problem 
posed by the legal system. Lengthy prosecutions make legal remedies very costly for the 
banks, and there is a high rate of acquittal for cases brought to criminal trial. There is 
overall a lack of expertise in the judicial system regarding bank fraud, and some concerns 
about corruption. Poorly trained police officers mean that many cases cannot be 
prosecuted successfully, and there is overall a lack of stability, equipment, training, and 
facilities, as well as a lack of legal structures and laws to address some types of fraud. 
Many banks choose to avoid prosecution because cost-benefit analysis shows that it is 
more trouble than it is worth.  
 
7.3 Discussion on Qualitative findings   
While the quantitative findings of the study were effective in describing fraud, the 
qualitative findings provided significantly more insight into the issues the banks 
considered important. These findings also identified some differences in the Kenyan 
banking system as compared to the general banking system.  
 
The conceptual framework discussed in Chapter 3 (Section 3.10) was constructed around 
three broad components: The individual perpetrator was represented by the Fraud 
Triangle, the immediate internal environment within the banking industry and the 
external environment surrounding the banking industry.  
The main issues that emerged from this research can be arranged along four thematic 
lines identified; including relationships between banks, employees and fraud detection, 
structural and institutional issues, and computer-based crimes and emergent challenges. 
These themes have been arranged based on the conceptual framework. 
7.3.1 The Perpetrator 
The qualitative research reflected a number of different relationships between banks, 
employees and fraud detection that provide keys to the development of a basic theme 
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regarding the individual or employee as a perpetrator (Section 7.3.1.1) and collusion 
(Section 7.3.1.2). Section 7.3.1 focuses on Research Question 2. It also addresses the 
central aspect of the conceptual framework (the individual perpetrator and insider 
collusion) in Chapter 3, Section 3.10. 
 
7.3.1.1 The Individual Perpetrator  
The conceptual framework focuses on the individual using the classical model of the 
Fraud Triangle (Cressey, 1973; Wells, 2005). In the fraud triangle, the pressure to commit 
fraud begins with a non-shareable financial burden, which provides the motivation to 
commit fraud. The individual must also have the opportunity (including access and skill) 
to commit the fraud, combined with the ability to rationalize the crime in accordance with 
ethics, need, or some other factor. This rationalization is then discarded following the 
fraud, though it may re-emerge on the fraudster being challenged (Cressey, 1973; Wells, 
2005).   
 
Cressey (1973) identifies six main reasons for fraud, and the findings of this research 
were consistent with some of these reasons. Most of the reasons found in the qualitative 
and quantitative studies found that status-gaining problems were the main motivations 
used, especially overconsumption. However, there were no significant statements 
regarding isolation and employee-employer relations. Violations of obligations like 
gambling or drugs were not apparent which is in contrast to Cressey’s findings. Personal 
failures also were not apparent. However, family issues like the need to pay school fees 
did emerge. This indicates some consistency with the fraud triangle’s motivations, and 
importantly did not indicate any findings that were outside this model. However, the use 
of bank representatives rather than perpetrator information for this question could result 
in some degree of bias in the findings. 
 
The second leg of the triangle refers to opportunity. The study revealed that those who 
perpetrated the fraud had ready or easy access to the funds. Most of the internal 
perpetrators used their positions – cashiers, tellers, and accountants - for committing 
fraud. The majority of frauds perpetrated, according to participants, were small-scale 
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frauds (with an average value of around US$1,500 in total) that were based on cheque 
and cash misappropriation or theft, manipulation of customer accounts, or other means 
that were readily available to the majority of bank workers. This is consistent with the 
need for opportunity (Cressey, 1973; Wells, 2005). Only one case could potentially 
represent a much larger-scale fraud. Cash and cheque handling controls could reduce this 
opportunity. It is possible that, given the relatively small sums (which are large in relation 
to salaries), that feeling underpaid could be an unstated motivating factor. This would 
also be consistent with Cressey’s model.  
 
Finally there is the issue of rationalization. One consistent rationalization was that 
everyone was doing it. This speaks to a rationalization in which the external environment 
of fraud is used as justification for the fraud, and which creates confusion between the 
external environment and internal ethical norms (Aguilar et al., 2000; Cressey, 1973). 
Thus, the external environment poses a challenge and it is one area where it is possible 
that the banks could influence fraud.  
 
One factor that is not discussed in the Fraud Triangle is collusion, or conspiracy between 
two or more parties in order to commit fraud (Breuer, 2006). The quantitative and 
qualitative studies carried out in this research both revealed that there was a high 
incidence of collusion among and across internal and external parties. Collusion is known 
to occur between workers at the same level, at different levels, and internal and external 
parties (Breuer, 2006; Canhoto & Backhouse, 2007). The most common use for collusion 
in cases studied here is to overcome gaps in opportunity. For example, an individual with 
high technical skill but no access to cash stores may collude with someone with limited 
technical skill but increased cash access in order to perpetrate a fraud, or a customer may 
collude with a bank teller in order to receive cash (Canhoto & Backhouse, 2007). The 
current study indicates that internal collusion was mainly between junior employees and 
either supervisors (middle level managers) or senior managers, confirming the necessity 
of persons at different levels of authority to collude to provide an impetus for fraud. 
External collusion with customers, suppliers and even ex-employees was identified in this 
study. Each party played a significant role based on their position or access to facilities 
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required for fraud to be committed. The development of collusion is likely not included in 
the Fraud Triangle because it is developed as an individual model of crime. 
 
Based on the findings in this study concerning collusion the researcher suggests a 
theoretical process chart that describes the way in which an individual may choose to 
commit fraud. This process chart demonstrates the individual characteristics that must be 
in place in order to allow for the commission of fraud within the banking industry in 
Kenya. This model can be used to examine the individual characteristics of the fraud and 
is shown in Figure 7.1. The problem of collusion is discussed in Section 7.3.1.2, as it has 
a strong influence on banking outcomes.  
 
Figure 7.1: The process of committing fraud 
 
7.3.1.2 Insider Collusion 
Insider collusion was cited as the major source of fraud in the majority of fraud cases 
outlined in the surveys as well as the interviews. Almost all frauds reported involved at 
least one insider, while some frauds involved two or more. Collusion with outsiders was 
also reported. 
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 These findings agree with recent reports which appeared in the Kenyan press 
(Okwembah, 2010) that claim that bank employees colluding with fraudsters had silently 
stolen KES2.4 billion Kenyan banks between January 2009 and July 2010. The Central 
Bank of Kenya statistics showed that KES 1.6 billion was stolen through collusion in 
2010 (Okwembah, 2010). Okwembah (2010) suggests that banks are actually 
underreporting losses to protect their reputations, meaning that this is an underestimate. 
However, there are cases filed weekly at the High Court against employees of banks, 
indicating the degree of the problem (Okwembah, 2010).  
 
The same source adds further that the figure of KES 2.4 billion is estimated to be much 
lower than what has actually been stolen as most banks remain silent to protect their 
reputations and to avoid bad publicity. However, this silence has not suppressed the 
number of fraud and theft cases that are filed by banks at the High Court, almost on a 
weekly basis, involving bank employees (Okwembah, 2010) which can imply that banks 
may be attempting to put some faith in the legal system. According to a confidential 
police report highlighted in the press, fraud through employee collusion is on the increase 
(Banking Fraud Report Shocker, 2010), lending support to the findings of the current 
research. 
 
Insider collusion can be particularly difficult to deal with, especially given that insiders 
understand the fraud prevention methods in use and may be able to determine ways to 
avoid them. The banks reported using a number of different methods and internal controls 
for reducing the potential for insider collusion, including separation of duties, job 
rotation, internal audits, screening and recruitment controls and other systems controls. 
The issue of internal controls is pursued in the next section 7.3.2 
 
7.3.2 Internal Environment factors – Banks and Industry 
Another main component of the conceptual framework considers the internal bank and 
industry factors. One of these factors arises from the theme on internal controls. As 
discussed in the previous section internal controls can be used to reduce fraud and 
collusion. Another theme that emerged in the qualitative research was the tension 
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between cooperation and competition in the banking industry, reflecting an internal 
environmental characteristic.  
 
The industry environment figures in eclectic models of fraud, which posits that weakness 
in industry groups and regulation is a determining factor in the prevalence of fraud 
(Riahi-Belkaoui & Picur, 2000). In particular, this industry weakness is reflected in the 
use of strong external assurances regarding the treatment of fraud, combined with internal 
disorganisation and lack of focus on changing institutions and priorities (Riahi-Belkaoui 
& Picur, 2000).  There are several factors that can be identified at the bank and industry 
level, including internal controls, sharing information and competing for customers and 
customer fraud awareness.  Research Question 3 is the main question addressed here 
(“How do banks approach fraud management”).  
 
7.3.2.1 Internal Controls  
By resorting to the separation of responsibilities the banks are effectively breaking the 
fraud triangle by denying the potential fraudster the opportunity required to engage in 
fraud. Separation of duties acts as a safeguard or cushion against fraud and enhances 
security for the banks by limiting the amount of control a given individual has over any 
one area (Stewart, Tittle & Chappel, 2009). This was consistent with the bank’s use of 
separation of duties. Findings also indicated that the bank used job rotation, including 
occasional short-term rotations to other regions, as a control mechanism. This had the 
effect of both breaking up existing collusion and providing opportunity for oversight 
from other employees. Job rotations are known to be one of the most effective means of 
fraud control, lowering loss to fraud by 61%, although they are not frequently used 
(ACFE, 2008). However, the organisations did not commonly use surprise audits, another 
internal control that is known to be effective, lowering median loss to fraud by 66% 
(ACFE, 2008). This provides strong support for the use of job rotation and indicates that 
more banks should consider the use of surprise audits as well. The case of K-Rep Bank 
illustrates the effectiveness of job rotation and surprise audits, along with other 
approaches (Campion, 2000, cited in Ledgerwood & White, 2006). By carrying out 
regular and sometimes unscheduled audits causes the employee to be weary that they are 
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being checked on. Auditing therefore serves as a deterrent (AICPA, 2012). In the current 
economic environment there is a greater demand for internal controls to work effectively. 
Like the USA and other countries that are leading the way in reinforcing the role of 
auditing in fraud prevention and detection, the banking industry in Kenya can benefit by 
learning from best practice. Even though Kenya’s banking industry has not been largely 
affected by the recent global financial and banking crisis they can learn some lessons 
from the experiences of countries that are currently undergoing such crisis.   
 
A notable weakness in the internal controls highlighted through the interviews related to 
staff screening procedures. Hiring the right employees is one of the first steps in 
preventing fraud. As already highlighted in the literature review appropriate background 
checks are essential and cover an individuals’ educational and professional credentials, 
criminal record, history of employment, media and credit checks as well as 
honesty/integrity testing (Brody, 2010). However, this was an area of apparent weakness 
in the study. In some cases banks have hired employees that have been known or later 
discovered to have had a fraud history, and who have gone on to commit fraud. 
Furthermore, background checks are not fully effective, and honesty and integrity testing 
are recommended (Brody, 2010). None of the responses indicated banks used this 
method. Low personal integrity was revealed to be a problem, agreeing with Albrecht’s 
(1984) fraud scale, which indicated that situational pressures, perceived opportunity, and 
low personal integrity are likely to lead to fraud. This further emphasizes the need for 
honesty and integrity testing (Brody, 2010).  
 
Background checks and references were seen as methods to reduce collusion, but there 
were serious problems, such as not receiving referral letters and circumventing policy. 
Banks that simply dismiss employees accused of fraud exacerbate the problem. These 
measures are simply ineffective against fraud involving collusion, either internal or 
potentially through organised crime.  
 
The problem of recruitment has been suggested in a confidential police report from the 
Banking Fraud Investigation Department recently released to the press (Bank Fraud 
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Report Shocker, 2010). This report questions recruitment criteria, indicating that most 
bank frauds involve bank employees, and that there was a strong link between 
recruitment practices and fraud. However, reference checks from credible sources are 
difficult to come by in Kenya, due to lack of organised criminal databases and other 
centralised systems. In Kenya the “Certificate of Good Conduct” is taken as proof. 
However, this system is vulnerable to corruption, making it less reliable. Even in cases 
where negative references are provided, they may be overlooked by recruiting officers, 
resulting in fraud. 
 
Insider threat is a common problem in banking. Insiders have easy access to systems and 
have knowledge and understanding of how systems work. They can collude to defraud 
the bank activities (Brancik, 2007; Adams, 2010). This indicates that this is an issue that 
has been identified in other banking contexts and so should be considered seriously.  
 
Responses relied on technical controls to detect and prevent fraud. However, these 
seemed to be mostly ineffective, with customers and personnel noticing most fraud. This 
is consistent with previous research, which has indicated that only around one third of 
complex fraud is detected by technical controls (Goode & Lacey, 2010). This does not 
make technical controls unnecessary, but instead indicates that they cannot be relied on. 
In particular, they are good at identifying isolated instances of fraud.  
 
However, one bank suffered a loss of around US$1,200,000 as the result of a single 
complex fraud. Given that fraud detection mechanisms are generally aligned to detection 
of fraud at only a single level, the use of multiple methods of fraud detection is best for 
the organisation (Goode & Lacey, 2010). However, technical controls alone are not 
enough to detect fraud. Banks need to control corporate culture and personnel to limit 
insider opportunities. Given that part of the opportunity to commit fraud is having an 
understanding of internal controls and how to circumvent them, this is consistent with 
findings regarding this area of concern (Cressey, 1973; Wells, 2005).  
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Another issue is the corporate culture. The survey results indicated that a large number of 
respondents believed that fraudsters committed fraud because they saw others getting 
away with it. The interviews revealed more issues with the corporate culture that could 
affect how the organisation encountered fraud. For example, there was an indication that 
banks would simply dismiss those found to be conducting a fraud rather than prosecute, 
because of the associated financial and non-financial costs, and that they would often hire 
without waiting for references due to the length of time it took reference letters to reach 
the organization. These issues speak to organizational cultures where the issue of fraud is 
not considered to be highly important, and where other concerns, such as cost or 
expedience, take precedence. However, if the press report (Okwembah, 2010) mentioned 
earlier in this section is considered then perhaps there could be a perceptual gap about 
prosecution or a change in the way banks are handling prosecution of fraudsters. 
 
 
7.3.2.2 The Kenya Bankers Association (KBA) and information sharing on fraud 
Sharing information is one of the fundamental keys to prevention of fraud, because of the 
ability to reduce exposure to fraud (Barth et al., 2008). A major force for information 
sharing in the industry is the Kenya Bankers Association (KBA), but the KBA can only 
be said to be partially successful. 
 
The KBA has been effective at standardisation and modernisation of the banking system 
in the past, such as implementation of the direct debit payment scheme (Central Bank of 
Kenya, 2003). The organisation is also currently undertaking some initiatives such as 
development of a fraudulent activity database, according to respondents. Another 
information sharing project is the Kenya Credit Information Sharing Initiative was 
created in 2009 as a project within the KBA leading to implementation of a credit 
information sharing mechanism in Kenya, which will allow banks to provide information 
to a credit reference bureau (Kenya Credit Information Sharing Initiative, 2010; Mwanza, 
2010). This was enabled by the Banking (Credit Bureau) Regulations of 2008, discussed 
in Chapter 3. The ability to share credit information will be a step in the right direction to 
alleviating the problem of adverse selection and information asymmetries that has 
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previously been a source of bank failures in Kenya. This could also provide a template 
for other information sharing projects. 
 
However, there were some problems with cooperation in this area. Some of the bank 
respondents indicated that their organisation often felt cut off or marginalised by the 
KBA, which they saw as prioritising the demands and input of larger banks. In the past 
and even in the present, most banks are reluctant to share information enabling fraudsters 
to operate within their systems undetected. A study by Waweru and Kalani (2009) on 
Kenyan banks found that information sharing among the banks concerning 
creditworthiness of borrowers was poor, as was the use of credit reference bureaus. This 
supports the findings of this study regarding information sharing. However, this attitude 
may be changing, as respondents believe that the sharing of information will deter 
fraudsters. This finding has been strengthened by recent reports appearing in the press 
(Okwembah, 2010) echoing similar sentiments within the banking industry. However, the 
actual level of information sharing is still relatively low, due to fear of negative publicity 
and loss of competitive advantage.   
 
The absence of a common database for banks has facilitated identity fraud in the banking 
industry. There is some industrial discussion about centralising identities in a national 
database (Ndungu and Etemesi, 2010). This research does support the need for this 
service. However, creating a national database raises issues of ownership, security of 
data, access, individual rights, management, financial capacity, and human resources 
(UNDP, n.d). It is unlikely to be an immediate fix.  
 
To achieve the initiatives mentioned in the paragraphs above the KBA has worked 
closely and deliberated with the Central Bank of Kenya, the Ministry of Finance and the 
office of the Attorney General. Given this, the KBA and its members should consider 
how the KBA can be modified to be a positive force in the development of the banking 
industry’s approach to fraud prevention and detection. However for this modification to 
be effected will depend on whether the KBA is adequately resourced in terms of funding, 
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trained personnel, technical staff etc. Fraud is a global phenomenon and no one entity or 
body can tackle it alone. Hence a concerted effort is required from different entities. 
 
7.3.2.3  Customer Fraud Awareness and competition 
One of the major findings of the study was that the majority of frauds were found by 
customers whose accounts were affected. This suggests that inadequate or ineffective 
internal controls are being used. However, it also suggests that there is an opportunity for 
improvement in broadening fraud detection capacity in banking institutions. There were 
only a few banks that indicated routinely using fraud awareness or education for their 
customers. There are several potential reasons that banks may not want to support or 
engage in customer education regarding fraud, which are discussed in greater detail 
below. However, this does not mean that this type of education could not be useful for the 
banks. Fraud awareness education is known to improve consumer confidence in banks, 
increasing their willingness to do business with them (Kim, Steinfield, & Lai, 2008). 
Understanding fraud protection measures in place and what to do if fraud is detected 
gives consumers more confidence in doing business. A bank that uses consumer fraud 
education would gain more customer trust than one that simply ignores the issue.  
 
Increasing competition for customers also leads to increased transparency (Barth et al., 
2008). This is important because, as the interviews showed, the Kenyan banking industry 
is very crowded and competition is very fierce, with customers having a large range of 
choices from small local banks to enormous multinational industrial and commercial 
banks. Competing for customers is therefore a distinct part of the Kenyan banking 
environment. Brownridge (1998(b)) argued that intensified competition in banking 
markets can encourage moral hazard by reducing the franchise value of the banks which 
represents the present value of a bank’s future profits. By providing information about 
their fraud-fighting activities to consumers, banks can reassure their customers and 
increase their security, reducing churn. As observed by Bradley & Stewart (2003) banks 
should respond to their customer needs as customers are now of greatest importance to 
the banking business. Ignoring the needs and preferences of customers can be detrimental 
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to bank success (Agarwal et al., 2009), so if customers have a preference for increased 
information this should be provided.  
 
7.3.3 External Environment Factors 
The third component of the conceptual framework consisted of the external environment, 
which is important as it affects to what degree fraud occurs in banks. The external 
environment contains structural, institutional, legal, socio-economic, ethical and 
information technology issues.  
 
7.3.3.1 Institutional, structural and legal issues  
Legal issues included a lack of appropriate institutions and legal structures, lack of 
knowledge regarding fraud in the investigative and prosecution systems, and lack of 
appropriate laws to combat fraud. These are known issues within the literature (Aguilar, 
Gill & Pino, 2000; Macey & O’Hara, 2003; Wilhelm, 2004). In Kenya, the judicial and 
court system do not operate efficiently and there is no proper system in place for fraud 
case reporting in Kenya. A number of initiatives have been made to improve the judicial 
system through appointment of more judges, new physical facilities and amendment of 
relevant laws (Waweru & Kalani, 2009). However more still needs to be done to improve 
legislature and efficiency in the justice system, as well as reduce corruption. One of the 
major issues found in this study was the length of time required for prosecution, which 
served as a significant deterrent to its use.   
 
7.3.3.2 Socio-economic and ethical issues 
Socio-cultural issues are reflected in the acceptance of corruption as well as economic 
conditions that create economic stress at many levels of society (Zahra et al., 2004; 
Bakre, 2007). Ethical issues in banking are reflected in a sense that fraud is accepted 
within society, although the use of whistle-blower programs does mitigate the outcomes 
(Aguilar et al., 2000). This can also be mitigated by the fact that a majority of the banks 
maintain a written code of ethics that should be read and signed on a regular basis by the 
staff. 
 
 243 
7.3.3.3 Corruption 
Corruption of the police and courts was found to be another problem in this study, 
resulting in unfair outcomes and discouraging prosecution. This is consistent with known 
facts about Kenya. Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, which 
calculates the perception of corruption within government and business environments 
within the country, ranks Kenya at a score of 2.2/10 (Transparency International, 2009; 
Transparency International, 2010). This places Kenya in the lower quartile of countries 
measured on the scale, indicating a very high level of corruption within business and 
government environments. Crucially, this implies that Kenya could have slowed 
economic growth. For example, research in Uganda found that bribery had a negative 
correlation with firm growth, with a 3% loss resulting from a 1% increase in bribery 
(Fisman & Svensson, 2007). This effect can be seen in banks, with banks not prosecuting 
those that commit fraud because of a perception that it will be futile.  
 
The resolution for this problem is not clear. Evidence suggests that in regions with 
existing high corruption, an increase in penalties for cheating or bribery can actually 
increase bribery rather than discourage it. This is particularly difficult in cases where the 
inspectors and regulators themselves are vulnerable to bribes, as this will result in an even 
higher level of bribery (Çule & Fulton, 2009). Given these conditions, there is no clear 
path forward to reduction of the level of corruption that Kenyan banks must deal with in 
the existing system. Instead, this must be a society-wide, government-led change to 
reduce the overall level of corruption in society.  
 
The Kenyan government is undertaking such a task with its Kenya Anti-Corruption 
Commission, which was established in 2003 to combat corruption through law 
enforcement, education, and development of good practices.  If this Commission is 
successful, the Kenyan banking system should see improved conditions over time. 
However, the Commission is unlikely to have an immediate impact of the type that would 
allow banks to more effectively prosecute fraudsters in the short term. Thus, efforts 
through the KBA need to continue, as do internal efforts and policies. Banks should also 
consider that during their cost-benefit analysis, they must include effects from hiring or 
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transferring fraudulent employees from other banks, which could make it more cost-
effective to prosecute offenders even under a corrupt system. However, this would 
require substantial coordination within the industry. 
  
7.3.3.4 Ethical culture  
The organisational culture within banks can either encourage ethical behaviour or create 
an environment where unethical behaviour thrives (Kaptein, 2008). Ethical culture was 
not fully explored in this study, but some dimensions of ethical culture were presented.  
One issue was use of incentives to reward whistle-blowing activity. This quantitative 
study showed that 23% of fraud was discovered through whistleblowing or fraud 
hotlines, consistent with a previous study in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, which 
found around 25% of frauds, were discovered this way (KPMG, 2007). This was also 
consistent with employee preferences for ethics hotlines rather than open door policies 
(Miceli et al., 2008b). However, there is some research that suggests that organisations 
may reject reports of wrongdoing that provide information about the organisational 
hierarchy, leaving employees open to isolation or other retaliation (Dworkin & Baucus, 
1998). This could prevent whistle-blowing from occurring (Miceli and Near, 1985; 
Dozier and Miceli, 1985). Developing a culture that encourages employees and other 
stakeholders who identify fraudulent activities to report or take appropriate action 
through an ethical hotline should be a priority. Assurance needs to be given to the 
whistle-blower that it is good to come forward and they will be protected (Vanasco, 1998; 
Vinten, 1994 in Seetharaman et al., 2004). 
 
7.3.4 Computer-Based Crimes and New Challenges 
The uses and abuses of technology also stood out in the qualitative research, particularly 
focusing on the ways in which technology could be used for protection against fraud and 
the ways in which it challenged existing fraud mechanisms. There are reflections of these 
themes within the existing literature as well. 
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7.3.4.1 Technology 
Information technology is reflected both in the availability of IT approaches to fraud 
reduction and to differentials in use and access (Fernandez & Gonzales, 2005). The 
relative lack of access of IT banking has reduced vulnerability on one front, although it 
may increase vulnerability on another. Fraud related crimes have been boosted by the 
introduction of the Internet and e-commerce (Seetharaman et al., 2004). Rusch (2001) 
also observed that there was a rapid increase in the growth of Internet fraud in e-
commerce. The current research identified two issues of importance to Kenyan banks in 
respect to technology including the use of online banking and the problem of chip and pin 
cards. 
 
7.3.4.1.1 Chip and Pin 
Credit cards were the third most common fraud instrument in the quantitative study. 
According to press reports3, a serious credit card fraud case occurred in Kenya involving 
a syndicate with fraudsters based in India, Sri Lanka and West Africa (Jayawardhana, 
2009). Credit and debit card frauds originating in Europe and the Americas are beginning 
to be seen in Kenya. Emerging frauds are syndicate-based, and more aggressive than 
those in the originating country. Even CCTV or guards do not serve as deterrents. Many 
interviewees indicated that signature-based cards were a cause of on-going fraud, and that 
a lack of explicit debit and credit card fraud laws exacerbated this problem. However, 
most fraud in this area was related to customer card theft or fraud by customers. 
International credit card issuers are pushing for the use of Chip and Pin cards in Kenya as 
such cards are seen as a way to reduce fraud. Kenya’s banking industry missed an initial 
target of 2006 for chip and pin implementation, retargeting implementation for 2010. 
This target was also missed.  
 
Reasons for this failure are multiple. An additional cost of $8 per card would increase 
initial layout by the bank, which may currently outweigh the benefits (Balancing Act, 
2010). Aladwani (2001) points out that inadequate resource can impede development of 
                                                 
3 Daily Nation, Kenya, 25th July 2008 
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electronic systems.  Kenyan banks could overcome the cost obstacle if they pool 
resources and share the cost of fraud prevention systems and technologies. However, this 
may not be a complete fix for the problem of card security. There is concern that chip and 
pin credit cards do not offer security improvements over signature cards (Finch, 2010). 
The introduction of these cards in the United Kingdom was at first considered to be a 
success, as there was a reduction in the ability to counterfeit cards or to fake 
authentication at the point of sale (Finch, 2010). However, fraud methods rapidly adapted 
(Finch, 2010). New techniques include card counterfeiting, online purchases, and stealing 
pins in various ways (Finch, 2010). There are also security holes that allow cards to be 
used without the pin, even at the point of sale (Murdoch et al., 2010). This indicates that 
the Kenyan banking system should not rely exclusively on chip and pin for enhanced 
security. Human factors training and automated fraud detection systems like Fraud 
Guard, currently in use in some banks, can also improve security. Other approaches 
include risk profile and planning, making contingency and rapid response plans, and 
improving training.  
 
7.3.4.2 Online Banking  
As compared to other banks in the literature review, Kenyan banks have been slow to 
adopt Internet banking. Gikanda and Bloor (2010) stated that Internet security is a major 
threat in e-banking, confirming the findings of this study. Most banks indicated that they 
either had not implemented Internet based banking, or that they had only implemented it 
in a restricted fashion, providing services for companies or elite customers. The banks felt 
this shielded them from much fraud, which is likely to be true given the total risk 
exposure of Internet banking to fraud, such as outside hackers (Lee, 2009). Automated 
and manual attacks often take advantages of issues like poor password choice that can be 
difficult to control, though this can be reduced through the use of two-factor 
identification (Bhargav-Spantzel et al., 2007). Internet-based fraud has already been seen 
in Kenya. The banking anti-fraud unit reported that in 2008, KES50 million ($641,000) 
intended for a firm in Dubai was diverted by hackers. In 2010, KES10 million ($128,000) 
was intercepted by hackers (Balancing Act, 2010). 
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While banks are protected from Internet attacks, they also lose competitive advantage. 
Bank respondents indicated they were planning to open Internet banking wider, allowing 
for an increased fraud exposure to more accounts. If customers view Internet accounts as 
vulnerable to fraud, they may not want to adopt these accounts (Lee, 2009).  A recent 
joint survey conducted by the Kenya ICT and TNS Research International (Kenya Digital 
Study, 2010) revealed that 39% of respondents were interested in having access to 
Internet banking, but 33% considered it irrelevant. Twenty-seven per cent of respondents 
felt that the main barrier to Internet banking was that the service was not offered by their 
bank or was restricted; the same number who thought that fraud was a major barrier. This 
shows that banks are still limiting Internet banking, and that customers do not yet 
consider it essential. However, banks should begin planning for security and customer 
awareness to smoothly implement online banking. 
 
7.3.5 Emerging Issues  
Emerging fraud issues in the Kenyan banking industry are centred on globalization, the 
external environment, and cross-border fraud. This has brought about issues in 
international cooperation and jurisdiction. With globalization, the external environment 
surrounding the banking industry has grown beyond the immediate external environment. 
This has brought about the threat of cross-border fraud. Credit card fraud is one example 
of this. Respondents indicated they believed a growth in cross-border credit card fraud 
was likely, due to increasing exposure to international financial markets. Some banks 
have improved systems in anticipation, but the banking industry overall has not reacted.  
Efforts made by the banking industry, however, need to be supported by more robust 
Government legislature that can allow international fraud to be effectively tackled. 
 
Another example is the 419 or advance fee fraud. Banks in Kenya need to be aware of 
this type of fraud, as it opens Kenyan banks up to international scrutiny and potential 
liability. Banks should consider this a major concern though monitoring it can be very 
difficult. Overall, evidence shows that Kenyan banks cannot only monitor domestic 
fraud, but must be ready to deal with international fraud. 
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7.4 Integration of Findings 
There are strong connections between the qualitative and quantitative findings in this 
research. This section discusses the inconsistencies and consistencies found in this 
research, considering what this means for the contribution of the research.  
 
7.4.1 Relationships between Banks and Customers  
Literature suggested significant factors of competition between banks and collusion as 
determinants of fraud. The qualitative analysis supported these findings. The customer 
was the main source of fraud detection and customer-internal actor collusion was a 
significant source of fraud. The quantitative findings also supported these conclusions, 
with 70% of frauds occurring as collusion between internal and external perpetrators. The 
second category of perpetrators, the internal collusion, was a distant second at 13.3%. 
This clearly indicates that the majority of frauds are perpetrated by internal employees 
and customers working in unison. This would seem to conflict with findings that stated 
customers were the main source of fraud detection. However, this is not necessarily 
impossible to resolve. In particular, instances of unauthorized access to accounts, such as 
use of another customer’s account or identity theft, ranked high in the ways in which 
fraud was perpetrated. Simply, this suggests that the customers identifying the frauds as 
victims are not the same customers or other external factors that are serving as 
perpetrators.  
 
A second significant relationship is between banks themselves. One issue in fraud is 
competition between banks for customers and employees, which often results in the 
banks accepting unknown or unacceptable risk. However, the banks also cooperate 
through the KBA. There are no quantitative figures on how many banks participate, 
though the qualitative findings indicate that there is widespread involvement. However, 
information and participation is uncertain and banks do not have a consistent view of the 
purpose of this involvement, making it less effective overall than it could be.  
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7.4.2 Prevention and Detecting Fraud 
The issue of preventing and detecting fraud was significant in both the qualitative and 
quantitative findings. The quantitative findings showed relatively high levels of use of 
industry-standard fraud detection mechanisms, including audit committees, ethics 
policies, and advanced technologies like data mining. However, the qualitative findings 
indicated that these methods were not necessarily effective. In particular, respondents 
mainly used job rotation and the segregation of duties as the main methods of fraud 
prevention, detection and control. The absence of fraud budgets or the inconsistent 
funding due to inability to predict fraud reflect that more needs to be done by banks to 
streamline planning and resources required to counter fraud. 
 
7.4.3 Structural and Institutional Issues 
The rates of criminal prosecution for fraud are low with just 30.9% of primary internal 
colluders being referred for criminal prosecution. Qualitative findings revealed that 
Kenyan law enforcement and legal structure and institutions are insufficient to the task of 
fraud prosecution. Issues like out-dated or missing laws, lack of knowledge and training, 
court inefficiency, and corruption make many banks avoid prosecution. This indicates a 
significant problem that cannot be resolved within a bank or even within the industry, but 
that needs to be assessed at an institutional and society-wide level.  
 
7.4.4 Computer-Based Crimes and New Challenges 
The quantitative findings suggested that banks were using computer-based technologies 
like antivirus and passwords commonly, though other approaches such as data mining 
and digital analysis were far less common. The qualitative findings indicated that banks 
did not currently face much in the way of online threats, although these were growing, 
because of limited use of online banking technologies. However, these are only likely to 
grow over time and the development of approaches to combat them is not currently on the 
horizon, from the qualitative findings regarding the matter. This could pose a significant 
threat in future.  
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7.4.5 General Integration of Findings 
Integration of qualitative and quantitative findings can lead to several conclusions. First, 
relationships are key to understanding the problem of fraud and fraud detection in the 
banking industry. Issues like collusion influence how fraud can be detected, while 
industry strength and involvement influences the ways in which fraud can be prevented 
on a larger scale. However, industry involvement, such as KBA participation, is uncertain 
at best and suffers from a number of flaws such as inconsistent information. Second, the 
fraud detection structures put into place in the banking industry may seem to be 
consistent with the current best practices, but in practice they can be shown to be 
underfunded and inadequate. Third, institutional and legal insufficiency does not allow 
for effective fraud prevention, limiting the recourse banks have to legal avenues. Finally, 
new technologies can both help prevent fraud and exacerbate it, offering new challenges. 
At the current time, Kenyan banks are not fully prepared to face these new challenges, 
although banking managers are aware of the gap between challenge and involvement.  
 
7.5 Differences between International and Other Banks 
Findings in Chapter 6 indicate a number of differences regarding treatment and 
perceptions of fraud between international banks and banks with a smaller scope (though 
these differences did not emerge in the quantitative findings). Closer involvement in the 
KBA and greater use of technology for fraud detection are notable. These differences are 
reflective of key issues in African business and its integration with Western firms, 
particularly differences in human resources and capital. The Kenyan banking industry is 
not idiosyncratic, but is instead influenced by the external environment of African and 
global business. These differences can be examined within the current literature in order 
to understand how the Kenyan banking industry is not an idiosyncratic environment, but 
is in some senses a microcosm of the wider African business world. This section focuses 
on these differences.  
 
7.5.1 Industry Involvement 
One qualitative observation was that international banks are far more involved with the 
KBA, taking active roles on the Securities and Fraud Committee. This contrasts with 
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domestic banks, which mainly play a more passive or support role. The KBA acts, among 
other roles as an information sharing body. International bankers generally showed a 
stronger understanding of the purpose of the KBA and involvement in its activities, as 
well as knowledge about its meetings. However, other banks did not show this level of 
knowledge. For example, one senior auditor at a regional bank expressed only a vague 
awareness of the meetings that took place, in contrast to expectations that she would 
know about the Securities and Fraud Committee even if she were not personally 
involved. It is possible that this could be due to size and availability of resources for fraud 
detection, or that this could be someone else’s duty. Regardless, these findings indicated 
that the overall level of involvement in the KBA was substantially different between 
international and domestic banks. 
 
Observed differences could be explained by size. Research into structural differences 
between large and small banks indicates that large banks tend toward a more rigid 
institutional structure and less informal information sharing and development (Berger et 
al, 2005), which could influence their choice of formal or informal networking, while 
smaller banks chose to use informal and soft information channels. However, smaller 
banks are highly vulnerable to failure from fraud compared to larger banks (Mishkin, 
1999), which could negatively affect the position of small banks. 
 
There is also likely to be a geopolitical issue involved. Historically, banking institutions 
in Africa have been relatively weak compared to the international market (Stein, 1994). 
This institutional weakness dates to the colonial period and the foundation and 
domination of banking systems by international banks (Stein, 1994). Historically, no such 
institutional boards existed prior to the structural adjustment and market liberalization 
programs of the 1980s (Neu et al, 2010). Thus, structures like the KBA are relatively 
new. The African banking system was also unstable much of the time from 1980 to 2000 
due to fraud and government corruption (Kane & Rice, 2001). Conditions of historical 
weakness and vulnerability to fraud, along with environmental conditions that could 
promote fraud, indicate that local and smaller banks could benefit from KBA 
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involvement. The KBA should also be proactive in developing ties to the domestic 
banking market and establishing legitimacy. 
 
7.5.2 Knowledge and Human Capital 
International banks generally showed a generally higher level of knowledge and ability to 
manage fraud than do domestic banks, including full-time fraud detection personnel. 
International banks are also more conversant with institutional reform issues. For 
example, international banks were more likely to identify unskilled prosecutors, rather 
than the more visible police or general courts, for failures in prosecution. International 
banks also have an objectively higher standard of human capital. For example, they hire 
members of the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE), who have higher and 
more up-to-date skills. However, this has not prevented all fraud in international banks. 
There is the possibility that greater cooperation would bring about sharing training and 
expertise through the industry.  
 
These issues point to the problem of human capital development (HCD), or development 
of skills and resources required for economic growth, which is a structural problem that is 
endemic to many African economies including Kenya (Patterson, 2007). In fact, 
differences in the efficiency of manufacturing and production in sub-Saharan countries 
have been largely shown to be attributable to different levels of human capital 
development (Bigsten, et al., 2000). HCD is required to trigger demographic transition 
(marked by lower mortality rates, longer lifespan, and lower birth rates) and 
industrialization (Tamura, 2006). The lack of HCD affects economic growth in Kenya 
generally, not just the banking industry. The lack of HCD is apparent in the failure of 
awareness of Basel II in banking institutions (Bank Supervision Annual Report, 2008). 
 
There are a variety of approaches the banks could take, although the problem of HCD is 
outside their direct control. One approach is seeking technical assistance and/or hiring 
Western fraud investigators to improve fraud response. The use of technical assistance is 
routinely used in African banking systems, before and after structural adjustment 
(Oshikoya, 2010). This would improve internal human resources.  Hiring Western fraud 
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investigators would be relatively expensive given wage differentials and would not 
provide sustainability, making it a short-term solution. Banks could also invest in human 
resources training themselves, an approach frequently taken by African companies 
(Kamoche, 2011). The on-going and sustainable development of required human 
resources is a broader societal issue that must be addressed at the state level to provide 
banks with access to suitable HCD. 
 
7.5.3 Capital and Technology Resources 
There are marked differences that can be observed in terms of resources. International 
banks are far more likely to have a fraud budget. Domestic and regional banks do not 
tend to have a specific fraud budget, and instead treat fraud as an on-going operating 
expense or ignore it completely. The CBK indicates that 60% of banks have set specific 
risk management budgets, up from 17% in 2004. Around 50% are setting aside amounts 
of up to 10% of their annual turnover for risk management This shows that most banks 
are beginning to assign more importance to risk management functions.  However, 40% 
of banks do not yet have specific risk management budgets (Risk Management Survey, 
2010).  
 
International banks are more likely to use technology, such as automated fraud detection 
and prevention systems. They more commonly offer online banking and telephone 
banking. These differences point to a significant difference in the two levels of banks in 
their available capital and technology resources in order to implement fraud detection. 
 
One of the major problems in this case is lack of capital for development of effective 
fraud programs. It should be recalled that Kenya is not devoid of resources with which to 
generate capital for business investment. Some countries like Angola have high revenue 
levels generated by natural resources. However, problems of capital flight and 
expatriation of funds from these resources mean that redistribution of capital is 
insufficient for growth (Frynas & Paulo, 2006). Kenya’s main resources come from 
tourism, export of tea, coffee, horticultural crops and industrial exports of refined 
petroleum. If re-distributed strategically these resources can provide capital resources for 
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technological development. However, this is not the only problem that African businesses 
in general, including the banks in this study, face when considering access to capital. 
 
Corruption is a serious problem, which limits Western investment and business 
involvement (De Maria, 2009). Corruption is also connected to technology. Foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and joint venture partnerships are major vehicles in technology 
transfer, or the transfer of specific knowledge sets and technology uses from firms in 
developed countries to those in developing countries through licensing, patents, and 
development of business processes (OECD, 2002). However, political instability 
including corruption is likely to inhibit FDI and reduce technology transfer (Asiedu, 
2006). Limitation of technology transfer from perceptions of corruption could reduce 
banks’ ability to access and use technology, resulting in overall lower technology use. 
However, banks also have other restrictions. For example, data privacy laws and other 
restrictions on interaction between banks could limit the degree to which a bank could 
engage in a meaningful joint venture partnership or FDI relationship with an international 
firm. However, it should be considered that overall lower levels of access to human 
capital, financial capital, and technology, rather than simple ignorance of or rejection of 
the importance of fraud detection within the bank, is far more likely to lie at the heart of 
this problem. 
 
7.5.4 Implications of Differences for the African Banking Industry 
Differences between domestic and international banks include identified structural 
problems with human capital development, financial capital availability, and technology 
availability that led to conditions under which the African banks in this study did not 
have as high a level of involvement or integration of technology as their international 
counterparts. These differences are connected to international economic conditions, 
including resources and business models. However, there are also historical and structural 
implications of these differences.  
 
These differences can be traced to structural adjustment programs and market 
liberalization. Structural adjustment was implemented in Kenya in the early 1980s, 
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liberalizing markets and lowering trade barriers. This was intended to increase the 
competitiveness of Kenyan companies and institutions through exposure to the outside 
world, and to move the economy from a dependent economy to one that was fully 
integrated into import and export structures (Mohan et al., 2000). However, this was not 
the result. Kenyan banks are disadvantaged in terms of size, resources, and technology 
compared to international banks. Insufficient HCD means that fraud detection cannot be 
sustainably implemented. With these challenges, banks have limited options for 
improving their performance. Approaches like technical assistance, hiring international 
specialists, or setting up a training program cannot be implemented without access to 
appropriate capital, which is not available from partners due to perceptions of corruption 
overall. This is not a problem that can be solved by the bank, but must be addressed by 
Kenyan society as a whole. 
 
7.6 Qualitative and Quantitative Findings in Relation to Theories of Fraud 
The economic and general theories of fraud can be used to consider the findings of this 
study, to determine how these findings relate to the existing theoretical frameworks. The 
intention is also to determine how the research could be used to expand the existing 
theoretical base in order to account for the findings identified. The qualitative and 
quantitative findings both have some implications for the theories of fraud that have been 
identified.  
 
7.6.1 Theories of Fraud 
Criminological, economic, and accounting theories of fraud have all been previously 
discussed, and each can be applied in this case.  
 
The basic theory of fraud is the theory of differential association (Sutherland, 1949). 
However, the main model applied in this research is the fraud triangle theory (Cressey, 
1973), which has been discussed extensively in this research. A refinement on the fraud 
triangle theory is the fraud scale (Albrecht et al., 1984; Albrecht, 2004), which substitutes 
integrity for rationalization. An extension of the fraud triangle, the fraud diamond, adds 
ability of the offender to commit the fraud (Wolfe & Hermanson, 2004). In addition to 
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the basic four factors of pressure, opportunity, motivation, and ability, this study has 
identified a fifth factor, collusion, which relates to almost 90% of frauds in the Kenyan 
banks.  
 
Main economic theories of fraud include agency theory and control fraud theory. Agency 
Theory holds that there is a fundamental problem with situations in which there is a 
principal-agent relationship (Stremitzer, 2005). Control fraud theory holds that in some 
cases, the entire structure of the organisation may be designed so as to facilitate fraud by 
specific agents within the firm, such as top managers (Davia et al., 2000). Agency theory 
may have some application, but there was no indication of control fraud evident in cases 
studied. 
 
Eclectic theories integrate a number of disciplines Riahi-Belkaoui and Picur (2000) 
identify a framework that integrates ecological theory, transmission theory, and anomie 
theory in order to identify situations where fraud is most likely to occur. However, the 
utility of these theories in this case is somewhat limited, with considerable disagreement 
regarding the application and characteristics of fraud profiling or simply echoing the 
fraud profile (Hollinger & Clarke, 1983; Steane & Cockerell, 2005; Weisburd et al.., 
2001). Thus, these studies are not discussed in detail.  
 
7.6.2 Criminological and Sociological Theories 
A basic application of the theory of association can be seen in collusion. Collusion 
between employees was the second most common situation in which fraud occurred, 
which is consistent with the theory of differential association, as were cases where 
associates, ex-co-workers, and others were co-conspirators. Although communication 
between participants clearly occurred, the study did not address the process of collusion. 
Thus, more comprehensive statement regarding the differential association theory cannot 
be made. Given that the theory of differential association is one of the most broadly 
accepted and applicable theories (Wells, 2005), the application to the research 
environment is justified. However, this theory cannot explain why fraud has occurred.  
 
 257 
The fraud triangle theory and its extension, the fraud diamond theory, are less limited. 
These theories posit that the commission of fraud is due to factors including opportunity, 
motivation or pressure, and rationalization, or in the case of the fraud diamond ability to 
commit the crime (Cressey, 1973; Wells, 2004; Wolfe and Hermanson, 2004). This 
theory can be seen to be extremely relevant to the current situation, given the motivations 
identified by those that have committed frauds as well as the rationalizations that were 
determined.  
 
The necessary prerequisite of financial fraud is that the individual must have the 
opportunity to commit the fraud; that is, they must be in a position of financial trust in 
order to commit the crime (Cressey, 1973). Of the three aspects of the fraud triangle, 
opportunity is the most observable or measurable element. In the past opportunity has 
mainly been investigated in the light of weak internal controls and segregation of duties 
(Dorminey et al., 2010). In this study, this could be applied to the bank customer(s), 
because the customer is in a position of limited financial trust due to the acceptance of 
their business by the bank. Customer frauds involved false identity documents and 
counterfeit or fake cheques, promoting trust. In a bank environment, there is some degree 
of trust associated with almost every position. Thus, the vast majority of the fraud 
perpetrators within the study do fall within the purview of this theory in terms of the 
opportunity to commit fraud. Factors that contributed to creating opportunity included 
weak internal controls, overriding of internal controls, poor or lax supervision, failure to 
segregate duties, failure to know the customers (KYC), easy access to customer accounts 
and taking employees taking advantage of trust vested in them as workers. However, this 
research revealed that opportunities such as lack of prosecution, the absence of effective 
anti-fraud programs and the ability of fraudsters to get re-employed were important 
considerations as well. 
 
The second leg of the fraud triangle is that of motivation, or the reason why the crime 
was committed. The main motivation identified by Cressey (1973) was a non-shareable 
financial strain, such as that attributable to financial isolation, poor investments, 
excessive spending, or problems such as drug abuse or gambling. A second motivation is 
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organisational dissatisfaction (Hollinger and Clarke, 1983). This motivation can be seen 
as a type of extension of anomie theory, in which the fraud perpetrator engages in fraud 
due to a lack of connection to the organisation specifically and the idea that they are not 
getting their fair share of the organisation’s resources (Wells, 2005).  
 
In fact, all of these motivations can be seen to be present in the fraud motivations that 
were identified in the quantitative study. There were two particular findings regarding 
“pressure” as a part of the fraud triangle. First, based on the respondent’s views, pressures 
like lifestyle habits, financial pressure and greed scored highly among the fraudsters as 
triggers for fraud commission, validating the fraud triangle. The absence of substance 
abuse and failing sets the findings apart from the literature (primarily based on Europe, 
America, and Australia). This could be attributed to differences in society and lifestyle, in 
particular differences in collectivism, socioeconomic status and the importance of family. 
In Kenya, the extended family is more important than the Western nuclear family or 
individual. Many of the motivations, such as increasing school fee pressure, were family-
related.  It can be argued that pressures such as substance abuse and gambling are 
predominantly individual, though they can be related to peer pressure. Additionally, 
habits like drugs and gambling are expensive. With over 50% of its population living 
below the poverty line, these would be very expensive habits and not within reach. This 
could explain why gambling and substance abuse score low as pressure points for 
committing fraud in Kenya. However, it could also be that perpetrators did not disclose 
these activities to fraud investigators.  
 
Secondly, this study exposed an unclear line between opportunity and pressure. In the 
questionnaire, among the choices given for motivators of fraud, “opportunity” was inbuilt 
as a distracter. “Opportunity” was mentioned by most participants making it the number 
one pressure, higher than financial pressure and lifestyle habits. This could imply that the 
three legs of the fraud triangle are not perceived as being distinct and therefore it follows 
that given sufficient opportunity, fraud did not require uniquely identifiable social, 
financial or organizational pressure for its occurrence. It also provides support for the 
theory of the accidental fraudster versus the predator (Kranacher et al, 2011), in which 
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there is a difference between generally good people pushed to commit fraud and those 
that seek out opportunities for fraud. The phenomenon of the serious fraudster seen in this 
research also reflects this theory. However, there was little support for organisational 
dissatisfaction theory, such as being underpaid of revenge (Hollinger & Clarke, 1983). 
 
The final leg of the fraud triangle theory is that of rationalization (Cressey, 1973). Some 
rationalizations include excessive need, identification of the fraud as good for the 
company, and a feeling of unfair treatment. These responses were considerably more 
mixed in this study. The most common rationalizations included a desire to get rich, 
family pressures, and an environment in which everyone else was engaging in fraud. The 
desire to get rich is consistent with an entitlement rationalization, in which the 
participants feel that they are entitled to a better lifestyle or more of the bank’s resources 
than they are currently being paid. This rationalization is not explicitly identified within 
Cressey (1973); however, it has emerged in later empirical studies on the problem of 
fraud, that this rationalization is common (Wells, 2005). Of course, the claims of family 
problems are also consistent with the rationalization process, as participants will come to 
believe that they do not have an alternative to maintain their family’s position.  
 
Capability, added by the fraud diamond model (Wolfe & Hermandson, 2004), speaks to 
the individual abilities and personal characteristics of the perpetrator, including the ability 
to perpetrate and cover up the fraud. All internal perpetrators in this research were 
employees who had access to cash paid in, applications for loans or had privileged access 
to customer account information; for example cashiers or tellers, verifiers, computer 
operators, receptionists, front office and back office accounting clerks, supervisors and 
staff is some junior and senior management positions. Some were also familiar with 
internal controls or trusted with ability to override them. External perpetrators commonly 
had access to inside knowledge through collusion, or in one case as an ex-employee. 
These findings offer support for the addition of ability to the model. 
 
One problem with this research is the use of second-hand reports to provide evidence for 
pressure, opportunity, and rationalization. (It is presumed that capability can be 
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adequately reported by banks aware of access and skills.) This is obviously problematic 
since what was reported to the banks may not actually be reality. However, the fact that 
pressures were not known does indicate that better knowledge of employees is called for. 
(Of course, it is also possible that there were no explicit pressures, as noted above.) This 
requires stronger HRM practices by banks. 
 
7.6.3 Economic Theories 
The agency theory can be seen to be highly applicable within this research area. The 
general findings indicated that the most common fraud was that conducted by insiders 
within the firm, or by collaboration between external and internal parties. The 
respondents did not generally indicate whether these were individuals in positions of 
authority, but to a certain extent this is irrelevant; for example, a bank teller that has 
power to control cash intake within a bank acts as an agent for the bank, and thus there is 
still a principal-agent problem. Lending malfeasance (Barth et al, 2009), where the 
lending officer is authorized to act as agent for the bank, is a common area of agency 
theory application, though this was not identified in this research (though it likely has 
occurred). However, this does not provide personal motivations for fraud, as do 
criminological theories like the fraud triangle/diamond, making it less satisfactory.  
 
7.6.4 Eclectic Theories 
The theory proposed by Riahi-Belkaoui and Picur (2000) indicated that fraud arose from 
internal and external conditions and one condition is that the bank may present an 
external face of being competent dealing with fraud that does not reflect the internal 
reality. This can clearly be seen to be the case within the banking industry as a whole as 
indicated by the interview material. For example, while the KBA was presented as a 
major self-regulatory effort, some respondents from smaller banks were only marginally 
participatory or aware. The participants indicated that there was ambivalence regarding 
public disclosure and information sharing, indicating concerns regarding the problem of 
scaring the public or seeming to be weak in their treatment of fraud. These responses 
clearly indicate that the banks in the study are generally not actually in control of their 
fraud situation, but instead are using the promotion of activities like the KBA’s Securities 
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and Fraud Committee action in order to disguise ineffective management of fraud in the 
internal organisation. This is the necessary precondition, according to this theory, and 
thus is highly important in introducing institutional conditions in which fraud could 
occur. 
 
Another condition required is an environment in which institutions have unequally 
distributed power, leading those that are not members of these institutions to ignore the 
problems that emerge within the organisation due to the perception of increased power 
(Riahi-Belkaoui and Picur, 2000). This is the case in Kenya, where a high rate of poverty 
associates the banking industry with power and wealth, isolating it from requirement for 
an effective regulatory and institutional environment. This is exacerbated by Kenya’s 
structural adjustment program, in which the regulation of the financial services industry 
was seen as a detrimental factor in the country’s growth and so much strict regulation and 
oversight by the government was removed (Mohan et al., 2000). Thus, in the case of the 
Kenyan banking industry is insufficient oversight and transparency driven by competitive 
concerns, creating conditions for secrecy regarding fraud. 
 
A third condition is an internal lack of social organisation (Riahi-Belkaoui and Picur, 
2000). This is absolutely a condition in the study. Interviews indicated that there was no 
independent way to clearly identify someone that had been previously convicted of fraud 
or sacked due to fraud; although the KBA was said to be working on a database that 
would allow for tracking this, it had not yet been prepared and did not have a clear 
delivery date. While banks relied on personal recommendations, a culture of secrecy and 
failure to provide these recommendations made these unreliable. Criminals could be 
attracted to the banks knowing they would not be immediately detected (tying in with the 
predatory theory discussion in section 7.6.2).  
 
Under the above three conditions, the organisation develops a culture in which fraud is 
endemic – that is, everyone is seen to be corrupt (Riahi-Belkaoui and Picur, 2000). This 
eases rationalization, as fraud is seen to be tolerated. Lack of effective regulation as 
shown in this study, must increase this perception as well, since there is no way to 
 262 
determine whether one’s co-workers are engaged in fraud (except for collusion). This 
organisational climate is reflected in many of the justifications for the fraudulent activity 
that were disclosed. It also reflects on the high rate of collusion between co-workers, 
which also reflects on differential association theory as discussed above. However, this is 
not just a bank culture problem, but a society-wide problem, that must be addressed at a 
higher level.  
 
7.7 Socio-cultural, Legal and Economic Issues  
The findings touched on a number of socio-cultural, legal and economic issues that 
affected the practice of fraud in the Kenyan banking industry. Some specific issues that 
have been identified include lack of institutional capacity to allow for successful 
prosecution, ethical issues, and economic issues that may come into play in the outcomes 
of the fraud investigation. 
 
7.7.1 Institutional Capacity and Legal Structure 
One of the major issues identified by participants is a lack of institutional capacity on the 
part of the Kenyan government to deal with the problem of fraud. Some of the problems 
identified included lack of interest, capacity and skills on the part of police and 
prosecutors, an inefficient and ineffective court system, and lack of sufficient laws to 
address problems like credit card fraud. This inadequacy in the Kenyan laws revealed 
through this study supports research on e-banking done by Gikanda and Bloor (2010) 
who found that the absence of clear legal regulations in Kenya poses a challenge of 
significant importance in the banking industry. Problems including lengthy and expensive 
proceedings, long recesses, and long periods between fraud identification and prosecution 
led to reduction of willingness to prosecute on the part of banks, which often used civil 
settlements or dismissal instead. However, many of the participants expressed frustration 
with this, and indicated that they would prefer that there was a consistent legal approach 
in place that they could use. 
 
The legal external environment, including laws, regulations, and institutions (Aguilar et 
al., 2000) is obviously going to be one of the major factors in how well banks can fight 
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fraud using a legal enforcement approach. Legal enforcement can occur at the local, 
national, or international level (Macey & O’Hara, 2003). The majority of issues in this 
case were national, with low international involvement. Issues such as corporate 
governance (Licht et al., 2005) and development law (Doidge et al., 2007) did not emerge 
explicitly during this review. However, two areas that did emerge were the legal 
environment for lending (Barth et al., 2008) and the availability, commonality, and 
competence of police investigation and criminal prosecution (Wilhelm, 2004) most 
especially. Thus, these findings were consistent with the expected outcomes in terms of 
the sources of fraud and their determinants.  
 
The weakness of laws related to banking fraud in Kenya is not unique. In fact, the 
conflict and consensus approach to fraud identifies weak structural regulation of white-
collar crime such as fraud as the outcome of institutions wanting to appear to be in 
control when in fact they are not (Carey, 1978 as cited by Riahi-Belkaoui and Picur, 
2000). Under this model, the social inequalities that cause conflict are also responsible for 
lack of effective legislation in order to prevent the crime from occurring. Under the 
ecological model of fraud, fraud actually occurs in the banking industry because the 
industry is the site of social disorganisation (Riahi-Belkaoui and Picur, 2000). Kenya may 
be particularly prone to social disorganisation due to general weakness and 
disorganisation of special interest groups, including accounting associations and the 
KBA, which could otherwise promote the banking industry’s interest in making laws. 
While larger international banks reported both KBA involvement and willingness to 
prosecute (likely due to greater resources), the KBA itself is not taking any definite 
measurable steps in improving legal institutions or provide training for prosecutors or 
policy. They have taken small steps, like advocating for Credit Reference Bureaus. 
However, there is significant room for improvement. This general weakness is consistent 
with the ecological theory of fraud. 
 
7.7.2 Sociocultural Issues 
A second area of concern that was seen in the qualitative and quantitative findings is the 
reflection of sociocultural issues, such as ethics and the general acceptability of 
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corruption and fraud, within the banking industry and society as a whole. Main 
sociocultural issues seen include the business environment and its conflict with cultural 
norms, the use of collusion and the social position of fraud as something that need not be 
hidden, and the overall prevalence of corruption. The bank’s use of ethical training is 
likely to be insufficient to overcome these problems.  
 
Ethical factors are social norms and values internalized by the individual that allow for 
acceptance of fraud by that individual (Aguilar et al., 2000). Ethical practice is a cultural 
issue, not only an organisational value. While it seems that ethical values should provide 
guidance against fraud, in fact ethical values can at times become twisted in order to 
allow for rationalization of fraud under the fraud triangle theory (Cressey, 1973; Wells, 
2005). For example, a worker that is underpaid may rationalize that he or she is not 
getting paid what he or she is worth, and that is unfair; in this case, fraud serves as a 
means of rectifying the disparity between the worker’s pay and their perceived self-worth 
(Wells, 2005). However, broader sociocultural norms can also play into the use of fraud 
in the industry; for example, if fraud is considered to be acceptable business practice, or 
is overlooked or ignored by employers or faces a relatively light treatment when 
discovered, it may well become endemic due to its general acceptance (Zahra et al., 
2007). The acceptance of corruption within a given society is of particular concern, since 
this is likely to allow for justification on a wider scale by the individual engaged in fraud 
(Bakre, 2007).  
 
This is particularly likely to be a problem where there is an existing environment of 
corruption and fraud. This was found to be the case in both the qualitative and 
quantitative findings. The persistence of collusion between co-workers also indicates that 
there was an environment in which there was a general acceptance of fraud. Finally, 
respondents indicated that corruption and bribery in the legal system itself were frequent 
causes for concern and were a major reason why the banks might avoid prosecution. This 
all indicates that there is a breakdown of ethics within the banking industry, as well as 
possibly within Kenyan society in general, that allows for fraud to take place. Thus, 
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fighting fraud within the Kenyan banking industry is not only an issue of changing 
corporate culture, but of changing the broader sociocultural norms.  
 
There were also economic issues involved in frauds reported, such as economic strain. 
This type of economic strain is consistent with the first leg of the fraud triangle, the non-
shareable financial problem (Cressey, 1973; Wells, 2005). While there were a number of 
other factors cited, including overconsumption and greed, the problems of high 
unemployment and low wages must be taken into account as potentially major 
sociocultural issues in the overall prevalence of fraud, since they will deliberately reflect 
on the use of fraud in the banking environment. This is particularly true for external 
perpetrators (as internal perpetrators have gainful employment).  
  
7.7.3 Industry Issues 
The banking industry itself must be taken to task for its own practices, many of which 
promote fraud. In particular, circumvention of Know Your Customer rules, lack of 
industry involvement in the KBA and lack of information regarding KBA activities, and 
failure to check references for new employees are all significant elements in the exposure 
of the Kenyan bank to fraud. The use of slipshod employment and customer verification 
practices by some of the Kenyan banks offers the opportunity that individuals need to 
commit fraud (Cressey, 1973; Wells, 2005). Banks need to take responsibility for their 
own hiring and customer recruitment practices in order to eliminate this opportunity. 
Although some banks have undertaken steps such as establishing whistle-blower hotlines 
(Black, 2005b; Schmidt, 2005) or ethical training programs (Aguilar et al., 2000), these 
programs are not sufficient. 
 
In essence, the current treatment of fraud by the banking industry in Kenya is consistent 
with the eclectic theory of fraud, in which the industry indicates they are taking private 
action to prevent fraud, while continuing to contribute to conditions of extreme social 
inequality; failure to apply pressure in order to create conditions for social control in the 
broader society; allowing conditions to continue to exist where fraud and white-collar 
crime are considered to be acceptable; and failing to report or prevent fraud from 
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occurring (Riahi-Belkaoui & Picur, 2000). Given this failure, banks must be held 
accountable for the environment that they have partially created and have failed to change 
substantially in order to prevent fraud. 
 
7.8 Broad Implications of Findings 
The findings demonstrate that, above all, the problem of insider fraud in the Kenyan 
banking industry is not simply a failure of the individuals, the banks involved, or indeed 
the banking industry. Instead, it is a broader social problem that is related to government 
policy and institutions as well as the general development of the Kenyan banking 
institution. The development of the banking structure and system means that the banking 
institution, perceived as being one of the elite institutions, is isolated and does not have 
access to outside resources to control fraud or pressure toward transparency. However, 
this is not only a matter of elitism, but of structural adjustment and resulting deregulation. 
Given this, the Western bias of the eclectic model discussed is exposed – it takes into 
account conditions under which deregulation has taken place, but does not address the 
legitimate role of regulation in fraud prevention. 
 
In general, the findings were largely consistent with the requirements of the Fraud 
Triangle and Fraud Diamond Theories and to a lesser extent the agency theory, 
differential association, and the eclectic theories discussed in the literature review. One 
significant factor that stood out and emerged from the research is the extent of insider 
fraud and collusion. From this study the presence of collusion, in essence, adds an extra 
dimension to the fraud elements identified in other studies.  These findings also pointed 
to a connection between the internal organisational culture and the external environment, 
demonstrating that even though the findings point to conditions within the bank, they also 
reflect issues that are seen in wider society and that need to be addressed there. Of 
particular importance are the KBA and its fraud-related actions. It can be seen that, rather 
than taking the leading role expected, the KBA serves to present a veneer of treatment of 
issues on security over a general lack of involvement and knowledge. The KBA should 
take the lead in development of robust fraud prevention measures in the banking industry 
which will go a long way in tackling the fraud threat. One overarching point is that fraud 
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cannot be viewed solely from the perspective of the individual. The organisation and the 
wider environment play a role in creating conditions for fraud to occur. Thus, the 
individual perspective is insufficient to explain the occurrence of fraud. 
 
7.9 Managerial Implications of Findings 
There are a number of issues relating to best practices in the banking industry. While 
internal fraud is clearly a concern, many banks do not take appropriate steps to prevent 
internal fraud from occurring, consistent with previous research (Brancik, 2007). For 
example, password security is used in most cases despite its known security weaknesses 
(Payne & Richards, 2008), leaving banks believing they have a higher level of security 
than they do. A more robust approach is two-factor identification, which uses something 
that a user has (like a number generation token or smart card) and something that the user 
is (like a pass-code, image recognition, PIN, or biometric identifier) to authenticate 
(Bhargav-Spantzel et al., 2007). This type of security is substantially more secure and 
less prone to failure than some single complex password identification. This is slightly 
more costly, and so has been avoided by incomplete cost-benefit calculations. However, 
banks should revise this stance in light of current conditions. 
 
Secondly, strategic frameworks can be used within the banks to boost the development of 
an effective approach to fraud management. Adams (2010) suggests the Prevent, Protect, 
Pursue framework:  
Prevent: Take measures to prevent fraud and detect areas of vulnerability before attacks 
happen. Implement correct procedures and ensure they are followed, train staff, and 
adhere to industry initiatives.  
Protect: Protect infrastructure against security breaches and implement warning systems 
to warn against them.  
Pursue: Follow best-practices guidelines and set standards for dealing with offenses.   
These practices allow banks to prevent further breaches (Adams, 2010). 
 
This basic framework provides a robust guidance for banking implementation of best 
practices and ensuring that the appropriate technical procedures are in place in order to 
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allow for the appropriate structure of banking standards and protective practices. Thus, 
the identification and correct implementation of strategic practice should be a key 
determinant in how banks prevent fraud.  
 
Thirdly, organisational culture has been found to be a determinant in a large number of 
cases of widespread internal fraud or malfeasance. Sometimes, organisational culture is 
such that participants believe the organisation to be effectively combating fraud, while at 
the same time fraud is allowed by policy variance (Smith & Drudy, 2008). A remedy for 
this is retraining managers to promote and enforce the policies that are in place, thus 
changing the corporate culture to ensure that it is more in line with the actual demands of 
the organisation (Small, 2006). Thus, banks that demonstrate this problem of lack of 
alignment between standards and practices should focus on improving this alignment in 
order to be better able to combat fraud. 
 
Fourthly, the KBA is representative of a self-regulatory organisation (SRO), which are 
held up as major mechanisms for the reduction of fraud and corruption within an industry 
(Nunez, 2007). SROs operate on the principle that industry regulation by the members of 
the industry itself is a far more important mechanism than government regulation, that it 
is less expensive, and that it is more effective than government regulation. This has been 
shown to be the case, with even corrupt SROs, which are vulnerable to bribery, having a 
higher level of self-regulation than industries that do not have this type of organisation 
(Nunez, 2007).  Kenyan banks have an opportunity through the KBA to do more in 
sharing information, such as the credit information sharing initiative, such as that 
available in other regions. At least 14 countries in Europe have public credit registers 
while all member countries have private credit bureaus (Giannetti et al., 2010). So far 
Kenya has only launched one credit bureau, which will reduce information asymmetries 
regarding customers. This success can be expanded. By working together and sharing 
fraud information the banks can enjoy a degree of transparency, enhanced stability, 
healthy competition and lower shared costs for screening and monitoring fraud (Giannetti 
et al., 2010; Mwanza, 2010). Not only should Kenyan banks endeavour to create adequate 
information sharing on fraud within the Kenyan banking industry, but should also 
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consider regional and international information sharing. This will assist in facilitating 
cross-border expansion as foreign banks can readily access data and information on the 
same footing with the local banks, as well as reducing cross-border fraud.  
 
7.10 Reflecting on the research questions and conceptual framework 
The qualitative study brought out a few characteristics of fraud in part answering 
Research Question 1. This captured the main types of fraud, the amount of fraud loss, 
reporting and recovery of fraud. These aspects were discussed in Chapter 5 and were 
therefore not pursued again for discussion here.  
 
This chapter has also followed up discussion based on Research Question 2 about 
characteristics of those who perpetrate fraud. From the onset in this chapter, research 
question 2 has been discussed highlighting the individual perpetrator as well as giving 
consideration to collusion and the concerns about internal controls. The characteristics of 
fraud perpetrators are discussed further revealing the centrality of the fraud triangle in 
individuals who commit fraud – pressure, opportunity and rationalization. To these 
characteristics the discussion incorporates two other characteristics, capability and 
collusion ending with a discussion on what can be done internally to minimize fraud and 
fight collusion making way for a discussion on the importance of internal controls. In 
answer to this research question the findings and subsequent discussion in this chapter 
indicates that other than the elements of the fraud triangle, capability and collusion are 
additional elements that should be considered in understanding fraud in the banking 
industry in Kenya. Also the nature of the perpetrator does not always fit the fraud triangle 
as results show that some perpetrators have a predatory nature and therefore do not fit the 
‘accidental fraudster’ that the fraud triangle was created to suit. 
 
Drawing in the discussion on internal controls leads us into Research Question 3 on how 
banks approach fraud management. The discussion highlights the significance of internal 
control systems in fraud management – job rotations, separation of duties and 
responsibilities, internal audit, screening and recruitment procedures and systems 
controls. The discussion later extends to fraud prevention and detection.  
 270 
 
Research question 3 is also answered in the discussion on the difficult balance between 
industry co-operation and competition for customers. Customer education is also 
addressed as an aspect of customer fraud awareness. These all have implications on fraud 
management as do external factors such as technological, socio-economic, ethical, 
institutional, structural and legal issues discussed.  
 
Research Question 4 is addressed for the first time in this chapter. Section 7.5 attempts to 
give an answer to the question “Are there differences between the approaches to fraud 
management adopted by Kenyan and international banks?” The discussion is built on 
findings of this research that point to differences in the way banks respond to industry 
involvement, access to knowledge and human capital, access to capital and technology 
resources and the broader implications of these differences for the African banking 
industry. 
Sections 7.4, 7.6 and 7.7 cut across Research Questions 2 and 3 discussing further issues 
earlier raised, integrating the findings and linking the same to theories and literature in 
fraud. 
 
The conceptual framework can be traced through Section 7.3. Section 7.3.1 reflects on 
the individual and the fraud triangle which is the central aspect of the conceptual 
framework. The internal factors representing the bank and the industry in the conceptual 
framework are discussed in Section 7.3.2 while the external environment factors of the 
conceptual framework researchable through this study are discussed in Section 7.3.3. 
Section 7.3.4 captures the information technology factor which is part of both the internal 
and external factors. As with the research questions, Sections 7.4 to Section 7.7 addresses 
a range of factors from the three aspects of the conceptual framework. 
 
7.11 Summary 
The findings of the qualitative and quantitative research had some important implications 
in terms of their connection to the literature. The findings were consistent with the 
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conceptual framework, although there were several emergent themes not included in the 
model.  
 
The structural and interpersonal relationships within the banking industry play a clear 
role in determining both the occurrence of fraud and its prevention. However, these 
relationships, particularly intra-industry relationships such as references and the KBA are 
not being used effectively to prevent fraud. Fraud detection also suffers from issues such 
as lack of dedicated resources and unavailability of predictive mechanisms. Although the 
interviewed fraud managers show a strong awareness of what they should be doing, they 
do not have the available resources to do so. A third issue and perhaps one of the most 
significant issues because it cannot be rectified through bank or industry level changes, is 
the failure of legal institutions, which make it extremely difficult to prosecute fraud in a 
timely or cost-effective fashion. Finally, there are a growing number of technology 
changes that could both encourage and prevent fraud. Banks need to focus more on 
preventative technologies in order to prepare for the development of incoming threats, 
which are already beginning to be seen within the industry. 
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Chapter 8  
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
8.1 Introduction 
The aim of this study was to make a contribution to the understanding and knowledge of 
fraud in Kenya. The research that has been discussed within this study was broad-ranging 
and detailed, and addressed a wide range of fraud-related issues in the Kenyan banking 
system. However, this only reflects a partial view of fraud in the Kenyan banking system, 
with only minimal discussion of the historical and colonial nature of the banking system 
addressed.  There is a deep substratum of political, social, and historical issues that fell 
outside the scope of this discussion, which has focused only on the banking practice 
aspects of the problem. Even considering this, the information produced within this 
review offers a significant basis for comparison of the Kenyan banking system with the 
banking systems of other countries, as well as exploring many of the issues that are found 
within this system. This chapter discusses the theoretical and practical contributions made 
in this research, summarizing the main findings in regard to the research questions 
(Section 8.2), discussing contributions to knowledge, theory, and literature (Section 8.3), 
discussing policy implications and recommendations (Section 8.4), and discussing 
limitations of the study and areas for further research (Sections 8.5 and 8.6).  
 
8.2 Summary of main findings and arguments 
The research questions that were the focus of the discussion are: 
1. What are the characteristics of fraud in the Kenyan banking industry?  
2. What are the perceived characteristics of those that perpetrate fraud in the Kenyan 
banking industry?  
3. How do banks approach fraud management?  
4. Are there differences between the approaches to fraud management adopted by 
Kenyan and international banks?  
Each of these questions can be addressed from a combination of primary research 
generated from both qualitative and quantitative findings and secondary research.  
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8.2.1  Fraud in the banking industry 
The first research question addressed the characteristics of fraud in the Kenyan banking 
industry. The information that this question is answered by is primarily indicated in the 
quantitative survey and was of an exploratory nature. In general, the banking industry is 
highly aware of fraud, with 90% of respondents indicating that fraud is a major problem, 
88.3% indicating that fraud was likely or very likely to be encountered in the banking 
industry, and 83.3% of respondents indicating that it was either increasing or increasing 
rapidly. This clearly indicates that the banking industry is highly aware of the problem of 
fraud and its implications for the industry. Economic pressure, advancements in 
technology and sophistication of criminals are seen as the main reasons behind the 
general increase of fraud in the banking industry but on the other hand improved control 
and technological measures coupled with a small improvement in the effectiveness of the 
justice system have mitigated the increase in fraud. 
 
Notably, all of the banks indicated at least one incident of fraud within the past year. The 
average mean loss to banks within this period was around KES 21 million (USD 
277,000). There was a wide variation in the amount of fraud reported, with the minimum 
fraud totalling KES 118,000 (USD 1,509) and the maximum fraud being around KES 271 
million (USD 3,466,000). However, the majority of fraud reports were much closer to the 
median. Fraud for the responding banks averaged between 1% and 1.5% of annual 
turnover, with international banks and subsidiaries having the lowest rates of fraud and 
regional and local banks having the highest rates of fraud. (Of course, this does not 
necessarily indicate that the amounts lost are higher at local banks, since local banks, 
having less income, will be more susceptible to losses in terms of the per cent of 
turnover.)  
 
The outcomes of this survey indicated that the majority of fraud in the Kenyan banking 
industry is both relatively low-volume fraud and is not technologically sophisticated. The 
majority of the frauds occur through misdirection, theft or appropriation of cash or 
cheques; only a few cases of fraud were associated with credit cards, and there was little 
online fraud reported, largely due to the relatively limited scale of online banking in 
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Kenya. The issue of technological constraints is verified by interview findings, which 
indicate that overall fraud that is detected is not very sophisticated. However, there is a 
significant concern that problems faced in fraud detection are due to lack of sophisticated 
fraud detection systems; the research indicated that the majority of fraud cases that were 
reported were in fact found by accident. Evidence indicates, however, that this is not 
unique to Kenyan banks, and in fact inadequate fraud controls is an issue that plagues the 
global banking industry. Thus, the Kenyan banking industry is probably not very 
different in terms of the fraud that is experienced than the global average, although there 
are some differences created by the level of technology used within the industry. 
 
The majority of fraud is investigated internally due to fear of damaging the banks’ 
reputation. Banks also have little confidence in the law enforcement bodies and the 
judicial system leading to a preference to negotiate and settle cases out of court, avoiding 
fully prosecuting the perpetrator, thereby encouraging the vice of fraud as the perpetrators 
know they can buy their way out. However, there is a greater tendency among the 
international banks to institute criminal proceedings against fraudsters as compared to 
local, national and regional banks. Other reasons such as the length of time involved in 
prosecuting perpetrators, the high acquittal rate, low recovery rate, lack of skilled and 
trained police, prosecutors and judges (in the area of fraud prosecution and investigation) 
and corruption among others have created a low appetite in the banking industry for 
seeking the maximum punishment of fraudsters.  
 
The frequently employed measures used by banks in preventing fraud include improving 
or reviewing internal controls, training employees on fraud prevention, establishing fraud 
prevention policies, establishing an ethical code of conduct and screening or reference 
checks on new employees. The use of protective software, passwords and continuous 
auditing offer banks some measure of security against fraudulent activities. However, 
highly effective software approaches such as data mining, data sampling and digital 
analysis are less commonly employed by banks supporting findings by Bierstaker et al. 
(2006). For the future Kenyan banks need to be ready to invest in fraud detection and 
software approaches such as data mining, digital analysis and forensic services (forensic 
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auditing and forensic accountants) as these have been found to be highly effective by a 
minority who use them. Anti-fraud technology comes with a high price tag. However, the 
banks must consider the benefits of such technology which far outweighs the cost and 
results in effective fraud prevention and detection. Presently, as revealed by this study, 
fraud may be considered to be small scale fraud. This perhaps mitigates against large 
expenditure in anti-fraud technology. The scale of fraud is nonetheless expected to 
increase necessitating future investment in robust technologies. 
 
This study has concluded that the size and/or percentage of fraud loss did not vary with 
the type of the bank. The study also found that fraud loss did vary with the size of the 
bank but not consistently. The findings therefore did not support previous studies by 
Murphy (1993) and Barnes and Webb (2007) possibly due to the use of a relatively 
smaller sample drawn from one specific industry and the differences in categorization of 
employee size. 
 
There is no sufficient evidence in this study to support views (Abiola, 2009; Fisher et al, 
2001) that international banks in Kenya are more likely to prosecute fraudsters and that 
local banks are more likely to avoid prosecuting. In addition banks are less likely to 
prosecute external perpetrators than internal perpetrators. 
 
There is weak support for a number of issues regarding fraud and the type of fraud 
prevention method employed by the banks. However, the study reveals evidence that 
supports the findings by Barnes and Webb (2007) who established that there was no 
significant relationship between the size of fraud loss, or the susceptibility of the 
organisation, and the incidence of fraud or theft.  
 
Overall, fraud is a significant concern in the banking industry, even if the loss figures are 
not proportionately on a very large scale. The overall loss to the banks was primarily 
from low-volume, technically uncomplicated frauds, and only one reported fraud posed a 
significant threat to the stability of the bank itself. However, the banking industry does 
appear to be very aware of fraud and its potential for significant growth.  
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8.2.2 Characteristics of perpetrators 
The second research question addressed the matter of the characteristics of those that 
perpetrate fraud. This question was addressed from a number of different angles. From a 
theoretical angle, the theoretical framework considered the fraud triangle proposed by 
Cressey (1973), which suggested that in order to overcome social norms enough to 
commit a fraud, an individual needed a motivation (usually consisting of an un-shareable 
financial problem that cannot be resolved otherwise), the opportunity to commit the 
fraud, and a rationalisation that would allow for the fraud to be justified. This was then 
modified, in light of the technological foundation of the modern banking industry, to 
include technical skill and collusion, in order to allow for the individual to successfully 
complete the fraud. Most telling was the use of collusion in almost all cases, either with 
another internal party or with an external member such as a customer. These collusions 
tended to marry the access of one party with the requirements of another; for example, 
junior managers were commonly involved in fraud, as were tellers and others that had 
access to cash. Fraudsters were also relatively younger and male, which is consistent with 
empirical findings regarding fraud that have been studied in other contexts.  This study 
has therefore identified one known dimension (capability) and one new dimension 
(collusion) in addition to the elements of the Fraud Triangle. This is discussed later in 
Section 8.4.1 of this Chapter as a part of the contribution to literature in the field of fraud. 
  
The Fraud Triangle adequately depicts and explains the actual fraud situation within the 
Kenyan banking industry. The majority of respondents identified un-shareable financial 
problems recognized as the reason for fraudsters committing fraud, such as living beyond 
their means, greed and financial pressures mainly associated with individual and family 
problems. The act of committing fraud simply for the purposes of exploiting an 
opportunity, rather than meeting some form of pressure sets the Kenyan bank fraudster 
apart as predominantly a “predator”. The idea of a predator is pursued further in Section 
8.4.2 of this chapter. Fraudsters also used the classical justifications for fraud, especially 
including the chance to get rich quickly, family pressure, the inability to obtain the funds 
elsewhere and a general atmosphere of fraud. The quantitative study suggest that 
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motivations such as gambling and substance abuse seem very low in the industry as did 
rationalization such as revenge and being underpaid.  
 
8.2.3 Approaches to fraud management  
The third research question addressed the problem of how banks tend to address the 
problem of fraud. In the empirical literature, fraud prevention techniques had three 
focuses, including external auditing, internal auditing, and mechanized approaches that 
relied on information technology in order to detect fraud that is occurring and prevent 
further fraud from occurring. The empirical literature indicated that dismissal and 
prosecution were the most likely outcomes for fraud. 
 
These empirical findings in the secondary research were tested in both the qualitative and 
quantitative findings. The findings indicated that, in common with other banking 
practices, auditing and information technology formed a major portion of the fraud 
detection and prevention strategy. However, this was limited by the relative lack of 
priority given to issues of fraud. Only a relatively small portion of the banks had 
dedicated fraud departments or officers; instead, fraud was often investigated by ad hoc 
members of the management team that were appointed once fraud was found. There were 
also significant issues with funding for fraud prevention. In particular, many of the banks 
indicated that they had no specific budget for fraud detection and prevention, while others 
indicated that the fraud budget was not a stand-alone item and was included under 
different heads such as training, information technology, internal controls etc. The 
success of the fraud prevention and detection methodologies generally employed by the 
banks can be assessed by the way in which frauds are detected; some 33% of fraud was 
detected by accident or chance and 23% through the combination of internal and external 
whistle-blowers, while only 18% was detected through internal controls and 10% through 
internal audits.  Thus, the institutional response to fraud, although it was consistent in 
form with the expectations of the researcher, did not conform in terms of the expectations 
of effectiveness. However, the sizeable percentage of whistle-blowers, both internal and 
external, indicates that this is a successful approach to creating a culture of fraud 
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prevention. Thus, the detection and prevention methodologies employed by the banks can 
be rated as being adequate. 
 
The response to fraud is of interest, as the quantitative evidence indicated that 
prosecution was a relatively unpopular option compared to what might have been 
expected from a Western institutional context; only 47% of the cases involved 
investigation by law enforcement bodies and of these only 28% to 30% of internal parties 
were prosecuted. Prosecution rates for external parties in this study were significantly 
higher, at 60% to 80%). The alternative institutional option of civil prosecution was even 
less popular, with only 6% to 11% of internal parties and 23% to 29% of external parties 
being subjected to civil prosecution for recovery. In majority of internal cases, the action 
that was taken was simple dismissal, while in at least a third of the external cases no 
action was taken at all. This seemingly low rate of institutional involvement was readily 
explained within the qualitative interviews, when the bank representatives explained that 
the police in Kenya do not have significant fraud investigation capacity or skill, and the 
prosecution of fraud cases is lengthy, uncertain, and expensive. The respondents also 
pointed to a failure within the legal structure itself: there is no clear definition within the 
law for credit card fraud, which makes such cases difficult to prosecute. Overall, 
participants indicated that the expense of civil or criminal prosecution, combined with 
inadequate legal structures, meant that prosecution of all but the most egregious frauds 
was neither cost-effective nor time-effective for the bank. The preferred strategy in minor 
cases or cases where the party was amenable to negotiation of a settlement for reparations 
was to take the approach unmediated by the courts. Thus, the reluctance to prosecute on 
the part of the banks is demonstrated to be a business decision. A large percentage of 
fraud cases were not followed up by the banks in order to secure a successful prosecution. 
 
One of the areas banks in Kenya have been found wanting in terms of internal controls 
was the selection and recruitment of bank staff. As indicated throughout this study, fraud 
is perpetrated by an individual(s). It is imperative therefore that the banks hire the right 
individuals as a measure towards managing fraud. Inadequate background checks at the 
time of recruitment have opened a door to potential serial fraudsters entering the banking 
 279 
industry. Information available via the Kenya Governments’ “Certificate of Good 
Conduct” system is not always reliable as data can be easily manipulated. There is 
therefore no central reliable employee reference check system that exists in the country 
making it difficult for the banks to secure vital information from credible sources. Yet not 
all the blame should be placed on a central reference system.  Banks need to share part of 
the blame as the study has revealed that banks have hired employees with a known 
history of fraud and in some cases ignored credible references. Greater caution needs to 
be taken in staff recruitment as a step towards better fraud management. 
 
8.2.4 Differences between Kenyan and international banks 
The fourth research question asked whether Kenyan banks and international banks have 
different approaches to fraud management. This was tested using a combination of 
quantitative and qualitative techniques. There were some differences found in the results, 
such as the amount lost to fraud and the use of formal fraud budgets and some 
approaches. The interviews demonstrated that international banks are more likely than 
local and regional banks to be active members of the KBA, and that these banks were 
more active in the process of creation of a database that could help to identify fraudsters 
and other potentially dangerous employees. International respondents also indicated that 
prosecution was important, and seemed to be more likely to engage in it. However, there 
is the possibility that international banks may be following wider policies and are able to 
ignore the costs and problems arising from the legal structure in Kenya. Overall, there 
were differences that were associated with these banks, but the differences were often not 
issues of orientation toward fraud or acceptance of fraud, and nor do the differences 
appear to be strictly culturally based. In particular, availability of resources to fight fraud 
is likely to be very different between international and local banks because international 
banks have far more financial, technical and human resources. 
 
8.3 Contribution to the Literature  
This research project was undertaken with the understanding that the literature on the 
banking industry in Kenya, and in Africa generally, is relatively sparse.  This research has 
endeavoured to provide more information on the banking industry in Kenya, providing 
 280 
both quantitative findings as well as qualitative findings that serve to add more depth to 
the literature. 
 
8.3.1 The role of institutions and societal structures  
One of the main contributions to the literature that this research has provided is 
reinforcement regarding the role of institutions and societal structures in detection, 
prevention, and prosecution of fraud. It is often simpler, when coming from a context 
where there is strong respect for the rule of law and strong policing and legal institutions, 
to place blame on banks and other companies that do not use the court system or other 
legal methods to address the problem of fraud. However, as the interviews with bank 
management and fraud investigators revealed, the situation is not as simple as that. 
Simply, without the strong policing and prosecution institutions that are generally present 
in most Western countries, but which are noticeably lacking in Kenya, it is often a 
rational business decision to not prosecute for fraud rather than to prosecute for fraud, as 
it is both simpler and less costly to do so. This can be viewed as a contribution to the 
literature, because it enforces the notion that businesses must operate within an external 
context, and this external context is key to how these businesses will make their operating 
decisions and what operating decisions will be made. It also challenges the notion that 
African businesses are operating under substantially different business rules than are 
Western businesses; for example, the interviewees noted that the decision to prosecute or 
not to prosecute for fraud was not based in societal connections or vague notions of 
‘tribal solidarity,’ but was instead based on rational business decision making processes. 
This places this research outside the scope of much business research on African 
institutions, but it also provides a valuable means of identifying the influence of the 
institutional environment on organizational decision making e.g. in prosecuting fraud 
cases.  
 
Ironically, the above discussion in this section may explain why international banks that 
originate from countries with stronger laws are more likely to take some form of action 
against fraudsters and show better defences than domestic banks. 
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8.3.2 Information on regulation and treatment of fraud 
A second contribution to literature is that this research provides information regarding 
regulation, treatment, and detection of fraud in Kenyan banking institutions. This is an 
area that has been relatively little explored in the academic literature, with the majority of 
reports that were found stemming from international non-governmental institutions such 
as the World Bank or IMF, or Government sources such as the Central Bank of Kenya. 
This general lack of information regarding the banking industry in Kenya along with 
other Sub-Saharan African countries means there is relatively little information for 
organisations and companies in Kenya and outside it. Given that the strength of 
institutions is one of the major factors in market entry, it is likely that the state of the 
Kenyan police and court institutions may prove to be prohibitive to entry for some firms. 
However, the provision of material regarding the nature and scope of fraud in the Kenyan 
banking system also provides some guidance for firms that are hoping to enter this 
market. Thus, this could be useful for practice as well. 
 
8.4  Contribution to theory 
This study has made some significant contributions to fraud theory based on the nature of 
fraud in Kenya’s banking industry as well as making some contribution to the 
conceptualization of fraud. 
 
8.4.1 The Fraud Pentagon 
An important contribution of this research is to confirm the value of the Fraud Triangle as 
a theoretical framework for understanding of fraud. Previous research has shown that the 
Fraud Triangle framework is useful for analysis of fraud cross-culturally, and it has been 
used in a number of empirical studies that have considered the problem of fraud from 
many different cultures. The Fraud Triangle was just as successful in describing 
motivation, justification, and opportunity to commit fraud in the Kenyan banking context 
as it has been in American, British, European, and Asian contexts. This indicates two 
issues of importance. First, the Fraud Triangle’s robustness as a theory of fraud has been 
reconfirmed in that the three elements suggested by Cressey (1973) were found to be 
present in the frauds considered in this study. Second, this demonstrates that there is in 
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fact nothing culturally unique about the practice of fraud in Kenya; instead, motivations, 
justifications, and opportunities are all very similar in origin. The main difference in 
fraud and its treatment did not appear to be in the fraud itself, but in whether or not the 
fraud was addressed through official institutions or not. This study did not reveal that 
Kenya was unique in terms of the types of fraud based in the literature.  
 
Another implication is additional factors in the commission of fraud. The modern 
banking environment requires technical skills or capability, expanding into the fraud 
diamond (Wolfe & Hermanson, 2004). This research has confirmed that the persons 
involved in fraud held positions within the organization where they could exercise their 
technical skills and capabilities to assist them in carrying out fraud. Thus this study has 
adopted the element of capability as a factor in the commission of fraud. This study noted 
that collusion is also a major concern of fraud in Kenyan banks and an element worth 
considering when it comes to the individual factors. A further suggestion is now made 
within this study to include collusion as a key element of fraud in as far as Kenyan banks 
are concerned bringing the number of significant fraud elements identified in this study to 
five – pressure, opportunity, rationalization, capability and collusion. Given the impetus 
that capability adds to the dimension of fraud and the idea that the new dimension, 
collusion, can be viewed as a stand-alone variable these two can be integrated along with 
the other variables of the fraud triangle into a new conceptualization of fraud called the 
“Fraud Pentagon” (Figure 8.1). The fraud pentagon suggests that in Kenya’s banking 
industry the combination of pressure and opportunity on the individual, when rationalized 
and coupled with the technical skills and capability of one or more than one person 
working in collusion, may lead to fraud. 
 
More importantly, this study has contributed a new dimension in that the analysis has 
helped to move the study away from a criminology/sociological focus on individuals and 
their motivations to a more business or organizational focus that emphasizes on other 
linkages such as collusion and contexts such as the legal structures and other business 
environmental factors (discussed further in Section 8.4.3). Therefore dealing with fraud 
within the banking organizations requires multi-thronged strategies that can address the 
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characteristics of the individual perpetrator, competition, industry co-operation, legal 
structures and collusion among other factors. 
 
 
 
Figure 8.1 The Fraud Pentagon - a proposed model of fraud in Kenyan banking 
 
This model builds on the Fraud Triangle (Cressey, 1973) and Fraud Diamond (Wolfe and 
Hermanson, 2004), incorporating collusion, a predominant theme of this study. The 
researcher hopes that this model can be applied to other banking contexts, allowing for 
greater understanding of fraud as a social as well as an individual phenomenon. 
 
 
 
Opportunity 
Capability 
Rationalization 
Collusion 
Pressure 
 284 
8.4.2 Opportunity and the Predator 
The Fraud Triangle presumes the existence of pressure, opportunity and rationalization. 
In this study, opportunity rather than pressure was perceived to take the lead. This is an 
important contribution as it implies that most of the bank fraudsters are predators and not 
the accidental fraudster (Dorminey et al., 2010). The predator as defined in Chapter 2 
(Section 2.3.2.6) is an individual whom right from the onset are inclined or disposed to 
defrauding the organization. They develop intentional fraud schemes unlike the 
accidental fraudster who does not set out to commit fraud but is lured gradually before 
they commit their first fraud. This has implications on the way the Fraud Triangle is 
applied as it may not fully fit the description of a predator but it has been tailored to suit 
the accidental fraudster (Dorminey et al., 2010). 
 
8.4.3 Conceptual framework 
The initial conceptual framework of this research took into account three broad aspects 
that impact on or encourage the incidence of fraud. Individual characteristics were based 
on the fraud triangle, while the bank and the industry were described with internal 
industry factors. External factors described the general environment. However, the 
findings suggest a variation on the initial conceptual framework (Section 3.10).  
 
Figure 8.2 Levels of revised conceptual framework 
 285 
 
In Figure 8.2 a single model is constructed that reflects all three levels of the revised 
conceptual framework. However, instead of viewing the conceptual framework as being 
composed of three separate distinct components as originally done, the suggested 
conceptual framework consists of three levels that are distinct yet interlocked or inter-
dependent. Figure 8.3 presents the revised framework.  
 
Figure 8.3 Emergent conceptual framework 
 
This framework continues to place the individual at the centre of the fraud, enveloped by 
the internal bank and industry environment and then by the external environment. This 
acknowledges that while individuals are responsible for fraud, capability, rationalization, 
and other factors are influenced by the banking industry structure and environment, 
including socioeconomic conditions and institutions. It also reflects the influences on 
individuals to commit fraud and the effects of the individual and industry conditions on 
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the banking industry, visually demonstrating the shift from individual criminological 
theories of fraud to broader theories of organizational fraud which introduces linkages 
and contexts such as industry and external factors and emphasizing social and cultural 
issues (expressed in Section 8.4.1). The conceptual framework that finally arises from 
this study is therefore a contribution to the theoretical and conceptual framework of 
banking in Kenya with the possibility of the same being extended or generalized to other 
bank settings.  
 
8.5 Policy implications 
The discussion of the findings have generated a number of recommendations for Kenyan 
banks, as well as for general reform of the Kenyan banking and legal system in order to 
reduce the potential for fraud within the system. These findings have been used to 
generate a set of recommendations for banks and for policymakers as well as the KBA to 
improve conditions in the banking system. 
 
8.5.1 Policy implications for Banks 
There were some recommendations for individual banks that have emerged from this 
study. These recommendations are based on the outcomes of the research combined with 
insights from the literature. 
 
First, the banks should pay attention to online banking fraud because as the study has 
shown the changing competitive environment means that it will soon become significant 
as banks begin to introduce online banking to all its customers in the near term. 
Mechanisms should be in place to prevent online fraud before systems are implemented, 
already a problem with banks that report a high rate of customer-based fraud with 
implemented systems. Based on literature, issues like online credit and debit card fraud, 
which is committed by people associated with the bank (Moore, Clayton, & Anderson, 
2009), also needs to be considered. This fraud is unlikely to be caught by existing 
systems. Banks need to consider their security levels on external IT systems, as these 
systems are likely to come under attack from the outside and may result in significant 
losses. Banks in Kenya, either individually or jointly under the KBA, could look at best 
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practice of other banks worldwide to learn how they have tackled similar fraud and so 
perhaps exploit the benefits of internet adoption. 
  
A second recommendation is a strategic recommendation regarding the way that banks 
consider fraud. In many cases, responses in this study indicated that fraud was considered 
to be a one-time or sporadic loss, and so it was not worth assigning routine resources or 
staff members to deal with the problem. However, banks also reported multiple, repeated 
‘sporadic’ losses. This indicates that this is not a short-term problem or a rare occurrence, 
but a routine occurrence that should be considered in a more strategic light. Changing the 
orientation of thought about fraud from a consideration of the problem as a rare 
occurrence to thinking about it as a common risk would change the understanding of 
fraud in the banks and possibly improve the bank’s ability to be proactive and reactive to 
the occurrence of fraud.  
 
Anti-fraud policies should be applied in the context of wider business strategies. This 
study has highlighted how the security dimensions of the “Know Your Customer” (KYC) 
policies are being undermined by marketing and competitive considerations. It has also 
shown above how competitive pressures may encourage Internet banking adoption before 
security systems are fully prepared as found in the research. This will no doubt lead to an 
increase in fraud risk. Such compromises suggest the need for an inter-strategy co-
ordination or a multi-thronged approach to strategy. Again this lends to the contribution 
that this study has moved away from an individual focus on fraud to a more 
organisational focus.  
 
8.5.2 Policy implications for the KBA 
There are four main recommendations that have emerged from this research for the 
Kenya Bankers Association (KBA), addressing guidance and improved customer 
awareness, information sharing, international ties, and legal institutions.  
 
The first issue is that of customer awareness campaigns. Banks are reluctant to engage 
with customer awareness campaigns about fraud, although they are known to be 
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effective, because of the potential for reputation loss.  Considering that brand identity is 
key to maintaining customer loyalty in the banking industry (Sweeney & Swait, 2008), 
and that the banking industry in Kenya is crowded with over 40 banks offering customers 
ample choice, this is unlikely to change. However, the KBA, as a banking association 
connected with all banks, is well-placed to conduct such a campaign. The KBA should 
take on a role in customer education, producing materials to be disseminated through all 
member banks regarding the potential for fraud, how to detect it, and how to report it. 
This could substantially improve coverage of the early-warning system of customer 
awareness without placing the brand reputation of any particular bank at risk. 
 
The second issue concerns the urgent creation of a centralised fraud database. The 
centralization of peoples’ identity in a national database system will go a long way in the 
establishment of a fraud management system, strengthen the investigative capacity of the 
Bank Fraud Investigations Department (BFID) of the Central Bank of Kenya and enhance 
judicial prosecution or consequences of financial fraud. 
 
The third recommendation focuses on international fraud issues. The KBA has an affiliate 
role with international banking associations. These connections could help to improve 
international fraud detection capabilities and help to leverage international fraud 
detection knowledge and practice for use in the Kenyan banking system. The KBA 
should create strategic partnerships between banking associations in other countries and 
the KBA, allowing for access to technical knowledge as well as formation of network 
relationships that could benefit the Kenyan banking industry as a whole. Dahan et al. 
(2010) confirm that similar partnerships have been formed between multinational 
enterprises and non-governmental organisations in the region in order to improve 
technology and knowledge transfer as well as improve regional commerce. Other 
literature shows that this approach could be modified in order to allow for cooperation by 
business associations, in order to reap some of the same benefits (Sweeney & Swait, 
2008). The same structure could be therefore be used to promote knowledge diffusion 
from international banks throughout the industry. This approach would allow for smaller 
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banks to begin to develop increased technical expertise, as well as to bring them more 
firmly into the KBA organisation. 
 
A fourth recommendation in this region is to use the KBA’s political ‘clout’ to improve 
the judicial and legal handling of the issue of bank fraud. Special concerns include lack of 
formal credit card laws, slowness of change, and out-dated and antiquated banking fraud 
laws. Organisations like the KBA have power to change these conditions using direct 
influence on the government through lobbying activities and public awareness and 
motivation of the public to change these laws (Bernhagen & Bräuninger, 2005). By 
applying this power and by providing its expertise to the Kenyan government, which 
respondents characterised as substantially overloaded and lacking the necessary expertise 
to implement these types of reforms, it would be possible for the KBA to improve 
conditions in terms of judicial and legal treatment of fraud. This would be a highly 
appropriate use of industry power that would benefit the full industry, as well as 
improving conditions in society overall.  
 
As an apex body in the industry KBA can also potentially take on the role of an educator 
for police and prosecutors. Seminars and workshops should not only be directed to the 
internal needs of the banks and customers but also embrace those who work with the 
industry to prosecute fraud cases. By so doing they will improve legal skills and reduce 
the number of cases acquitted by the courts due to inadequate evidence and poor legal 
skills. 
 
8.5.3 Policy implications for the Kenyan Legal System 
The recent enactment of the Anti-Money Laundering Law in December 2009 and the 
establishment of Credit Reference Bureaus in 2009 will help to boost the banking 
industry’s fight against fraud. However, it is clear that the Kenyan legal system must 
undergo some structural reforms in order to increase the robustness of the Kenyan 
banking system towards fraud. Although banking fraud is not considered to be a 
significant problem at this time, the evidence indicates that this will become an increasing 
problem over time. For example, drawing from literature, telecoms fraud (of which some 
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banking fraud is a subset) resulted in a loss of $700 million in Africa in 2009 (Ghosh, 
2010). These figures are only expected to increase over time. This is particularly 
problematic with the growth of mobile banking services, which are highly popular in 
Kenya and Africa on the whole as a means of providing non-branch banking services. 
Frimpong (2007) notes that the potential for banking fraud is often seen as one of the 
factors that put small and medium enterprises (SMEs) off the idea of online banking, 
reducing the uptake of internet banking even in cases where this could be a possible 
improvement over existing banking services. Finally, there is the potential that advance 
fee fraud, (often called ‘419’ fraud) originating from Nigeria, could affect the Kenyan 
banking system’s overall reputation. The last issue is in many ways the most serious 
issue, as it has been shown to affect the investor confidence in other countries, reducing 
the country’s ability to compete in terms of foreign direct investment (FDI) and economic 
development (Ampratwum, 2009). Thus, it is clear that the government must act to 
reduce the structural barriers to prosecution and improve access to the judicial system for 
banks hoping to reduce fraud levels. 
 
Based on the findings of this research the suggested ways for improving the judicial and 
legal system is a combination of restructuring the laws and judicial system and advanced 
training for police, attorneys, and judges in issues of banking fraud and other financial 
crimes. The Central Bank of Kenya already has a dedicated police unit (the Banking 
Fraud Investigations Department - BFID) devoted to the prosecution of financial crime, 
according to the interviewees. However, this capacity should be expanded in order to 
allow for improved support from this region. Another possibility is advanced training for 
a larger number of police officers and others through a financial crimes training program. 
These types of programs are one of the ways in which police units in other regions have 
been able to keep up with financial crimes and have gained an increased level of ability to 
combat these crimes (Michel, 2008). Other alternative measures include increased 
organisational ties with international agencies such as Interpol and other national policing 
agencies from regions that have achieved some degree of success with international 
banking crime (Michel, 2008). Consistency in the police force that prosecutes fraud at the 
BFID must be established. The regular changes made in the police force deployed at the 
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BFID makes it difficult for fraud cases to be followed up to a successful conclusion. 
Perhaps instituting a minimum serving term for police within the department can bring 
stability to this department and enhance its efficiency and effectiveness in managing and 
reducing general levels of fraud within the banking industry. 
 
Finally, as revealed from this study, the court system must be improved in terms of the 
time and cost involved in fraud prosecution, in order to increase the likelihood that banks 
will choose to use prosecution as a means of deterring financial fraud. Although these 
measures may not seem important at this time, as bank officers estimate that the losses to 
fraud are relatively low, they are only likely to grow more substantial over time 
especially in increasingly global financial markets and as evidenced by recent press 
reports highlighting the reported fraud losses in the previous chapter. The likelihood of 
non-prosecution also encourages fraudsters to engage in fraudulent acts. Making changes 
to the judicial and policing system now will prevent this excessive growth over time.  
 
8.6 Limitations of this study  
This study has provided a comprehensive view into the treatment of fraud within the 
Kenyan banking system. Nonetheless there are some potential limitations that should be 
considered in the discussion of these results and consideration of the outcomes of the 
study.   
 
8.6.1 Generalizations  
First, the results are geographically and temporally limited. Although they provide an 
insight into the Kenyan banking system (and indirectly, into structural conditions of the 
industry and of judicial and political systems in place at this time), they cannot be applied 
to any other countries except in terms of the general findings and lessons learned. These 
results, in other words, apply only to Kenya on the large scale. Furthermore, they are 
temporally limited – that is, the conditions in place now are described, and some 
historical information is included, but this does not imply anything about conditions that 
may take place following changes to industry, government, technological or the banking 
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structure. This should be considered in terms of the application of the findings of the 
study to other contexts or over a long period of time. 
 
8.6.2 Validity of data 
Small samples are often considered to be ‘non-representative’ resulting in generalisations 
that could be used subjectively by the reader. The sample sizes used in this study was not 
large but every effort was made to ensure its representativeness. In order to achieve 
representativeness respondents were drawn from a cross-section of local, national, 
regional and international banks. Respondents were chosen using purposive and snowball 
sampling. Purposive sampling allows for the selection of specific groups in the sample 
and in so doing obtain a representative sample. The key informants in this study were 
specifically chosen as they are the bank staffs who are specialists in the area of fraud and 
were considered to be the best informed in the organization on fraud matters. Though the 
sample size appears to be small (17 for interviews and 60 for the survey), it is 
representative of the 40 banks that were the population of the study as representativeness 
has more to do with where the sample is drawn from rather than with the sample size. It 
can be argued that the views of a few people may not adequately capture an entire 
organizations view. Selecting informants who directly oversee the functions responsible 
for fighting fraud helps to mitigate the limitation of representativeness. Therefore it could 
be safe to assume that the views expressed by two or three respondents in the qualitative 
interviews could be fairly sufficient in representing the banks’ perceptions, views and 
attitudes towards fraud as these respondents are the experts in the organization.   
 
Nonetheless it is important to acknowledge that the sample size used in the quantitative 
study could influence the outcome and precision of the statistical inferences obtained 
from using the Chi-Square test. In future and, with the benefit of hindsight, a repeat of 
this or a similar study using a larger sample size may return different results. Therefore 
the results and claims of the hypotheses testing should be used conservatively. 
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8.6.3 Respondent bias 
A second limitation in these results must also be considered. That limitation is the 
potential for internal respondent bias. They could also have been some unintentional 
respondent bias of some areas of fraud not being detected. As noted above, there are 
some instances where respondents felt it would be unwise to disclose, or did not truly 
know, the full scope of the fraud issue. Given this, and given the importance of brand 
reputation in maintaining customers, it is possible that some respondents have withheld 
information that would change the interpretation of the findings, or that they did not have 
access to this information in the first place. For example, information regarding specific 
fraud prevention technologies may be limited, or there may be limitation of the scale and 
scope of fraudulent activities within the organisation itself. These are issues that could 
lead to respondent bias, through the hiding of potentially important information that 
would change the outcomes of the study if it were revealed. Although the researcher tried 
to avoid this potential both by cross-checking information between sources and by 
reassuring participants that the information regarding their situation would not be 
disclosed, this remains a potential issue within the results of the study. If this is the case, 
it is likely that the outcome of this bias would be to provide an overly optimistic or 
reductive view of fraud in the Kenyan banking system, as participants would not want to 
provide the potential impression that fraud was more widespread than it actually is. Thus, 
there is the potential that this research is overly optimistic in terms of the estimation of 
fraud amounts, although it is not anticipated that there is substantial overestimation of the 
effectiveness of fraud measures or other such issues. The researcher did not explicitly 
detect this bias as the responses from participants showed consistency; but nonetheless it 
is best if the potential for this bias is acknowledged rather than ignored as there is a risk 
in researching the ‘policeman’ as it could lead to biased views from the respondents. 
 
8.6.4 Perceptions 
A third limitation to this study is that it raises issues regarding the perceptions of the 
respondents and perceptions of fraudsters’ motives. The study does not highlight what the 
fraudsters actually think or do. However, the information coming from the respondents 
who are fraud fighters may be more credible than information raised from the fraudsters. 
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But again there is scope for bias here in the interests of those combatting fraud to portray 
the fraud challenge as difficult, costly etc. 
 
8.6.5 Gaining Access   
Gaining access to respondents is a critical part of gathering information for research. 
Fraud is a sensitive topic not only within Kenya’s banking industry but also in other 
industries. Organisations and individual respondents tend to view the researcher as an 
“investigator” and still treat researchers with great suspicion. Though the researcher 
found the respondents in the banking industry more open than has traditionally been the 
expectation in Kenya, there was a sense in which the respondents held back on 
information and others refused out-rightly to participate in the study. In some instances 
respondents held back on some information with claims such as they were bound by 
Codes of Secrecy. As a result this topic was toned down following the pilot study and 
some pertinent questions that pertained to specific aspects of fraud were not included in 
the research. Gaining access was not very easy but through snowball sampling a network 
of respondents was finally established through personal contacts and friends. In the end 
the sample was large enough with at least thirty out of a possible 40 banks participating. 
Considering that many countries have far fewer banks this research was able to achieve 
much by reaching at least 75% of the banking institutions. Thus in spite of the problems 
associated with access the findings of this study can be used to make limited 
generalizations. 
8.6.6 Theoretical limitations 
One of the main limitations that this study faced is the lack of theoretical frameworks that 
can be used to discuss fraud in the local context where politics and government are the 
main contributors to large scale fraud. As discussed in Chapter Two, the main cases of 
fraud in the banking industry in Kenya have been politically motivated and the history of 
fraud has roots in political connections. There is also lack of adequate literature in regard 
to fraud in Kenya and Africa. This coupled with limited or selected release of information 
from the respondents made it impossible to fully explore fraud using existing theoretical 
frameworks. 
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8.7 Areas for Further Research 
This research has provided a great deal of information regarding the Kenyan banking 
system and the management of fraud within this system. However, as always, there 
remain areas for further research that could be exploited. A number of potential areas for 
further research are identified and the ways in which this research could be conducted are 
discussed. 
 
One area for further research is into customer awareness of banking fraud. The research 
highlighted an interesting contradiction – much fraud in the banking system is actually 
detected by customers that notice something amiss with their bank accounts. However, 
there is little attention paid to building customer awareness for the potential for fraud. On 
the one hand, this is understandable, given that banks do not want to lend the impression 
that they are vulnerable to fraud, leading customers to potentially abandon them for banks 
that do not lend this impression. (Of course, the difference in the potential for fraud 
would not be related to the actual reduction in fraud potential, but simply in the level of 
information provided to customers.) However, given that customers are a major point of 
awareness regarding fraud, training them to identify fraudulent activity in their accounts 
could greatly increase the fraud detection capabilities and robustness of the existing 
system. In order to do this effectively, however, it is necessary to understand what 
customers already know about banking fraud and fraud detection in order to design this 
type of informational campaign effectively. A proposed area of research is therefore in 
Kenyan banking customer populations, to identify the general level of knowledge 
regarding the issue of banking fraud and bank fraud identification. The proposed method 
for this research is a large-scale survey covering major geographic areas and ensuring that 
customers of all Kenyan banks are included. 
 
A second area of research is more intensive research into the issue of international fraud. 
Most of the respondents to the interviews indicated that international fraud was a growing 
area of concern, and that it was simultaneously very difficult to manage due to problems 
with jurisdictional arrangements, lack of cooperation between international bodies, and 
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lack of clear laws in Kenya in some cases reducing the effectiveness of international 
prosecution of banking fraud. A more in-depth study focusing directly on international 
banking fraud in Kenya could provide insight into the scope of this problem and identify 
how this problem could potentially be rectified, or at least offer a way to reduce the 
severity of challenges that are posed by the growing internationalization of the banking 
sector. This research may most effectively be undertaken by extensive documentation 
research, including bank records and records of international agencies, judicial and 
legislative documentation, and all other areas concerning the issue of international fraud 
detection and prevention. This research would be large in scale and require substantial 
access to the documentation of numerous organisations; as such, it may be research that is 
most effectively performed outside the academic area, by a policy setting body within 
Kenya itself. Legal research into fraud may also be an area worth exploiting. 
 
A third area of research can be aimed at promoting connections between international 
banks and local banks. It is clear that collaboration between banks is the key to ensuring 
that there is a reduced level of fraud within the Kenyan banking system as a whole. In 
particular, this research indicated that there was a consistent overlap in bank workers, 
which often allowed a worker or customer that perpetrated fraud in one bank to move on 
to another bank undetected. This is particularly important given the relative scarcity of 
resources in the Kenyan judicial system to combat banking fraud, so it represents a way 
for banks to cooperate and increase their ability to detect the potential for fraud and to 
avoid it.  The KBA provides the obvious institutional location for establishment of a 
clearing house for information regarding workers and customers, which would allow 
banks to avoid this type of repeated fraud. Some evidence indicates that the KBA is 
already beginning to develop a central database for information regarding fraud both of 
staff and external fraudsters.  However, smaller banks reported that they did not gain as 
much information from the KBA as larger banks, as they were less integrated into the 
structure. An action research project aimed at developing this database and ensuring that 
smaller banks have access to, and skills to use, the database would be beneficial to 
increasing the ability of the Kenyan banking system as a whole to react effectively to 
incidences of fraud. Thus, the suggested research project is to implement a database that 
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can be used by all banks and to assist banks in development of interfaces and methods for 
use of this system.  
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Appendix I Statistical Outcomes 
I.A Cross tabulations by Organisational Description  
 
8.7.1 Views on Fraud  
 Description of the operation of your institutions 
Loc. 
bank 
Nat. 
Bank 
Inter. 
bank 
Inter. 
Sub. 
Reg. 
Bank 
Total 
Classification 
of fraud 
problem 
Major 
Problem 
Count 17 8 17 2 10 54 
% of 
Total 
28.3% 13.3% 28.3% 3.3% 16.7% 90.0% 
Minor 
Problem 
Count 2 0 2 0 1 5 
% of 
Total 
3.3% .0% 3.3% .0% 1.7% 8.3% 
Not a 
Problem 
Count 0 0 0 0 1 1 
% of 
Total 
.0% .0% .0% .0% 1.7% 1.7% 
Total Count 19 8 19 2 12 60 
% of 
Total 
31.7% 13.3% 31.7% 3.3% 20.0% 100.0% 
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 Description of the operation of your institutions 
Local 
bank 
Nat. 
Bank 
Intern. bank Intern Sub Reg. 
Bank 
Total 
Likelihood 
of frauds in 
financial 
sector 
Very 
likely 
Count 12 4 15 1 9 41 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
63.2% 50.0% 78.9% 50.0% 75.0% 68.3% 
Quite 
likely 
Count 3 3 2 1 3 12 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
15.8% 37.5% 10.5% 50.0% 25.0% 20.0% 
Likely Count 3 1 2 0 0 6 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
15.8% 12.5% 10.5% .0% .0% 10.0% 
Quite 
unlikely 
Count 1 0 0 0 0 1 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
5.3% .0% .0% .0% .0% 1.7% 
Total Count 19 8 19 2 12 60 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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 Description of the operation of your institutions 
Local 
bank 
Nat. 
bank 
Inter. bank Inter. Sub. Reg. 
Bank 
Total 
Opinion 
on 
overall 
trend of 
fraud 
Increasingly 
Rapidly 
Count 3 2 7 0 0 12 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation 
of your 
institutions 
15.8% 25.0% 36.8% .0% .0% 20.0% 
Increasing Count 13 4 9 2 10 38 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation 
of your 
institutions 
68.4% 50.0% 47.4% 100.0% 83.3% 63.3% 
Constant Count 2 2 2 0 1 7 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation 
of your 
institutions 
10.5% 25.0% 10.5% .0% 8.3% 11.7% 
Decreasing Count 1 0 1 0 1 3 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation 
of your 
institutions 
5.3% .0% 5.3% .0% 8.3% 5.0% 
Total Count 19 8 19 2 12 60 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation 
of your 
institutions 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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8.7.2 Characteristics of the Fraud Experience  
 Description of the operation of your institutions 
Local 
bank 
Nat. 
Bank 
Inter. 
bank 
Inter. 
Sub. 
Reg. 
Bank 
Total 
Main 
perpetrato
r of the 
fraud 
An internal 
perpetrator 
working 
alone 
Count 2 0 2 0 1 5 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
10.5% .0% 10.5% .0% 8.3% 8.3% 
Collusion 
between 
internal 
perpetrators 
Count 4 0 3 0 1 8 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
21.1% .0% 15.8% .0% 8.3% 13.3% 
An external 
perpetrator 
working 
alone 
Count 1 0 1 0 0 2 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
5.3% .0% 5.3% .0% .0% 3.3% 
Collusion 
between 
external 
perpetrators 
Count 1 0 1 0 1 3 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
5.3% .0% 5.3% .0% 8.3% 5.0% 
Colluding 
internal and 
external 
perpetrators 
Count 11 8 12 2 9 42 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
57.9% 100.0% 63.2% 100.0% 75.0% 70.0% 
Total Count 19 8 19 2 12 60 
% within 
Description 
of operation 
of your 
institutions 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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 Description of the operation of your institutions 
Local 
bank 
Nat. 
Bank 
Inter. bank Inter. Sub. Reg. 
Bank 
Total 
Internal 
1st 
party 
An Executive 
(Director/Officer) 
Count 1 0 0 1 0 2 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation 
of your 
institutions 
5.9% .0% .0% 50.0% .0% 3.7% 
A junior manager Count 0 2 0 0 3 5 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation 
of your 
institutions 
.0% 28.6% .0% .0% 27.3% 9.3% 
A middle 
manager 
Count 5 0 2 0 2 9 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation 
of your 
institutions 
29.4% .0% 11.8% .0% 18.2% 16.7% 
A senior manager Count 2 0 3 0 1 6 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation 
of your 
institutions 
11.8% .0% 17.6% .0% 9.1% 11.1% 
A junior non-
managerial 
employee 
Count 4 3 7 0 4 18 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation 
of your 
institutions 
23.5% 42.9% 41.2% .0% 36.4% 33.3% 
A middle non-
managerial 
employee 
Count 3 2 2 1 0 8 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation 
of your 
institutions 
17.6% 28.6% 11.8% 50.0% .0% 14.8% 
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A supervisor Count 2 0 3 0 1 6 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation 
of your 
institutions 
11.8% .0% 17.6% .0% 9.1% 11.1% 
Total Count 17 7 17 2 11 54 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation 
of your 
institutions 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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 Description of the operation of your institutions 
Local 
bank 
Nat. 
Bank 
Inter. bank Inter. Sub. Reg. 
Bank 
Total 
Internal 
2nd 
party 
An owner Count 0 0 0 1 0 1 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation 
of your 
institutions 
.0% .0% .0% 50.0% .0% 3.0% 
An Executive 
(Director/Officer) 
Count 1 0 0 0 0 1 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation 
of your 
institutions 
9.1% .0% .0% .0% .0% 3.0% 
A junior manager Count 4 0 3 0 2 9 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation 
of your 
institutions 
36.4% .0% 25.0% .0% 40.0% 27.3% 
A middle 
manager 
Count 0 0 3 0 0 3 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation 
of your 
institutions 
.0% .0% 25.0% .0% .0% 9.1% 
A senior manager Count 1 0 0 0 1 2 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation 
of your 
institutions 
9.1% .0% .0% .0% 20.0% 6.1% 
A junior non-
managerial 
employee 
Count 2 0 3 0 1 6 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation 
of your 
institutions 
18.2% .0% 25.0% .0% 20.0% 18.2% 
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A middle non-
managerial 
employee 
Count 1 0 2 0 1 4 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation 
of your 
institutions 
9.1% .0% 16.7% .0% 20.0% 12.1% 
A supervisor Count 2 3 1 1 0 7 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation 
of your 
institutions 
18.2% 100.0% 8.3% 50.0% .0% 21.2% 
Total Count 11 3 12 2 5 33 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation 
of your 
institutions 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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 Description of the operation of your institutions 
Local 
bank 
Nat. 
Bank 
Inter. bank Inter. Sub. Reg. 
Bank 
Total 
External 
1st 
Party 
A 
Customer 
Count 8 3 3 1 5 20 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
57.1% 37.5% 20.0% 50.0% 45.5% 40.0% 
A 
competitor 
Count 0 0 1 0 0 1 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
.0% .0% 6.7% .0% .0% 2.0% 
A supplier Count 0 1 1 1 0 3 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
.0% 12.5% 6.7% 50.0% .0% 6.0% 
A 
Contractor 
Count 1 0 0 0 1 2 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
7.1% .0% .0% .0% 9.1% 4.0% 
A former 
Employee 
Count 1 2 1 0 2 6 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
7.1% 25.0% 6.7% .0% 18.2% 12.0% 
An 
organised 
Criminal 
Count 4 0 6 0 3 13 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
28.6% .0% 40.0% .0% 27.3% 26.0% 
 345 
A 
company 
agent 
Count 0 0 3 0 0 3 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
.0% .0% 20.0% .0% .0% 6.0% 
A Friend Count 0 2 0 0 0 2 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
.0% 25.0% .0% .0% .0% 4.0% 
Total Count 14 8 15 2 11 50 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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 Description of the operation of your institutions 
Local 
bank 
Nat. 
Bank 
Inter. bank Inter. Sub. Reg. 
Bank 
Total 
Main 
perpetrator 
of the 
fraud 
An internal 
perpetrator 
working 
alone 
Count 2 0 2 0 1 5 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation 
of your 
institutions 
10.5% .0% 10.5% .0% 8.3% 8.3% 
Collusion 
between 
internal 
perpetrators 
Count 4 0 3 0 1 8 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation 
of your 
institutions 
21.1% .0% 15.8% .0% 8.3% 13.3% 
An external 
perpetrator 
working 
alone 
Count 1 0 1 0 0 2 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation 
of your 
institutions 
5.3% .0% 5.3% .0% .0% 3.3% 
Collusion 
between 
external 
perpetrators 
Count 1 0 1 0 1 3 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation 
of your 
institutions 
5.3% .0% 5.3% .0% 8.3% 5.0% 
Colluding 
internal and 
external 
perpetrators 
Count 11 8 12 2 9 42 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation 
of your 
institutions 
57.9% 100.0% 63.2% 100.0% 75.0% 70.0% 
Total Count 19 8 19 2 12 60 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation 
of your 
institutions 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Description of the operation of your institutions 
Local 
bank 
Nat. 
Bank 
Inter. bank Inter. Sub. Reg. 
Bank 
Total 
External 
2nd 
Party 
A 
Customer 
Count 0 2 3 0 2 7 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
.0% 50.0% 33.3% .0% 25.0% 25.9% 
A 
competitor 
Count 0 0 1 0 0 1 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
.0% .0% 11.1% .0% .0% 3.7% 
A supplier Count 0 0 1 1 2 4 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
.0% .0% 11.1% 50.0% 25.0% 14.8% 
A former 
Employee 
Count 1 0 0 0 0 1 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
25.0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 3.7% 
An 
organised 
Criminal 
Count 3 1 3 1 2 10 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
75.0% 25.0% 33.3% 50.0% 25.0% 37.0% 
A 
company 
agent 
Count 0 0 1 0 1 2 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
.0% .0% 11.1% .0% 12.5% 7.4% 
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Other Count 0 1 0 0 1 2 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
.0% 25.0% .0% .0% 12.5% 7.4% 
Total Count 4 4 9 2 8 27 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Description of the operation of your institutions 
Local 
bank 
Nat. 
Bank 
Inter. bank Inter. Sub. Reg. 
Bank 
Total 
Age of the 
Internal 1st 
Party 
Below 
30yrs 
Count 3 2 8 1 5 19 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
17.6% 25.0% 50.0% 50.0% 45.5% 35.2% 
31-
40yrs 
Count 11 6 6 0 5 28 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
64.7% 75.0% 37.5% .0% 45.5% 51.9% 
41-
50yrs 
Count 3 0 2 0 1 6 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
17.6% .0% 12.5% .0% 9.1% 11.1% 
Over 
50yrs 
Count 0 0 0 1 0 1 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
.0% .0% .0% 50.0% .0% 1.9% 
Total Count 17 8 16 2 11 54 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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 Description of the operation of your institutions 
Local 
bank 
Nat. 
Bank 
Inter. bank Inter. Sub. Reg. 
Bank 
Total 
Gender of 
Internal 1st 
Party 
Male Count 14 5 15 2 7 43 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
82.4% 62.5% 88.2% 100.0% 63.6% 78.2% 
Female Count 3 3 2 0 4 12 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
17.6% 37.5% 11.8% .0% 36.4% 21.8% 
Total Count 17 8 17 2 11 55 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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 Description of the operation of your institutions 
Local 
bank 
Nat. 
Bank 
Inter. bank Intern. Sub. Reg. 
Bank 
Total 
Age of the 
Internal 2nd 
Party 
Below 
30yrs 
Count 5 1 2 1 0 9 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
45.5% 33.3% 16.7% 50.0% .0% 27.3% 
31-
40yrs 
Count 4 2 10 0 5 21 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
36.4% 66.7% 83.3% .0% 100.0% 63.6% 
41-
50yrs 
Count 2 0 0 0 0 2 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
18.2% .0% .0% .0% .0% 6.1% 
Over 
50yrs 
Count 0 0 0 1 0 1 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
.0% .0% .0% 50.0% .0% 3.0% 
Total Count 11 3 12 2 5 33 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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 Description of the operation of your institutions 
Local 
bank 
Nat. 
Bank 
Intern. bank Intern. Sub. Reg. 
Bank 
Total 
Gender of 
the Internal 
2nd Party 
Male Count 8 2 8 2 3 23 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
72.7% 66.7% 61.5% 100.0% 60.0% 67.6% 
Female Count 3 1 5 0 2 11 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
27.3% 33.3% 38.5% .0% 40.0% 32.4% 
Total Count 11 3 13 2 5 34 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Description of the operation of your institutions 
Local 
bank 
Nat. 
Bank 
Inter. bank Intern. Sub. Reg. 
Bank 
Total 
Age of the 
External 1st 
Party 
Below 
30yrs 
Count 1 2 2 0 2 7 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
7.7% 25.0% 14.3% .0% 20.0% 14.9% 
31-
40yrs 
Count 9 5 7 2 7 30 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
69.2% 62.5% 50.0% 100.0% 70.0% 63.8% 
41-
50yrs 
Count 3 1 4 0 1 9 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
23.1% 12.5% 28.6% .0% 10.0% 19.1% 
Over 
50yrs 
Count 0 0 1 0 0 1 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
.0% .0% 7.1% .0% .0% 2.1% 
Total Count 13 8 14 2 10 47 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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 Description of the operation of your institutions 
Local 
bank 
Nat. 
Bank 
Intern. bank Intern. Sub. Reg. 
Bank 
Total 
Gender of 
External 1st 
Party 
Below 
30yrs 
Count 13 8 13 2 8 44 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
92.9% 100.0% 86.7% 100.0% 80.0% 89.8% 
31-
40yrs 
Count 1 0 2 0 2 5 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
7.1% .0% 13.3% .0% 20.0% 10.2% 
Total Count 14 8 15 2 10 49 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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 Description of the operation of your institutions 
Local 
bank 
Nat. 
Bank 
Inter. bank Inter. Sub. Reg. 
Bank 
Total 
Age of the 
External 2nd 
Party 
Below 
30yrs 
Count 0 2 0 0 0 2 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
.0% 50.0% .0% .0% .0% 7.7% 
31-
40yrs 
Count 4 2 6 2 8 22 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
100.0% 50.0% 75.0% 100.0% 100.0% 84.6% 
41-
50yrs 
Count 0 0 1 0 0 1 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
.0% .0% 12.5% .0% .0% 3.8% 
Over 
50yrs 
Count 0 0 1 0 0 1 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
.0% .0% 12.5% .0% .0% 3.8% 
Total Count 4 4 8 2 8 26 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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 Description of the operation of your institutions 
Local 
bank 
Nat. 
Bank 
Inter. bank Inter. Sub. Reg. 
Bank 
Total 
Gender of the 
External 2nd 
Party 
Below 
30yrs 
Count 4 3 7 2 6 22 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
100.0% 75.0% 77.8% 100.0% 75.0% 81.5% 
31-
40yrs 
Count 0 1 2 0 2 5 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
.0% 25.0% 22.2% .0% 25.0% 18.5% 
Total Count 4 4 9 2 8 27 
% within 
Description 
of the 
operation of 
your 
institutions 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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8.7.3 Software and Fraud Detection Methods in Use 
 Description of the operation of your institutions 
Local 
bank 
Nat. 
Bank 
Inter. bank Inter. Sub. Reg. 
Bank 
Total 
Password 
protection in 
use 
Yes Count 17 8 19 2 12 58 
Expected 
Count 
17.0 8.0 19.0 2.0 12.0 58.0 
% within 
Password 
protection in 
use 
29.3% 13.8% 32.8% 3.4% 20.7% 100.0% 
% within 
Description of 
the operation 
of your 
institutions 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 29.3% 13.8% 32.8% 3.4% 20.7% 100.0% 
Total Count 17 8 19 2 12 58 
Expected 
Count 
17.0 8.0 19.0 2.0 12.0 58.0 
% within 
Password 
protection in 
use 
29.3% 13.8% 32.8% 3.4% 20.7% 100.0% 
% within 
Description of 
the operation 
of your 
institutions 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 29.3% 13.8% 32.8% 3.4% 20.7% 100.0% 
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 Description of the operation of your institutions 
Local 
bank 
Nat. 
Bank 
Inter. bank Inter. Sub. Reg. 
Bank 
Total 
Antivirus 
software in 
use 
Yes Count 18 8 19 2 12 59 
Expected 
Count 
18.0 8.0 19.0 2.0 12.0 59.0 
% within 
Antivirus 
software in 
use 
30.5% 13.6% 32.2% 3.4% 20.3% 100.0% 
% within 
Description of 
the operation 
of your 
institutions 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 30.5% 13.6% 32.2% 3.4% 20.3% 100.0% 
Total Count 18 8 19 2 12 59 
Expected 
Count 
18.0 8.0 19.0 2.0 12.0 59.0 
% within 
Antivirus 
software in 
use 
30.5% 13.6% 32.2% 3.4% 20.3% 100.0% 
% within 
Description of 
the operation 
of your 
institutions 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 30.5% 13.6% 32.2% 3.4% 20.3% 100.0% 
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 Description of the operation of your institutions 
Local 
bank 
Nat. Bank Inter. bank Reg. 
Bank 
Total 
Firewall software in 
use 
Yes Count 12 2 8 3 25 
Expected Count 12.0 2.0 8.0 3.0 25.0 
% within Firewall 
software in use 
48.0% 8.0% 32.0% 12.0% 100.0% 
% within Description 
of the operation of 
your institutions 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 48.0% 8.0% 32.0% 12.0% 100.0% 
Total Count 12 2 8 3 25 
Expected Count 12.0 2.0 8.0 3.0 25.0 
% within Firewall 
software in use 
48.0% 8.0% 32.0% 12.0% 100.0% 
% within Description 
of the operation of 
your institutions 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 48.0% 8.0% 32.0% 12.0% 100.0% 
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 Description of the operation of your institutions 
Local 
bank 
Nat. 
Bank 
Inter. bank Inter. Sub. Reg. 
Bank 
Total 
Discovery 
sampling in 
use 
Yes Count 3 3 10 1 7 24 
Expected 
Count 
3.0 3.0 10.0 1.0 7.0 24.0 
% within 
Discovery 
sampling in 
use 
12.5% 12.5% 41.7% 4.2% 29.2% 100.0% 
% within 
Description of 
the operation 
of your 
institutions 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 12.5% 12.5% 41.7% 4.2% 29.2% 100.0% 
Total Count 3 3 10 1 7 24 
Expected 
Count 
3.0 3.0 10.0 1.0 7.0 24.0 
% within 
Discovery 
sampling in 
use 
12.5% 12.5% 41.7% 4.2% 29.2% 100.0% 
% within 
Description of 
the operation 
of your 
institutions 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 12.5% 12.5% 41.7% 4.2% 29.2% 100.0% 
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 Description of the operation of your institutions 
Local 
bank 
Nat. 
Bank 
Inter. bank Inter. Sub. Reg. 
Bank 
Total 
Ratio 
analysis in 
use 
Yes Count 6 2 6 1 3 18 
Expected Count 6.0 2.0 6.0 1.0 3.0 18.0 
% within Ratio 
analysis in use 
33.3% 11.1% 33.3% 5.6% 16.7% 100.0% 
% within 
Description of 
the operation of 
your institutions 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 33.3% 11.1% 33.3% 5.6% 16.7% 100.0% 
Total Count 6 2 6 1 3 18 
Expected Count 6.0 2.0 6.0 1.0 3.0 18.0 
% within Ratio 
analysis in use 
33.3% 11.1% 33.3% 5.6% 16.7% 100.0% 
% within 
Description of 
the operation of 
your institutions 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 33.3% 11.1% 33.3% 5.6% 16.7% 100.0% 
 
 Description of the operation of your institutions 
Local 
bank 
Inter. bank Reg. Bank Total 
Digital analysis in use Yes Count 2 7 1 10 
Expected Count 2.0 7.0 1.0 10.0 
% within Digital analysis 
in use 
20.0% 70.0% 10.0% 100.0% 
% within Description of 
the operation of your 
institutions 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 20.0% 70.0% 10.0% 100.0% 
Total Count 2 7 1 10 
Expected Count 2.0 7.0 1.0 10.0 
% within Digital analysis 
in use 
20.0% 70.0% 10.0% 100.0% 
% within Description of 
the operation of your 
institutions 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 20.0% 70.0% 10.0% 100.0% 
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 Description of the operation of your institutions 
Local 
bank 
Nat. 
Bank 
Inter.  bank Reg. 
Bank 
Total 
Data mining 
software in use 
Yes Count 4 1 9 8 22 
Expected Count 4.0 1.0 9.0 8.0 22.0 
% within Data 
mining software in 
use 
18.2% 4.5% 40.9% 36.4% 100.0% 
% within 
Description of the 
operation of your 
institutions 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 18.2% 4.5% 40.9% 36.4% 100.0% 
Total Count 4 1 9 8 22 
Expected Count 4.0 1.0 9.0 8.0 22.0 
% within Data 
mining software in 
use 
18.2% 4.5% 40.9% 36.4% 100.0% 
% within 
Description of the 
operation of your 
institutions 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 18.2% 4.5% 40.9% 36.4% 100.0% 
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 Description of the operation of your institutions 
Local 
bank 
Nat. 
Bank 
Inter. bank Inter. Sub. Reg. 
Bank 
Total 
Filtering 
software in 
use 
Yes Count 12 4 12 2 8 38 
Expected 
Count 
12.0 4.0 12.0 2.0 8.0 38.0 
% within 
Filtering 
software in 
use 
31.6% 10.5% 31.6% 5.3% 21.1% 100.0% 
% within 
Description of 
the operation 
of your 
institutions 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 31.6% 10.5% 31.6% 5.3% 21.1% 100.0% 
Total Count 12 4 12 2 8 38 
Expected 
Count 
12.0 4.0 12.0 2.0 8.0 38.0 
% within 
Filtering 
software in 
use 
31.6% 10.5% 31.6% 5.3% 21.1% 100.0% 
% within 
Description of 
the operation 
of your 
institutions 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 31.6% 10.5% 31.6% 5.3% 21.1% 100.0% 
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 Description of the operation of your institutions 
Local 
bank 
Nat. 
Bank 
Inter. bank Inter. Sub. Reg. 
Bank 
Total 
Continuous 
Auditing 
software in 
use 
Yes Count 14 7 14 1 10 46 
Expected 
Count 
14.0 7.0 14.0 1.0 10.0 46.0 
% within 
Continuous 
Auditing 
software in 
use 
30.4% 15.2% 30.4% 2.2% 21.7% 100.0% 
% within 
Description of 
the operation 
of your 
institutions 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 30.4% 15.2% 30.4% 2.2% 21.7% 100.0% 
Total Count 14 7 14 1 10 46 
Expected 
Count 
14.0 7.0 14.0 1.0 10.0 46.0 
% within 
Continuous 
Auditing 
software in 
use 
30.4% 15.2% 30.4% 2.2% 21.7% 100.0% 
% within 
Description of 
the operation 
of your 
institutions 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 30.4% 15.2% 30.4% 2.2% 21.7% 100.0% 
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I.B T-Tests 
 
8.7.4 Rankings of Fraud Prevention Measures 
 
 
No of employees N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Improvement or review of 
internal controls 
>= 4 21 1.90 1.044 .228 
< 4 34 1.29 .871 .149 
Establishing fraud prevention 
policies 
>= 4 17 2.71 1.160 .281 
< 4 20 2.85 1.268 .284 
Establishing an ethical code of 
conduct 
>= 4 10 3.20 1.476 .467 
< 4 15 3.40 1.183 .306 
Implementing a fraud hotline >= 4 8 4.25 .707 .250 
< 4 15 3.27 .799 .206 
Training employees on fraud 
prevention 
>= 4 20 2.65 1.348 .302 
< 4 24 2.83 1.049 .214 
Screening/reference checks on 
new employees 
>= 4 8 3.50 1.414 .500 
< 4 13 3.00 1.291 .358 
Establishing a fraud budget >= 4 2 3.00 2.828 2.000 
< 4 2 2.50 2.121 1.500 
Automated fraud prevention >= 4 5 4.60 .894 .400 
< 4 6 3.50 1.378 .563 
Staff rotation policy >= 4 5 4.20 .837 .374 
< 4 11 4.18 .874 .263 
Security department >= 4 6 3.50 1.761 .719 
< 4 5 3.60 1.140 .510 
Ethics training >= 4 1 4.00 . . 
< 4 5 3.80 1.095 .490 
Use of forensic accountants >= 4 2 2.00 .000 .000 
< 4 2 2.50 .707 .500 
Close supervision >= 4 0a . . . 
< 4 10 4.10 1.101 .348 
Fraud auditing >= 4 3 4.00 1.000 .577 
< 4 3 4.67 .577 .333 
Inventory observation >= 4 0a . . . 
< 4 1 5.00 . . 
Surveillance of electronic 
correspondence 
>= 4 0a . . . 
< 4 1 2.00 . . 
 366 
Limiting opportunities >= 4 4 2.75 1.708 .854 
< 4 3 4.00 1.732 1.000 
High deterrence measures >= 4 3 2.67 1.528 .882 
< 4 2 4.00 1.414 1.000 
Spot checking >= 4 4 3.75 1.258 .629 
< 4 6 4.33 .816 .333 
Asset protection programs >= 4 0a . . . 
< 4 0a . . . 
a. t cannot be computed because at least one of the groups is empty. 
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Levene's 
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig
. 
t df Sig. 
(2-
taile
d) 
Mean 
Differen
ce 
Std. 
Error 
Differen
ce 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lowe
r 
Uppe
r 
Improvement or 
review of 
internal controls 
Equal 
varianc
es 
assume
d 
3.92
4 
.05
3 
2.34
0 
53 .023 .611 .261 .087 1.134 
Equal 
varianc
es not 
assume
d 
  
2.24
1 
36.78
0 
.031 .611 .273 .058 1.163 
Establishing 
fraud prevention 
policies 
Equal 
varianc
es 
assume
d 
.284 .59
8 
-
.358 
35 .722 -.144 .402 -.961 .673 
Equal 
varianc
es not 
assume
d 
  
-
.361 
34.78
7 
.720 -.144 .399 -.955 .667 
Establishing an 
ethical code of 
conduct 
Equal 
varianc
es 
assume
d 
.412 .52
7 
-
.375 
23 .711 -.200 .533 -
1.303 
.903 
Equal 
varianc
es not 
assume
  
-
.359 
16.42
8 
.724 -.200 .558 -
1.380 
.980 
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d 
Implementing a 
fraud hotline 
Equal 
varianc
es 
assume
d 
.095 .76
0 
2.91
9 
21 .008 .983 .337 .283 1.684 
Equal 
varianc
es not 
assume
d 
  
3.03
4 
16.05
3 
.008 .983 .324 .296 1.670 
Training 
employees on 
fraud prevention 
Equal 
varianc
es 
assume
d 
2.44
5 
.12
5 
-
.507 
42 .615 -.183 .362 -.913 .546 
Equal 
varianc
es not 
assume
d 
  
-
.496 
35.54
1 
.623 -.183 .370 -.934 .567 
Screening/refere
nce checks on 
new employees 
Equal 
varianc
es 
assume
d 
.965 .33
8 
.832 19 .416 .500 .601 -.758 1.758 
Equal 
varianc
es not 
assume
d 
  
.813 13.89
0 
.430 .500 .615 -.820 1.820 
Establishing a 
fraud budget 
Equal 
varianc
es 
assume
d 
. . .200 2 .860 .500 2.500 -
10.25
7 
11.25
7 
Equal 
varianc
es not 
assume
  
.200 1.855 .861 .500 2.500 -
11.10
7 
12.10
7 
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d 
Automated fraud 
prevention 
Equal 
varianc
es 
assume
d 
2.73
9 
.13
2 
1.52
9 
9 .161 1.100 .719 -.527 2.727 
Equal 
varianc
es not 
assume
d 
  
1.59
3 
8.588 .147 1.100 .690 -.473 2.673 
Staff rotation 
policy 
Equal 
varianc
es 
assume
d 
.225 .64
2 
.039 14 .969 .018 .466 -.981 1.017 
Equal 
varianc
es not 
assume
d 
  
.040 8.149 .969 .018 .458 -
1.034 
1.070 
Security 
department 
Equal 
varianc
es 
assume
d 
2.83
5 
.12
7 
-
.109 
9 .916 -.100 .918 -
2.177 
1.977 
Equal 
varianc
es not 
assume
d 
  
-
.113 
8.582 .912 -.100 .881 -
2.109 
1.909 
Ethics training Equal 
varianc
es 
assume
d 
. . .167 4 .876 .200 1.200 -
3.132 
3.532 
Equal 
varianc
es not 
assume
  
. . . .200 . . . 
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d 
Use of forensic 
accountants 
Equal 
varianc
es 
assume
d 
. . -
1.00
0 
2 .423 -.500 .500 -
2.651 
1.651 
Equal 
varianc
es not 
assume
d 
  
-
1.00
0 
1.000 .500 -.500 .500 -
6.853 
5.853 
Fraud auditing Equal 
varianc
es 
assume
d 
.400 .56
1 
-
1.00
0 
4 .374 -.667 .667 -
2.518 
1.184 
Equal 
varianc
es not 
assume
d 
  
-
1.00
0 
3.200 .387 -.667 .667 -
2.715 
1.382 
Limiting 
opportunities 
Equal 
varianc
es 
assume
d 
.019 .89
6 
-
.953 
5 .384 -1.250 1.312 -
4.622 
2.122 
Equal 
varianc
es not 
assume
d 
  
-
.951 
4.415 .391 -1.250 1.315 -
4.769 
2.269 
High deterrence 
measures 
Equal 
varianc
es 
assume
d 
.046 .84
4 
-
.980 
3 .399 -1.333 1.361 -
5.664 
2.997 
Equal 
varianc
es not 
assume
  
-
1.00
0 
2.427 .406 -1.333 1.333 -
6.204 
3.538 
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d 
Spot checking Equal 
varianc
es 
assume
d 
.354 .56
8 
-
.899 
8 .395 -.583 .649 -
2.080 
.913 
Equal 
varianc
es not 
assume
d 
  
-
.819 
4.698 .452 -.583 .712 -
2.449 
1.283 
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I.C Hypotheses variables 
 
8.7.5 Variables extracted from the questionnaire item scores 
Variable Definition Level SPSS value labels for 
categories a 
PERCENTAGE LOSS 
TO FRAUD  
Overall monetary loss from 
fraud as a percentage of 
business turn-over 
Ordinal 1 = Less than 1%  
2 = More than 1% 
VALUE LOSS TO 
FRAUD 
Direct value of loss to the 
bank due to fraud (KES) 
Ordinal 1 = Less than  5,000,000 
2 = More than 5,000,000 
PERCENTAGE 
TURNOVER LOSS 
TO FRAUD 
Percentage of the bank's 
annual turnover lost to fraud   
Ordinal 1 = Less than 1% 
2 = More than 1% 
 
TYPE OF BANK Classification of bank Nominal 1 = International or 
International Subsidiary 
2 = National, Regional, or 
Local 
SIZE OF BANK Number of employees in the 
bank 
Ordinal 1 = Less than 500 
2 = More than 500 
ACTION Action taken by the bank 
when  fraud was discovered 
Nominal 1 = Criminal prosecution 
2 = Civil prosecution for 
recovery 
PARTY Party involved in the fraud Nominal 1 = Internal 1st Party 
2 = Internal 2nd Party   
3 = External 1st Party 
4 = External 2nd Party 
DETECTED FRAUD   How much fraud the bank 
detects as a percentage of the 
total incidences 
Ordinal 1 = 75% or less 
2 = More than 75% 
SECURITY 
PROTOCOL 
Measures taken by the bank to 
prevent fraud  
Nominal 0 = No (not ranked 1 to 5) 
1 = Yes (ranked 1 to 5) 
  
a Note: The categories used for the statistical analysis were collapsed from the larger number of categories 
used in the questionnaire. Collapsing of categories was essential to ensure that at least 50% of the cells each 
cross-tabulations included 5 or more cases. 
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I.D Cross-tabulations of security protocols 
 
8.7.6 Cross-tabulations of detected fraud vs. security protocols used 
    DETECTED FRAUD 
Total 
χ2 test 
statistic 
p-value 
SECURITY PROTOCOL  ≤ 75% >75% 
Improvement or review of 
internal controls 
No 2 2 4 2.008 .156 
Yes 10 41 51   
Total 12 27 55   
 
    DETECTED FRAUD 
Total 
χ2 test 
statistic 
p-value 
SECURITY PROTOCOL  ≤ 75% >75% 
Establishing fraud 
prevention policies 
No 5 14 19 .344 .557 
Yes 7 29 36   
Total 12 43 55   
 
   DETECTED FRAUD 
Total 
χ2 test 
statistic 
p-value 
SECURITY PROTOCOL  ≤ 75% >75% 
Establishing an ethical code 
of conduct 
No 8 25 33 .284 .594 
Yes 4 18 22   
Total 12 43 55   
 
   DETECTED FRAUD 
Total 
χ2 test 
statistic 
p-value 
SECURITY PROTOCOL  ≤ 75% >75% 
Implementing a fraud hotline No 5 30 35 3.201 .074 
Yes 7 13 20   
Total 12 43 55   
 
 
 
    DETECTED FRAUD 
Total 
χ2 test 
statistic 
p-value 
SECURITY PROTOCOL  ≤ 75% >75% 
Training employees on fraud 
prevention 
No 6 8 14 4.873 .027* 
Yes 6 35 41   
Total 12 43 55   
 
   DETECTED FRAUD 
Total 
χ2 test 
statistic 
p-value 
SECURITY PROTOCOL  ≤ 75% >75% 
Screening/reference checks 
on new employees 
No 10 26 36 2.170 .141 
Yes 2 17 19   
Total 12 43 55   
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    DETECTED FRAUD 
Total 
χ2 test 
statistic 
p-value 
SECURITY PROTOCOL  ≤ 75% >75% 
Establishing a fraud budget No 9 43 52 11.370 .001* 
Yes 3 0 3   
Total 12 43 55   
 
   DETECTED FRAUD 
Total 
χ2 test 
statistic 
p-value 
SECURITY PROTOCOL  ≤ 75% >75% 
Automated fraud prevention No 11 38 49 .105 .746 
Yes 1 5 6   
Total 12 43 55   
 
   DETECTED FRAUD 
Total 
χ2 test 
statistic 
p-value 
SECURITY PROTOCOL  ≤ 75% >75% 
Staff rotation policy No 8 32 40 .284 .594 
Yes 4 11 15   
Total 12 43 55   
 
  
 DETECTED FRAUD 
Total 
χ2 test 
statistic 
p-value 
SECURITY PROTOCOL  ≤ 75% >75% 
Security department No 10 34 44 .107 .744 
Yes 2 9 11   
Total 12 43 55   
 
   DETECTED FRAUD 
Total 
χ2 test 
statistic 
p-value 
SECURITY PROTOCOL  ≤ 75% >75% 
Ethics training No 11 39 50 .011 .918 
Yes 1 4 5   
Total 12 43 55   
 
   DETECTED FRAUD 
Total 
χ2 test 
statistic 
p-value 
SECURITY PROTOCOL  ≤ 75% >75% 
Use of forensic accountants No 10 42 52 3.742 .053 
Yes 2 1 3   
Total 12 43 55   
 
 
   DETECTED FRAUD 
Total 
χ2 test 
statistic 
p-value 
SECURITY PROTOCOL  ≤ 75% >75% 
Close supervision No 8 38 46 3.230 .072 
Yes 4 5 9   
Total 12 43 55   
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   DETECTED FRAUD 
Total 
χ2 test 
statistic 
p-value 
SECURITY PROTOCOL  ≤ 75% >75% 
 Fraud Auditing No 12 39 51 1.204 .273 
Yes 0 4 4   
Total 12 43 55   
 
   DETECTED FRAUD 
Total 
χ2 test 
statistic 
p-value 
SECURITY PROTOCOL  ≤ 75% >75% 
Inventory observation No 12 42 54 .284 .594 
Yes 0 1 1   
Total 12 43 55   
 
   DETECTED FRAUD 
Total 
χ2 test 
statistic 
p-value 
SECURITY PROTOCOL  ≤ 75% >75% 
Surveillance of electronic 
correspondence 
No 11 43 54 3.650 .056 
Yes 1 0 1   
Total 12 43 55   
 
   DETECTED FRAUD 
Total 
χ2 test 
statistic 
p-value 
SECURITY PROTOCOL  ≤ 75% >75% 
Limiting opportunities No 10 38 48 .214 .643 
Yes 2 5 7   
Total 12 43 55   
 
 
   DETECTED FRAUD 
Total 
χ2 test 
statistic 
p-value 
SECURITY PROTOCOL  ≤ 75% >75% 
High deterrence measures No 12 38 50 1.535 .215 
Yes 0 5 5   
Total 12 43 55   
 
   DETECTED FRAUD 
Total 
χ2 test 
statistic 
p-value 
SECURITY PROTOCOL  ≤ 75% >75% 
Spot checking No 10 35 45 .024 .878 
Yes 2 8 40   
Total 12 43 55   
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8.7.7 Cross-tabulations of size of bank vs. security protocols used 
  SIZE OF BANK 
Total 
χ2 test 
statistic 
p-value 
SECURITY PROTOCOL  < 500 > 500 
Improvement or review of 
internal controls 
No 2 3 5 .055 .814 
Yes 25 30 55   
Total 27 33 60   
 
   SIZE OF BANK 
Total 
χ2 test 
statistic 
p-value 
SECURITY PROTOCOL  < 500 > 500 
Establishing fraud 
prevention policies 
No 12 11 23 .776 .379 
Yes 15 22 37   
Total 27 33 60   
 
  SIZE OF BANK 
Total 
χ2 test 
statistic 
p-value 
SECURITY PROTOCOL  < 500 > 500 
Establishing an ethical 
code of conduct 
No 12 23 35 3.896 .048* 
Yes 15 10 25   
Total 27 33 60   
 
  SIZE OF BANK 
Total 
χ2 test 
statistic 
p-value 
SECURITY PROTOCOL  < 500 > 500 
Implementing a fraud 
hotline 
No 19 18 37 1.573 .210 
Yes 8 15 23   
Total 27 33 60   
 
  SIZE OF BANK 
Total 
χ2 test 
statistic 
p-value 
SECURITY PROTOCOL  < 500 > 500 
Training employees on 
fraud prevention 
No 10 6 16 2.700 .100 
Yes 17 27 44   
Total 27 33 60   
 
  SIZE OF BANK 
Total 
χ2 test 
statistic 
p-value 
SECURITY PROTOCOL  < 500 > 500 
Screening/reference 
checks on new employees 
No 18 21 39 .060 .807 
Yes 9 12 21   
Total 27 33 60   
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  SIZE OF BANK 
Total 
χ2 test 
statistic 
p-value 
SECURITY PROTOCOL  < 500 > 500 
Establishing a fraud 
budget 
No 25 31 56 .043 .835 
Yes 2 2 4   
Total 27 33 60   
 
  SIZE OF BANK 
Total 
χ2 test 
statistic 
p-value 
SECURITY PROTOCOL  < 500 > 500 
Automated fraud 
prevention 
No 22 30 52 1.142 .285 
Yes 5 3 8   
Total 27 33    
 
 
  SIZE OF BANK 
Total 
χ2 test 
statistic 
p-value 
SECURITY PROTOCOL  < 500 > 500 
Staff rotation policy No 19 25 44 .220 .639 
Yes 8 8 16   
Total 27 33 60   
 
  SIZE OF BANK 
Total 
χ2 test 
statistic 
p-value 
SECURITY PROTOCOL  < 500 > 500 
Security department No 23 26  49 .406 .524 
Yes 4 7 11   
Total 27 33 60   
 
  SIZE OF BANK 
Total 
χ2 test 
statistic 
p-value 
SECURITY PROTOCOL  < 500 > 500 
Ethics training No 22 32 54 3.958 .047* 
Yes 5 1 5   
Total 27 33 60   
 
  SIZE OF BANK 
Total 
χ2 test 
statistic 
p-value 
SECURITY PROTOCOL  < 500 > 500 
Use of forensic 
accountants 
No 25 31 56 .043 .835 
Yes 2 2 4   
Total 27 33 60   
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  SIZE OF BANK 
Total 
χ2 test 
statistic 
p-value 
SECURITY PROTOCOL  < 500 > 500 
Close supervision No 19 31 50 5.939 .015* 
Yes 8 2 10   
Total 27 33 60   
 
 
  SIZE OF BANK 
Total 
χ2 test 
statistic 
p-value 
SECURITY PROTOCOL  < 500 > 500 
 Fraud Auditing No 25 29 54 .367 .545 
Yes 2 4 6   
Total 27 33 60   
 
  SIZE OF BANK 
Total 
χ2 test 
statistic 
p-value 
SECURITY PROTOCOL  < 500 > 500 
Inventory observation No 27 32 59 .832 .362 
Yes 0 1 1   
Total 27 33 60   
 
  SIZE OF BANK 
Total 
χ2 test 
statistic 
p-value 
SECURITY PROTOCOL  < 500 > 500 
Surveillance of electronic 
correspondence 
No 26 33 59 1.243 .265 
Yes 1 0 1   
Total 27 33 60   
 
  SIZE OF BANK 
Total 
χ2 test 
statistic 
p-value 
SECURITY PROTOCOL  < 500 > 500 
Limiting opportunities No 25 28 53 .864 .353 
Yes 2 5 7   
Total 27 33 60   
 
  SIZE OF BANK 
Total 
χ2 test 
statistic 
p-value 
SECURITY PROTOCOL  < 500 > 500 
High deterrence measures No 25 30 55 .055 .814 
Yes 2 3 5   
Total 27 33 60   
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  SIZE OF BANK 
Total 
χ2 test 
statistic 
p-value 
SECURITY PROTOCOL  < 500 > 500 
Spot checking No 23 27 50 .121 .728 
Yes 4 6 10   
Total 27 33 60   
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Appendix II Supporting Data 
II.A. Corruption Perception Index, 2010 
 
 
Source: Transparency International, 2010 
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II.B. CPI Rankings for Sub-Saharan Africa, 2010 
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Source: Transparency International, 2010 
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II.C. List of Commercial Banks in Kenya, 2008 
1) African Banking Corporation Ltd  
2) Bank of Africa Ltd  
3) Bank of Baroda Ltd  
4) Bank of India  
5) Barclays Bank of Kenya Ltd  
6) CFC Stanbic Bank Ltd  
7) Charterhouse Bank Ltd (Bank under suspension by Central Bank of Kenya) 
8) Chase Bank Ltd  
9) Citibank, N.A.  
10) City Finance Bank Ltd  
11) Commercial Bank of Africa Ltd  
12) Consolidated Bank of Kenya Ltd  
13) Co-operative Bank of Kenya Ltd  
14) Credit Bank Ltd  
15) Development Bank of Kenya Ltd  
16) Diamond Trust Bank Ltd  
17) Dubai Bank Ltd  
18) Ecobank Ltd  
19) Equatorial Commercial Bank Ltd  
20) Equity Bank Ltd  
21) Family Bank Ltd  
22) Fidelity Commercial Bank Ltd  
23) Fina Bank Ltd  
24) First Community Bank Ltd (New bank) 
25) Giro Commercial Bank Ltd  
26) Guardian Bank Ltd  
27) Gulf African Bank Ltd (New Bank) 
28) Habib AG Zurich 
29) Habib Bank Ltd  
30) Imperial Bank Limited  
31) Investment & Mortgages Bank  
32) Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd  
33) K-Rep Bank Ltd  
34) Middle East Bank Ltd  
35) National Bank of Kenya Ltd  
36) NIC Bank Ltd  
37) Oriental Commercial Bank Ltd  
38) Paramount-Universal Bank Ltd  
39) Prime Bank Ltd. 
40) Southern Credit Banking Corp. Ltd  
41) Standard Chartered Bank Ltd  
42) Transnational Bank Ltd  
43) Victoria Commercial Bank Ltd 
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Non Banking Financial Institutions  
44) Housing Finance Co. of Kenya Ltd  
45) Savings & Loan Ltd  
Source: Central Bank of Kenya, Bank Supervision Annual Report, 2008. 
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II.D. Ownership Structures of Banks  
I) INSTITUTIONS IN TERMS OF SHAREHOLDING 
a) Foreign owned institutions 
i) Foreign owned not locally incorporated 
Bank of Africa (K) Ltd. 
Bank of India  
Citibank N.A. Kenya  
Habib Bank A.G. Zurich  
Habib Bank Ltd.  
ii) Foreign owned, locally incorporated institutions (Partly owned by locals) 
• Bank of Baroda (K) Ltd.  
• Barclays Bank of Kenya Ltd.  
• Diamond Trust Bank Kenya Ltd.  
• K-Rep Bank Ltd.  
• Standard Chartered Bank (K) Ltd.  
• Ecobank Ltd. 
• Gulf Africa Bank (K) Ltd.  
• First Community Bank  
iii) Foreign owned but locally incorporated institutions (Wholly owned 
subsidiary) 
UBA Kenya Bank Limited 
b) Institutions with Government participation 
• Consolidated Bank of Kenya Ltd.  
• Development Bank of Kenya Ltd.  
• Housing Finance Ltd.  
• Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd.  
• National Bank of Kenya Ltd.  
• CFC Stanbic Bank Ltd.  
c) Institutions locally owned 
• African Banking Corporation Ltd.  
• City Finance Bank Ltd.  
• Commercial Bank of Africa Ltd.  
• Co-operative Bank of Kenya Ltd.  
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• Credit Bank Ltd.  
• Charterhouse Bank Ltd.  
• Chase Bank (K) Ltd.  
• Dubai Bank Kenya Ltd. 
• Equatorial Commercial Bank Ltd.  
• Equity Bank Ltd.  
• Family Bank Ltd.  
• Fidelity Commercial Bank Ltd.  
• Fina Bank Ltd.  
• Giro Commercial Bank Ltd.  
• Guardian Bank Ltd.  
• Imperial Bank Ltd.  
• Investment & Mortgages Bank Ltd.  
• Middle East Bank (K) Ltd.  
• NIC Bank Ltd.  
• Oriental Commercial Bank Ltd.  
• Paramount Universal Bank Ltd.  
• Prime Bank Ltd.  
• Southern Credit Banking Corporation Ltd.  
• Trans-National Bank Ltd.  
• Victoria Commercial Bank Ltd.  
d) Institutions Listed on the NSE  
• Barclays Bank of Kenya Ltd.  
• CFC Stanbic Bank Ltd.  
• Equity Bank Ltd.  
• Housing Finance Ltd.  
• Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd.  
• NIC Bank Ltd.  
• Standard Chartered Bank (K) Ltd.  
• Diamond Trust Bank Kenya Ltd.  
• National Bank of Kenya  
• Co-operative Bank of Kenya Ltd. 
Source:  Central Bank of Kenya, 2008(c): 
http://www.centralbank.go.ke/financialsystem/banks/shareholding.aspx 
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II.E. Mergers in the Kenyan banking sector, 1989-2010 
No.  Institution Merged with Current Name Date 
approved 
1 9 Financial Institutions All 9 Financial Institutions 
Merged together 
Consolidated Bank of 
Kenya Ltd 
1989 
2 Indosuez Merchant 
Finance 
Banque Indosuez Credit Agricole 
Indosuez 
10.11.1994 
3 Transnational Finance 
Ltd. 
Transnational Bank Ltd. Transnational Bank Ltd. 28.11.1994 
4 Ken Baroda Finance 
Ltd. 
Bank of Baroda (K) Ltd. Bank of Baroda (K) Ltd. 02.12.1994 
5 First American Finance 
Ltd. 
First American Bank Ltd. First American Bank 
(K) Ltd. 
05.09.1995 
6 Bank of India Bank of India Finance Ltd. Bank of India (Africa) 
Ltd. 
15.11.1995 
7 Stanbic Bank (K) Ltd. Stanbic Finance (K) Ltd. Stanbic Bank Kenya 
Ltd. 
05.01.1996 
8 Mercantile Finance Ltd. Ambank Ltd. Ambank Ltd. 15.01.1996 
9 Delphis Finance Ltd. Delphis Bank Ltd. Delphis Bank Ltd. 17.01.1996 
10  CBA Financial Services  Commercial Bank of Africa 
ltd  
Commercial Bank of 
Africa ltd  
26.01.1996 
11 Trust Finance Ltd. Trust Bank (K) Ltd. Trust Bank (K) Ltd. 07.01.1997 
12  National Industrial 
Credit Bank Ltd. 
African Mercantile Banking 
Corp. 
NIC Bank Ltd. 14.06.1997 
13 Giro Bank Ltd. Commerce Bank Ltd. Giro Commercial Bank 
Ltd.  
24.11.1998 
14 Guardian Bank Ltd. First National Finance Bank 
Ltd. 
Guardian Bank Ltd. 24.11.1998 
15 Diamond Trust Bank 
(K) Ltd. 
Premier Savings & Finance 
Ltd. 
Diamond Trust Bank 
(K) Ltd. 
12.02.1999 
16 National Bank of Kenya 
Ltd. 
Kenya National Capital 
Corp. 
National Bank of Kenya 
Ltd. 
24.05.1999 
17 Standard Chartered 
Bank (K) Ltd. 
Standard Chartered 
Financial Services 
Standard Chartered 
Bank (K) Ltd. 
17.11.1999 
18 Barclays Bank of Kenya 
Ltd. 
Barclays Merchant Finance 
Ltd. 
Barclays Bank of Kenya 
Ltd. 
22.11.1999 
19 Habib A.G. Zurich Habib Africa Bank Ltd. Habib Bank A.G. Zurich 30.11.1999 
20 Guilders Inter. Bank 
Ltd. 
Guardian Bank Ltd. Guardian Bank Ltd. 03.12.1999 
21 Universal Bank Ltd. Paramount Bank Ltd. Paramount Universal 
Bank 
11.01.2000 
22 Kenya Commercial 
Bank  
Kenya Commercial Finance 
Co. 
Kenya Commercial 
Bank Ltd. 
21.03.2001 
23 Citibank NA ABN Amro Bank Ltd. Citibank NA 16.10.2001 
24 Bullion Bank Ltd. Southern Credit Banking 
Corp. Ltd. 
Southern Credit 
Banking Corp. Ltd. 
07.12.2001 
25 Co-operative Merchant 
Bank ltd  
Co-operative Bank ltd  Co-operative Bank of 
Kenya ltd  
28.05.2002 
26 Biashara Bank Ltd. Investment & Mortgage 
Bank Ltd. 
Investment & Mortgage 
Bank Ltd. 
01.12.2002 
27 First American Bank ltd  Commercial Bank of Africa Commercial Bank of 01.07.2005 
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ltd  Africa ltd  
28 East African Building 
Society  
Akiba Bank ltd  EABS Bank ltd  31.10.2005 
29 Prime Capital & Credit 
Ltd.  
Prime Bank Ltd.  Prime Bank Ltd.  01.01.2008 
30 CFC Bank Ltd. Stanbic Bank Ltd. CFC Stanbic Bank Ltd. 01.06.2008 
31 Savings and Loan (K) 
Limited  
Kenya Commercial Bank 
Limited  
Kenya Commercial 
Bank Limited  
01.02.2010 
32 City Finance Bank Ltd.  Jamii Bora Kenya Ltd.  Jamii Bora Bank Ltd.  11.02.2010 
33 Equatorial Commercial 
Bank Ltd 
Southern Credit Banking 
Corporation Ltd 
Equatorial Commercial 
Bank Ltd 
01.06.2010 
 
 
 
Mergers in the Kenyan Banking Industry  
(Source: Adapted from Central Bank of Kenya, 2010) 
 
 
Institution Acquired by Current Name Date 
approved 
Mashreq Bank Ltd.  Dubai Kenya Ltd.  Dubai Bank Ltd.  01.04.2000 
Credit Agricole Indosuez 
(K) Ltd.  
Bank of Africa 
Kenya Ltd.  
Bank of Africa 
Bank Ltd.  
30.04.2004 
EABS Bank Ltd.  Ecobank Kenya Ltd.  Ecobank Bank Ltd.  16.06.2008 
Summary of acquisitions in the Kenyan Banking Industry 
(Source: Central Bank of Kenya, 2010) 
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II.F. Conversions in the Banking Sector, 1994-2007 
N o .   F i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n  ( o l d  
n a m e )  
C o m m e r c i a l  B a n k  ( n e w  
n a m e )  
D a t e  
a p p r o v e d  
1 Universal Finance Ltd. Universal Bank Ltd. 03.11.1994 
2 Akiba Loans & Finance Ltd. Akiba Bank Ltd. 14.11.1994 
3 Diamond Trust Company Ltd Diamond Trust Bank Ltd 15.11.1994 
4 Credit Kenya Finance Ltd Credit Bank Ltd 30.11.1994 
5 Consolidated Finance Ltd African Banking Corp. Ltd 08.12.1994 
6 Imperial Finance Co. Ltd Imperial Bank Ltd 08.12.1994 
7 Lake Credit Finance Ltd. Reliance Bank Ltd. 13.01.1995 
8 Habib Kenya Finance Ltd. Habib African Bank Ltd. 26.01.1995 
9 Finance Institution of Africa Ltd FINA Bank Ltd 13.01.1995 
10 Air Credit Finance Ltd. Ari Bank Corporation Ltd. 07.03.1995 
11 City Finance Ltd City Finance Bank Ltd 23.03.1995 
12 Credit Finance Corporation Ltd CFC Bank Ltd 29.03.1995 
13 Equatorial Finance Co. Ltd Equatorial Commercial Bank Ltd 23.06.1995 
14 Southern Credit Finance Ltd Southern Credit Banking Corp. Ltd 26.09.1995 
15 First National Finance Ltd. First National Finance Bank Ltd. 19.04.1995 
16 Prudential Finance Ltd. Prudential Bank Ltd. 12.05.1995 
17 Combined Finance Ltd. Paramount Bank Ltd. 05.07.1995 
18 National Industrial Credit Ltd National Industrial Credit Bank Ltd 28.09.1995 
19 Euro Finance Ltd. Euro Bank Ltd. 20.12.1995 
20 Victoria Finance Company Ltd Victoria Commercial Bank Ltd 11.01.1996 
21 Co-operative Finance Ltd. Co-operative Merchant Bank Ltd. 27.03.1996 
22 Investments & Mortgages Ltd Investment & Mortgages Bank Ltd 27.03.1996 
23 Credit & Commerce Finance Ltd. Commerce Bank Ltd. 15.04.1996 
24 Development Finance Co. Ltd Development Bank of Kenya Ltd 20.09.1996 
25 Charterhouse Finance Ltd Charterhouse Bank Ltd 01.01.1998 
26 Fidelity Finance Ltd Fidelity Commercial Bank Ltd 07.03.1999 
27 K-Rep Ltd K-Rep Bank Ltd 24.03.1999 
28 Equity Building Society Equity Bank Ltd 28.12.2004 
29 Akiba Bank Ltd EABS Bank Ltd 31.10.2005 
30 Family Finance Building Society Family Bank Ltd 01.05.2007 
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Conversions within the Banking Industry 
 (Source: Adapted from Central Bank of Kenya, 2010b) 
 
 
 
Overall activity of the Kenyan banking industry, 1994-2010 
 (Source: Adapted from Central Bank of Kenya, 2010 and 2010b) 
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Appendix III Research Instruments 
III.A. Fraud Survey Questionnaire  
1) Nature, trends and characteristics of fraud 
  
This section assesses the industry’s vulnerability to fraud. Please circle the number 
that represents your response. 
  
1.1 How would you classify the problem of fraud in the banking industry? 
 
  1. Major problem 2. Minor problem 3. Not a problem   
 
1.2 How would you assess the likelihood of frauds occurring in the financial 
sector over the next five years?  
 
Very  Quite    Quite  Very  
Likely  Likely  Likely  Unlikely  Unlikely 
    1     2      3      4      5   
 
 
1.3 What in your opinion is the overall trend of fraud in the financial industry?  
 
Increasing        Rapidly 
Rapidly  Increasing Constant Decreasing Decreasing 
     1       2      3       4      5  
  
 
1.4 What do you think are the reason(s) for the trend in 1.3 above? Please circle a 
maximum of three of the most important reasons out of the possible reasons 
below.  
 
   1. Economic pressure 
   2. *More/less sophisticated criminals 
   3. Changing society values 
   4. Socio-cultural factors 
   5. Political factors 
   6. Effectiveness of justice systems  
   7. Advanced computer technologies 
   8. *Good/Poor ethical practices 
   9. *Good/Poor management practices 
10. *Inadequate/Improved fraud training for those involved in fraud  
prevention 
 11. Other specify)_______________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________ 
 
(* delete as appropriate) 
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2) FRAUD EXPERIENCE 
The degree of fraud varies from one organisation to another. In this section I would 
like you to think of a typical or the last fraud incident you can remember your 
organisation being involved in the last five years which resulted in a monetary loss. 
 
Concerning the actual fraud tell us: 
2.1 Who was/were the main perpetrator(s) of the fraud? 
 1. An internal perpetrator working alone 
 2. Collusion between internal perpetrators 
 3. An external perpetrator working alone 
 4. Collusion between external perpetrators 
 5. Colluding internal and external perpetrators 
 
2.2 Who were the party/parties involved in the fraud? (Give at most the main 2 
internal and 2 external parties) 
 Internal 1st Party    Internal 2nd Party 
 1. An Owner    1. An Owner 
 2. An Executive (Director or Officer) 2. An Executive (Director or Officer) 
 3. A Junior Manager   3. A Junior Manager   
 4. A Middle Manager   4. A Middle Manager 
 5. A Senior Manager   5. A Senior Manager 
 6. A Junior non-managerial employee 6. A Junior non- managerial employee 
 7. A Middle non-managerial employee 7. A Middle non-managerial employee 
 8. A Supervisor    8. A Supervisor 
 
 External 1st Party    External 2nd Party 
 1. A Customer    1. A Customer 
 2. A Competitor    2. A Competitor 
 3. A Supplier    3. A Supplier 
 4. A Contractor    4. A Contractor 
 5. A Former Employee   5. A Former Employee 
 6. An Organised Criminal   6. An Organised Criminal 
 7. A Company Agent   7. A Company Agent 
 8. Other ________________________ 8. Other __________________________ 
 
2.3 What was/were the age(s) and gender(s) of the perpetrator(s)? 
Party Age Gender 
1. Internal 1st Party 1. Below 30 years 
2. 31- 40 years 
3. 41- 50 years 
4. over 50 years 
1. Male 
2. Female 
2. Internal 2nd Party 1. Below 30 years 
2. 31- 40 years 
3. 41- 50 years 
4. over 50 years 
1. Male 
2. Female 
3. External 1st Party 1. Below 30 years 
2. 31- 40 years 
3. 41- 50 years 
4. over 50 years 
1. Male 
2. Female 
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4. External 2nd Party 1. Below 30 years 
2. 31- 40 years 
3. 41- 50 years 
4. over 50 years 
1. Male 
2. Female 
 
2.4 What type of fraud was it? (Circle any three at most) 
1. Cash 
2. Cheques 
3. Credit card 
4. Other negotiable instruments 
5. Inventory (stock/supplies) 
6. Kickbacks/bribery/corruption 
7. Conflicts of interest 
8. Identity 
9. Fixed assets (Specify) __________________________________________ 
10. Other current assets (specify)____________________________________ 
11. Intangible assets; specify whether 
  a) Patents/copyrights/trademarks 
  b) Confidential Information/Intelligence 
  c) Goodwill 
  d) Leasing 
  e) Intellectual Property Rights ____________________________ 
  f) Other Intangibles (specify) _____________________________ 
 
2.5 What was the nature of the fraud? (Circle any three at most) 
1. Theft 
2. Diversion/Misappropriation 
3. Conversion 
4. Abuse/Misuse 
5. Sabotage 
6. Infringement 
7. Other (specify)________________________________________________ 
 
2.6 What else did the fraud involve? (Circle any three at most) 
1. Transfer of funds (e.g. wire transfer) 
2. The use of computers 
3. Identity fraud  
4. Falsified accounts & financial statements 
5. False invoicing  
6. Fraudulent expense claim 
7. Nothing else 
8. Other (please explain)___________________________________________ 
 
2.7 What was (were) the perpetrators principle motivating factor(s) for committing 
the fraud? (Circle any three at most) 
1. Gambling 
2. Personal financial pressure (e.g. payment of school fees, debts etc.) 
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3. Greed  
4. Lifestyle habits 
5. Opportunity 
6. Substance abuse (e.g. consumption to alcohol, drugs etc) 
7. Corporate financial pressures (e.g. meeting corporate targets) 
8. Other _______________________________________________________ 
9. Don’t know 
 
2.8 What was (were) the reason(s) given by the perpetrator(s) in justification of their 
fraudulent actions? (Circle at most any three responses) 
1. Under-paid 
2. Influenced/forced by others 
3. Was just borrowing hoping to repay 
4. Everyone else around them was fraudulent 
5. Others are getting away with fraud and so they thought they also could 
6. Was seeking revenge on the organisation for what they did to them 
7. Had family pressure and taking the money was the only way to resolve it 
8. Reasoned that the amount taken was not too large a sum 
9. It was an opportunity to get rich quickly 
10. Others (please explain) _________________________________________ 
11. Don’t know 
 
2.9 If possible, could you estimate the overall monetary loss from this fraud incidence 
as a percentage of business turn-over (income)? 
 
1. Less than 1% 
2. 1% - 5% 
3. 6% - 10% 
4. 11% - 15% 
5. 16% - 20% 
6. Over 20% 
7. Don’t know 
 
2.10 Could you, if possible, quantify the direct loss to the organisation due to this 
fraud, either in value or as a percentage of business turn-over? 
   
1. K.Shs._____________ 2. _______ %  3. Do not know 
 
2.11 Why did the fraud occur? (Circle up to any three reasons) 
 1. Poor screening procedures on hiring employees 
 2. Poor internal controls 
 3. Overrides of internal controls by management 
 4. Poor organisational culture 
 5. Lack of ethical culture (e.g. honesty, integrity etc) 
 6. Failure to punish offenders 
 7. Lack of fraud training 
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 8. Poor inventory control 
 9. Poor record keeping and lack of adequate documentation 
 10. Use of new technology and systems 
  11. Other (specify) _______________________________________________ 
 12. Don’t know 
 
2.12 How was the fraud detected?  
1. By accident/chance  
 2. Internal controls 
 3. External audit 
 4. Internal audit 
 5. Internal whistleblowers/fraud hotline 
 6. External whistleblowers (tip offs, complaints) 
 7. Third party investigations 
 8. Computer system controls  
 9. Anonymous letters/calls 
 10. Other (please specify) __________________________________________ 
 11. Don’t know 
 
2.13 Who investigated the fraud? (Circle up to any three that apply) 
 1. Law enforcement body (e.g. Police) 
2. Government regulatory body (e.g. KACC, CMA, Law Society of Kenya) 
3. Internal investigation by Finance Department 
4. Internal investigation by Security Department 
5. Case reviewed by internal audit committee 
6. External Auditors 
7. Risk Manager 
8. Forensic Accountants 
9. Other (specify) _____________________________________________________ 
 
2.14 (a) What action(s) did the organisation take when this fraud was discovered? 
 
       Internal  External 
       Party   Party  
      1st  2nd   1st  2nd  
1. Immediate dismissal     [ ]  [ ]    
2. Disciplinary action other than dismissal  [ ]  [ ]     
3. Allowed employee(s) to resign   [ ]  [ ]    
4. Civil prosecution for recovery   [ ]  [ ]   [ ]  [ ] 
5. Criminal prosecution     [ ]  [ ]   [ ]  [ ]  
6. Negotiated settlement    [ ]  [ ]   [ ]  [ ]  
7. Took no action     [ ]  [ ]   [ ]  [ ]  
8. Other action (please specify)    [ ]  [ ]   [ ]  [ ] 
     _____________________________________ 
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(b) In case of criminal or civil prosecution what was (were) the outcomes? 
  
       Internal  External 
       Party   Party  
      1st  2nd   1st  2nd  
1. Acquittal      [ ]  [ ]   [ ]  [ ] 
2. Conviction      [ ]  [ ]   [ ]  [ ]  
3. Negotiated settlement    [ ]  [ ]   [ ]  [ ]  
4. On-going case     [ ] [ ]  [ ] [ ] 
 
(c) What was the extent of financial recovery? 
  
     Internal  External 
     Party   Party    
    1st  2nd   1st  2nd  
1. 0%     [  ]  [  ]   [  ]  [  ] 
2. Partial (give % of recovery)  [  ]%  [  ]%   [  ] % [  ]%  
3. Full (100%)    [  ]  [  ]   [  ]  [  ]  
 
3. FRAUD PREVENTION 
In this section I would like to find out how your organisation carries out fraud 
management, the counter-fraud measures being employed and the costs of fraud. 
 
3.1 What measures have/are being taken to prevent fraud in your organisation? Please 
rank up to five of the most important ones with ‘1’ = the most important, ‘2’ = the next 
most important to ‘5’ = the 5th most important 
  
Circle Measure Rank (1-5) 
  1 Improvement or review of internal controls  
  2 Establishing fraud prevention policies  
  3 Establishing an ethical code of conduct  
  4 Implementing a fraud hotline (whistle blowing)  
  5 Training employees on fraud prevention and detection  
  6 Screening/reference checks on new employees  
  7 Establishing a fraud budget  
  8 Automated fraud prevention e.g. use of surveillance 
equipment (cameras) 
 
  9 Staff rotation policy  
10 Security department  
11 Ethics training  
12 Use of forensic accountants  
13 Close supervision  
14 Fraud auditing  
15 Inventory observation  
16 Surveillance of electronic correspondence  
17 Limiting opportunities  
18 High deterrence measures  
19 Spot checking  
20 Asset Protection programs  
 397 
21 Other (specify)  
 
 
3.2 Please indicate what fraud technology/software you use, stating whether it is 
internally or externally developed and the perceived effectiveness of the application 
 
Fraud software (Circle as 
appropriate) 
Tick Internally or 
externally 
developed 
Int. = Internally 
Ext. = Externally 
Effectiveness 
1 = Very effective 
2 = Effective 
3 = Ineffective 
4 = Not sure 
  1. Filtering software Yes [  ]    No [  ] Int. [  ]    Ext. [  ] 1   2   3   4 
  2. Firewalls Yes [  ]    No [  ] Int. [  ]    Ext. [  ] 1   2   3   4 
  3. Password protection Yes [  ]    No [  ] Int. [  ]    Ext. [  ] 1   2   3   4 
  4. Continuous auditing Yes [  ]    No [  ] Int. [  ]    Ext. [  ] 1   2   3   4 
  5. Discovery sampling Yes [  ]    No [  ] Int. [  ]    Ext. [  ] 1   2   3   4 
  6. Virus protection Yes [  ]    No [  ] Int. [  ]    Ext. [  ] 1   2   3   4 
  7. Financial ratios Yes [  ]    No [  ] Int. [  ]    Ext. [  ] 1   2   3   4 
  8. Digital analysis Yes [  ]    No [  ] Int. [  ]    Ext. [  ] 1   2   3   4 
  9. Data mining Yes [  ]    No [  ] Int. [  ]    Ext. [  ] 1   2   3   4 
10. Other (specify) Yes [  ]    No [  ] Int. [  ]    Ext. [  ] 1   2   3   4 
11. Other (specify) Yes [  ]    No [  ] Int. [  ]    Ext. [  ] 1   2   3   4 
 
 
3.3 How much fraud do you think your organisation detects on an annual basis? (Insert 
estimated percentage either by value and/or by number of incidences) 
 
By Value (K.Shs)   ______ % of the total value of fraud is detected 
 
By No. of incidences  ______ % of number of fraud cases are detected 
 
3.4 How often do fraud prevention methods get reviewed? 
1. Quarterly 
2. Half yearly 
3. Annually 
4. Less frequently 
5. Continually 
6. After a fraud incidence 
7. Other (specify) ____________________________ 
8. Don’t know 
 
3.5 Who is responsible for carrying out the review? 
 1. C.E.O 
 2. Accountant 
 3. Internal Audit committee 
 4. External Auditors 
 5. Other (specify) _______________________________ 
 6. Don’t know 
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3.6 Can you quantify how much of the organisations annual turnover you think has been 
lost to fraud in the last financial year? 
 
 ______ %  
 
 
 
4) PERSONAL AND ORGANISATIONAL INFORMATION 
 
4.1 Which of the following best describes the operations of your institution? (Circle as 
appropriate) 
 
 1. Local Bank 
 2. National Bank 
 3. National subsidiary 
 4. International Bank 
5. International Subsidiary 
6. Other (specify) ___________________________________ 
 
4.2 What type of entity is your organisation? 
 1. Public Limited Company 
 2. Private Limited Company 
 3. Public Sector (Government) 
 4. Other (specify) ___________________________________  
 
4.3 How large is whole organisation based on number of employees? (Tick as 
appropriate) 
 
[ ] 0-100 [ ] 101-500 [ ] 501-1,000 [ ] 1,001-10,000 [ ] Over 10,000 
 
4.4 What role do you perform in the organisation? 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
 
4.5 How many years of experience do you possess? 
  
Years of overall accounting/auditing experience  
Years worked in present banking institution  
  
 
  
  
Thank you for taking your time to participate in this survey!!! 
 
Kindly return the completed questionnaire using the freepost self-addressed envelope 
provided. 
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III.B Interview Schedule 
1) How large is the audit/ fraud/security department? (no. of employees) 
 
2) How important are your external auditors in fraud detection? Why? 
  
3) Please nominate the type, value and perpetrator of the largest single fraud you 
can recall in the past five years 
 
  
Type of fraud  
Perpetrators   
Factors contributing to the fraud  
How was the fraud detected  
How much of the funds were recovered  
Was the matter reported to police  
How much did it cost to investigate the 
fraud 
 
What was the total loss incurred?  
 
4) Where fraud involved internal perpetrators could you provide details about the 
perpetrators 
 
Gender  
Age  
Position in employment  
Length of service within organisation 
prior to the fraud occurring 
 
Duration of service in current position at 
time of committing the fraud 
 
Motivation for the fraud  
Period of time elapsed before fraud was 
discovered 
 
Did internal perpetrator have a known 
history of dishonest conduct 
 
Did the person act alone, with internal 
or/and external collusion 
 
Did the perpetrator have a history of 
fraud? What type of prior fraud(s) had the 
perpetrator committed? 
 
What action was taken against the 
perpetrator (s)?  
 
Was the action an adequate deterrent?  
 
5) What did you learn from this incidence? 
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6) Has the incidence helped the organisation improve its’ fraud prevention and 
detection methods? 
7) What can be done to prevent this type of fraud occurring again? 
8) Do the banks share about their fraud experiences at industry level? 
9) What measures are banks putting in place jointly to reduce the incidence of fraud? 
10) Has the organisation had any fraud incident involving the misuse of 
computers/computer networks/online banking or organised criminal groups? 
11) Has internet banking increased your banks vulnerability to fraud?  
12) How has the bank protected itself by the use of fraud software and technology? 
13) Does the organisation have a budget for fraud?  
14) How much is the fraud budget as a percentage of the total budget? 
15)  Has this budget increased over the past five years?  
16) Are all employees educated on anti-fraud measures and policies? 
17) How are anti-fraud policies communicated to employees 
18) Are employees provided with training on how to implement the fraud policies? 
19) Which anti-fraud measures have been most effective in combating fraud? How? 
20) Does your bank have a code of ethics and are all the employees aware of it? 
21) Has the organisation experienced any unethical behaviour in the past 5 years? 
22) Who is responsible for developing an ethical culture in the organisation? 
23) What type of unethical behaviour has the organisation experienced on a regular 
basis in the past 5 years?  
24) What cultural and factors contribute to unethical behaviour in your organisation? 
25) Are you aware of certain types of frauds, existing in other countries, that could 
likely find their way into the Kenyan Financial Sector? 
26) What measures are being put in place to combat such emerging frauds before they 
hit the industry? 
27) What can be done to reduce fraud in the banking industry in Kenya? 
28) How do you enforce deterrence in a positive way? 
29)  In the process of fraud there are four main elements, namely: Prevention, 
detection, investigation and prosecution. Could you briefly discuss some of the 
challenges the organisation faces in these areas? 
 
 Prevention – 
 
 Detection –  
 
 Investigations – 
 
 Prosecution – 
 
30) General Comments 
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Appendix IV Sample Interview Outcomes 
 
INTERVIEW - ADAM (Participant No. 005) – National bank 
1) How large is the audit department (no. of employees) 
 The audit department consists of 4 people. We also have a compliance 
 department and it consists of 2 people. 
2) How important are your external auditors in fraud detection? Why? 
 Hmm..mm …. to some extent not so much really with external auditors 
 because basically they depend on internal audits. The reports that they review 
 are mainly done by internal auditors. They will possibly do some 
 recommendations but they never get to the ground. Basically what they are 
 looking for is potential loss to the institution for financial purposes….and that 
 is really what they do 
3) Please nominate the type, value and perpetrator of the largest single fraud you can 
recall in the past five years 
 
  
Type of fraud We have many frauds happening almost 
on a daily basis, just to mention - cheque 
issuance. Fraudulent cheques are passed 
on and are normally paid on the wrong 
accounts. On the compliance side there is 
a deterrence called Know Your Customer 
(KYC). However, we still find that 
cheques are intercepted through clearing 
or they are substituted with fake cheques. 
By the time you get the cheque, the 
cheque will be fraudulent, the good 
cheque would have gone elsewhere and 
the funds are gone. We have quite a 
number of these cases happening 
everyday. I will just mention about a case 
of a transfer which involved a cheque. 
This case happened offshore. We received 
a foreign cheque drawn on an overseas 
bank (a German Bank) and the cheque 
was drawn in Euros. As usual we don’t 
give immediate credit we normally send 
these cheques on collection basis to the 
paying bank, which we did. We got the 
credit later, an indicator that the cheque 
had been cleared offshore. We then 
proceeded to avail the funds to the payee. 
Three months later we got information 
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from Germany saying that the cheque we 
had paid was unpaid! We were informed 
that the cheque had been fraudulently 
obtained through a robbery in one of the 
countries but had filtered into Kenya, 
where someone was dishing out the 
cheques for payment of various facilities. 
In view of their laws in Germany we had 
no option but to take the hit. We got hold 
of the payee, who happened to be one of 
our customers’ customer and the case is 
still pending in court. It has taken us the 
last three years or so.  
Perpetrators  A customers’ customer. The perpetrator 
was paying for goods supplied by one of 
our customers, banking the same 
fraudulent cheque into the customers 
account. The customer was deemed to 
have received good funds. So the loss fell 
on the bank. There was no deposit clause 
for recourse to state what would happen 
if the cheque returned unpaid after funds 
had been availed. Today we on our 
deposits we have a clause for recourse 
such that in case the cheque returns 
unpaid the individuals account is debited 
Factors contributing to the fraud The fact that the fraud occurred outside 
the country made it difficult to for us to 
monitor it. Infact, the perpetrator had 
claimed to be an NGO in Uganda and he 
had been given a cheque as an NGO 
because he was setting up an office in 
Kenya! Apparently when the cheque was 
returned unpaid we were told that the 
office of the German Embassy in Uganda 
had been broken into in an incidence of 
robbery with violence (resulting in the 
death of a guard). The proceeds of the 
cheque were being used to purchase 
furniture and furnishings for the new 
office that was to be located in Kenya – 
which never happened to be. The German 
police came in to testify. Unfortunately 
there were fears of threats to the 
witnesses from Germany (as per 
Interpol). But finally they did come in and 
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testified. The original cheque was 
retained by the police in Germany for 
investigations and we are yet to hear 
from them as of date. So the case is still 
held up. 
How was the fraud detected The case of the stolen cheques had 
already been reported to the German 
police, but the paying bank was not 
aware. It is only in the process of the 
investigation that they realised one of the 
cheques had come through. 
How much of the funds were recovered Shs. 8 million – some of the goods  
purchased  with the fraudulent funds were 
traced, recovered and sold through a 
court action 
Was the matter reported to police Yes 
How much did it cost to investigate the 
fraud 
We have no cost on our side other than 
time taken up going to court and the Shs. 
3 million losses. The police are the ones 
who are investigating the fraud. We wrote 
off the fraudulent cheque amount within 
the year it occurred. If we ever get the 
money back we will write it back! 
What was the total loss incurred? The loss was 11 million Shillings. But the 
net loss was eventually 3 million. We 
have an insurance cover but in this case 
there was no insurance recovery as the 
fraud occurred outside Kenya. 
 
4) Where fraud involved internal perpetrators could you provide details about the 
perpetrators? 
 
Gender Male 
Age In mid 40’s 
Position in employment  
Length of service within organization 
prior to the fraud occurring 
 
Duration of service in current position at 
time of committing the fraud 
 
Motivation for the fraud The fact that he was associated with or 
dealing with a group of politicians (peer 
pressure) and he perhaps wanted to 
remain in their good books 
Period of time elapsed before fraud was 
discovered 
3 months 
Did internal perpetrator have a known  
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history of dishonest conduct 
Did the person act alone, with internal 
or/and external collusion 
Alone 
Did the perpetrator have a history of 
fraud? What type of prior fraud(s) had the 
perpetrator committed? 
Yes. We discovered that he had been 
involved in other fraudulent transactions 
(with part of the same series of 
fraudulently stolen cheques) with other 
local banks (Standard bank & National 
Bank) and a South African group. He had 
purchased furniture from a company 
called Supreme (from South Africa) and 
paid with one of the fraudulent cheques. 
At that time, the other local banks did not 
co-operate with our enquiries on this 
person and on those orders…they said 
they had nothing. It was only six months 
later they came crying saying “yes, we 
should have heard from you!” They were 
also hit and also suffered a loss because 
their cheques were also returned unpaid 
and it took them longer to recover their 
money. 
What action was taken against the 
perpetrator (s)?  
He was arrested and prosecuted 
Was the action an adequate deterrent? For foreign cheques we are bound by 
offshore regulations which are drawn 
according to the rules and regulations in 
other countries. So in Kenya if a cheque 
is 6 months old it is stale and cannot be 
drawn. But offshore they have 
regulations, in the USA of UK and the 
instruments can be drawn even after 1 
year and for correspondent banks could 
take for as long as they wish! So 
internationally am not sure if it is an 
adequate deterrent.  
 
However, locally, I can say that arresting 
a person and taking them to court is 
indeed a good deterrent. Because once 
you do that someone will start thinking 
twice unless he is a criminal…but no is 
born a criminal anyway, that is the much 
we know…but people just turn to one 
because of greed 
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Interviewer: Is he currently in prison or 
is he on bail. 
Interviewee: This is the other ironic part 
of it! I got him arrested in my office. 
When he was arrested he was taken to the 
police station and was locked in. I 
appreciate the way the police moved 
swiftly on that day of the arrest making it 
possible for us to retrieve all the goods - 
the furniture, bicycles, electronics, 
cameras, videos cameras that he had 
bought from this coming….because they 
moved the same night and picked all 
these things from the Western side where 
this person (politician) came from. 
Interestingly after the arrest the 
perpetrator was in custody for 3 months 
and was released on bail. After that the 
guy did not care any more. When he 
reports to court he comes with friends 
whom he says are his colleagues in the 
NGO. Him and the politician (our 
customer) do not seem interested or 
concerned about the case which has 
really dragged on with various reasons 
being given by the perpetrator and his 
lawyers for not having the case heard 
before the court. The guy is still running 
free 
 
Interviewer: Does that make you 
frustrated? 
Interviewee: Yah, actually you feel 
frustrated because you have got all the 
facts and you go to court….again I am 
talking about the judiciary…. You go 
there you are in there day in day out, for 
a year two years…you sometimes loose 
taste of it. Most of us have testified except 
our customer, who also doesn’t seem to 
be keen because he is not at a loss. He 
doesn’t seem to take a keen interest 
because every time they are bonded there 
is always an excuse. Initially we used to 
have the excuse with the lawyers of the 
culprit, the fraudsters lawyers… they 
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would never turn up in court, or it would 
be said he is in another court or he is 
sick….or this…until eventually the 
magistrate ruled that the case would 
proceed with or without lawyers. 
 
[Points of interest: The perpetrator was associated to some political leader (a former 
MP) and this was around the election campaign period in 2005. Towards the election 
is when these things happened. So apparently this money was being used for the 2007 
election campaign. One of the consignments had 60 bicycles – “Bodaboda” which 
was going to be dished for election purposes. When this person came he portrayed 
himself as a Professor/Lecturer at the Makerere University in Uganda. As he was 
introduced to the bank by the politician who was a customer we opened an account 
for him. He used to come every Monday morning and you will only see him in 
Nairobi and you will not see him until a week later as he claimed to be busy and 
could only come over the weekend.] 
 
5) What did you learn from this incidence? 
When you get a customer introduced to you, you must ensure that you find out 
more about the person. Because we did not know this person, we knew our 
customer who had banked a cheque in his account. But you see we eventually 
opened an account for him (fraudster) through our customer… but we didn’t 
know much about this customer. We learnt that we must know our customer and 
where to find them. Due diligence must be taken before we open an account. 
Customers must give something like a utility bill as proof of where you live or 
operate from (in case of a business). We also now carry out prompt or abrupt 
visits to the address  given by a customer. Every three months we visit business 
premises to avoid problems associated with ‘brief case’ businesses. 
 
6) Has the incidence helped the organization improve its’ fraud prevention and 
detection methods? 
Yes, we have improved our controls on account opening. 
 
7)  What can be done to prevent this type of fraud occurring again?  
Just KYC 
8) Do the banks share about their fraud experiences at industry level? 
Yes. Under the Kenya Bankers Association we have a Fraud and Securities 
Committee that meets every three months (or as and when is necessary when  an 
urgent matter arises). The committee has representatives from all banks and I happen 
to be a member of the committee. In the past banks used to be so rigid in trying to 
keep things to themselves…I don’t want you to know…I don’t want this bank to know 
what we are going through. But now it is an industry norm that if this person hits one 
bank today, tomorrow it will be  another bank. Apparently the perpetrator we are 
talking about had committed a similar crime in Standard Bank and another one in the 
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National Bank. So we realised had we shared the information this person would not 
have succeeded in opening an account.  
 
9) What measures are banks putting in place jointly to reduce the incidence of fraud? 
We have set up a database that acts like a reference bureau where banks can 
make reference to individuals who are blacklisted. We share information now 
openly. We also use the forum to criticise those who are not observing the KYC 
rule and paying attention to internal controls. We all want business, so you find 
banks are bending rules here and there, but we encourage each other not to do 
so. One of the key things we think will be a good deterrent in the industry is to 
have the paying bank confirm that the cheque is good. So the cheque is cleared by 
the paying bank first. If the cheque turns round to be fraudulent then the paying 
bank ends up being at a loss. However, the collecting bank must also be 
responsible and know the person you are giving the money. If this recourse is in 
place then both the paying and collecting bank are alert and seek to know their 
customer as the recourse would make them liable to repay the money within the 
period of one month. This would be a major deterrent when it will become 
effective. 
 
Unfortunately we have fake documents readily available to the public which 
fraudulent individuals can use to carry out identity fraud. When you walk around 
on some our streets you can get an ID. Or there is impersonation; somebody picks 
up your ID goes put his photo in it puts their picture in your Id and transacts with 
it…it is happening. 
 
10) Has the organization had any fraud incident involving the misuse of 
computers/computer networks/online banking or organized criminal groups? 
We have been reluctant to enter into internet banking but that is where the 
industry is moving and we cannot avoid going in the same direction. Very recently 
we launched an online service for our customers. Customers are given their 
internet profile and they have a password that is intended to protect them and 
provide privacy and security online. However, we have network hackers who get 
into the system, pick up information and do whatever they want.  
 
Interviewer: Any problem with organized criminal groups? 
Interviewee: No we have not had problems with organized criminal groups. We 
haven’t seen much of that. The only thing is that they may be organized…because 
what we have realised there are some people do absolutely nothing other than but 
to sit in some of the cafes in this country….they operate from cafes I tell you…and 
that is where they transact from. Maybe they are waiting for a cheque! Let’s 
assume there is an internal fraud facilitated by someone internally… he might 
take your signature for the person (fraudster) to practise and on so he can sign 
the cheque and pass it through 
 
12) Has internet banking increased your banks vulnerability to fraud?  
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For sure it has….We have not had any internet fraud activities. But we are 
definitely now more vulnerable to fraud. For example, we developed a certain 
product (NIC MOVE) which really hit the market and everyone now knew of our 
banks presence. That is the time we started getting the highest number of 
fraudulent cheque frauds. Some individuals opened up accounts with fake 
documents and contact details – and you will think this a company and these are 
their directors. We used to do a call back. But unfortunately the number reflected 
on the letter heads would be the number of the same fraudsters. 
 
13) How has the bank protected itself by the use of fraud software and technology? 
The challenge of trying to keep hackers off and arrest them is a difficult one. As a 
measure we have put up firewalls that you will be able to go to a certain level and 
you can’t proceed further. We have six months testing that you can’t access our 
systems or break in. The firewalls have different levels of access requiring 
different passwords. It increases the degree of difficulty in trying to access the 
system. We look at day to day transactions on the system to identify any 
anomalies through an audit.  
 
14) Does the organization have a budget for fraud? 
No, because it is not something we think would happen and it would happen once 
in a while. We have not really had significant levels of fraud to warrant a 
separate, distinct budget. The case I talked to you about was the one major case 
we have ever had. Most of the cases that occur occasionally involve small sums of 
money. 
15) How much is the fraud budget as a percentage of the total budget? 
16)  Has this budget increased over the past five years?  
17) Are all employees educated on anti-fraud measures and policies? 
We have a fraud policy which also includes the red-flags and I carry out training 
every six months for all staff. If there are new members of staff we also take them 
through the fraud policies. 
18) How are anti-fraud policies communicated to employees 
Our policy is on the company website and staffs are expected to read it. We also 
have handy folders that every staff member has and one can make reference to it. 
19) Are employees provided with training on how to implement the fraud policies? 
Yes, we carry out internal training. Personnel whose jobs directly relate to fraud 
prevention are taken to external courses (workshops and seminars)organized by 
the Central Bank, the Kenya Bankers Association and other private organizations. 
During the training case studies are given out so that the employees can relate 
with real life stories and issues in fraud. Such case studies are used to train the 
employees on detection of fraud and implementation of the policies. 
 
20) Which anti-fraud measures have been most effective in combating fraud? How? 
Training has been effective as well as internal audit. We also have call backs to 
payees when big cheques are presented to the bank. However, with time 
fraudsters come to learn what the limit requiring call backs is and they bring 
cheques that are below the callable level. 
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21) Does your bank have a code of ethics and are all the employees aware of it? 
Yes, we have a code of ethics and every employee must sign the code. Every 6 
months the HR department issues a form to all employees who are required to 
attest that they have re-read the code of ethics and sign. 
 
22) Has the organization experienced any unethical behaviour in the past 5 years? 
Yes, I have had two separate cases where staffs have taken money from customers 
with the intention of putting it into the customers account and it never happened. 
In one of the case the customer was repaying a loan and the loan became 
overdue. The customer when faced with repossession of their assets enquired and 
insisted that he had been paying in the money.. In the course of investigating it 
was found that the staff member had taken the money. The employee was 
dismissed. In the other case, a staff member took some money from a client in the 
pretext of writing down accrued charges on commission. All these incidences 
occurred 4 years ago and led to the code of ethics being signed continuously 
rather than just upon entry as in the past 
 
23) Who is responsible for developing an ethical culture in the organization? 
Director of Human Resources and all other Managers contribute to the ethical 
culture. New employees undergo a two weeks induction and it is then that they are 
made aware of the code of ethics and the all the policies. The employee is 
expected to familiarize themselves with all these. 
 
24) What type of unethical behaviour has the organization experienced on a regular 
basis in the past 5 years?  
25) What cultural factors contribute to unethical behaviour in your organization? 
No, there are no specific cultural issues that I can point out, but there are social 
factors that show up due to peer competition and pressure. You will find that 
there is an age group (20-30’s) that is particularly involved in fraud 
 
26) What do you perceive to be the implications of unethical behaviour on your 
business?  
27) Are you aware of certain types of frauds, existing in other countries, which could 
likely find their way into the Kenyan Financial Sector? 
 
Not really, because some of the more recent frauds like card fraud have reached 
Kenya. There were people with what we call “White cards” withdrawing a lot of 
money from ATMS’ here but apparently the clients are offshore. One of them used 
our ATM & was arrested. There was no complainant locally as the accounts were 
off-shore accounts. So the guy has ended up free. 
 
28) What measures are being put in place to combat such emerging frauds before they 
hit the industry? 
Kenya Bankers is assisting in developing fraud prevention measures that the 
industry can use. We can already see the effectiveness of the measure by the fall 
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in number of bank robberies. This is due to measures being given out to banks 
through the Kenya Bankers Association 
 
29) What can be done to reduce fraud in the banking industry in Kenya? 
30) What kind of compliance techniques do you use to ensure that fraud losses are 
minimized? 
We use limits and call backs to also check that there is compliance with bank rules. We 
have maker – checker distinctions. 
 
31) How do you monitor effectiveness and success of your security and fraud control 
measures? 
We look at the number of incidences that have occurred on a monthly basis to capture the 
trends in the numbers, nature and types of frauds 
 
32) How do you enforce deterrence in a positive way? 
The staff members first of all are well paid to encourage them not to get involved in 
fraud. We encourage anonymous whistle blowing and give monetary rewards to staff who 
help in preventing an attempted fraud or who give vital information that leads to the 
frustration of a fraud. Sometimes people come forward openly and say what is 
happening. If it happens to be true then they are rewarded. 
 
33) In the process of fraud there are four main elements, namely: Prevention, detection, 
investigation and prosecution. Could be briefly discuss some of the challenges the 
organization faces in these areas? 
 
Prevention – There is a problem with getting co-operation when looking for necessary 
and vital information that can help to prevent the occurrence of a fraud. 
 
Detection – Retrieving the documents that you need for evidence. Fortunately we have 
different people with different responsibilities. The person who keeps the cheques is 
different from the person who did the processing. Now unfortunately…so when you 
approach say the person who handles cheques and ask for a specific cheque, they assume 
you are following up a fraud, which may not be the case; I may want to see it for a 
different reason. Management support is essential in getting documentation 
 
Investigations – Mostly the crime is committed from elsewhere and it only filters to you 
as the paying bank. It is hard to investigate frauds (collusions or external) directly 
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without having to involve the police, Central Bank or the Court. It is a big drawback. 
Even other banks that are players in the industry are not very co-operative when it comes 
to investigation. Unless we agree … because there is a crime that has been committed 
over that account can you freeze that account or block that account until we settle this 
matter…that does not happen! Most of the cases will tend to be cheque frauds and it 
drags forever. 
 
Prosecution – Cases drag on for a very long time. Cases are just mentioned and you are 
told to wait for another date and that date is not tomorrow. The earliest I have seen is 
duration of 3 months. Especially when it comes to September – October you will not get a 
hearing in the current year because you will be told the diary is full.  
The other element of it is that you are dealing with a criminal and you do not know what 
this person is going to say about you out there in the streets. There is the threat to 
physical security (in that you can end up becoming a victim of the fraudster). 
 
33) General comments 
 
KYC is very important in fraud reduction and prevention for the industry. If we move 
liability to the collecting bank as opposed to the paying bank then there will be more 
diligence on part of the banks. As you receive a deposit into your customers account, you 
must know this customer is well known to me and if I was to produce them I would be 
able to. If there is fraud committed over this that account I will be able to get this person. 
But you will find because we all want money, we are rushing to win any type of 
account…we don’t even care about the documents, because at the end of the day we are 
looking at the bottom line – what are your profits at the end of the year, hoping all is 
going to be well! 
 
The other thing is the market place, the environment we are living in! We have so many 
of unemployed people. When they sit down they don’t think of anything positive other 
than how they can get money and how they can mug you. When they mug you they take 
your cheque book and tomorrow your cheque book is already withdrawing money in your 
account. These are the things that are in the society and if we can get these ones out, I 
think we will be in the right direction. 
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Appendix V – List of Interviewees 
Participant No. Pseudo (Code) Name Type of Bank 
001 Gabriel Regional 
002 Ruth Regional 
003 Moses International 
004 Joseph Local 
005 Adam National 
006 Joel Regional 
007 Joshua International 
008 Caleb Local 
009 Titus National 
010 Solomon Local 
011 David Regional 
012 Elijah International 
013 Jacob Local 
014 Abraham International 
015 Thomas Regional 
016 Simon International 
017 Paul Local 
 
